CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A013800050001-3
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RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
15
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
January 23, 2004
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 26, 1969
Content Type:
REPORT
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50r
26 May 1969
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0125/69
26 May 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: The struggle for party control will
continue at the plenum this week. (Page 4)
International Communist Conference: Soviet intran-
sigence will probably bring dissents from the Ruma-
nians and Italians. (Page 5)
Communist China - USSR: Peking has issued a lengthy
proposal to negotiate border problems. (Page 6)
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Bolivia: Despite gains this week, President Siles'
position still depends on military chief Ovando.
(Page 8)
Venezuela: Student demonstrations may resume today.
(Page 9 )
Hungary: Budapest will start talks about joining
GATT. (Page 10)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Soviet economic delegation
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C South Vietnam: President Thieu on 25 May suc-
cessfully launched his new National Social Democratic
Front (NSDF).
In an address to the inaugural meeting of the
NSDF, Thieu emphasized that the new front is not
designed to monopolize patriotism or to seek dicta-
torial power. The door is open, Thieu stated, for
others to join the NSDF or to form opposition
groupings, and he called for those who wished to
participate in the anti-Communist struggle but who
differed with the policies of the NSDF to organize
themselves.
Appearing on stage with Thieu, who is President
of the Council of Chairmen, were the leaders of the
six parties which now constitute the NSDF: Ha Thuc
Ky, leader of the Revolutionary Dai Viets; Senator
Nguyen Gia Hien, chairman of the Greater Solidarity
Force; Truong Cong Cuu, Nhan Xa chairman; Vu Hong
Khanh, representing a faction of the VNQDD; Trinh
Quoc Khanh, chairman of the (Hoa Hao) Social Demo-
cratic Party, and Nguyen Van Huong, chairman of the
Lien Minh.
Thieu still has a long way to go before the
NSDF becomes a functioning national political or-
ganization, and he may even doubt that it will ever
amount to much more than a vehicle by which various
political factions in South Vietnam can be provided
a feeling of participation in the government process.
A hint of what Thieu probably sees as the basic or-
ganizations for the struggle against the Communists
came in his reference to "other important anti-Commu-
nist elements" such as the army, the civil service,
and the government administration. He noted that
the NSDF "will cooperate" with these forces to
vanquish the Communists.
(continued)
26 May 69
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day Ninti, a~u
AN I CORPS
XUY?N i
1. Quw Nhan
ETON PHU
YEN 1
SOUTH VIETNAM
I
140
MILES
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C Scattered but fairly stiff ground clashes ac-
counted for most of the action over the past several
days. The Communists were particularly active in
the central highlands, where on 23 May they attacked
a variety of targets, including the Ben Het Special
Forces Camp, several South Vietnamese Army units and
several hamlets. In addition, Communist forces at-
tacked a paramilitary outpost guarding a bridge on
Route 14 in Kontum Province, making the bridge im-
passible.
Enemy casualties were heavy in the engagements
in the highlands and in III Corps, where US and South
Vietnamese forces teamed up to kill 96 enemy troops
in Binh Long Province. ARVN units lost 34 killed
and 69 wounded, however, when they were attacked some
12 miles north of the Long Khanh provincial capital.
In a series of clashes in the delta, the Communists
lost a reported 211 killed compared to allied cas-
ualties of 18 killed and 58 wounded.
26 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Czechoslovakia: The central committee plenum
scheduled for 29 May is shaping up as an important
encounter in the struggle between conservatives and
moderates for control of the party.
National party first secretary Husak--in office
for little more than a month--is fighting to gain
control of the party and to point it along an in-
ternally moderate and pro-Soviet course. He is
being challenged by conservatives, led by Czech
first secretary Strougal, who are now on the of-
fensive. The conservatives wish to return to an
orthodox style of Communist rule.
The Soviets, by denying Husak public support,
are not making it any easier for the new leader.
Moscow, for example, reportedly rejected Husak's
bid for a visit before the plenum.
There have been a number of skirmishes in the
struggle, largely involving the editorial staffs
of various publications with a liberal bent. The
conservatives seem to have won most of these, which
have been limited to the Czech lands. Strougal's
most important victory to date was the purge of
liberals from the party organization of the impor-
tant industrial region based in Ostrava. Other
liberal regional party bodies are under attack,
as is the Prague city committee.
Rumors are rife about imminent sweeping purges
of the army, the Czech (as distinct from Slovak)
government, and the Foreign Ministry, as well as
in the party and among the press. Such rumors are
exaggerated because neither Husak nor Strougal has
sufficient control over the party or over the press
at this point to turn his attention elsewhere.
26 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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International Communist Conference: The Ru-
manian and Italian delegations would probably regis-
ter dissents at the international Communist confer-
ence in Moscow next month if the Soviets are intran-
sigent on the most controversial issues.
The Rumanians have made it clear that they will
continue to object to the principal document that
will be presented. In a communique issued after a
one-day party plenum on 21 May, Bucharest announced
that party leader Ceausescu will lead the delegation.
Rumanian representatives--apparently to both the
current preparatory talks under way in Moscow and
the conference on 5 June--have a "mandate" to ex-
press Rumania's point of view and to work for the
improvement of the conference document.
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Communist China - USSR: Peking's proposal to
negotiate border demarcation problems with Moscow
is intended to portray China's reasonableness and
undermine Moscow's position in the dispute.
The timing of the announcement suggests that
the Chinese might be trying to embarrass the Soviets
on the eve of the world Communist conference.
Peking made a lengthy statement on 24 May re-
sponding to an earlier Soviet offer to reopen talks
that had failed in 1964. The Soviet offer,,. made on
29 March, was contentiously worded and obviously
made for propaganda purposes. The Chinese reply
is in the same spirit.
The Chinese statement repeats long-standing
demands that Moscow recognize the treaties estab-
lishing the frontiers as "unequal treaties." Pe-
king certainly expects Moscow to reject this con-
dition since the Soviets have consistently refused
to give the Chinese an opening which would legiti-
mize China's claims to Soviet territory. After the
military clashes last March, Peking stated that the
1964 border talks had foundered on this same issue.
The Chinese probably hope that a Soviet rejection
of Chinese terms will make Moscow appear to be the
insincere party in the dispute.
Moscow has been using the border problems in-
ter alia to influence Communist attitudes against
the Chinese in preparation for the world Communist
conference. By ostensibly demonstrating a willing-
ness to negotiate at this time the Chinese ma ho e
to undercut the Soviet effort.
26 May 69
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Bolivia: President Siles has made some politi-
cal gains in recent weeks, but his position still
depends on his shaky alliance with armed forces com-
mander in Chief Ovando.
A number of observers believe that Siles' search
for popularity has led him to blatantly demagogic
posturing that could cause him serious problems in
coming months. Since he assumed the presidency af-
ter Barrientos' death last month, for example, Siles
has held out exaggerated hopes to students, teachers,
and miners and has made no effort to check criticism
of a contract with a US-owned company to build a
pipeline to Argentina.
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C Venezuela: Student disturbances may resume
today in Caracas.
The city was relatively quiet during the week-
end, but students are poised for further action.
Large-scale violence could erupt if a Communist
student leader wounded on 22 May should die.
Venezuelan authorities have expressed concern
over demonstrations that have occurred elsewhere in
the country. In Maracaibo, at least 30 students
were arrested on Thursday, and the army may have to
b
l
e ca
led in to assist the national guard, which is
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Huunga~~~~__r__y~: Budapest, according to a Hungarian
foreigne official, will initiate preliminary
discussion next month with the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), with a view toward
eventual accession.
Hungary's interest in talks with GATT at this
time probably is designed largely to obtain nondis-
criminatory treatment for its exports to the Common
Market. To enhance Budapest's case, the official
claimed that as a result of economic reforms in-
troduced in January 1968, Hungary's foreign trade
system is comparable to that of the GATT member
states, and that Budapest is therefore eligible for
membership.
The official added, however, that Hungary is
in no hurry to join GATT. He claimed Hungary would
not be in a position to negotiate tariff concessions
.with GATT members for two or three years because
Hungarian companies have been granted tariff exemp-
tions during this period by the Budapest government.
The Hungarians are aware that US legislation
currently prohibits extension of most-favored-nation
treatment, but they nevertheless are seeking US sup-
port for their case before GATT. Although Budapest
realizes that the US would be required to invoke a
GATT waiver clause prohibiting the US from granting
most-favored-nation treatment, the Hungarians cal-
culate that any indication of US support would be
helpful.
26 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-Czechoslovakia: Soviet Deputy Premier
Baybakov heads an economic delegation that went to
Prague on 23 May for talks with Czechoslovak lead-
ers. The Czechoslovak news agency has said that
Baybakov will discuss the further development of
economic cooperation and the coordination of bilat-
eral economic plans. Although Soviet economic aid
may also be discussed, the USSR probably will take
a hard look at Husak's over-all performance before
deciding on credits for Prague.
26 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Secret
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