CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014200110001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
1 August 1969
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No. 0183/69
1 August 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: Party officials are preparing for
the anniversary of the invasion. (Page 3)
Middle East: Fighting has generally subsided this
week : Page 5)
El Salvador - Honduras: Many obstacles impede a
final solution to t e crisis. (Page 6)
France: The French reportedly will produce low-grade
enriched uranium for export. (Page 7)
Communist China: Peking appears to be taking a
toug er stance on the problem of political disunity.
(Page 8)
Cuba-Venezuela: Broadcast terminated (Page 11)
West Germany - Latin America (Page 13)
Uruguay: Cooperative opposition (Page 13)
UN - South Africa: Punitive proposals (Page 13)
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E Vietnam: The lull in significant Communist-
initiater military activity continues, and no solid
evidence of an early break in the pattern has ap-
peared.
I Ian upcoming autumn campaign, the dimensions
of which are still not clear. A new resolution
laying out Communist strategy for the rest of 1969
is to be disseminated soon. It reportedly calls for
at least three so-called "highpoints" in military
action in August and September.
communist military units throughout South Vietnam
are in the process of planning a "general offensive"
which will begin to unfold next month.
the scope of the Commu-
nists' plans for their next seasonal military effort
remains unclear. Moreover, there are a number of
indications which suggest that Communist offensive
efforts in the next month or so will be quite limited,
probably similar to the harassing actions which
generally characterized this year's summer campaign.
1 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Czechoslovakia: Party officials are preparing
contingency plans for the anniversary of the Soviet-
led invasion on 20-21 August.
Communist Party boss Husak, Czech party leader
Strougal, and Slovak party leader Sadovsky met on
30 July with regional commanders of the People's
Militia, the party's quasi-military force. The con-
ferees discussed "the militia's activities for the
forthcoming period" and its state of readiness to
fulfill its tasks. The meeting reflects the party's
concern about possible anti-Soviet and antiregime
demonstrations.
The party also continues to crack down on peo-
ple who allegedly are spreading antistate material.
Over 40 people have been arrested so far, the first
acknowledged political arrests since Husak took
over. Nevertheless, handbills calling for demon-
strations against the government and the Soviets
continue to be spread.
A more tangible expression of popular discon-
tent occurred on 29 July when Czech workers report-
edly stoned a candidate member of the Soviet polit-
buro when he tried to visit their plant. Neither
Pra ue nor Moscow has yet commented on this event.
1 Aug 69
Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Alexand
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Israeli-controlled areas following
June 1967 hostilities
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Middle East: Fighting has generally subsided
this week, but minor clashes in Syria and along the
Suez Canal have resulted in casualties for both sides.
Syrian aircraft and artillery struck at Israeli
positions in the Golan Heights - Mount Hermon area
yesterday, according to spokesmen in Damascus. The
air strike, the first initiated by Syria, was said
to be in retaliation for Israel's air attack on 30
July against fedayeen bases in the area. Along the
Suez Canal one Israeli soldier was killed and another
wounded on 30 July in the sporadic exchanges of mortar
and light arms fire.
The withdrawal of UN observers along the canal
appears less likely. In a meeting yesterday of the
seven nations contributing observer personnel, it
was agreed that Secretary General Thant would take
the initiative in convening the Security Council for
consideration of withdrawal and that the council
alone had the power to make that decision.
Israel continues to pursue its impossible dream
of "educating" the Arabs to recognize the futility
of military action. The independent Hebrew newspaper,
Yediot Aharonot, said regarding the Suez Canal that
i~ Egypt learns the lesson and stops, so much the
better, but if this is not sufficient for the student,
the only way to teach him is to increase the punish-
ment still further."
1 Aug 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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El Salvador - Honduras: Progress has been made
toward troop withdrawal., but many obstacles impede a
final solution to the crisis.
Salvador's President Sanchez is publicly claim-
ing both a military and a diplomatic victory, a boast
which is adding to Honduran dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the conflict:. The psychological letdown
Hondurans are experiencing will probably be reflected
in continued antagonism toward Salvadoran citizens
in Honduras.
As Honduran authorities return to areas formerly
occupied by Salvadoran armed forces, new difficulties
in implementing the OAS resolutions will probably
arise.
Isalvadoran forces have pillaged
many villa es, causing the populace to flee.
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France: The French will begin to produce low-
grade enriched uranium for export in competition
with the US and UK
The uranium will come from the gaseous diffu-
sion facility at Pierrelatte, which is the source
of the highly enriched uranium for France's nuclear
weapons. Apparently the French have largely satis-
fied their immediate military needs for weapons-
grade uranium.
The Pierrelatte facility could continue to turn
out reduced amounts of highly enriched uranium for
military needs, and at the same time enough reactor-
grade uranium could be withdrawn from the early
stages of the process for establishing some export
markets.
Sale of this uranium at US prices would result
in a financial loss to the French, but they probably
would tolerate the loss to secure future markets.
If the French are able to build sufficient markets
by these sales, they may then decide to construct
new plant capacity at Pierrelatte to handle the de-
mand for reactor-grade uranium. Such construction
could be completed in two to four years. It might
enable the French to sell this material at competi-
tive prices in expanded markets over the next few
decades. F77 I
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Communist China; Propaganda broadcasts assailing
"anarchism" an stressing "organizational discipline"
have increased recently, suggesting that Peking is
taking a tougher stance on the problem of political
disunity.
Since mid-July broadcasts from. about a dozen
provinces have taken up the -theme, and some have gone
as far as describing anarchy as the "archenemy" of
the proletarian revolution "at, this moment." The
chief targets of the propaganda appear to be unruly
"mass organizations" and their representatives on the
local revolutionary committees. An Anhwei broadcast
of 23 July, for example, warned the leadership at all
levels and revolutionary mass organizations to
strengthen discipline and "resolutely carry out every
directive" of the party central committee..
In attempting to bring mass organizations under
control--especially since the ninth, party congress
in April--Peking is making a sharp departure from a
policy followed during the hectic days of the Cultural
Revolution. At that time Red Guards were told "rebel-
lion is justified" and were encouraged to "'seize all
power" and to destroy the existing party apparatus.
Now, according to a Peking broadcast of 29 July,, the
masses are being warned against the tendency toward
"anarchism, bourgeois factionalism;, and ultrademoc-
racy" which "wrecks the party organization" and
"adversely affects" policy imple:men.tation?
The crackdown on Red Guards was initiated over
a year ago, but factionalists have shown a reluctance
to disband their organizations and "unite" with. their
former rivals. This latest campaign directed against
"anarchistic" trends suggests that Peking is growing
impatient with these recalcitrant elements and may be
movin more forcefully toward curbing their influence
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Cuba-Venezuela: Radio Havana's termination of a
specialized propaganda broadcast directed to Venezuela
is further evidence of Cuba's interest in presenting
a more respectable image in Latin America. The pro-
gram, which had been heard regularly since November
1966 and was noted for its violent attacks on both
the Venezuelan Government and the Venezuelan Commu-
nist Party, was discontinued on 18 July. A similar
program beamed to Chile for over three years was
dropped on 8 May. By removing these overt remnants
of its aggressive policies of 1966-67, Havana prob-
ably hopes to create a more favorable atmosphere for
the growing number of Latin American leaders who are
openly questioning the practicality of OAS sanctions
against Cuba.
(continued)
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West. Germany - Latin America
Aid Minister Eppier, re-
turning from a Latin American trip in June, came out
strongly for an increase in the West German assistance
program. Donn recently set up two interministerial
task forces to coordinate political-cultural and
trade-aid activities with Latin America. In 1968
Bonn committed only $40 million in bilateral develop-
ment loans to Latin America out of a total German
program of $300 million.
Uruguay s The opposit:i.on par ties have taken a
significant step to end the bitter- struggle between
the government's legislative and executive branche-
by agreeing to cooperate with President Pacheco in
matters affecting the "well-being and development of
the nation." Legislative unwillingness to support
Pacheco': hard-line policies on economic austerity
and civil disorder had, in recent weeks, forced the
President to rule almost exclusively by decree. The
opposition parties are now trying to gain a voice in
policy formation but it remains to be seen to what
extent Pacheco will be willing to listen to them or
even to increase consultation with key sectors of his
own party.
UN - South African Pretoria's failure to comply
with the Security Council resolution of last March,
which called upon South Africa to withdraw from South-
West Africa or face unspecified measures, has come
before the council. Zambia has called for mandatory
trade sanctions against South Africa, a proposal un-
likely to receive enough votes for adoption. A res-
olution may also be offered to sequester royalties
and fees paid Pretoria by companies doing business
in South-West Africa and place them in a UN trust fund
to be held for the South-West Africans. Regardless
of the outcome, Pretoria will not alter its stance.
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