CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A013300070002-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 28, 2003
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 19, 1969
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
C 196
19" March 1969
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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Laos: Souvanna has had second thoughts about a pro-
posed government counteroffensive. (Page 3)
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USSR-Israel: Moscow is again permitting a limited
number of Jews to emigrate to Israel. (Page 5)
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Laos
102
C H I N A
V I
BURMA
Nam
IKhang t..
XIEh ;
Plane des
t j Jarres 1
KHOUAi'J4
l
i f
I.
(% < /' -" V e n8i''a n e
11: D.,-.6- Lin.
Communist-controlled territory
Contested territory
? Communist-held location
2_r 75 100 Miles
0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers
94666 3-69 CIA I
102
C
r'P,oTtpyens
P ateau
Appr
`SOUTH
?VIETNAM
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Laos: Prime Minister Souvanna has had second
thoughts about a proposed government counteroffen-
sive in the northeast.
On the advice of Lao military leaders and US
advisers, Souvanna has withdrawn his endorsement
of Meo leader Vang Pao's ambitious plan to capture
a number of Communist positions near the Plaine des
Jarres in order to blunt the North Vietnamese "of-
fensive" in Xieng Khouang Province. Citing the
lack of resources to carry out such an undertaking,
Souvanna has asked Vang Pao to step up harassment
against the enemy with troops under his command,
while at the same time establishing a new defensive
line north of the Plaine des Jarres.
In addition to reflecting a relatively sober
appraisal of the military realities, Souvanna's
decision suggests that Lao fears concerning current
Communist objectives in the northeast have waned
somewhat in the two weeks since the fall of Na Khang.
The enemy's failure thus far to follow up with a
major effort against remaining government positions
in northern Xieng Khouang probably has been an im-
portant contributing factor.
I(Map)
19 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-Israel: Moscow is again permitting a
limited number of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel.
Jewish emigration was almost completely stopped
at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. The
flow has resumed in recent mon hs
the number permitted to leave
since the a as risen substantially, and that
recent emigrants have not been limited to hardship
cases and have included all ages and professions.
According to the latest figures available, the flow
returned late last fall to its pre-war levels of
about. 100-200 per month, but rose sharply to 231
for the first two weeks in January.
The USSR probably hopes that, by permitting
increased but still very limited emigration, it
can develop some leverage to encourage the Israelis
to take a more flexible attitude toward proposals
for a. Middle East settlement. The regime may also
see advantages in ridding itself of some potential
troublemakers.
Moscow's failure to publicize the liberaliza-
tion of its emigration policy undoubtedly results
from the desire to avoid damaging relations with
the Arab states. This nevertheless limits the
credit which it can expect to win. 7- 1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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