CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A013300070002-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 28, 2003
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 19, 1969
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A013300070002-5.pdf237.18 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01330TVfPret 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Top Secret C 196 19" March 1969 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300070002-5 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Approved or Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300070002-5 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS 25X1 Laos: Souvanna has had second thoughts about a pro- posed government counteroffensive. (Page 3) 25X1 USSR-Israel: Moscow is again permitting a limited number of Jews to emigrate to Israel. (Page 5) 25X1 Approved Fdr Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300070002-5I 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79TOO975AO13300070002-5 Laos 102 C H I N A V I BURMA Nam IKhang t.. XIEh ; Plane des t j Jarres 1 KHOUAi'J4 l i f I. (% < /' -" V e n8i''a n e 11: D.,-.6- Lin. Communist-controlled territory Contested territory ? Communist-held location 2_r 75 100 Miles 0 25 50 75 100 Kilometers 94666 3-69 CIA I 102 C r'P,oTtpyens P ateau Appr `SOUTH ?VIETNAM Approved or Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01 33 0070002-5 25X1 Laos: Prime Minister Souvanna has had second thoughts about a proposed government counteroffen- sive in the northeast. On the advice of Lao military leaders and US advisers, Souvanna has withdrawn his endorsement of Meo leader Vang Pao's ambitious plan to capture a number of Communist positions near the Plaine des Jarres in order to blunt the North Vietnamese "of- fensive" in Xieng Khouang Province. Citing the lack of resources to carry out such an undertaking, Souvanna has asked Vang Pao to step up harassment against the enemy with troops under his command, while at the same time establishing a new defensive line north of the Plaine des Jarres. In addition to reflecting a relatively sober appraisal of the military realities, Souvanna's decision suggests that Lao fears concerning current Communist objectives in the northeast have waned somewhat in the two weeks since the fall of Na Khang. The enemy's failure thus far to follow up with a major effort against remaining government positions in northern Xieng Khouang probably has been an im- portant contributing factor. I(Map) 19 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Approved USSR-Israel: Moscow is again permitting a limited number of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel. Jewish emigration was almost completely stopped at the time of the Arab-Israeli war in 1967. The flow has resumed in recent mon hs the number permitted to leave since the a as risen substantially, and that recent emigrants have not been limited to hardship cases and have included all ages and professions. According to the latest figures available, the flow returned late last fall to its pre-war levels of about. 100-200 per month, but rose sharply to 231 for the first two weeks in January. The USSR probably hopes that, by permitting increased but still very limited emigration, it can develop some leverage to encourage the Israelis to take a more flexible attitude toward proposals for a. Middle East settlement. The regime may also see advantages in ridding itself of some potential troublemakers. Moscow's failure to publicize the liberaliza- tion of its emigration policy undoubtedly results from the desire to avoid damaging relations with the Arab states. This nevertheless limits the credit which it can expect to win. 7- 1 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 Approved Igor Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO133000710002-5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO13300070002-5