CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014500090001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/03/11 :CIA-RDP79T00975A014~9~i1~i~~J1-1
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
~. ~ ~r
13 Sept~:~nber 1969
State Dept. review completed
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Approved For Release 2004/03/11 :CIA-RDP79T00975A014500090001-1
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No. 0220/69
13 September 196'
Centr~cl Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
USSR - Communist China: More on the Kosygin visit.
Page 1
South Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 3)
Communist China: The "war preparations" drive is
being hampered by apathy. (Page 4)
UK: A sizable balance-of-payments surplus has been
registered. (Page 5)
Guyana-Surinam: Publicity about an alleged Guyanese
attack has raised tensions. (Page 7)
NATO: A recommendation has been made to establish
a committee on the challenges of modern society.
(Page $ )
Sudan: Firing of Communists (Page 9)
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USSR - Communist China: The meeting of Kosyg~i_n
and Chou En-lai appears to have been at Soviet in-
itia~tive .
It seems likely that Kosygin told the Chinese
that the situation was becoming more and more dan-
gerous and that measures to halt the deterioration
were essential. Moscow had other good reasons fo.r
wanting a meeting. At its present level, the dis-
pute is hurting the Soviets on several fronts. They
believe that the Chinese are trying to ?'bleed them
white" on the border and that Peking may be preparesd
to continue the skirmishes indefinitely. In addit~_on,
the Soviets find themselves at a political disadva.ri-
tage, since both their enemies and their allies be-?
lieve them vulnerable because of preoccupation with
the Chinese.
Moscow has refrained from almost all anti-
Chinese propaganda since the meeting.- The Soviets
may be testing Peking's intentions with this move,
as well as buttressing their claim to be the ag-
grieved party by demonstrating a willingness to tarie
down the polemics.
There is nothing in the first scraps of evidexice
to suggest that the Chinese will respond to Kosygi.ri's
approach in the desired fashion. It is still too
early to tell whether they will moderate their be-
havior on the border or let up on their propaganda.
At this point, however, the outlook is for no im-
provement in Sino-Soviet .relations in the wake of
the premiers' meeting. 25X1
13 Sep 69 Cen#ra.l In-tel7igenca B%elletin ~~
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