CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Publication Date:
May 9, 1969
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
D
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
50
9 May 1969
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No. 0111/69
9 May 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR: The chief political officer of the armed forces
has reaffirmed party supremacy over the military.
(Page 3)
USSR: Moscow has moved toward ratifying the NPT, but
still links final action to West German adherence.
(Page 5)
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West Germany: Pressure to revalue the deutschemark
increased sharply yesterday. (Page 7)
Europe: The Council of Europe may find it difficult
to avoid a decision in December on continued Greek
membership. (Page 8)
Lebanon: Clashes between the army and the fedayeen
are becoming more frequent. (Page 9)
East Germany - Cambodia: The two countries established
full diplomatic relations yesterday. (Page 10)
Nationalist China: Chiang Kai-shek has decided to
permit some streamlining of the armed forces. (Page 11)
Turkey: Religious reaction raises the prospect of
increasing violence in the coming parliamentary elec-
tion campaign. (Page 12)
Finland-Europe: European security conference (Page 13)
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C Vietnam: The Communists' new ten-point program
announced on 8 May appears designed to capture some
of the propaganda initiative lost as a result of
South Vietnamese President Thieu's initiative in
March.
The program restates basic objectives, but with
a hint of flexibility. Communist goals still appear
to be the unilateral withdrawal of US forces and the
replacement of the present government of South Viet-
nam with a coalition government which the Communists
will be able to control.
There is a hint, however, in the new program
that the Communists might be considering a call for
a cease-fire before a political settlement has been
worked out. This is the strongest such hint to date
from the Communists. The new proposal also used
vague language which may be intended to leave room
for cooperation with Saigon in a coalition arrange-
ment.
The new statement, however, cuts directly across
allied insistence that troop withdrawals must be
mutual. The new phrasing insists that US withdrawals
must be unconditional and unilateral, and hints that
any discussion of North Vietnamese withdrawals--if
they are to be discussed at all--will be negotiated
only by the "Vietnamese sides."
Saigon and Hue were hit by terrorist attacks
on 8 May, although military action throughout most
of the country remained at a low level.
In the capital's worst rash of terrorism this
year, five South Vietnamese were killed and nearly
50 others, including six Americans, were wounded on
7-8 May. Two bombs were set off in the central
post office located several blocks from the US
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[Embassy. There were four other incidents involving
the use of grenades or hidden explosives against US
and South Vietnamese cars and trucks.
Hue received eight rounds of 122-mm. rocket fire
on 8 May. Three civilians were killed and two others
wounded, including one American. This was the first
such attack in almost two months and was directed
against the section of town that contains most govern-
ment activities.
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USSR: The chief political officer of the So-
viet armed forces has strongly reaffirmed party
supremacy over the military.
The text of an article by General Yepishev in
the most recent issue of the party's foremost jour-
nal, Kommunist, has just been received in Washing-
ton. Yepishev is the head of the Chief Political
Directorate of the Army and Navy, and as such is
the ranking officer of the apparatus responsible
for the political indoctrination of the armed forces.
His article, which was available in Moscow nearly
two weeks ago, received extensive comment, and was
misrepresented in important respects in some Western
press accounts.
The Yepishev piece does not, as some of these
accounts have alleged, revive the doctrine, discarded
in the Khrushchev years, that war between the cap-
italist and Communist world is "inevitable." It
does remind that such wars are "possible" and that
"if the imperialists nevertheless succeed in un-
leashing" a third world war the Communist side would
win.
Although this does not contradict the Khrushchev
line, it does shift the emphasis. The Khrushchev po-
sition was susceptible to the interpretation that,
in Moscow's view, war was not only undesirable but
unthinkable. Even before Khrushchev's overthrow,
it was evident that the political and military lead-
ership was not comfortable with this position. As a
theoretical base for political indoctrination and
strategic planning, it had the effect of undermining
the raison d'etre of the Soviet armed forces.
Yepishev also reaffirms the validity of Lenin's
doctrine, borrowed from Clausewitz, that war is the
continuation of politics by other means. This dogma,
too, had lost favor in Khrushchev's last years. Its
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revival is not new with Yepishev, however, but be-
gan soon after Khrushchev's overthrow.
Using the approaching Lenin centennial as a
springboard for a discussion of morale and disci-
pline in the armed forces, Yepishev underscores the
supremacy of the party across the whole spectrum of
military affairs. The party is to have the last
word on military doctrine and on the allocation of
resources between civilian and military claimants
and within the armed forces themselves. At the
same time, Yepishev's reiteration of the traditional
line that men and their morale are as decisive an
element in war as equipment reads as a call for an
even more intensive indoctrination of military per-
sonnel. Neither point is likely to win the profes-
sional soldiers' favor.
There is nothing in the text or in the circum-
stances of the article's appearance to indicate that
Yepishev is responding to a challenge from the mil-
itary. The vigor of his restatement of traditional
principles concerning army-party relations may mean,
however, that the Soviet authorities believe that
the "political consciousness" of the military could
stand improving.
The high mortality rate recently among senior
members of the Soviet military establishment prob-
ably has little if any political significance. Al-
though nine general officers have died during the
past two weeks, eight others did so during a simi-
lar period in late January - early February.
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USSR: Moscow has taken a step toward ratifying
the nonproliferation treaty (NPT), but continues to
link final action to West German adherence.}
CFirst Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told
Ambassador Beam yesterday that the Soviet Government
had decided to approve the treaty and to place it
before the Supreme Soviet for ratification. He
stipulated, however, that "completion of the process"
will "greatly depend" on accession to the treaty by
countries potentially capable of producing nuclear
weapons, especially West Germany. Kuznetsov did not
reply directly to the US proposal that Moscow and
Washington simultaneously complete ratification in
order to encourage other states to act
Kuznetsov again made clear that Moscow looks
to the -US to bring West Germany along. He had argued
in Washington last month that the US had assured the
Soviets, when the NPT was in preparation.- that West
Germany "would be a party" to the treaty.)
he Soviets--who could ratify in a matter of
minutes if they chose--gave no indication of how
long their tactical delay of the final act of rati-
fication might last. Poland and Czechoslovakia have
now ratified, and the Soviets may be disinclined to
hold back indefinitelI
There are obvious disadvantages to Moscow in
continuing to mark time while encouraging others to
move rapidly. The Soviets are nonetheless inhibited
by Bonn's inaction, and disturbed by Bonn's efforts
to seek a political price from Moscow for West Ger-
man signature. Bonn is expected to hold off until
after the national elections next September.V-
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West Germany: cpr_ssure to revalue the deutsche-
mark (DM) increased sharply yesterday as speculative
money flooded into West Germany.
The Bundesbank bought about $1.24 billion in
foreign exchange, surpassing by almost $400 million
the peak daily volume during the monetary crisis of
last November. The bank's efforts to send substan-
tial amounts of these funds back out of the country
have been generally unsuccessful because of the con-
viction of the international fina cial community
that a DM revaluation is imminent
Although the rush toward the DM has entailed
a flig-fit from virtually every currency, including
the US dollar, the dollar has remained basically
strong. The absence of any immediate threat to the
dollar is evident in the relatively sluggish activ-
ity in Europe's ajor gold markets, where Zx-ices
continued stable.
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Europe: The Council of Europe may find it dif-
ficult to avoi a decision at its next - meeting in
December on continued Greek membersh
The council's committee of ministers adopted
a resolution on 6 May expressing "anxiety" over the
Greek situation and recognizing the need for Athens'
return to democracy. The resolution, which supported
a recommendation by the Consultative Assembly in Jan-
uary, further stated that the assembly's recommenda-
tion will be brought to the attention of the Greek
Government so that it may "draw the necessary con-
The resolution states that the committee of
ministers is "ready to take a decision" on the Greek
membership issue at its next meeting in December.
The committee apparently hopes to have in its hands
by that time a report on the Greek situation by the
Commission of Human Rjy, hts to serve as a partial
basis for the decision.\
The present Greek regime is not likely either
to make significant reforms or to withdraw volun-
tarily from the Council of Europe between now and
December. Athens' course of action, however, de-
pends at least partially on its own assessment of
the likelihood of Greece's being ex elle from the
council
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Lebanon: Clashes between the Lebanese Army
and the fedayeen are increasing in tempo and in-
tensity, as the political crisis remains unresolved.
As the army increases its efforts to contain
the e ayeen, a number of clashes have taken place.
The latest series of such incidents, which began on
4 May, has pitted the army against Saiqah, the
Syrian backed organization. Thus far, seven com-
mandos and two soldiers have been killed
Lebanese troops in general are reported in-
creasingly angry over fedayeen attacks on their
units. One military commander in central southern
Lebanon has on his own moved his troops from posi-
tions along the Lebanese-Israeli border to other
positions from which they could better face the
fedayeen entering Lebanon from Syria
Yesterday Fatah leader Yasir Arafat and Presi-
dent Nasir's personal representative, Sabri al-
Khuli, who is apparently delivering a message to
the Lebanese Government, met with fedayeen leaders
in Beirut They also held discussions with Presi-
dent Hi MU.
Lebanon remains without a cabinet, as Hilu is
apparently unable to find a Muslim political leader
willing to form a new government. The main stumbling
block is the demand by Rashid Karami and other
leading candidates that there must be a national
consensus on fedayeen policy. The political crisis
may th efore continue unresoly for some time to
com
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East Germany - Cambodia: Pankow scored another
diplomatic success yesterday when relations with
Cambodia were elevated to the ambassadorial level.
The action followed by eight days an Iraqi
agreement to recognize East Germany. The East Ger-
mans presumably will now try to exploit these deci-
sions to persuade other third world countries to
follow suit. Statements issued in East Berlin and
Phnom Penh suggest that the Cambodians were belatedly
"rewarding" East Germany for recognizing Cambodia's
borders.
West Germany will regard the Cambodian action
with concern. In an attempt to prevent a possible
chain reaction of recognitions, Bonn probably will
declare Phnom Penh's move "an unfriendly act" and
may go so far as to break diplomatic relations and
terminate further commitments under its modest aid
program. Bonn had allotted Cambodia $6 million,
as of December 1968.
In the Sudan, the :Leftist foreign minister an-
nounced on 5 May that he was resurrecting an earlier
proposal to establish relations with East Germany.
His statement appears to have been a reaction on
his part to a move in the Sudanese Constituent As-
sembly to re-establish relations with the US and
West Germany, rather than the product of an over-
ture at this time from Pankow.
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Nationalist China: President Chiang Kai-shek
has apparently decided to permit -.gme streamlining
of Taiwan's oversized armed forces
The Generalissimo's son, Defense Minister Chiang
Ching-kuo, has informed the US ambassador that "pre-
liminary actions" have been taken on a three-phase
program to cut back and reorganize the present
590,000-man armed forces. The defense minister said
that the first phase, to begin in July, would cut
about 53,000 men from the army; he did not elaborate
on the nature or timing of the other phases.
Chiang Ching-kuo emphasized that the changes
would not reduce combat effectiveness, an apparent
reminder that significant troop cuts depend on US
willingness to provide modern arms and equipment.
Recent US agreement: to proceed with the first
phase of a joint helicopter production project pro-
vides Chiang Ching-kuo with added leverage to en-
sure that the streamlining program is supported at
the top level of the government, particularly by
the army leadership
President Chiang and many other Nationalist
officials have opposed force reduction in the past
because they believed such a move would be inter-
preted as an abandonment of the regime's traditional
goal of returning to the mainland and thereby un-
dermine the legitimacy of Kuomintang rule on Taiwan.
Growing economic pressures, however, apparently have
forced the regime to accept the need for reorganiza-
tion of its expensive military establishment.\
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Turkey: Religious reaction has again surfaced
In Turkey, raising the prospect of increasing vio-
lence during the approaching parliamentary election
campaign.
A relatively minor incident during the funeral
of a public official noted for his liberal religious
views has been seized upon by the political opposi-
,-ion to attack the Justice Party government headed
by Prime Minister Demirel. A censure motion in
parliament against the government was easily beaten,
but the lines have been sharply drawn.
A major demonstration in Ankara protesting the
funeral incident, and the resultant charges and
countercharges by key political figures, have drama-
tized one of the most profound issues in modern
Turkish society: the place of religion in society
=ind the de-emphasis accorded the Muslim religion
during the Ataturk reform period.
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1VOTES
Finland-Europe: Helsinki has informed all
European governments, the US, and Canada that it
is willing to host a European security conference
and a preparatory session. The Finnish Government
maintains that its action has not been prompted by
any other state, but its proposal will no doubt be
welcomed by Moscow. The idea of a security confer-
_ A '1 t' f the Nor-
'
d
at t.e pri mee ing
ence was discusse
dic foreign ministers, but the Finns offered no
proposals at that time. The Finnish note suggests
discussions among the governments concerned to de-
termine if the essential preconditions for a con-
ference exist. There is reason to believe that the
Finnish Government thinks that Helsinki is not
likely to be the site of any eventual conference
because of the lack of facilities.
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