CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
March 24, 1969
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1.pdf311.23 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01330g 10001-1 ecret 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret 50. 24 March 1969 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Approved For Release 2003/0:8DCP79T00975A013300110001-1 No. 0071/69 24 March 1969 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1) Rumania: Party and state chief Ceausescu has be- come supreme commander of the armed forces. (Page 2) Communist China - Japan: Trade agreement negotia- tions have bogged down over political issues. (Page 3) Indonesia: President Suharto is consolidating his control over the army. (Page 4) 25X1 Equatorial Guinea: Withdrawal of Spanish civil guard (Page 5) Approved For Release 2003/0P79T00975A013300110001-1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 SECRET Tonle Sap CAMBOD\A \/Y VINH LONG KIFN NORTH \ ~VIETNA PINII \ I JN C. LONG: KHANH QUING NAM /I rJ Q 3IANO TIN QUANG DUG 1 ~. PH LI OG TU 3' LONG III CORPS Capital Special Zone DUG / NINH THUAN i MILES AVERAGE STRENGTH OF ENEMY UNITS Battalion: VC 200-400 NVA 300-500 Regiment: VC 1,000-1,500 NVA 1,200-2,000 Division: VC 5,000-7,000 NVA 5,000-8,000 Approved For Release 200/4i4-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/C$}2CR] ' DP79T00975A013300110001-1 I South Vietnam: Fighting continued at a steady pace over the weekend with ground battles and Com-, munist shellings in all corps areas. Enemy attacks are featuring renewed emphasis on rural hamlets and refugee centers. The Commu- nists attacked a recently pacified hamlet in the delta on 21 March, killing 35 South Vietnamese and wounding 48 others. In I Corps and in the central highlands, sharp attacks were launched against a refugee holding area and several other hamlets. Some of these terrorist raids were conducted by main force units, a departure from past Commu- nist practice that usually left such attacks to local Viet Cong forces. Preliminary reports from II Corps indicate that the government's regional and popular force troops suffered, heavier casual- ties than either US or South Vietnamese regular units last week because of the enemy's increased emphasis on attacking rural hamlets. Saigon was disturbed by only minor exchanges of small-arms fire in surrounding Gia Dinh Province. Although allied operations appear to have temporar- ily set back enemy plans for attacks around the cap- ital area, there are continuing indications from prisoners and captured documents that. the Communists are planning another offensive surge in the near future. In addition, reports from I Corps men- tion enemy offensive plans that go well into April. The Communists launched several significant, ac- tions against allied installations in II Corps. Ac- cording to preliminary information, the heaviest dam- age occurred in Binh Dinh Province, where an attack on an ammunition depot resulted in 28 US wounded and the destruction of 359,000 artillery rounds. The en- emy maintained relatively moderate pressure on mili- tary installations in I Corps. Da Nang air base re- ceived ten 122-mm.. rockets, damage, but Hue was quiet. 24 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/i DP79T00975A013300110001-1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/O3 pI.C-11DP79T00975A013300110001-1 Rumania: Party and state chief Ceausescu has tightened his control of Rumanian military affairs by having himself named supreme commander of the armed forces. Ceausescu's new title derives from the parlia- ment's formal establishment on 13 March of the De- fense Council. The council has existed at least on paper since December 1967 but seemingly has been dormant. The parliament's action may have been de- signed to serve several aims. With the recent War- saw Pact summit meeting in mind, Bucharest probably intends to convey to its allies the impression that it is not neglecting military preparedness. At the same time, however, the law governing the council contains language with strong national- istic overtones. It refers, for example, both to the council's responsibilities in case of surprise attack and to the patriotic guards, a home militia created in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslo- vakia. Inasmuch as centralized control over the military and the patriotic guards is assured under the council, the Rumanians may be serving notice on their allies of at least the likelihood that they will resist any invasion. Creation of the council also introduces an ad- ditional legalistic impediment to any future approval of joint military maneuvers on Rumanian soil. The chain of command for such approval now embraces the party, state, and Defense Council each of which Ceausescu heads. 24 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0~ ffTDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Approved For Release 2003/0?)W1 _TDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Communist China - Japan: Negotiations in Pe- king to extend to trade agreement between the two countries have bogged down over political issues. After more than a month of talks, the Japanese and Chinese negotiators still are working out a comm-uniqu6 on political affairs. The deadlock probably stems from Peking's insistence that the Japanese delegation directly condemn the "anti- China policies" of the Sato government before prog- ress can be made in actual trade discussions. When the Chinese made the same demand during last year's trade talks, the impasse was broken by the Japanese expressing "deep understanding" of Pe- king's position. The Japanese delegation also agreed to Peking's "Three Political Principles," which, among other things, enjoin Japan from im- peding the normalization of diplomatic relations. The Sato government is under considerable pressure from domestic business interests to revive the semiofficial trade mechanism, which lapsed at the end of last year. The Japanese do not, however, expect Peking to agree to more than a one-year ex- tension of the agreement. Although an early settle- ment seems unlikely, the Japanese will probably ul- timately accede to some formulation in the commu- niqu6 that will satisfy Peking and permit the com- mercial phase of the talks to begin. Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/S1 RthAXRDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Approved For Release 2003/0fbJC& bP79T00975A013300110001-1 Indonesia: President Suharto is consolidating his control over the army, apparently in order to centralize government authority further. he wishes to restore primary military author- ity to the army general staff. In recent years, partly out of operational necessity, much authority has been assumed by regional commanders, particu- larly those in Java, and by Suharto's own personal military assistants. Suharto apparently sees cen- tralization as a means toward moving against army corruption and malpractices. With the anti-Communist security program well in hand, Suharto apparently sees a tightened army structure as a practical move both to increase his own political control and to achieve greater con- sistency in government administration. He is es- pecially interested in strengthening central direc- tion of the government's priority five-year eco- nomic development plan. Because the inefficient and inadequately trained bureaucracy is unable to administer many of the government's programs ade- quately, Suharto may plan to rely on army channels even more than previously. In recent months, both military and civilian elements had criticized the general staff's gradual absorption of power. This criticism has subsided, however, as it has become clear that Suharto him- self is firmly behind centralization. Military and civilian officials are also pleased that the move will undercut the power of some of Suharto's per- sonal advisers, whose interference in government they have bitterly resented. F_ I Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/0RI DP79T00975AO13300110001-1 Approved For Release 2003,%1W6Rf]4`RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 NOTES Equatorial Guinea: President Macias, in another abrupt switch, has rejected a moratorium on the with- drawal. of Spain's 260-man civil guard proposed by UN Secretary General Thant's representative. Macias is insisting on immediate evacuation, and Madrid, which recently had been considering acceptance of the mora- torium, reportedly has reverted to its earlier de- cision to withdraw the force. Removal of the guard, which has been an important factor in the country's tenuous stability, may lead to early new disturbances and a direct challenge to Macias' rule. 24 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 20033]RFfRDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Seclroved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1 Secret Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1