CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014600120001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 2, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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gecret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Department review
Secret
50
2 October 1969
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No. 0236/69
2 October 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Communist China: Little to celebrate. (Page 1)
Vietnam: Both allied and enemy losses down. (Page 3)
Japan: Student "guerrillas" open campaign. (Page 4)
Portugal: Somewhat freer political atmosphere. (Page 5)
The Netherlands: Labor trouble for government. (Page 6)
Tanzania-Zambia: Progress on the railroad. (Page 9)
Algeria - East Germany: Diplomatic exchange. (Page 10)
Bolivia: Newspaper takes anti-US tone. (Page 11)
British Honduras: Independence conference. (Page 12)
Netherlands Antilles: New elections prospect. (Page 13)
UN: Hijacking proposal (Page 14)
USSR-Indonesia: Economic aid (Page 14)
South Africa: Party split (Page 15)
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Communist China; The celebrations in Peking
yesterday on the 20th anniversary of the Communist
government showed clearly that there is little to
celebrate.
The sobriety and restraint of the occasion
reflected the severe domestic and foreign problems
facing the regime. Although Mao Tse-tung and Lin
Piao both appeared, reportedly in good health, they
did not bring with them from their five-month ab-
sence from public view any new or distinctive pol-
icy guidelines. Lin's brief and nondescript ad-
dress at the National Day rally and a speech by
Chou En-lai at a 30 September reception gave rel-
atively short shrift to the Cultural Revolution.
Both leaders reiterated the appeals for national
unity that Peking has been making since the Ninth
Party Congress in April.
A joint People's Dail - Red Flag - Liberation
Army Journal editorial on 1 October stressed the
same themes as last year, calling for the rebuilding
of the party and the consolidation of local govern-
ments, testimony to the slow progress being made
in repairing the damage done during the Cultural
Revolution.
The level of both the North Korean and North
Vietnamese delegations to the National Day cere-
monies suggests that Peking is making renewed ef-
forts to counter Soviet attempts to isolate China.
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North Korea's delegation to the National Day cere-
monies ranked notably higher than that of last
year. North Vietnam's Premier Pham Van Dong was
the featured foreign guest at the celebrations,
and the Peking press highlighted the friendly talks
between Chou En-Tai and Pham Van Dong. Peking
probably believes that closer relations with Hanoi
will afford it new opportunities to
post-Ho leadership.
2 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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C Vietnam: The latest battle casualty reports
reveal that both allied and enemy losses decreased
significantly in the third quarter of this year.
An average of about 150 US personnel were killed
each week during July, August, and September, com-
pared with some 280 per week in all of 1968 and about
245 per week in the first six months of 1969. South
Vietnamese battle deaths over the past three months
have averaged around 230 per week, according to
preliminary reports. This figure is well below the
weekly average of South Vietnamese combat deaths in
1968 and in the first half of this year. Current
allied casualty rates are generally in line with
those of the so-called "lull" periods in the summer
and late fall of 1968.
Communist battle losses during the past three
months have averaged about 2,500 deaths per week,
down from an average of some 3,500 per week during
all of 1968 and in the first half of 1969.
These lower casualty figures primarily reflect
changes in enemy tactics made after costly offen-
sives in late February and March. At that time,
the Communists moved many main force troops forward
into exposed positions and attempted to sustain
pressure for several weeks. Since last spring, how-
ever, they have concentrated their efforts on brief
surges of shellings and limited ground attacks.
Moreover, the short periods of increased enemy ac-
tivity during the past three months have been con-
siderably less intense than those in May and June.
The Communists have been relying increasingly on
small commando-type sapper units and guerrillas
rather than large conventional infantry forces.
2 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Japan: Student "guerrillas" have opened in
earnest their campaign against the police as a pre-
lude to larger protests later this month and next.
Following last week's molotov cocktail attacks
on police boxes in Osaka and Kyoto, rampaging stu-
dents on Tuesday launched similar hit-and-run raids
against police and other public facilities in
Tokyo. Breaking up into groups of 20 or 30, they
simultaneously attacked some ten targets, dispersing
only when confronted with sizable police forces.
The student violence is likely to continue,
partly in reaction to the recent police crackdown
under the new university reform bill. In addition,
student extremists will try to set off widespread
disturbances on 10 and 21 October, dates fixed for
major antigovernment demonstrations. This in turn
would set the stage for even larger protests against
Prime Minister Sato's visit to the US in November
for talks on Okinawa.
The government is anxious to keep demonstra-
tions within bounds as Japan heads into its crucial
year of 1970 when the security treaty with the US
comes up for review. Other compelling reasons to
maintain order are the prospect of national elec-
tions and Japan's Proudly anticipated role as host
to "Expo 70." F I
2 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Portugl: A somewhat freer political atmosphere
marks preparations for the National Assembly elections
on 26 October.
Prime Minister Caetano's efforts to establish a
political form which would distinguish him from his
predecessor seem to be opening the door to a some-
what less rigid system. Although a massive govern-
ment victory in the election is expected, all poli-
tical groups are campaigning because they consider
the present political setup to be transitional.
Within the government's National Union party,
old-line supporters of Salazar are vying for power
with moderate reformers led by a close associate of
Caetano. Both conservatives and moderates are re-
presented on the government slate, and three fourths
of the candidates are new faces. In two provinces,
government party splinter groups are running separ-
ately from the National Union.
The prime minister has avoided making any changes
that might be politically dangerous. In a speech on
27 September, for example, Caetano advocated admin-
istrative reform and a strong presidential system.
This move may have been calculated to placate old-
line Salazarist supporters of President Thomaz, in-
cluding some of the military, who have been reported
restless and critical of the Caetano regime.
The antigovernment elements are split because
Socialist leader Mario Soares and his group refused
to associate with the Communists. Soares apparently
reasoned that his best strategy is to gamble on
Caetano's wanting a moderate anti-Communist opposi-
tion to play more of a role in Portugal. The re-
maining opposition is associated with the Communists
and is stronger organizationally than the group led
by Soares, but is weak in leadership. Its adherents
are younger and include some Socialists and Christian
Democrats, as well as orthodox and pro-Peking Commu-
nists and other extremists. F
2 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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The Netherlands: A decision by the largest
trade'union federation to boycott national-level wage
consultations could lead to serious trouble within
the De Jong government.
The Socialist labor federation (NW) announced
the decision shortly after parliament approved last
Friday a hotly debated bill to broaden the govern-
ment's right to intervene in wage contracts deemed
contrary to the national interests Labor generally
regards the bill as a reversion to restrictive wage
policies pursued during most of the postwar period.
The government, on the other hand, sees it as a means
of combating inflation and keeping the budget bal-
anced.
The three major labor federations all opposed
the bill, but they have not agreed on tactics. The
NW's boycott will apply to wage talks in two advi-
sory bodies, both containing representatives of labor
and management and one also including the government.
The boycott could open the door for strikes when con-
tracts are approved that are unacceptable to the NW?
The Catholic federation has also agreed to boycott
certain wage consultations, while the Protestant
group is taking a wait-and-see attitude.
The bill caused considerable dissension within
two of the four coalition parties. Fifteen Catholic
deputies pressed for a "No" vote that would have
cost the coalition its majority, and only Prime Min-
ister De Jong's threat to resign got the measure
passed.
2 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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Chinese Communists Slate Construction of Tan-Zam Railroad for Early 1970
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Tanzania - Zambia - Communist China: The Chinese
have almost completed surveying the Tan-Zam railroad
right-of-way and are scheduled to begin construction
early next year.
Almost 400 more Chinese railroad technicians
have arrived in Tanzania over the last six weeks,
bringing the total to about 1,000. In addition, 1,800
tons of track and other railway equipment came in from
China this week. According to a Zambian official,
the engineering survey will be finished in November
and construction will start in March 1970. When the
line is completed sometime in 1975, Zambia will begin
to ship most of its copper exports, which earn over
90 percent of its foreign exchange, through the port
of Dar es Salaam. Zambia is now largely dependent on
the railways running through the white-ruled states
of Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola.
Although the cost of the project and the repay-
ment schedule are still unknown, the Tanzanian and
Zambian governments will finance local costs over the
next five years largely by selling Chinese goods--
textiles, tools, agricultural equipment, and food--
through their state trading corporations. These goods
will be furnished under a commodity credit arrange-
ment to be repaid later. The Tanzanians hope to repay
the credit with local manufactured goods rather than
hard currency, but it is unclear how the Zambians
intend to pay back their portion. F
(Map)
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Algeria - East Germany; There are signs that
Algeria may be moving toward an exchange of diplomatic
representatives with East Germany.
Responding to Ulbricht's invitation, Algeria
is sending an important governmental delegation headed
by the minister of commerce to attend East Germany's
20th anniversary celebrations. After announcing the
minister's attendance, the official Algerian press
went on to rationalize a possible diplomatic exchange.
The commentary pointed out, for example, that the
existence of East Germany was a political fact, that
the East Germans had normalized relations with Cam-
bodia and several Arab countries, and also that good
relations could be maintained with both Germanies.
Algeria is virtually the only important radical
Arab state without a diplomatic representative in
Pankow. It has been resisting East German pressures
for diplomatic exchanges for a number of years.
During this time, however, it has concluded cultural,
scientific, and.economic agreements with East Germany,
has exchanged governmental and party delegations,
and has received some minor East German assistance.
On the other hand, Algeria also has received
important economic assistance from West Germany,
despite the fact that relations were broken in 1965.
Although Bonn would probably fulfill any existing
obligations, it probably would not make any signifi-
cant new aid commitments should Algiers in fact recog-
nize Pankow
2 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 10
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Bolivia: A major La Paz newspaper has taken a
strident tone against the US, apparently with the ap-
proval of the new military government.
On Wednesday, the newspaper Jornada charged that
"US imperialism," represented by the AID programs,
the Export-Import Bank, and the US consulates, was
to blame for the recent crash of a Bolivian airliner
that claimed 74 lives.
The paper, which reportedly is sponsored by high
government officials, said that US agencies forced
the airline to fly old and unsafe equipment. The
government is exhorted to "liberate the state from
the withering influence of USAID and other develop-
ment agencies."
Bolivian officials are also continuing to speak
of their desire for an "ideological confederation"
with the military government of Peru. The Peruvians,
however, have rejected any close identification with
the Ovando government although they extended diplo-
matic recognition after Brazil and Argentina had led
the way.
Peru's hesitancy to accept the "ideological
confederation" concept is probably due to fear that
any indication that it is encouraging Ovando's left-
ist and nationalistic policy statements might re-
kindle doubts among foreign governments and investors
about Peru's economic and political policies. After
stressing the differences in the Peruvian and Boliv-
ian situations in a press conference on 28 September,
Foreign Minister Mercado made it clear th t the "Peru-
vian revolution is not for export."
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British Honduras: The British hope to persuade
Premier Price not to request a conference on inde-
pendence in November.
Independence for the colony has long been sty-
mied by Guatemala's claim to the territory and by
Britain's unwillingness to grant a post-independence
defense guarantee. The British minister of state for
Caribbean Commonwealth Affairs will begin a visit to
the colony today. He will probably caution Price to
delay any independence plans until after the Guate-
malan elections in March 1970.
The British will have a difficult time dissuad-
ing Price from requesting a conference. The premier
has long promised to lead the colony to full inde-
pendence during his current term of office. He is
concerned about facing the electorate, which he
must do before 15 March, without having made any
progress toward independence. He will probably want
a conference this fall, therefore, to show that he
has made every effort to convince the British to
grant a defense guarantee.
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Netherlands Antilles: Unsuccessful efforts to
form a new government may lead to new elections.
The date for installation of a new government,
29 September, passed with no agreement among the six
parties represented in the 22-man legislature (Staten)
elected on 5 September. In the first meeting of the
Staten on Monday, the representatives split into two
l]_-man groupings.
Four varied opposition parties have lined up
against the Democratic and Patriotic parties, which
controlled the government until ousted after serious
riots swept the main island of Curacao last May. As
a result of the legislative impasse, the caretaker
government appointed at that time remains in power.
If no solution is found in the next month or so, the
interim minister-president may have no choice but to
call new elections.
Ideology has played little part in the maneuver-
ing currently under way, and individuals might cross
party lines at any time to break the impasse. It is
also possible, however, that the Democratic-Patriotic
bloc might be willing to risk new elections in an at-
tempt to strengthen its position.
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UN: Dutch Foreign Minister Luns proposed yes-
terday that the UN General Assembly take up the
matter of aerial hijacking. The Dutch have pre-
pared a resolution urging full support for the
Tokyo convention provisions on the seizure of civil
aircraft and for a supplementary convention on the
punishment of hijackers now being drafted by the
International Civil Aviation Organization. The So-
viets appear to be very hostile toward the Dutch
initiative. They maintain that it is not a proper
subject for Assembly consideration and are trying
to give the impression the proposal is a US anti-
Cuban move in disguise. As a result of Moscow's
position, Finland has decided to drop its earlier
plan to have the Security Council consider the mat-
ter. Helsinki will also back away from cosponsoring
the Dutch resolution.
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USSR-Indonesia: Following a month of talks in
Djakarta, Moscow has agreed to resume some economic
aid to Indonesia, but the two countries have not
yet settled the thorny debt problem. The Soviets
will complete work on several development projects
that have been in abeyance since mid-1966, and they
may provide new aid for Indonesian tin and fishing
industries. Discussions on Indonesia's $800 million
debt to the USSR will be continued at a later date.
(continued)
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South Africa: Ultraracist dissidents in the
ruling National Party may soon form a new political
party. The dissidents, who oppose Prime Minister
Vorster's policies of cultivating relations with
Black African states, reportedly reached the deci-
sion after a series of strategy meetings. They
have been under increasing pressure from Vorster
forces to toe the line on party policies or face
expulsion. With national elections only seven
months away, it is unlikely that this splinter
group will be able to build an organization effec-
tive ennugh to challenge the National Party leader-
ship.
(continued)
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