CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013300100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
50
22 March 1969
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No. 0070/69
22 March 1969
Central intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China - Burma: Peking's endorsement of
Burmese Communist insurgency underscores poor re-
lations between the two countries. (Page 2)
Greece: There are growing signs of frustration
within the military government (Page 3)
Poland: The Poles may be planning fresh moves on
European security and aiming for improved relations
with the US. (Page 4)
East Germany - Berlin: A softer line (Page 5)
India: New army chief of staff (Page 5)
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"Da Nang
}Chu Lai
}Qui Nhon
zl-t- "IAM
`gANH
119 CORPS
CAMBODIA
NORTH
1VIETNAM
IV CORPS
SOUTH VIETNAM
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C South Vietnam: The upsurge in Communist mili-
tary activity which began on 21 March is likely to
persist during the weekend.
The new attacks have followed the pattern of
the ;past month's offensive. They generally con-
sisted of widespread shellings against allied in-
stallations, with only a few significant ground
attacks.
With a few exceptions, casualties and damage
in the latest actions have been light. Substantial
damage to allied aircraft was inflicted when enemy
rockets hit the Chu Lai air base, and Communist
sappers set fires at Qui Nhon which destroyed over
a million gallons of fuel. The three major popu-
lation centers of Saigon, Hue, and Da Nang were
not shelled during the latest attacks, but US
facilities near Da Nang received several ineffec-
tual rounds of rocket and mortar fire.
Additional Communist-initiated activity alo
these same lines is likely this weekend
t may well include sapper strikes in Saigon
nearby provinces. L
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Communist China - Burma: Peking's latest en-
dorsement of Burmese Communist insurgency under-
scores the dismal state of Sino-Burmese relations.
A Burmese Communist statement, issued by Peking
on 20 March and obviously Chinese-inspired, has de-
nounced the Burmese Government in the most violent
terms since the summer of 1967, when Sino-Burmese
relations sharply deteriorated.
The statement also suggests that China is in-
terjecting itself more forcefully into the contin-
uing leadership struggle within the Burmese party.
The denunciation of a number of long-standing Bur-
mese Communist leaders indicates that China is
taking sides in the dispute in an attempt to support
Leaders under Peking's thumb.
A Chinese press release, issued in conjunction
with the Burmese statement, underscored the identi-
fication between Peking and the Burmese party by
reporting a "recent" meeting between two Burmese
Communist leaders and Premier Chou En-lai.
Although Peking has been giving limited mate-
rial support to the Burmese Communists for over 18
months;; the party's capabilities for effective in-
surgency remain low. Burmese military operations
last year against the Communists, plus the factional
dispute within the Communist leadership, appear to
have broken the movement in central Burma--the
party's primary area of operation. The Communists
have more potential for fomenting trouble in north-
eastern Burma along the Chinese border where an
amalgam of ethnic and Communist insurgents has
more successfully challenged the government.
The Chinese, however, are obviously aware of
the present weaknesses of the Burmese Communists
and are probably unwilling to increase significantly
the material support they give them. The Burmese
party's statement of 20 March mentioned the "cer-
tain difficulties" ahead for the Burmese ty and
noted the need for "self-reliance."
22 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Greece: There are signs of growing frustra-
tion within the military government, but no seri-
ous challenge to its rule is evident.
The uneasiness within the regime has been
aroused by the government's inability to carry out
its much touted social programs and administrative
reforms. Premier Papadopoulos continues to have
difficulty in enlisting competent administrative
people.
The junta, nevertheless, remains firmly en-
trenched, and Papadopoulos is not likely to relin-
quish control by taking any major steps toward a
democratic government in the next year or so. Pop-
ular sentiment in favor of the government is no
better than lukewarm. The old political forces,
however, are still in disarray; the death of ex-
premier George Papandreou last fall left a leader-
ship gap which no leader now in Greece has been
able to fill.
Presently, the only recognizable potential
threat to Papadopoulos would appear to be in the
army, where some frustrations have been expressed,
but key military elements seem strongly in favor
of his continued rule.
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Poland: Consultations in Warsaw by Poland's
ambassador to Washington, Michalowski, suggest that
the Polish regime may be planning fresh moves on
European security as well as toward improved Polish-
US relations.
in addition to his regular consultations, Micha-
lowski has been received by the Chief of State, Spy-
chalski, and has held talks with party boss Gomulka.
Meetings between the party leader and Polish career
ambassadors are not unprecedented but are rare. Mi-
chalowski also reportedly plans to meet with Premier
Cyrankiewicz.
Michalowski had indicated to US officials be-
fore he left for Warsaw that Poland was working on
updating its European security proposals. This is
the principal topic he is likely to have discussed
with the leadership in Warsaw, and one he may wish
to raise on his return to Washington late this month.
In a conversation with US Embassy officers in War-
saw this week, Michalowski appeared relaxed and op-
timastic about the future of Polish-US relations.
Michalowski's activities further underscore
Warsaw's recent efforts to brush up its image, which
suffered first from the anti-Semitic aspects of last
year's intraparty struggle and later from Poland's
role in the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Michalowski's top-level reception at home sug-
gests also that he is at present in no political
danger. There had been reports that as a moderate
with a background of close cooperation with US of-
ticials, he might be one of several diplomats with
Jewish antecedents who were slated for eventual re-
moval.
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East Germany - Berlin: The East Germans appear
to be easing their approach to Berlin problems.
They have ceased obstructing Berlin traffic and ap-
parently have also made less onerous their proce-
dures for processing such traffic. The East German
interzonal trade negotiator has told his West Ger-
man counterpart that it is more important to look
toward the future than at past problems. According
to some West German officials, Pankow has indicated
a readiness to begin talks with the West Germans.
The East Germans may be adopting a soft line in an
effort to influence Bonn to enter into such dis-
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India: India's new army chief of staff, Lt.
General Manekshaw, is a tough-minded, combat-ex-
perienced officer who is noted for his apprehensions
about: the Chinese Communist military threat. Al-
though Manekshaw, as the senior lieutenant general,
was in line for the chief of staff post, his ap-
pointment was held up for two months because some
cabinet members were concerned about his flamboyant
individualism and his staunchly anti-Communist rep-
utation. Many remember his open fight in 1960-62
with Defense Minister Krishna Menon over the ade-
quacy of defense preparations along the China bor-
der. Manekshaw's efficient handling of tribal re-
bellions in eastern India may have tipped the scales
in his favor.
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Secret
Secret
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