CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014100030001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review completed
Secret
.- 5 o
7 July 1969
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No. 0161/69
7 July 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
USSR-Romania: The Soviet leaders have apparently
put off their projected trip to Romania. (Page 3)
Ital : A realignment of political forces is under way.
Page 4)
Burma: Prospects for bringing civilians into the
military regime continue to recede. (Page 5)
Indonesia: The Indonesian Communist Party is making
efforts to reorganize, but so far no real progress
has been made. (Page 6)
Kenya: The assassination of Tom Mboya does not al-
ter the immediate political equation, but could
threaten long-range stability. (Page 8)
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Can 1no?-,
SOUTH VIETNAM
Igo
MILES
NORTH
nVtETNAM
SECRET
Demilitarized Zone
JIc
AVERACESTRENGTH
OF ENEMY UNITS
Battalion:
VC
200 400
NVA
300 500
Regiment:
VC
1,0001,500
NVA
1,2002,000
Division
VC
5,000 7,000
NVA
5,0008,000
id CORPS
Vung Tau
Capita{ Specie{ Zone
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Vietnam: Communist forces stepped up shelling
attacks in--the III and IV corps areas over the week-
end, interrupting a lull in enemy-initiated activity
that had held for about two weeks.
Some 40 mortar and rocket barrages were reported
during the night of 5-6 July, about half of which
resulted in light casualties and damages to allied
bases and towns. Two rockets impacted harmlessly
in Saigon. Ground fighting remained generally light
and scattered in all corps areas, continuing a trend
set late in June.
The Communist shellings probably signal the
start of the enem 's July campaign, forecast
I las the final and most intense
pnase o e over-all summer offensive. The current
partially disengaged posture of the enemy's main
force, however, suggests that the July campaign will
be a limited phase of attacks similar to those in
May and June.'
A number of sources have reported Communist
plans to take some new political initiatives in con-
junction with upcoming attacks. One prisoner from
the northern delta said that his unit's mission is
to ensure that a shadow regime, presumably the Pro-
visional Revolutionary Government (PRG), will "emerge"
during the offensive. Although he gave no specifics,
the prisoner apparently was referring to some plan
for popularizing the PRG locally throughout the coun-
try.
In at least one province, Tay Ninh, the Commu-
nists are not counting on propaganda alone, but in-
tend to put teeth into their claims to political
power by launching additional attacks against urban
areas. The enemy also appears to be trying to get
another round of terrorist attacks going in Saigon,
despite the difficulties in organizing such opera-
tions in the past.
(continued)
. Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Xuan Thuy's airport news conference following
his return to Paris on 5 July offered no clues of
upcoming Communist moves at the Paris talks. Hanoi's
chief negotiator stuck to standard Communist formu-
lations in his statements. He dodged queries about
the reduced level of fighting and the cut-back in
North Vietnamese troop infiltration. Thuy said that
such questions concerning events in South Vietnam
should be addressed to the PRG.
Thuy had been absent from Paris for about six
weeks. He touched base with Chou En-lai in Peking
and Premier Kosygin in Moscow during his return trip.
(Map)
7 Jul 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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USSR-Romania: The Soviet leaders apparently
have put off their projected trip to Romania in re-
action to the President's visit.
Although there has been no authoritative state-
ment on the matter, some minor Soviet officials are
saying that the Soviet leaders will not now be visit-
ing Romania to sign a new friendship treaty. A So-
viet Embassy counselor in Bucharest hinted that the
Romanians might have to travel to Moscow for the
signing of the treaty. The editor of a Soviet weekly
denied to a US Embassy officer in Moscow on 4 July
that the Soviet leaders would be going to Romania
in the near future, adding the spurious claim that
stories about the trip had only been speculation
coming from non-Soviet sources.
Romanian officials are noncommittal on the
prospects for the treaty-signing. In contrast to
earlier remarks, First Deputy Foreign Minister Maco-
vescu contended on 4 July that nothing had been de-
cided on the visit by the Soviets.
Further Soviet countermoves to the Presidential
trip are probably still under review in Moscow.
Among indications of this have been the failure of
the Soviet ambassador to return to Bucharest on 2
July as had been expected and the continuing lack
of direct editorial comment in the Soviet press.
The Soviet press, however, has indirectly expressed
Moscow's displeasure by citing adverse Western edi-
torial comment on the trip.
7 Jul 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Italy: A realignment of political forces is
now under way.
Prime Minister Mariano Rumor's government, which
resigned on 5 July, will stay on in a caretaker ca-
pacity until a decision is reached on a new govern-
ment. The resignation was forced when the Socialist
Party, formed in 1966 by the anti-Communist Social
Democrats and the old-line Socialists, redivided last
week into two separate political parties.
Factionalism is also acute in the Christian
Democratic party, which must elect new leaders at
its National Council meeting that convenes on 9 July.
There are increasing demands within the party that
both leadership and policy assume a more pro-labor
orientation. Left-wing Christian Democrats, like
the left-wing Socialists, insist that the democratic
parties should open a "dialogue" with the Italian
Communist Party, which has shown increased indepen-
dence from Moscow during the past year.
The US Embassy in Rome notes, nevertheless,
that several Christian Democratic leaders had esti-
mated that a Socialist Party split would result in
a centrist leadership group for the Christian Demo-
crats, excluding the extremists on left and right.
Such leadership might then seek to establish a minor-
ity Christian Democratic government, at least for the
summer.
A prospect of increasing labor unrest seems
likely to accentuate political dissension. Labor
negotiations scheduled for the second half of 1969
involve some 50 national contracts and four million
workers, one fifth of the country's entire labor
force. The industries affected are far more criti-
cal for the economy than those industries that have
been involved in contract negotiations over the past
7 Jul 69 Central Intelligence Tslletin 4
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Burma: Prospects for bringing civilians into the
military regime continue to recede.
Although General Ne Win broached the possibility
of civilian participation in the government last fall,
recent events indicate that he has acceded to strong
resistance within the military. He reportedly indi-
cated to the ruling military Revolutionary Council in
late June that he might wait two more years before
permitting any significant loosening of the tight mil-
.itary hold on the government. The appointment on 2
July of four high-level military commanders to new
deputy government minister positions was probably in-
tended to discourage hopes of former civilian offi-
cials for early participation in the government.
The disappointment of civilian politicians may
prompt them into open criticism of continuing mili-
tary rule. Although civilian criticism would pose
no threat to the Ne Win regime, it would strengthen
the hand of the hardliners among the military who
,are firmly opposed to sharing power with civilians.
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Indonesia: A small group of self-appointed Indo-
nesian Communist Party cadre is making preliminary
efforts to establish a new party organization, but so
far has made no real progress.
The already weakened party was left in disarray
in 1968 after the government suppressed the armed
struggle campaign in East and Central Java and vir-
tually wiped out the party's surviving top leader-
ship. Since then, more moderate cadre have assumed
de facto leadership of the party and have sought to
institute a pragmatic reorganization.
In a series of meetings during April and May,
they established a three-member liaison committee
to oversee organizational activities. A secretar-
iat was also formed to carry out the committee's
directives. These party leaders have shelved the
idea of establishing a central committee and polit-
buro until area committees are again functioning.
Although the new leadership has approved the for-
mation of selected party committees throughout Java,
little actual rebuilding appears to have taken place.
Security conditions in Indonesia still make it dif-
ficult for party activists to function. Further, the
failure to establish a central committee and a party
program beyond meeting reorganizational needs under-
scores the weakness of the party and the present lead-
ership's hope of avoiding more internal splits by de-
laying discussion of controversial policies and tac-
tics. Former party leaders who are in exile in a
number of countries appear to have little influence
on the present leaders.
one plan aimed at meeting both moderate and mili-
tant demands was submitted in late April to a meeting
of senior cadre. It called for separating party op-
erations in the urban and rural areas, with rural
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cadre exploiting local social and economic grievances
and urban cadre working to organize intellectuals and
laborers. Although the plan was apparently given a
cool reception, such a division could evolve natur-
ally if party cadre fail to reach a consensus on
party tactics and to find some common meeting ground
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Kenya: The still unsolved assassination of Tom
Mboya a not alter the immediate political equation,
but could threaten long-range stability.
The dominance of Kikuyu politicians--President
Kenyatta's own tribe--continues, and this group con-
trols security forces that appear capable of coping
with any anti-Kikuyu reaction from members of Mboya's
Luo tribe. The opposition Kenya People's Union, which
is led by the pro-Communist Oginga Odinga, has a Luo
tribal base, but prospects for turning Mboya's assas-
sination to its advantage are limited, largely because
of the party's weakened position after years of har-
assment by the government.
Mboya's talents will be sorely missed. Kenyatta
recently assigned Mboya responsibility for management
of the campaign for general parliamentary elections
promised before June 1970, the first since indepen-
dence. The ruling party has no one approaching Mboya's
competence in this sphere. Similarly, Mboya's suc-
cessful handling of Kenya's economic development of-
fered hopeful prospects for mitigating popular dis-
content. Although Mboya was viewed by some Kikuyu
leaders as the major obstacle to their continued dom-
inance, he was one of the few politicians qualified
to ease the difficult transition period after the
departure of the aged Kenyatta.
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