CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015100100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 11, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50,.-'."
11 December 1969
State Department review completed
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No. 0296/69
11 December 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Warsaw Pact: Eastern European representation in the
Pact's command structure was strengthened. (Page 1)
Libya: Arrests will likely put an end to any coup
plots. (Page 2)
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Portugal-Senegal: Lisbon is trying to force Senegal
to curb Portuguese-Guinean insurgents. (Page 5)
Dahomey: Yesterday's military coup is likely to com-
pound political and economic problems. (Page 6)
Venezuela: Persistent labor difficulties are posing
major problems. (Page 7)
Greece: The government is trying to avoid suspension
from the Council of Europe. (Page 8)
Albania-Greece: Tirana may be interested in improving
relations with Athens. (Page 9),
Finland: Prime Minister Koivisto's inability to oper-
ate under pressure may scuttle NORDEC. (Page 10)
Southeast Asia: ASEAN members will meet for talks
about mutual cooperation. (Page 11)
Laos: Communist road construction (Page 13)
USSR - Communist China: Peking talks (Page 13)
USSR: Natural gas sales (Page 14)
Italy: Talks with Peking (Page 14)
UN-Cyprus: Peacekeeping (Page 14)
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Warsaw Pact: The strengthening of Eastern Eu-
ropean representation in the Pact's command structure
may have been the main topic of the meeting in Moscow
which ended yesterday.
According to TASS, a two-day Warsaw Pact "mili-
tary council" session was chaired by Marshal Yakubov-
sky, the commander in chief of the joint forces.
This is the first time that such a council has been
mentioned in public and its composition remains un-
known. The only Pact defense minister known to be
in Moscow is the Romanian, Ionita, who is accompanied
by six senior generals, one or more of whom may have
attended the meeting.
The inclusion of additional Eastern European
members in the command structure was agreed to at a
Pact summit meeting in Budapest in March 1969. The
council may have been created at that time. Through-
out the year, there have been numerous consultations
in Moscow, perhaps on this subject, but so far little
has been revealed about implementing the decision.
There have also been rumors that certain Eastern Eu-
ropean military leaders would be transferred to Mos-
cow for Pact duty. In addition there is another un-
verified report that a building to house the joint
staff is being constructed in Moscow.
Next year's Pact maneuvers may also have been
a topic at the meeting because the TASS announcement
said that training was discussed. The use of the
phrase "full agreement" on all questions discussed
may mean that Romania was successful in keeping the
Pact from scheduling training exercises on its soil.
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C Libya: The Revolutionary Command Council has
moved to crush an anti-Egyptian army faction that
was planning to seize control of the government.
Two members of the junta, Defense Minister
Hawwaz and Minister of Interior Ahmad have been ar-
rested for plotting to overthrow the junta. Recent
reports have indicated that both men were concerned
over the growing influence of Egypt in Libyan af-
fairs. They reportedly feared council President
Qaddafi, who was said to have been negotiating with
Egypt and the Sudan to form a union, was striving
to place Libya under complete Egyptian domination.
In announcing the arrest of Hawwaz and Ahmad,
the council labeled them as part of a traitorous,
superfluous, ignorant, and ossified clique that did
not understand the concept of the Libyan revolution.
It added that the clique was supported and manipu-
lated by foreign powers to harm the Libyan people.
I the council
earlier is wee also rounded up approximately 100
army and police officers who were presumably part
of the same coup-plotting group. The arrest of the
officers serves to dampen any enthusiasm for coup
plotting that may have been developing in the army.
More importantly, their arrest and that of such key
figures as Hawwaz and Ahmad indicates that any ef-
fective threat against the junta has apparently now
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Portugal Attempting to C
Dakar
Bathurst.
Insurgents Based in Senegal
Portuguese forces from 8rgene shell
Sene~arese town for second time
Bigene
PORTUGUESE
GUINEA
Bissau
'C7
Conakry,
SIERRA
LEONE
Freetown
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Portugal-Sene al: Portugal is trying to force
the Senegaese to curb the activities of Portuguese
Guinean insurgents who operate from Senegal.
On two recent occasions Portuguese forces, en-
gaged in an increasingly active guerrilla war in
Portuguese Guinea, shelled a southern Senegalese
border town located near an insurgent supply depot.
The second shelling occurred while the UN Security
Council was considering a resolution condemning
Portugal for the first attack. Although the council
condemned Lisbon, the Portuguese may continue to
attack Senegalese border towns.
President Senghor has in the past restricted
the activities of the insurgents, but he is unlikely
to deny them use of Senegalese territory. Senghor
is also under considerable pressure, both domestic
and foreign, not to give in to the Portuguese.
(map)
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Dahomey: Yesterday's military coup is likely
to compound Dahomey's numerous political and economic
problems.
Army chief of staff Lieutenant Colonel Kouandete
is in control in Cotonou, although full details are
still lacking on the coup and all those involved.
the coup was triggered
prematurely when the plotters learned that President
Zinsou was aware of their plans and about to take
countermeasures. Zinsou was taken by soldiers to an
undisclosed location.
Colonel Kouandete has publicly appealed to all
former Dahomean leaders to return home. The reasons
for the appeal are unclear, but the return of the
three regional leaders who jostled for control of
the government before they were exiled in 1965 would
aggravate political tensions.
Even without the return of these three men, the
coup could easily spell further trouble for this
poverty-stricken former French colony. Kouandete,
an opportunist with no known ideological moorings,
has many enemies even within the army, some of whom
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It seems unlikely that he or
any other Dahomean could make more progress than
Zinsou with the overwhelming political and economic
problems that have plagued Dahomey since independence
nine years ago.
In addition, the economic situation could become
further complicated if the French react strongly to
the coup, the fifth in six years. Following the last
military takeover two years ago, which was also led
by Kouandete, the French temporarily suspended all
direct financial subsidies, plunging the country in-
to near bankruptcy. F7 I
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Venezuela: Persistent labor difficulties are
posing major problems for the Caldera government.
Labor leaders in the eastern state of Bolivar
have decided to call a general strike in support of
a week-old walkout by 6,000 iron and steel workers.
Moreover, there are signs that workers of the Vene-
zuelan Electrical Federation in Caracas also will
go on strike because of disagreements on contract
proposals.
The administration has a record of giving in to
salary demands. Several weeks ago striking teachers
won a 45-percent salary increase, a precedent that
was sure to open the way for demands for similar wage
increases.
The government is in a tough mood now, however,
and has arrested two key labor leaders. In view of
continued worker intransigence and the threat of a
general strike, President Caldera may use the army to
protect plant facilities and to maintain order. When
the army occupied the Central University in Caracas
in late October, public response to the move was gen-
erally favorable.
Caldera probably views his strong stand as a way
to stem the growing labor and student difficulties.
Moreover, he probably hopes that it also will pacify
the military which has become more restive in recent
weeks.
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Greece: The government is preparing its case
to avoid s su pension from the Council of Europe at
the meeting this weekend.
In the past two weeks, the regime has increased
its efforts to counter the argument from some council
members that Greece should be expelled for violation
of human rights and failure to move toward constitu-
tional government. Foreign Minister Pipinelis has
stated his determination to keep Greece in the coun-
cil and may try to hold up the voting on a procedural
basis before the Scandinavians introduce their draft
resolution for suspension.
Several other options, however, have come to
the fore. A Swiss-Austrian formula calls for the
expulsion of Greece on a suspended basis. If the
regime shows no progress toward constitutional gov-
ernment within a certain period, the expulsion would
become effective. The council may also decide to re-
view the report of the Human Rights Commission. This
would automatically delay a decision for at least
three months.
meanwhile, progovernment newspapers in Athens
are attacking the British for a leak by the London
Times of the council's report on conditions in Greece.
They assert that Britain has violated the secrecy
commitments of the council and that the British press
distorted the report to the detriment of Greece. A
few days after the British article appeared, the
Greek Government announced the submission of 11 draft
laws--one governing the formation of political par-
ties--as proof of its intention to move toward con-
stitutional government.
Some council members are arguing that Greece's
expulsion from the council could cause serious reper-
cussions in NATO. Greece also will emphasize its
strategic importance to the security of Europe. But
should suspension seem certain, Greece w uld probably
resi n to avoid further embarrassment.
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Albania-Greece: Albania's failure to react to
a recent Greek ostile outburst may mean that Tirana
is interested in improving relations with Athens.
The tirade, by a member of the Greek ruling
junta, restated Athens' claims to southern Albania,
where the Greek minority is concentrated. One Yugo-
slav diplomat on the scene expressed concern that
the controversy over the speech would dampen chances
of a future rapprochement between Tirana and Athens.
The Greek Government, however, disavowed the speech.
Greece and Albania do not now have relations;
the two are technically still at war because no
peace treaty has been signed since World War II.
Belgrade believes Tirana's recent moves to end its
self-imposed isolation signify a willingness to
"improve" relations with Greece. A Yugoslav diplo-
mat in Athens believes he has detected some recip-
rocal sentiment in the Greek Foreign Ministry. Ath-
ens has recently taken a new look at its Balkan
neighbors and in this context Yugoslavia reportedly
has been quietly encouraging Greeks who favor a
softer stance toward Albania so that the opportunity
is not lost.
Reports during the last year that Albania was
considering increasing contacts with Greece have
been flatly denied by Tirana. Now, however, Alba-
nian leaders are saying they are interested in good
relations with all neighbors, "despite differences
in social systems."
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Finland: The inability of Finnish Prime Min-
ister Koi sto to operate under pressure has damaged
him politically and may scuttle the Nordic Economic
Union (NORDEC), as now proposed.
The prime ministers of Finland, Sweden, Norway,
and Denmark had been scheduled to meet in Finland in
mid-December to try to settle their remaining dif-
ferences over NORDEC. Without consulting the other
governments, the Finns late last week abruptly an-
nounced that the meeting was off. They used the ex-
cuse that no further action should be taken on NORDEC
until the relationship of Denmark and Norway to the
European Communities was clarified.
After the other Nordic governments berated Hel-
sinki for its move and Finnish President Kekkonen
decided that a Nordic meeting was essential, the
government announced that a conference would be held
on Friday, but only to discuss Finland's current at-
titude toward NORDEC. Koivisto pointed out that a
lack of unity within the government prevented further
Finnish NORDEC negotiations. Any decision about re-
suming a role in NORDEC would have to be made by the
government installed after parliamentary elections
next March.
Koivisto had earlier received considerable fa-
vorable publicity for his warm advocacy of full Finn-
ish participation in NORDEC. For this reason he has
provoked the enmity of Foreign Minister Karjalainen,
who has long had a stranglehold on the conduct of
Finnish foreign relations. With no political experi-
ence before 1966, Koivisto has been unable to cope
with Karjalainen's infighting and has found the
rough-and-tumble of Finnish politics particularly
bruising.
On several occasions Koivisto has made emotional
statements deploring the fractious nature of the gov-
ernment coalition and more than once has threatened
to resign. He has already announced that he will not
serve as prime minister after the March elections.
In the wake of his most recent performance, there is
doubt whether he would even be asked.
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Southeast Asia: The member states of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at
their ministerial meeting next week can be expected
to talk warmly of mutual cooperation but do little
else.
The development of ASEAN, established by
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand in August 1967 primarily to foster
mutual economic, cultural, and technical cooperation,
has been hindered by frictions such as the Malay-
sian-Philippine quarrel over the sovereignty of
Sabah. While member nations are anxious to develop
new regional ties, ASEAN is still barely off the
ground.
Dissension over the presence of foreign ob-
servers at next week's meeting in Kuala Lumpur may
further jeopardize ASEAN's progress. Malaysia,
the host for the conclave on 16-18 December, has
invited Laos and will probably invite South Vietnam
to send observers, despite objections by Singapore
and Indonesia that either both Hanoi and Saigon be
invited or both be excluded. Malaysia is adamant
that North Vietnam be excluded. The problem may be
resolved if any observers who attend are allowed to
sit in on only the opening ceremonies.
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 AREA CHINA
OF
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NORTH
VIETNAM w-
ommu nist Road Construction Proceeds Rapidly
BURMA
Muong sihC
. \
""thew motorable
Barr
H6uei
\ Sai
0 15
Statute MTIec
96893 12-69 CIA
Phong Sall
rtoad Muon
S. _ aA Sai
Muong
Bert
Muong Houn
VaNeY
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Laos: Communist road construction in the
north-
west
is moving ahead at a rapid pace. Chinese
engi-
neers
have extended the motorable limit of the
new
road
southwest of Muong Sai some ten miles in
little
over one week
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Within a two-month period, approximately
27 miles of new road have been constructed. Chinese
engineers have claimed that the road would be com-
leted to Muona Houn by May 19 70
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With the road now a way to Muong
Houn, the Chinese official's estimate would appear
somewhat conservative. There is no evidence at this
time of road construction activity south of Muong
Houn. (Map)
USSR - Communist China: The editor of the jour-
nal of Moscow's institute for US studies, Berezhkov,
has told a US Embassy official that First Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov may soon leave the Peking
talks. Commenting that "two months" of negotiations
at the vice-minister level was enough, Berezhkov said
that the question of reducing the talks to a lower
level is now being discussed in Peking. Berezhkov
has proved well informed in the past, and his remarks
add credibility to previous speculation that Kuznet-
sov, who had been expected to lead the SALT talks,
will soon be returning. Lowering the level of the
talks would probably mean that both sides feel they
have clearly laid out their basic positions and rec-
ognize that the continuing negotiations will be slow
(continued)
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USSR: Moscow has made a major breakthrough in
sales of natural gas to western Eurgpe after several
years of on and off negotiations. the USSR and Italy
signed a 20-year agreement on 10 December for the ex-
change of Soviet natural gas for steel, pipe and other
equipment. A similar agreement is to be signed with
West Germany in January and discussions have been
held with France. The USSR will not supply any gas
to these markets until the early 1970s. Moscow will,
however, receive Western credits for the immediate
import of critically needed large diameter pipe to
expand its long-distance oil and gas pipeline net-
works. These deals come at a time when Soviet hard
currency earnings are lagging, largely as a result
of the leveling off of petroleum deliveries to the
West.
Italy: Rome's talks with Pek:ng, suspended for
several months, will be resumed shortly, according
to Italian Ambassador Ortona in Washington. Italy
is prepared to recognize Peking as the only govern-
ment of China, but it is not willing to accept Pe-
king's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. At the
United Nations this fall, Italy made its long-planned
shift from opposition to abstention on the annual
resolution to expel Nationalist China, a move designed
to help negotiations with Peking.
UN-Cyprus: The Security Council meets today to
discuss Secretary General Thant's report on UN peace-
keeping operations in Cyprus and to consider extend-
ing the stay of the UN force in Cyprus. Thant con-
cluded that solutions of Greek Cypriot - Turkish
Cypriot communal differences are "still not in sight"
and thus saw "no reasonable alternative" to an exten-
sion of the force mandate. An appendix to his report
suggests a reorganization that could lead to a fairly
sizable troop reduction and meaningful financial
savings. The Council is expected to approve an ex-
tension for six months.
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