CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014500030001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 6, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
6 September 1969
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0214/69
6 September 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Brazil: The government will meet the demands of the
ambassador's kidnapers. (Page 3)
Libya: The military junta's political goals are
still unclear. (Page 5)
Western Europe: Chancellor Kiesinger and President
Pompidou will meet next week. (Page 6)
India-Nepal: The latest talks produced no definite
settlement of outstanding problems. (Page 7)
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ryietnam: Hanoi's new leadership may already
face problems in maintaining a balance between its
two major allies.
Chou En-lai's sudden departure from Hanoi im-
mediately after short discussions with the post-Ho
leadership may reflect a reluctance by the North
Vietnamese to engage in substantive discussions with
the Chinese at this time. In his meetings with the
North Vietnamese leaders Chou undoubtedly registered
Peking's views on the conduct of the war and the
Paris negotiations. There is nothing in the commu-
niqu6 concerning the Chinese delegation's departure
to indicate Hanoi's reaction to these views. It is
possible that the makeup of the Chinese funeral
delegation will provide a better clue to the state
of Chinese - North Vietnamese relations.
Chou may also have been reluctant to be in
Hanoi when a Soviet delegation arrived. He remained
less than 24 hours, returning to Peking the same day
that he arrived.
Soviet Premier Kosygin left Moscow on 5 Sep-
tember at the head of the Soviet delegation that
will attend Ho's funeral. The Soviet delegation,
apart from Kosygin, does not appear to be an espe-
cially high-powered one.
The Soviet message of condolence to the North
Vietnamese outlines Moscow's main hopes for the new
leadership by implying that it should concentrate
on developing and strengthening the socialist regime
in the North.
Enemy military activity during the night of
4-5 September was typical of the "highpoint" tactics
the Communists have adopted since early spring.
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[Although 86 enemy shellings were reported, mostly
against military targets in III and IV corps, along
with a few ground attacks northwest of Saigon, al-
lied casualties and damage were light. US military
installations in Da Nang were hit severely early to-
day, however, resulting in three US soldiers killed
and 112 wounded. The Communists may intend to sustain
this level of action until their cease-fire begins on
25X1 Monday.
6 Sep 69
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Brazil: The government has agreed to meet the
demands of Ambassador Elbrick's kidnapers.
Foreign Minister Magalhaes Pinto announced
yesterday that the government is ready to release
he 15 political prisoners demanded by the kidnapers.
The prisoners include prominent extremist student
eaders, Communists, and other left-wing radicals.]
The kidnapers said they would release the ambassador
when the 15 are in Algeria, Chile, or Mexico. The
Mexican and Chilean governments have offered to ac-
cept them, (and the Brazilians intend to fly them to
Mexico this morning.)
The National Liberating Action (ALN)--one of
the two signers of the ransom manifesto--has not
been positively identified. The pro-Castro Carlos
Marighella and his group are probably the most ef-
fective terrorists in Brazil. They have been re-
sponsible, for example, for many robberies as well
as for the assassination of US Army Captain Chandler
in Sao Paulo last October. Their involvement in the
kidnaping could account for the professionalism dis-
played by the abductors.
6 Sep 69
(continued)
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Two more incidents involving student terrorists
have occurred in Sao Paulo. On 3 September police
killed at least one student in a gun battle, and on
4 September two student terrorists were killed when
their car exploded as they attempted to move a load
of dynamite.
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Libya: The military junta is slowly restoring
public services, but its political goals are still
unclear.
With no resistance in sight, the new regime is
turning its attention to the restoration of vital
services. Electricity and water are available in
urban centers and attempts are being made to clean
the streets. Civilian police have reappeared to
direct traffic during the periods when the curfew
is not in effect. The junta has also ordered that
food stores, pharmacies, and other shops hold their
prices steady. It plans to reopen banks and permit
internal air travel next week.
The junta is seeking to reassure the business
community. At a meeting with a select group of
Benghazi businessmen, a spokesman for the junta
stated that the new regime's goal of "socialism"
will be directed at social reform rather than na-
tionalization.
The military, however, is continuing to admin-
ister the country alone. Government ministries re-
main closed and the normal bureaucratic machinery
has ground to a standstill.
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Western Europe: European Communities (EC) is-
sues will probably dominate the talks in Bonn next
week between Chancellor Kiesinger and President
Pompidou.
The British have requested that Bonn raise the
issue of EC enlargement during the talks. Kiesinger
has said that UK entry would be an important theme
of the discussion. He has also expressed the hope
that Pompidou would provide a more precise picture
of French intentions in Europe. The Germans want
to get down to serious discussions, but the French
will probably try to keep the talks general but
friendly.
Bonn is moving closer to the French position
that the problem of financing the common agricul-
tural policy (CAP) must be solved before British
entry. Bonn is prepared to try to reach agreement
on CAP financing by the end of the year. A German
official told US Embassy officials that UK inter-
ests would be kept in mind during any CAP negotia-
tions and that a CAP settlement need not be "ever-
lastingly permanent."
Bonn anticipates that an EC summit meeting
could be held as early as November. French offi-
cials do not want to hold the summit until early in
1970. This French view, combined with German de-
sires for adequate summit preparations, will prob-
ably preclude such a meeting prior to December.
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Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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India-Neal: The latest talks ended Thursday
with no definitive settlement of outstanding prob-
lems.
Four days of hard bargaining in New Delhi re-
portedly did not produce final agreement on the key
issue of future mutual security and intelligence
arrangements. New Delhi apparently has not yet
given formal consent to the Nepalese timetable for
the early and complete evacuation of Indian person-
nel from checkposts near the Tibet-Nepal frontier.
Press reports indicate, however, that progress was
made on this issue as well as on proposals for re-
structuring India's 50-man military advisory group
in Kathmandu.
A joint statement issued at the conclusion of
the talks reflects a generally cordial atmosphere,
but discloses that final decisions on security ar-
rangements will be temporarily postponed. Trade,
transit, and boundary demarcation problems are ex-
pected to be taken up again in New Delhi in October.
Further progress in resolving issues, partic-
ularly the Indian military presence in Nepal, prob-
ably can be reached only at the highest political
level. This opportunity may arise during King Ma-
hendra's stopovers in India en route to Europe this
week and on his return in Octohr
6 Sep 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Secret
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