CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080002-6
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
April 28, 2005
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 27, 1969
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080002-6.pdf | 144.96 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2005/05/12: CIA-RDP79T00975A
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
- 11 19
27 June 1969
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Laos: Government troops are still holding on at
Muong Soui but their position has worsened. (Page 2)
Pakistan-Belgium: Sale of tanks (Page 8)
Peru: Plantation seizures (Page 8)
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C Laos: Government forces are still holding on
at Muong Soui, but the end appears near.
A fresh Communist ground attack--once again
with the support of tanks--in the early hours of
27 June further reduced the base's defensive peri-
l
arge
meter and resulted in the desertion of
Lao military leaders must choose soon whether
to give up Muong Soui or bring in new reinforcements.
The inability of government troops to re-establish
a viable defensive perimeter and the doubtful morale
of the remaining defenders suggests that the situa-
tion will be difficult to salvage if the Communists
nnntinue to press their attack.
The loss of Muong Soui would have little im-
mediate effect on the military situation in Xieng
Khouang Province. Although some Lao aircraft have
staged from the Muong Soui airstrip, the base itself
and the large neutralist garrison there have con-
tributed relatively little to either the defense of
the Plaine des Jarres or to the government's guer-
rilla bases farther north. If the Communists hold
Muong Soui, however, they will be in a better posi-
tion to move westward and re-establish their pres-
ence in northern Vientiane Province, from which
they were driven several years ago.
The psychological impact of the fall of Muong
Soui would be more severe. In addition to raising
new alarms about Communist military intentions, the
attack will deflate the recently raised hopes ofhLao
leaders that Hanoi might be more i-n Laos.
27 Jun 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Pakistan-Belgium: The two countries have re-
newed their agreement in principle for the sale of
US-manuf M-47 medium tanks to Pakistan,
Agreement had been reached in u y 1958
but a parliamentary uproar over Belgian shipment of
arms to Biafra forced postponement of the deal.
Pakistan recently concluded an agreement for the
purchase of M-47s from Turkey but none
have yet been shipped. oth agreements, however, are
sub?ect to final US approval.. Pakistan wants these
tanks to replace worn out M-47s already
in its inventory.
C Peru: The Velasco government began the imple-
mentation of its agrarian reform program yesterday
by taking over the eight largest sugar plantations
in the country, including those of the US-owned W.
R. Grace & Co. Government administrators were sent
to the plantations and the Lima business offices,
and considerable sums were frozen in the companies'
bank accounts. Moving against foreign-owned lands
first was probably calculated to generate nation-
alistic support for Velasco and the land reforms in
an effort to counter the expected opposition from
wealthy Peruvian land owners.
27 Jun 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
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