CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A014900030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 5, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 4, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
4 November 1969
State Dept. review completed
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No. 0264/69
4 November 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
North Vietnam: There is evidence of policy differ-
ences in the post-Ho leadership. (Page 1)
Cambodia: The government's squabble with Sihanouk
may be aggravated. (Page 3)
Lebanon: The situation has eased since the cease-
fire went into effect on Sunday. (Page 5)
Somali Democratic Re ublic: The Council has named
its members an appointed a cabinet. (Page 6)
Colombia: The selection of the governing coalition's
presidential candidate remains open. (Page 7)
Libya: Attack on US Embassy (Page 8)
Venezuela: Student troubles (Page 9)
UN - Middle East: UNRWA debate (Page 9)
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*North Vietnam: A recent speech by North Viet-
nam's Party First Secretary Le Duan provides the
most explicit evidence to date suggestive of policy
differences in the post-Ho leadership.
An "abridged" version of the speech broadcast
on 31 October is the first time in two years that
Le Duan's views on the war in South Vietnam have
been aired in public. Le Duan seems to argue that
the war must retain its high priority until Commu-
nist objectives are achieved, but his words lack a
ring of authority and have a distinctly defensive
tone,
Le Duan may be fighting a rear-guard action on
behalf of his views. This idea is evident in his
plea for party unity. In one passage he noted that
divergent views, even between "two comrades in the
party," are perfectly normal. He insists, however,
that in order to maintain the "collective working
system," differences must be discussed and unanimity
achieved. It is inadvisable, he says, "to adopt: the
opinion of one person and force all others to follow
it." Such a statement suggests that Le Duan is pro-
testing the emergence of a new party strongman who
feels powerful enough to act without taking other
leaders' views into account.
Firm conclusions about the North Vietnamese
leadership cannot be drawn from this speech alone.
It suggests, however, that a serious contest for
control of the party has been under way. The other
main contestant for power probably is Truong Chinh,
the next ranking member of the party politburo,
whose views on the war and on domestic policy in
North Vietnam seem to have carried the day during
the past year. The fact that Le Duan's views have
been broadcast, however, suggests that he retains
considerable authority and that many policy and
leadership questions remain to be decided.
*The Director of The Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search, Department of State, believes that the Le
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Duan speech, although an unusual admission of di-
verging views within the Party, is not a clear in-
dication of the nature of those precise disagree-
ments or of the Level at which they exist. There
may well be disputes within the Politburo and pos-
sibly between Le Duan and Truong Chinh; however, we
have no firm knowledge of whether either Le Duan or
Truong Chinh has primary responsibility for any
specific policy Lines.
Neither the Le Duan speech nor the recent Truong
Chinh speeches provide evidence that they disagree
fundamentally either on domestic issues or on the
war in the South. For example, Truong Chinh in his
Last speech (broadcast October 19), Like Le Duan,
placed "the anti-US salvation resistance" (the war)
ahead of "socialist building" when he Listed the
"two revolutionary tasks."
Moreover, serious disagreements are not at this time
likely to be aired publicly since the Politburo is
acutely aware that both the "enemy" and its own rank
and file are Looking for divisions in the leadership
and would prefer not to provide fuel for such specu-
lation. Le Duan's references to such cadre short-
comings as joining the Party for "privileges and
special interests," and "abusing power...and dam-
aging the people's interests" strongly suggest that
his remarks were intended to apply primarily to the
Party level he was in fact addressing, the district
cadres of Haiphong's An Thuy District. His stress
on the importance of achieving "complete victory"'
in the South bolsters his case for Party unity and
is probably also intended to inspire a war-weary
population to make further sacrifices for the war.
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Cambodia. The government's squabble with
Prince Sihanouk may be aggravated by Prime Minis-
ter Lon Nol's departure for Paris.
Lon Nol left for France last week on a medi-
f absence,
cal
ome
observers in Phnom Penh see Lon No l's e i l prob-
lems as having political overtones. He may have
elected to slip away in order to avoid repercus-
sions from the deteriorating relations between the
Chief of State. and the cabinet.
In Lon Nol's absence, Deputy Prime Minister
Sirik Matak will head the cabinet. Matak, who has
led the government's fight to exert its independ-
ence from Sihanouk's interference, has been partic-
ularly irritating to the Chief of State. Lon Nol's
departure comes at an inopportune time in view of
his role as the buffer between Sihanouk and other
members of the government. His absence may thus
increase friction to the point where the cabinet's
tenure is in doubt.
Although the outcome of the current imbroglio
is far from certain, at the very least the govern-
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ment's economic reform program could be
affected.
Sihanouk believes
and trade policies
that the government's
have aggravated the
fiscal
country's
economic problems. The government may have to
yield some of its initiative on economic matters
in order to avoid a showdown with the prince.
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Lebanese Tapline Sabotaged After Fighting Ends
I SYR I A
Palestinian refugee camp
LEBANON
.LL Ba'labakk ,I
Beirut
41-
Sidon .1
Line sabotaged again
by fedayeen, 2 November
Tyre. AL
/.v
Tapline
Mount
Hermon
1
Damascus
S Y R I A
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Lebanon: The situation has eased since the
cease-fire went into effect on Sunday.
There were no official reports of cease-fire
violations yesterday as the Lebanese and fedayeen
negotiations move from Cairo to Beirut. Shortly
after the fighting came to end, however, Tapline
was sabotaged for the second time in a week near
the Lebanese port city of Sidon. Fedayeen from
the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front reportedly
had been planning such an incident.
The Palestinian refugee camps within the coun-
try remain a potential danger, although local lead-
ers of the Palestine Liberation Organization re
portedly are attempting to pacify the militants in
the camps. The Lebanese Army, for its part, is
trying i-r) ase its manpower.
over a thousand volunteers ave been
accepted for immediate military service.
(map)
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Somali Democratic Republic: The Revolution-
ary Council as f1naicl~y_ffis_cl+_sed its membership
and announced the appointment of a 14-man cabinet
to head the government ministries.
As expected, the 25-member council is domi-
nated by army officers who hold 20 seats; the re-
maining five are police officers. Army Commander
General Siad is president of the council and also
retains responsibility for defense matters. The
council has retained control over internal secu-
rity, local government, and the police.
The civilian members of the cabinet appear to
be young, educated, civil servants who have held
important posts in the bureaucracy but were not
politically involved with past governments. Gen-
eral Korshel, the police commander and a vice pres-
ident of the council, is in charge of the interior
ministry and is the sole military member in the
cabinet.
A possibly ominous sign for Somali-Ethiopian
relations is the appointment of Omar Arteh Galib
to be in charge of foreign affairs. Arteh was
formerly ambassador to Ethiopia and is well known
for his intense opposition to the detente policy
of former prime minister Egal. Although the Ethi-
opians are concerned over his appointment, the
Revolutionary Council itself has made tentative
efforts to assure Addis Ababa of its intention to
maintain good relations.
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Colombia: The governing National Front's se-
lectionof its presidential candidate this week
will not be a cut-and-dried affair.
Misael Pastrana's lead in the race for nomina-
tion by the Conservative Party convention tomorrow
is so slim that deals on behalf of several possible
choices reportedly are being prepared. The Liber-
als, who are partners with the Conservatives in the
National Front, will meet on Friday to approve the
coalition candidate. An internal power struggle
and suspicion of Conservative leader Ospina's in-
tentions will enliven the Liberals' convention.
Leaders of both parties apparently believe
that extension of the National Front's "share and
share alike" arrangement is best for both. They
have agreed on an extensive platform for the next
administration, and on Saturday will hold a joint
convention to proclaim the candidate and start the
campaign for elections to be held on 19 April 1970.
Other presidential candidates are ex-dictator
General Rojas Pinilla and maverick Conservative
Belisario Betancur, whose candidacy was proclaimed
last week by a "popular" Conservative convention..
Betancur's endorsement by ex-president Leon Valencia
is important but qualified by the latter's own am-
bitions to return to power if the occasion arises.
Betancur has accepted the National Front program,
however, and seems determined to try to enter the
fray at the regular convention. He has the support
of Colombia's largest labor union as well as the
students, the Christian Democrats. Cher small
groups. F77 I
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NOTES
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Libya: A mob attack which slightly damaged
the US Em assy in Tripoli Sunday appears to have
taken Libyan officials by surprise. The attack and
a somewhat more serious one on the UK Embassy grew
out of an officially encouraged demonstration pro-
testing the 52nd anniversary of the Balfour Declara-
tion which led to the establishment of Israel. Fol-
lowing an official protest by the US charge, Libyan
authorities took security precautions, which are
still in force, to prevent a repetition. The in-
cident reflects the intense anti-American and anti-
British feeling generated in the Arab world by the
allegations of US and UK support for Israel.
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Venezuela: The Central University in Caracas
remains quiet, but violence could erupt any time.
Government. officials decided to order the military
to occupy the campus after military leaders said
they would do it on their own if the government did
not act. Most Venezuelans approve the decision be-
cause they are alarmed over the deteriorating po-
litical situation caused by the disorder in the
congress, university unrest, and the national
teacher's strike. There are unconfirmed reports
that petroleum workers and the chauffeurs union
plan to strike in support of the teachers. Such a
sympathy strike could provide extremist student
leaders with an opportunity to generate student
participation and possible violence.
UN - Middle East: The principal debate on
the Middle East during the current session of the
UN General Assembly will probably arise next week
out of the discussion in the special political com-
mittee of the work of the UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA). Israel's refusal to permit a mass return
to the west bank of the Jordan River of persons
displaced by the 1967 war.is likely to be the Arabs'
point of departure for broader commentary. Tel
Aviv maintains that the danger of fedayeen infiltra-
tion has forced it to limit the return of displaced
persons and it will probably cite fedayeen opera-
tions from UNRWA camps in Jordan.
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