CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080002-6
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 28, 2005
Sequence Number: 
2
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 27, 1969
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080002-6.pdf144.96 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/05/12: CIA-RDP79T00975A DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Top Secret - 11 19 27 June 1969 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080002-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 Approved For Re ease 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014000080002-6 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS Laos: Government troops are still holding on at Muong Soui but their position has worsened. (Page 2) Pakistan-Belgium: Sale of tanks (Page 8) Peru: Plantation seizures (Page 8) 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For R4lease 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0140p0080002-6 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 25X1 Approved For P,,elease 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 C Laos: Government forces are still holding on at Muong Soui, but the end appears near. A fresh Communist ground attack--once again with the support of tanks--in the early hours of 27 June further reduced the base's defensive peri- l arge meter and resulted in the desertion of Lao military leaders must choose soon whether to give up Muong Soui or bring in new reinforcements. The inability of government troops to re-establish a viable defensive perimeter and the doubtful morale of the remaining defenders suggests that the situa- tion will be difficult to salvage if the Communists nnntinue to press their attack. The loss of Muong Soui would have little im- mediate effect on the military situation in Xieng Khouang Province. Although some Lao aircraft have staged from the Muong Soui airstrip, the base itself and the large neutralist garrison there have con- tributed relatively little to either the defense of the Plaine des Jarres or to the government's guer- rilla bases farther north. If the Communists hold Muong Soui, however, they will be in a better posi- tion to move westward and re-establish their pres- ence in northern Vientiane Province, from which they were driven several years ago. The psychological impact of the fall of Muong Soui would be more severe. In addition to raising new alarms about Communist military intentions, the attack will deflate the recently raised hopes ofhLao leaders that Hanoi might be more i-n Laos. 27 Jun 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Releaso 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0140g0080002-6 25X1 25X1 25X6 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6 Approved For 25X1 25X1 Pakistan-Belgium: The two countries have re- newed their agreement in principle for the sale of US-manuf M-47 medium tanks to Pakistan, Agreement had been reached in u y 1958 but a parliamentary uproar over Belgian shipment of arms to Biafra forced postponement of the deal. Pakistan recently concluded an agreement for the purchase of M-47s from Turkey but none have yet been shipped. oth agreements, however, are sub?ect to final US approval.. Pakistan wants these tanks to replace worn out M-47s already in its inventory. C Peru: The Velasco government began the imple- mentation of its agrarian reform program yesterday by taking over the eight largest sugar plantations in the country, including those of the US-owned W. R. Grace & Co. Government administrators were sent to the plantations and the Lima business offices, and considerable sums were frozen in the companies' bank accounts. Moving against foreign-owned lands first was probably calculated to generate nation- alistic support for Velasco and the land reforms in an effort to counter the expected opposition from wealthy Peruvian land owners. 27 Jun 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 8 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000p80002-6 Approved Fo Top Secret Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14000080002-6