CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 24, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01330g 10001-1
ecret
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50.
24 March 1969
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/0:8DCP79T00975A013300110001-1
No. 0071/69
24 March 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Rumania: Party and state chief Ceausescu has be-
come supreme commander of the armed forces.
(Page 2)
Communist China - Japan: Trade agreement negotia-
tions have bogged down over political issues.
(Page 3)
Indonesia: President Suharto is consolidating his
control over the army. (Page 4)
25X1
Equatorial Guinea: Withdrawal of Spanish civil
guard (Page 5)
Approved For Release 2003/0P79T00975A013300110001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
SECRET
Tonle
Sap
CAMBOD\A
\/Y VINH
LONG
KIFN
NORTH \
~VIETNA
PINII
\ I JN C.
LONG:
KHANH
QUING NAM /I
rJ
Q 3IANO TIN
QUANG
DUG
1 ~.
PH LI OG
TU 3'
LONG III CORPS
Capital Special Zone
DUG / NINH
THUAN
i
MILES
AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Battalion: VC 200-400
NVA 300-500
Regiment: VC 1,000-1,500
NVA 1,200-2,000
Division: VC 5,000-7,000
NVA 5,000-8,000
Approved For Release 200/4i4-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/C$}2CR] ' DP79T00975A013300110001-1
I South Vietnam: Fighting continued at a steady
pace over the weekend with ground battles and Com-,
munist shellings in all corps areas.
Enemy attacks are featuring renewed emphasis
on rural hamlets and refugee centers. The Commu-
nists attacked a recently pacified hamlet in the
delta on 21 March, killing 35 South Vietnamese and
wounding 48 others. In I Corps and in the central
highlands, sharp attacks were launched against a
refugee holding area and several other hamlets.
Some of these terrorist raids were conducted
by main force units, a departure from past Commu-
nist practice that usually left such attacks to
local Viet Cong forces. Preliminary reports from
II Corps indicate that the government's regional
and popular force troops suffered, heavier casual-
ties than either US or South Vietnamese regular
units last week because of the enemy's increased
emphasis on attacking rural hamlets.
Saigon was disturbed by only minor exchanges
of small-arms fire in surrounding Gia Dinh Province.
Although allied operations appear to have temporar-
ily set back enemy plans for attacks around the cap-
ital area, there are continuing indications from
prisoners and captured documents that. the Communists
are planning another offensive surge in the near
future. In addition, reports from I Corps men-
tion enemy offensive plans that go well into April.
The Communists launched several significant, ac-
tions against allied installations in II Corps. Ac-
cording to preliminary information, the heaviest dam-
age occurred in Binh Dinh Province, where an attack
on an ammunition depot resulted in 28 US wounded and
the destruction of 359,000 artillery rounds. The en-
emy maintained relatively moderate pressure on mili-
tary installations in I Corps. Da Nang air base re-
ceived ten 122-mm.. rockets, damage, but
Hue was quiet.
24 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/i DP79T00975A013300110001-1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2003/O3 pI.C-11DP79T00975A013300110001-1
Rumania: Party and state chief Ceausescu has
tightened his control of Rumanian military affairs
by having himself named supreme commander of the
armed forces.
Ceausescu's new title derives from the parlia-
ment's formal establishment on 13 March of the De-
fense Council. The council has existed at least on
paper since December 1967 but seemingly has been
dormant. The parliament's action may have been de-
signed to serve several aims. With the recent War-
saw Pact summit meeting in mind, Bucharest probably
intends to convey to its allies the impression that
it is not neglecting military preparedness.
At the same time, however, the law governing
the council contains language with strong national-
istic overtones. It refers, for example, both to
the council's responsibilities in case of surprise
attack and to the patriotic guards, a home militia
created in the wake of the invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia. Inasmuch as centralized control over the
military and the patriotic guards is assured under
the council, the Rumanians may be serving notice on
their allies of at least the likelihood that they
will resist any invasion.
Creation of the council also introduces an ad-
ditional legalistic impediment to any future approval
of joint military maneuvers on Rumanian soil. The
chain of command for such approval now embraces the
party, state, and Defense Council each of which
Ceausescu heads.
24 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/0~ ffTDP79T00975A013300110001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/0?)W1 _TDP79T00975A013300110001-1
Communist China - Japan: Negotiations in Pe-
king to extend to trade agreement between the two
countries have bogged down over political issues.
After more than a month of talks, the Japanese
and Chinese negotiators still are working out a
comm-uniqu6 on political affairs. The deadlock
probably stems from Peking's insistence that the
Japanese delegation directly condemn the "anti-
China policies" of the Sato government before prog-
ress can be made in actual trade discussions.
When the Chinese made the same demand during
last year's trade talks, the impasse was broken by
the Japanese expressing "deep understanding" of Pe-
king's position. The Japanese delegation also
agreed to Peking's "Three Political Principles,"
which, among other things, enjoin Japan from im-
peding the normalization of diplomatic relations.
The Sato government is under considerable
pressure from domestic business interests to revive
the semiofficial trade mechanism, which lapsed at
the end of last year. The Japanese do not, however,
expect Peking to agree to more than a one-year ex-
tension of the agreement. Although an early settle-
ment seems unlikely, the Japanese will probably ul-
timately accede to some formulation in the commu-
niqu6 that will satisfy Peking and permit the com-
mercial phase of the talks to begin.
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/S1 RthAXRDP79T00975A013300110001-1
 Approved For Release 2003/0fbJC& bP79T00975A013300110001-1
Indonesia: President Suharto is consolidating
his control over the army, apparently in order to
centralize government authority further.
he wishes to restore primary military author-
ity to the army general staff. In recent years,
partly out of operational necessity, much authority
has been assumed by regional commanders, particu-
larly those in Java, and by Suharto's own personal
military assistants. Suharto apparently sees cen-
tralization as a means toward moving against army
corruption and malpractices.
With the anti-Communist security program well
in hand, Suharto apparently sees a tightened army
structure as a practical move both to increase his
own political control and to achieve greater con-
sistency in government administration. He is es-
pecially interested in strengthening central direc-
tion of the government's priority five-year eco-
nomic development plan. Because the inefficient
and inadequately trained bureaucracy is unable to
administer many of the government's programs ade-
quately, Suharto may plan to rely on army channels
even more than previously.
In recent months, both military and civilian
elements had criticized the general staff's gradual
absorption of power. This criticism has subsided,
however, as it has become clear that Suharto him-
self is firmly behind centralization. Military and
civilian officials are also pleased that the move
will undercut the power of some of Suharto's per-
sonal advisers, whose interference in government
they have bitterly resented. F_ I
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/0RI DP79T00975AO13300110001-1
 Approved For Release 2003,%1W6Rf]4`RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
NOTES
Equatorial Guinea: President Macias, in another
abrupt switch, has rejected a moratorium on the with-
drawal. of Spain's 260-man civil guard proposed by UN
Secretary General Thant's representative. Macias is
insisting on immediate evacuation, and Madrid, which
recently had been considering acceptance of the mora-
torium, reportedly has reverted to its earlier de-
cision to withdraw the force. Removal of the guard,
which has been an important factor in the country's
tenuous stability, may lead to early new disturbances
and a direct challenge to Macias' rule.
24 Mar 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 20033]RFfRDP79T00975A013300110001-1
 Seclroved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP79T00975A013300110001-1