CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013200080001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
State Dept. review completed
Secret
5()`
6 March 1969
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No. 0056/69
6 March 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Berlin: The West German Federal Assembly meeting
passed without major harassment. (Page 5)
West Germany: Gustav Heinemann, the Social Demo-
cratic can idate, has been elected president.
(Page 6)
Eastern Europe - USSR: Moscow and its Eastern Eu-
ropean allies are trying to work out a common line
on intrabloc problems. (Page 7)
Yugoslavia: Soviet attendance at the Yugoslav Party
Congress remains in doubt. (Page 8)
Czechoslovakia: Defiant Czechoslovak writers are
not supporting reconciliation with invasion powers.
(Page 9)
Peru: The government plans to return all five US-
o ned vessels if the US asks for the return of a
destroyer. (Page 10)
Panama: The junta has decreed the "extinction" of
all political parties. (Page 11)
Iraq: An attack on a petroleum facility has severely
curtailed oil production. (Page 12)
Tunisia-Algeria: A new rift has developed between
the two countries. (Page 13)
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C South Vietnam: Six 122-mm. enemy rockets hit
Saigon yesterday, killing 22 civilians and wounding
43 others; the second shelling of Saigon since 1
March.
This latest enemy action is a calculated act of
defiance, probably intended to underscore Communist
insistence that they will not curb military activ-
ities without progress in the Paris talks. The Com-
munists clearly hope that sporadic attacks of this
sort, and such terrorist acts as the attempted as-
sassination yesterday of Prime Minister Huong, will
shake the South Vietnamese Government and produce
divisions on the allied side.
In view of the attempted assassination of the
prime minister and the repeated rocket attacks on
Saigon, many South Vietnamese leaders will probably
urge President Thieu to withdraw from the Paris talks
at least temporarily or to make some other demonstra-
tion of firmness against such provocations.
Few significant contacts with enemy ground
forces were reported on 5 March except for one pro-
longed clash with a North Vietnamese unit on the
western approaches to Saigon.
This action occurred in Hau Nghia Province when
an estimated battalion-sized force attempted to break
through US 25th Infantry Division positions. The
Communists were beaten back after taking heavy losses
in the ten-hour engagement. Prisoner reports and
constant harassing attacks in this sector had indi-
cated that the enemy would attempt to move major
forces toward Saigon via Hau Nghia.
Communist shellings and firefights in the west-
ern highlands of II Corps continued to gather momen-
tum on 5 March and were expanded to include civilian
as well as military targets. These attacks, coupled.3
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CIA/DIA AGREED ESTIMATES
OF ENEMY MILITARY-POLITICAL STRENGTHS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
As of 31 December 1968
MILITARY THREAT
Combat Forces
150,000 - 180,000
NVA
105,000 - 125,000*
VC MF/LF
Administrative Services
45,000 - 55,000
55,000 - 75,000
NVA
VC
10,000 - 20,000
45,000 - 55,000
60,000 - 100,000--
TOTAL MILITARY THREAT
265,000 - 355,000
OTHER IRREGULAR
ORGANIZATIONS
Self Defense Forces
80,000 120,000
Assault Youth
10,000 - 20,000
TOTAL
90,000 - 140,000
POLITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
80,000 - 100,000
*An estimated 20,000-25,000 of these NVA troops are serving in VC units. The estimate of NVA
combat forces excludes an estimated 28,000 troops, not representing an immediate threat, deployed
north of theDMZ
**The military threat represented by the Guerrilla forces is not on a parity with that of main and
local forces because probably only about one third of the guerrillas are well-armed, trained and
organized
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with several recent incidents involving rural pop-
ulation centers in III Corps and the delta, suggest
that the enemy may once again be making the allied
pacification program a major objective. Prior to
this, the program has been relatively unscathed by
the enemy's latest offensive, a development in sharp
contrast to the Tet offensive of 1968.
A CIA and DIA Working Group has recently con-
cluded a joint review of intelligence on the strength
of the VC/NVA military order of battle, other irreg-
ular organizations, and the political infrastructure.
The agreed CIA/DIA estimates of these forces as of
31 December 1968 are shown in the table.
The military order of battle or military threat
component of the agreed estimate includes NVA and
VC Main and Local Forces, Administrative Services
Forces, and Guerrillas. Their combined strength
as of 31 December 1968 is estimated at from 265,000-
355,000 troops.
The enemy has also organized many other elements
of the South Vietnamese population. These are not
part of the direct military threat, and CIA and DIA
have attempted to quantify only those elements judged
to perform some military support functions or to be
the principal target of allied pacification and secu-
rity programs. These groups include an estimated
90,000-140,000 persons in Self Defense and Assault
Youth organizations and an estimated 80,000-100,000
persons in the Political Infrastructure.
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Berlin: Yesterday's meeting of the West Ger-
man Federal Assembly in West. Berlin passed without
major harassment.
The East Germans twice closed the Berlin-
Helmstedt autobahn yesterday, once for three hours
and once for four hours. These were the longest
closures during the current imbroglio. For the
first time the other two major roads to West Ber-
lin were closed, also for four hours. US and Brit-
ish convoys experienced some delays. There was no
harassment of West Berlin itself, and access from
West Berlin to the Communist part of the city was
not impeded. According to West Berlin Mayor
Schuetz, this week's minor harassments have had
little effect upon the morale and confidence of the
city's inhabitants.
A Soviet diplomat in East Berlin, however, has
suggested that problems concerning access to West
Berlin may not be over. On 3 March the Soviet of-
ficial, who has accurately "predicted" East German
moves in the past, said that in the next six months
the East Germans will gradually impose restrictions
on the transport of industrial goods to and from
the city, "right down to the buttons" used on West.
German Army uniforms.
This statement may have been intended as a
follow-up to the Soviet note of 28 February in
which Moscow requested the East Germans to study
measures to cut off the flow of military goods al-?
legedly manufactured in West Berlin. Neither the
Soviet note nor subsequent East German statements
tied implementation of such measures to the presi--
dential election, thus leaving the door open
continuing them after the electors go home.
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West Germany: The effects of the election in
Berlin of Gustav Heinemann, the Social Democratic
Party candidate, as President of West Germany are
likely to carry over into next September's parlia-
mentary election period.
Heinemann, 69, is expected to provide a more
lustrous presence in the largely ceremonial office
when he takes over from
Heinrich Luebke, who retires on 30 June.
Heinemann, unlike Luebke, has never been accused of
collaboration with the Nazis, and therefore will
not provide as vulnerable a target for East German
propaganda.
Heinemann's slim margin of victory was pro-
vided by the small Free Democratic Party, which
threw its support to him, partly to keep open the
possibility of a governing coalition with the So-
cial Democrats in Bonn after the September elec-
tion.
Some Christian Democrats, unaccustomed to de-
feat in national contests, may view the results
sourly and feel justified in conducting an even
tougher political campaign next fall. Their de-
feated candidate, Defense Minister Gerhard Schroeder,
may make himself available once more for the chan-
cellorship--a post he has long wanted--?and resume
his role of intraparty rival to Chancellor Kiesinger.
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Eastern Europe - USSR: Moscow and its Eastern
European allies are trying to work out a common
line on several intrabloc problems before dealing
with the broader problems facing the Communist move-
ment.
Polish party chief Gomulka's visit to Moscow
on 3-4 March was the most. recent in a series of
top-level bilateral meetings. Earlier this year
East Germany's Ulbricht and Hungary's Kadar visited
the USSR, and other Eastern European leaders may
soon follow suit.
The bland Polish-Soviet communique and the
mention of "exchanged opinions" suggests that Mos-
cow solicited and advanced views on nagging prob-
lems of improving the organization and functioning
of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. The root issue, how-
ever, appears to be the degree of Moscow's control
and use of these organizations in applying the
principle of "limited sovereignty" in Eastern Eu-
rope.
Differences over specific proposals apparently
have delayed calling top-level multilateral economic
and Warsaw Pact meetings since late last year. Hun-
garian and Polish economic experts have taken part
in detailed talks in Moscow following the visits of
their party leaders, and a Rumanian economic dele-
gation arrived there on. 5 March. Latest reports
predict an economic summit meeting in Moscow in
late March or early April.
The USSR, through its bilateral talks with the
Eastern Europeans, probably hopes to resolve at
least some of the problems in advance of the oft-
postponed international Communist conference in
May in Moscow. There, the Soviet leaders evidently
hope to achieve at least a facade of Soviet-led
Communist unity and be in a better position to deal
with Peking and other schismatic parties.
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Yugoslavia: Attendance by the Soviet Union
and some of its like-minded allies at the Yugoslav
party congress remains in doubt,
Sixty delegations have accepted invitations
to the congress, which opens on 11 March, but Ru-
mania is the only Communist country to do so. Even
though Poland did not invite Yugoslavia to its con-
gress last November, Belgrade asked all ruling Com-
munist parties except China, Albania, North Korea,
North Vietnam, and Cuba.
The Yugoslavs also have invited representatives
from several social democratic parties including,
for the first time, the West German Social Demo-
cratic Party. The Germans have agreed to send three
high-level observers.
The number two man in the Yugoslav party,
Mijalko Todorovic, met with the Soviet ambassador
on 18 February and 1 March, but it is not known
whether they were able to find a compromise which
would allow Soviet participation. Moscow is dis-
turbed because the Yugoslavs have made it clear
that at the congress they will denounce the Soviet
intervention in Czechoslovakia and extol the de-
centralization inherent in Yugoslavia's "self-
management" policies. An article on 4 March in
Pravda stresses that "self-mana ement" undermines
tzeading role of the party.
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Czechoslovakia: Defiant Czechoslovak writers
are not supporting the regime's recent policy of
reconciliation with the invasion powers.
The progressive Czechoslovak writers' union
has boycotted a meeting of Soviet bloc writers
which opened yesterday in Budapest. The union says
it will accept contacts with its Soviet and East
European counterparts, but only on more equal terms.
The Czechoslovaks had earlier indicated that
there could be no rapprochement with Soviet writers
until Soviet publications apologized and retracted
attacks on their writers' union president Eduard
Goldstuecker, who is in exile. The writers, most
of whom still support Dubcek, may also be seeking
an end to the diatribes against the Prague leader-
ship carried by the Russian literary journals.
The Czechoslovak writers' union, which appears
to have been relatively inactive since the invasion,
is showing new signs of vitality. It will hold its
first federal writers' union congress on 12 April
in Bratislava. The congress is likely to be stormy,
with renewed demands by some liberals that the re-
gime abolish its present restrictions and restore
to the mass media the freedom of speech and expres-
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Peru: The government has tentatively decided.
that iif the US asks it to return the destroyer Ish-
erwood because of the recent fishing boat incident,
vall five US ships on loan will be sent back.
Peru now has two destroyers and three other
vessels on loan from the US, but only the Isherwood
could be subject to US legislation requiring the
recall of ships on loan to a country that seizes
US fishing boats.
The Peruvian Navy reportedly is pushing for the
purchase of ships from the United Kingdom to replace
those on loan from the US. In addition, a Lima news-
paper with considerable influence in the government
has called for the purchase of British destroyers
equipped with the Seacat naval surface-to-air mis-
sile.
Serious consideration will probably be given to
this proposal, particularly if the Isherwood is re-
called. The fact that Chile, Argentina, and Brazil.
already possess the Seacat would make a strong case
for the purchase, but in view of Peru's serious eco-
nomic problems, the large price tag would be a strop
argument against it.
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Panama: The junta government has officially..
decreed the "extinction" of all political parties,
pending revision of the electoral code governing
formation of new.-parties.
The initial decision to take this step was
announced by former national guard chief of staff
Martinez shortly before his expulsion by comman-
dant Torrijos. Figurehead junta leaders Pinilla
and Urrutia stated that the move was intended to
ensure that no one "gets advantage" in elections
promised.for the first half of 1970.
Details on the, nature of these elections have
not been disclosed and a prominent member of the
electoral tribunal says that the question of
whether to hold presidential. elections next year
is still being debated in government councils.
.Military and civilian elements are also re-
ported to be at odds over requirements for regis-_
tration of new parties. Guard leaders prefer a
higher minimum membership figure, but the politi-
cians argue that this might lead to the legal qual-
ification of only one party. This would presumably
not displease the guard, which seems bent on
forming its own Political or anization.
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Iraq: Damage to an Iraq Petroleum Company
(IPC) plant in northern Iraq has severely curtailed
the country's oil production.
The plant was hit by rocket or mortar fire on.
the night of 1 March. As a result, IPC states
Iraq's production has dropped from about 1.1 mil-
lion to only about 440 thousand barrels per day.
It will probably take two weeks before production.
begins to rise again and considerably longer be-
fore former levels are reached.
There is no information on the identity or
motives of those responsible for the sabotage.
The installation is located in Kurdish territory,
and it could have been attacked by Kurds as a pre-
lude to a renewal of o en revolt b the Kurds in
the spring .
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Tunisia-Algeria: A new rift apparently has
developed between the two countries, diminishing
hopes for harmony in the Maghreb.
Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika will not
make the official visit to Tunisia scheduled for
this month, according to a Tunisian official.
Bouteflika was to have signed the protocols ham-
mered out by a mixed Tunisian-Algerian commission
that met in Algiers in January. These protocols
concerned the export of Algerian crude oil through
Tunisia, and trade and financial accords.
The Tunisian official claims that Algeria not
only refuses to discuss border questions but is
unwilling to accept the findings of the National
Geographic Institute of Paris which studied all
aspects of the disputed border under a Tunisian-
Algerian agreement concluded last year.. Algeria
continues to insist that the present border be
maintained; Tunisia, in light of longstanding ter-
ritorial claims, cannot consider this.
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