CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A013800090001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 31, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secv,
31 May 1969
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3.1
No. 0130/69
31 May 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
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Israel-Jordan: Military action along the cease-fire
lines will probably intensify. (Page 5)
Middle East: A US-owned pipeline has been blown up in
Israeli-occupied Syria. (Page 7)
Malaysia: Security is returning to normal, but
emergency government is expected to continue. (Page 8)
Argentina: General strike has seriously impaired
image of the Ongania government. (Page 10)
Cuba: Castro has acknowledged that this year's
sugarcane harvest is faring badly. (Page 11)
Peru: The Communist labor federation is gaining. (Page 12)
Burma: Withdrawal of support by militiamen may fur-
ther weaken government on Chinese border. (Page 13)
Indonesia-Australia: Border incidents in New Guinea
continue. Page 14)
USSR: A period of intense politicking over agricul-
tural policy may be in the offing. (Page 15)
Nordic Economic Union: The movement toward Scandi-
navian economic integration has slowed. (Page 17)
Arab States: Possible demonstrations (Page 18)
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AVERAGE STRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Demilitarized Zone
Regiment: VC 1,000-1,500
N V A 1,200-2,000
;ji)17_'z7
SE4
SOUTH VIETNAM
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~go
MILES
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E South Vietnam: Military activity resumed
throughout South Vietnam on 31 May following the
Buddha's birthday standdown periods observed by
Communist and allied forces.
During the 24-hour allied period, a total of
79 major and 68 minor enemy violations were recorded
with many of these taking place in I and III corps.
Most of the incidents consisted of small-unit skir-
mishes and encounters with reconnaissance patrols.
The most significant fighting that developed during
the holiday period was a battle eight miles south-
west of Dak To where South Vietnamese troops engaged
a well-dug-in enemy force estimated to be larger
than a battalion. No friendly or enemy casualties
have been reported as the contact continues.
With an eye to President Thieu's forthcoming
meeting with President Nixon on 8 June, South Viet-
nam and South Korea have taken a strong stand for
hard-line allied policies across the board in nego-
tiating with the Communists.
A joint communique wrapping up Thieu's four-day
visit to South Korea gave only lukewarm endorsement
to President Nixon's recent peace initiatives and
reaffirmed that the 1966 Manila Conference statement
remains the basis of the allied position. The com-
munique` advises against any early de-escalation of
allied military operations in South Vietnam by say-
ing that both military and diplomatic efforts should
be continued until a lasting peace is secured.
Presidents Thieu and Pak took an especially
tough stand on the matter of troop withdrawls and
did not acknowledge Saigon's earlier assertions that
some US forces could be replaced by South Vietnamese
troops by the end of 1969. The communique says that
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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C "any withdrawal" of allied forces should be subject
to full allied consultations. It also declares
flatly that in the absence of corresponding action
by the Communists, unilateral withdrawal "of even
a part of allied troops" would prejudice the se-
curity of the remaining allied forces. This seems
to reflect concern not only with the negotiations,
but also with the pros ect of US steps to "Vietnam-
ize" the war.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 2
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Israel-Jordan:
LJthe situation in the Jordan Valley is be-
coming dangerously warm."
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There is no clear indication as to what action
the Israelis intend to take. They have already re-
taliated with air strikes, artillery barrages, and
last week a ground operation across the border. An
Israeli military spokesman, however, told the press
recently that "we've been treating the Jordanians
with kid gloves so far."
King Husayn, like Nasir, probably believes he
must focus world attention on the border in order
to put pressure on the Big Four powers to step up
their deliberations. He may also be trying to com-
bat what appears to the Arabs to be a tendency to
treat the cease-fire lines as permanent borders.
Husayn has recently expressed deep concern over Is-
rael's settlements in former Jordanian territory
and over Israeli fortifications along the Jordan
River. Repeated Israeli public statements to the
effect that, short of an acceptable peace settle-
ment, the Israelis intend to stay put also are a
continuing source of frustration.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Tapline Blown Up in Israeli-Occupied Syria
Tyre"
Israelis attempting to prevent oil spill
from polluting irr)gated area --
l,--Dan' Baniy~ias
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J O R:,.D A N
WEST BANK
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HEIGHT 7
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Trans Ara ian
Pipeline ( apline
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C Middle East: Last night the US-owned pipe-
line carrying oil from Saudi Arabia to the Mediter-
ranean was blown up in Israeli-occupied Syria.
Saboteurs, presumably Arab fedayeen, blew up
the 36-inch pipe near the town of Baniyas, allow-
ing the oil to flow down toward Hula, Israel's
largest irrigated area and the headwaters of the
Jordan River. Israeli authorities are attempting
to close an emergency pipe valve, while bulldozing
dams to contain the oil spill. The oil flows by
gravity at the rate of 18,000 gallons per minute
and could cause massive pollution of Israel's water
resources if not checked.
The incident will raise serious political and
diplomatic problems for both the Trans Arabian Pipe-
line Company (Tapline) and the countries through
which it passes. Other Arab states may censure
those countries which have benefitted financially
from oil passing through Israeli-occupied Arab
territory. Israel may feel that now it has a good
excuse to cut the flow of premium Arab oil to the
Mediterranean, especially since its own pipeline
bypassing the closed Suez Canal is scheduled for
completion late this year.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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Malaysia: The security situation is returning
to normal, but Malay officials expect a long period
of emergency government,
Although communal tensions remain high, only
isolated cases of arson and shooting are being re-
ported, mostly in Kuala Lumpur. Curfews have been
largely suspended during daylight hours but are ex-
pected to remain in force at night for some time in
formerly troubled areas.
Chinese opposition leaders seem inclined, for
the time being at least, to restrain their followers
from retaliating against Malay excesses. The Chinese
community, however, is bitter and resentful. Most
Chinese are convinced that the initial rioting on
13 May was either organized in advance by local
Malay officials or could have been averted by them.
The Chinese fear, moreover, that the Malay lead-
ers intend to perpetuate present government emer-
gency powers. This fear and resentment, if not
eased by Malay concessions, will heighten the dan-
ger of further communal violence and open the way
for the growth of Communist influence in the Chi-
nese community.
Meanwhile, Malay exultation at having bested
the Chinese has given way to fears of Chinese re-
taliation. The more chauvinistic Malay elements
are in the ascendancy, and there is growing pres-
sure for greater political solidarity along racial
lines.
Most Malay leaders, as well as the rank and
file, seem to be in accord with the need to shelve
Prime Minister Rahman, whose policies of compromise
with the Chinese are regarded as largely responsible
for the Alliance's setback in the election of 10 May.
(continued)
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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The dominant figures in the emergency regime,
Deputy Prime Minister Razak and Home Minister Ismail,
have said that they expect the all-powerful National
Operations Council to remain in control for at least
six months.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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I Argentina: Yesterday's 24-hour general strike
joined by students has seriously impaired the thor-
oughly progressive image of the Ongania government.
The strike, held to protest the government's
labor policies and its alleged use of excessive
force to suppress student demonstrations since 15
May, was successful despite the government's attempts
to head it off. These measures had included issuing
a ban on the strike; authorizing the establishment
of military courts to try persons accused of a wide
variety of crimes affecting national security; and
placing military forces at the disposition of pro-
vincial governors where required.
The strike actually began at noon on 29 May
when workers in the industrial center of Cordoba
left their jobs and marched on the center of the
city. Police gunfire killed at least three workers,
and some of the other marchers began burning stores
and sniping at police. The sniping continued even
after military forces took control of the city to
restore order; one soldier was killed and several
wounded.
Elsewhere the strike itself apparently took
place without major violence. Nearly all unions
took part; this was the first important example of
joint action by two major union blocs since the
split in the National Labor Confederation in 1967.
The collaboration of workers and students may be
an additional sign of future problems awaiting the
government. While the Ongania administration has
the power to control the unrest, it may be forced
to adopt a much more authoritarian stance which
could seriously impair its reasonably progressive
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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Cuba: Fidel Castro has acknowledged that this
year's sugarcane harvest is faring badly.
Castro referred to the harvest as "the agony
of this country" in a speech on 26 May. He admitted
that with the harvest 85 percent complete, sugar
production amounted to only 4.28 million metric tons.
Total production probably will not exceed 4.7 mil-
lion tons, compared with 5.2 million tons in 1968.
Castro attributed this year's poor performance
to sharply reduced milling yields, organizational
problems, the lack of skilled technicians, and dif-
ficulties caused by the extensive preparations being
made for the 10-million ton harvest scheduled for
next year.
The 10-million ton crop in 1970 is more im-
probable than ever in light of this year's harvest.
Although supplies of cane and milling capacity may
be sufficient to reach this goal, there is little
prospect that Cuba will be able to marshal enough
men and machinery to harvest the requisite amount
of cane. Cuba's capacity to harvest cane apparently
is not much higher than in 1967, when 6.1 million
tons of sugar were produced.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Peru: The Communist national labor federation
is magi g gains at the expense of the APRA federa-
tion, which has long dominated the Peruvian labor
scene.
Julio Cruzado, secretary general of the APRA
labor federation, blames its decline on lack of sup-
port from individual APRA union leaders, the subor-
dination of the federation's activities to the par-
ty's political considerations, and internal disputes.
He specifically criticized those APRA labor leaders
who have attacked as a "sell-out" the federation's
posture of "accommodation" toward the military gov-
ernment.
The Communist labor federation is making ad-
vances in the mining, metal, and sugar industries,
particularly in unions at US-owned enterprises.
Some observers believe that the government will
soon be forced to grant it official recognition.
31 May 6 9 Central Intelligence Bulletin 12
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Burma: The government's position in insurgent
areas a ng the Chinese border may have been further
weakened.
About 3,000 of up to 10,000 ethnic minority
militiamen in northeast Burma withdrew their coop-
eration from the Burmese Army this week 25X1
eir
action apparently was -spurred by a government crack-
down on smuggling and black marketeering in the area
and by demoralization from heavy casualties in re-
cent heavy fighting with Chinese Communist - backed
insurgents.
The militia are former non-Communist insurgents
who in late 1967 agreed to assist the Burmese Army's
anti-Communist operations in return for the govern-
ment's turning a blind eye to their opium-running
and smuggling. Dissension between Burmese Army
units and these forces reportedly has been increas-
ing for some months.
The Burmese Army, which has found its efforts
in northeast Burma complicated by difficult terrain
populated by hostile minorities, has relied heavily
on these armed tribesmen in the border area. The
government's recent abandonment of a border strip
to Communist insurgents may have been partially
prompted by the undependability of some militia
units. For the time being, the tribesmen appear
simply to have withdrawn their support from the gov-
ernment without renewing active insurgency. 25X1
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 13
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Indonesia-Australia: Indonesian forces are
intermittently pursuing West Irian dissidents across
the border into Australian Papuan New Guinea, dis-
pite Djakarta's assurances that such border cross-
ings would cease.
Both governments are giving increased attention
to the border area since an incident in late April
when Indonesian troops--attempting to dislodge sus-
pected West Irian dissidents from a border camp--
crossed into Australian territory and fired on Aus-
tralian forces. Approximately six incidents have
been reported since then.
Indonesian concern over the possibility of
anti-Indonesian operations being carried out from
Australian territory is apparently not without some
foundation.
continued
border incidents can be expected throughout the sum-
mer as Djakarta carries out the act of free choice
in West Irian. Australia and Indonesia will seek
to improve cooperation on border problems and to
prevent them from Jeopardizin g their good relations.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 14
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USSR: A new period of intense and more open
politicking among the top leaders over agricultural
policy may be in the offing.
In an unusual public stand, politburo member
Voronov has lent his full personal support to the
controversial "link" approach to organizing farm
labor. Voronov, who is also premier of the Russian
Republic (RSFSR), defended the long-debated link
system in a recent newspaper interview. No member
of the politburo has commented so vigorously in pub-
lic on a controversial issue since late 1967, when
Polyansky spoke out in an effort to prevent further
cuts in agricultural investments.
Essentially the link is a small mechanized
team of workers assigned for an extended period of
time to a particular section of the farm. The link
is responsible for the entire production cycle and
is paid on the basis of the final results. This
contrasts with the system now predominant in the
USSR, under which peasants are organized into brig-
ades based on the type of work performed and are
paid primarily on a piece-work basis.
Official supporters argue that the link approach
has distinct advantages in terms of both efficiency
and output. Conservatives, however, oppose the sys-
tem on ideological grounds. They fear that it will
foster private property instincts and fragment cen-
tral control. Efforts to promote variations of the
link system, dating back to Stalin's day, have all
foundered on this conservative resistance.
In March, however, supporters of the link sys-
tem won a victory when the RSFSR passed a decree ap-
proving the system in principle. The decree called
for widespread experimentation to prepare for the
conversion of all the farms in the RSFSR to the sys-
tem. In addition, the newly published draft of a
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 15
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Soviet collective farm charter endorses the link as
one of the accepted forms of labor organization.
Voronov's defense of the link now, however, may mean
that some of his politburo colleagues still have
serious misgivings.
Both sides in the debate appear to be overstat-
ing the economic and administrative importance of
the link system. If indeed there have been suc-
cesses, they stem in part from favored treatment in
the form of the best equipment and manpower. Fears
of the conservatives that the state's control over
agriculture will be weakened seem unfounded as long
as the state controls prices and the allocation of
scarce inputs such as fertilizer and machinery.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 16
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Nordic Economic Union: The movement building
up early this year for a Nordic Economic Union (NOR-
DEC) of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden seems
to have lost momentum.
From the outset the NORDEC scheme encountered
stiff resistance in all four countries from economic
interests unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices.
Now many of these interests, especially in Norway and
Denmark, are arguing that De Gaulle's resignation
has opened up new prospects for European integration
to which any plan for Nordic integration would be
detrimental. Some Scandinavian officials believe
that only limited Nordic integration could be
achieved in the face of such resistance. They con-
cede that the recommendations of the experts for a
NORDEC treaty, due on 15 July, will be loaded with
withdrawal and termination clauses.
Swedish leaders, the most active in selling the
NORDEC idea, have met privately with the Finns and,
also, with the Norwegians since De Gaulle's resigna-
tion. The Swedes apparently fear that Denmark and
Norway will enter the Economic Communities and leave
Sweden out in the cold. To make NORDEC more attrac-
tive to the other Scandinavian countries, Stockholm
has expressed its willingness to increase the Swed-
ish contribution to the proposed Nordic economic ad-
justment funds.
The concept of Nordic integration still has
wide popular support in Scandinavia. The Nordic
governments can, therefore, be expected to tempor-
ize on NORDEC, at least until after the Norwegian
and Finnish parliamentary elections in September
1969 and March 1970 res ectively.
31 May 69 Central intelligence Bulletin
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Arab States: There may be demonstrations in
various Arab capitals next week on the second an-,
niversary of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. In
Libya, security forces in the eastern province have
been placed on alert, all leaves have been canceled,
and troops guarding official buildings have been
strengthened. The Libyan Government is taking
these measures to prevent a recurrence of the dem-
onstrations in June 1967 which caused serious dam-
age to US and other Western installations. These
measures may, however, be strictly precautionary,
since on several previous occasions rumored demon-
strations have failed to materialize.
31 May 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 18
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