CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A01480% 01F1-5
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
5 Q
State Dept. review completed
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/ECDP79T00975A014800110001-5
No. 0259/69
29 October 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Lebanon: The focus of political activity has shifted
to Cairo, but fedayeen pressure continues. (Page 1)
USSR-Czechoslovakia: The Czechoslovaks got a ring-
ing verbal endorsement from Moscow, but little else.
(Page 2)
West Germany: Brandt has mapped out a broad activ-
ist course in foreign affairs. (Page 4)
Communist China - West Germany: Peking wants to
get the Lan-chou petrochemical complex operating.
(Page 6)
South Vietnam: Communist agents in provincial towns
are continuing their subversive activities. (Page 7)
India: Party strife is increasing in West Bengal and
civil disorders are anticipated in the'Punjab. (Page 9)
Bolivia: Military discontent is growing over the
increasing influence of radical civilians. (Page 10)
25X1
Tanzania - Zambia - Communist China: The railroad
project may be approved next month. (Page 12)
Burundi: The President's position appears to have
eel n weakened. (Page 13)
USSR-SALT: Delegation selection (Page 14)
USSR: Laser development (Page 14)
Albania: Foreign policy views (Page 15)
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03 7 . &_Z P79T00975A014800110001-5
Lebanon: The focus of political activity has
shifted to Cairo as the fedayeen continue to apply
pressure in Lebanon.
Lebanese Armed Forces Commander Bustani is in
the Egyptian capital for "mediation" talks under
the auspices of Egyptian President Nasir. Bustani
seems unlikely to return to Beirut with much lasting
comfort. for Lebanese President Hilu in his struggle
with the fedayeen. Bustani is personally not very
forceful, and the fedayeen are likely to gain in-
creased freedom of action.
Meanwhile, sporadic incidents of shooting and
bomb throwing occurred in Beirut yesterday. Clashes
between Lebanese security forces and commandos took
place in eastern and northern Lebanon.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/0ShC DP79T00975A014800110001-5
USSR-Czechoslovakia: Moscow sent the visit-
ing Czec oslova] party-state delegation home yes-
terday with a ringing verbal endorsement of party
chief Husak's leadership, but apparently little
else.
The joint statement issued at the departure
of the delegation indicates that the Soviets do
not intend to give up the carrot and stick tactics
that have been so effective in Czechoslovakia, de-
spite their satisfaction with the trend of events
in Prague. The statement mentioned neither a sig-
nificant hard-currency loan nor a partial with-
drawal of troops. The Czechoslovaks had hoped that
Moscow would be prepared to be more forthcoming on
these matters as a reward for the authoritarian
controls which have been reimposed in Prague.
The most tangible result of the visit was an
agreement to expand trade and economic cooperation
and to sign a new treaty of friendship and alliance
next year. The Soviets again agreed to increase
deliveries of some industrial raw materials, and
to "assist" Prague in purchasing other unspecified
goods, in-foreign markets.
These appear to be only stop-gap measures.
The friendship treaty will probably serve as window
dressing for the new shape of Soviet-Czechoslovak
relations.
Nevertheless, the red-carpet treatment which
the delegation received and Brezhnev's glowing en-
dorsement of Husak's leadership on Monday are in-
dicative of Soviet satisfaction with his policies.
Brezhnev endorsed Husak as "an outstanding politi-
cal figure," indicating that the Soviets are pre-
pared to continue to work with the present leader-
ship in Prague.
(continued)
29 Oct 69 Ventral Intelligence Bulletin 2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17: CIA- DP 79T00975A01480011 0 -
 Approved For Release 2004/0:'.IKi-'bP79T00975A014800110001-5
Brezhnev's reference to the "legitimate aspi-
rations" of the post-Novotny Dubcek leadership in
January 1968 may mean that Husak will be allowed
to reintroduce some reforms once party controls and
supremacy have been completely restored. Husak
noted, however, that "normalization" has not been
completed. This means that new domestic restric-
tions in Czechoslovakia and further purges of the
art government, and mass organizations are likely.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/03tJ.E P79T00975A014800110001-5
C West Germany: In his official policy state-
ment yesterday, Chancellor Brandt mapped out a
broad activist course in foreign affairs, although
one that carefully avoids radical departures from
already established policy lines.
Brandt's scattergun approach provided few
clues to priorities among the diverse policies he
outlined, suggesting that Bonn will press them all
and be satisfied to make progress where it can.
Nor did he indicate which way Germany might move
if forced to face up to hard choices among the
potentially conflicting strains.
Brandt: placed special emphasis on pumping new
life into Bonn's relations with the East. He would
initiate direct talks with the USSR, Poland, and
East Germany, and would have the Western Allies--
the US, UK, and France--continue to seek Soviet
cooperation in alleviating sources of tension over
Berlin.
While avoiding specifics, Brandt seemed to
imply that his government would be more flexible
in meeting Eastern demands. As a starter, he al-
luded to the concept of two German states existing
in one nation, a thought alien to West German con-
servatives who have perenially denied the legiti-
macy of East Germany.
Paying tribute to his nation's close ties with
the US, the Chancellor nonetheless spoke out for
"a more independent German policy within a more ac-
tive partnership." When he stated in effect that
Bonn would emphasize the primacy of its own goals,
Brandt was echoing pronouncements first enunciated
by former Chancellor Kiesinger.
Brandt indicated that his government, while
continuing its allegiance to NATO, would take a
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Ap"pro"ve or a ease - -
 Approved For Release 2004/03o1.u DP79T00975A014800110001-5
more positive attitude than previous Bonn govern-
ments toward detente measures. Bonn's special con-
tribution in this line would include negotiation
of renunciation of force agreements with East Eu-
ropean governments and signature of the NPT in due
course. Hewing to a cautious line on the European
Community, Brandt called for its strengthening and
broadening. Although he endorsed British entry,
he also spoke of the need for German-French harmony.
Negative outbursts from the opposition Chris-
tian Democrats suggests that the Brandt foreign
policy may face tough going in the Bundestag. It
also suggests Kiesinger may have difficulty main-
taining the discipline required to fulfill the re-
sponsible opposition role he has promised.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/0 /j&TCIRt DP79T00975A014800110001-5
Communist China - West Germanys The release .
of several West German -technicians reflects Peking's
desire to get China's largest petrochemical complex
at Lan-chou into operation.
The four technicians who had been detained for
over a year, had been working on the $45 million
petrochemical complex being built by the West Ger-
man firm Lurgi and two British firms. Peking ex-
pelled other free world personnel working on the
project in mid-1968.
Peking has been negotiating with the West Ger-
mans to bring in technicians to start production on
the Lurgi-built facilities, which are the key plants
in the Lan-thou compex. They embody some of the
most. advanced petrochemical processes available in
the free world, and Chinese capabilities for bring-
ing the complex into full operation are limited.
The output of the complex at full capacity will in-
crease Chinese production of plastics by about one
third and almost, double the output of synthetic
fibers. Delays in completion of the complex have
cost the Chinese an estimated $30 million per year.
Although Lurgi probably now may be willing to
send a technical. team to Lan-chou, it could have
difficulty in recruiting technicians, particularly
among subcontractors. West German unions have said
that they would not allow any of their members to
return to China unless some guarantee were made for
their safety.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Rele se 2004/-03/1T:: ~CIIA
25.X1
 Approved For Release 2004/OVA MAtRDP79T00975A014800110001-5
South Vietnam: Communist agents in provincial
towns continue subversive activities despite rela-
tively effective government security operations.
I the Communist
"city operations" groups es a is a in two towns
of Ba Xuyen Province had a network of some 200 in-
formers out of a total population of 6,000. The
subversive operations are aimed at eliciting in-
formation from South Vietnamese civil servants and
military personnel, and recruiting them into the
apparatus.
The members of the "city operations" group
also collect taxes for the Communists in these
government-controlled towns. Major targets of this
extortion racket are Chinese merchants who are
threatened physically and later with disclosure to
the government once they have started paying.
Communist subversive operations in urban areas
are widespread, but their success has been spotty;
government security agencies have uncovered numer-
ous enemy agents in many large towns. Nevertheless,
the size of the Communists' apparatus indicates it
will take a far gre r effort to eliminate this
type of subversion.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/0SA$ .l DP79T00975A014800110001-5
Coalition government
collapses, 24 October
ORISSA ,Coalition government
e)4 by
inter-party strife
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2004/03c&DP79T00975A014800110001-5
India: Inter-party strife is increasing, and
some civil disorder is anticipated in the Punjab
area.
Conflict among the 14 parties in West Bengal's
ruling coalition is a growing threat to the govern-
ment. The two national Communist parties are part
of the coalition, but the far-left Marxist Commu-
nists have been trying to use their dominant posi-
tion to extend their control in the state. Tensions
resulting from this effort have led to violent
clashes with the supporters of their coalition part-
ners, and the Marxists are coming under bitter at-
tack.
Some anti-Marxists, however, fear that they
would not survive a new election and most are aware
that they would have great difficulty forming a new
coalition. They would probably prefer to force con-
cessions from the Marxists rather than topple the
government. Options are narrowing, however, as the
security situation deteriorates, and the warring
coalition partners become increasingly unable to
govern. The collapse last week of India's only
other Marxist-led state government--in Kerala--may
give the anti-Marxist forces the example they need
to join ranks in bringing down the coalition.
Adding to New Delhi's problems is the situation
in northern India, where security forces are pre-
paring for civil disorder and violent clashes be-
tween Sikhs in Punjab and Hindus in neighboring
Haryana following the death on Monday of a Sikh
leader after a 74-day fast. The Sikh began the
fast in an attempt to force New Delhi to grant to
Punjab State the city of Chandigarh, the status of
which has been under dispute since 1966 when Haryana
State was separated from the Punjab. Talks are now
being held, but the Punjabis insist on sole posses-
sion, and they have been unwillin to give sufficient
compensation to satisfy Haryana.
(Map)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 9
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/03/,A1-&_ 79T00975AO14800110001-5
Bolivia: Military discontent is growing over
the increasing influence of the radical civilians
in the cabinet.
Foreign Minister General Ruiz has told the US
Ambassador that he and. 'his military colleagues op-
pose the efforts of civilian cabinet officers to
cause strains in Bolivia's relations with the US.
He added that the military would not tolerate be-
ing used in this manner any longer. According to
General Ruiz, President Ovando has decided to ex-
clude the leader of the civilian radicals, minister
of Mines Quiroga, from any further dealings with
Gulf Oil Company and will handle future negotia-
tions himself.
President Ovando is expected to travel to
Cochabamba in the next few days to try to placate
middle-grade army officers who have openly ex-
pressed their dissatisfaction with the nationaliza-
tion of Bolivian Gulf and are calling for Quiroga's
dismissal. Quiroga has built a large personal fol-
lowing with his demagogic anti-US statements, how-
ever, and Ovando would :be hesitant to remove him
unless military opposition seriously threatened
his own position. Ovando may even have difficult
in silencing the minister on the Gulf issue.I
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 200~4I03/1 -
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03/(Uj- A-3pP79T00975AO14800110001-5
Tanzania - Zambia - Communist China: Final
details lit-He Tan-ZZam railroad project may be ap-
proved in early November.
If approval is given by Tanzanian, Zambian,
and Chinese Communist officials, construction might
begin next April. Contracts for the railroad's
rolling stock also may be officially awarded to
China at the November meeting, according to domes-
tic Zambian Radio. If the cost of the rolling
stock is included, the total Chinese loan to Zambia
and Tanzania might be about $360 million.
The Tanzanian Government reportedly has de-
cided to use its own resources to finance half of
the local costs for the Tan-Zam railroad. The
other half is to come from the sale of Chinese Com-
munist goods furnished under a commodity credit ar-
rangement. Local costs in Tanzania, which are ex-
pected to total about $12 million annually over a
five-year period, are believed to include the
living expenses of Chinese technicians, salaries
of local workers, purchases of building materials,
freight, and miscellaneous charges.
Previous Tanzanian budget estimates envisioned
two-thirds financing from the sale of Chinese goods,
while newspaper reports indicated that all local
costs would be defrayed with the sale proceeds.
The government move apparently was prompted by in-
sufficient local demand for the Chinese commodities
as well as fear of increased competition for infant
Tanzanian industries. Despite these measures, fi-
nancing of local costs may still present difficul-
ties. Details of how Zambia plans to resolve this
problem are not yet known.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 12
SECRET
Approved For Rely ease 2UO-T[07/ - -
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/0$/W RiK-kDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
Burundi: President Micombero's position ap-
pears to have been seriously weakened by recent
developments.
Last month, the Tutsi-dominated government ex-
posed what it said was coup plotting among members
of the majority Hutu tribe. This has made Micom-
bero vulnerable to charges from extremist Tutsis
that his policy of reconciliation toward the Hutu
is a failure.
Moreover, increasing Hutu unrest in the coun-
tryside recently prompted Micombero to make an ex-
tensive tour of the interior. During the trip, he
tried to enlist the support of church leaders to
restore calm among the people.
Micombero's troubles have been compounded by
Foreign Minister Ntawurishira. The foreign minister,
who apparently enjoys the backing of anti-Micombero
elements in the government, has persisted in pub-
licly denouncing the Belgian ambassador for alleged
complicity in the Hutu coup plot. Micombero has
publicly retracted the charge to placate the Bel-
gians and to retain their all-important aid, but he
has failed to carry out his threat to take punitive
action against Ntawurishira. The extremist Tutsis
who support the foreign minister will see Micom-
bero's failure to act as a further indication of
weakness.
Micombero has been able to rely on the support
of the key Tutsi army officers who helped bring him
to power. The present deterioration in his position,
however, could lead them to lose their confidence in
him and look for a replacement. Extremist Tutsis in
the government may encourage them to take just such
a step.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2004/0 6~if"gII DP79T00975A014800110001-5
NOTES
USSR-SALT? Several Soviet Foreign Ministry of-
ficials iave indicated that Moscow is having a dif-
ficult time deciding who will head its delegation
to the strategic awns limitation talks (SALT) ac-
cording to the US Embassy. First Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov had been considered the most
likely chief, but he is presently engaged in the
talks in Peking. There is speculation that the
choice may be Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov who
has been involved in bilateral discussions with the
US regarding a political settlement in the Middle
East. Meanwhile, the Moscow press has carried only
brief statements on the opening of SALT, without
editorial comment.
USSR: The Soviets are assembling the world'
most powerful laser
ecause o e
size and comp exity o t e apparatus and the extremely
short duration of the energy burst, the Soviet laser
has no weapon systems application, although the ex-
perience of building such a high energy laser may
add to Soviet research on military lasers. The de-
vice is designed for research in controlled thermo-
nuclear reactions--a possible future source of elec-
trical power--and is expected to be in operation by
January 1970. It will produce short bursts of en-
25X1
25X1
ergy at power :Levels 10 to
100
times higher than
those of a US laser which
was
publicly
announced
earlier this year and was
thought to be
the most
powerful in the world.
25X1
(continued)
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
 Approved For Release 2004/03CRI%FjDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
Albania: Tirana's interest in having "normal"
relations with "all neighboring states, irrespec-
tive of ideological and social order differences,"
was cited by Premier Mehmet Shehu during his speech
marking the 25th anniversary of the first Communist
regime in Albania. Shehu's remarks appear for the
first time to include Greece and Bulgaria and are
clearly intended to improve relations further with
Yugoslovia and Italy. Tirana has no diplomatic
ties with Greece, and Bulgaria only exchanges a
commercial representative with Albania. Italian-
Albanian relations are already relatively good.
Last April Tirana set aside polemics--at least tem-
porarily--with arch-enemy Yugoslavia, and declared
that Belgrade, along with Tirana and Bucharest, had
a common cause in he threat all three face from
the Soviet Union.
29 Oct 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 15
SECRET
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A014800110001-5
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
 SeC,tpproved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5
Secret
Approved For Release 2004/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO14800110001-5