CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A015300010003-8
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
10
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 26, 2002
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 30, 1969
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A015300010003-8.pdf222.95 KB
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Approved For Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975A01538j"8 Ulu 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret 50. 30 December 1969 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015300010003-8 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Approved For Release 2003/(Mib]AlkDP79T00975A015300010003-8 No. 0312/69 30 December 1969 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS 25X6 North Vietnam: Defense Minister Giap provides clues to Hanoi's ong-term military strategy. (Page 2) 25X6 Israel: Military exercises (Page 5) Ethiopia: Student disturbances (Page 5) USSR-Brazil: Aircraft landing rights (Page 6) USSR-Yugoslavia: Trade protocol delay (Page 6) SECRET Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015300010003-8 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Approved For Release 2003tF9&RBT-RDP79T00975A015300010003-8 North Vietnam; A long new article on the war by Defense Minister Giap, although not a blueprint of Communist military tactics, does provide some of the most authoritative clues to Hanoi's longer term strategy in soipe time. Writing on the occasion of the army's 25th anni- versary in .date December, Giap strongly suggests that in the next few months the Communists will try to maintain a credible military threat and to prepare for whatever opportunities may come their way in the course of further protracted warfare. Giap repeat- edly stresses the need for the Communists to preserve and to build their forces, to safeguard rural base areas, and to be ready to exploit allied military and political vulnerabilities as they may appear. Giap calls for continued strong military action by the Communists. His emphasis on fundamentals, however, and on ensuring that adequate political pre- parations precede climactic phases of the struggle suggests that Hanoi does not believe the time is ripe for an across-the-board challenge to the allied po- sition in South Vietnam through an all-out military effort. Although Giap keeps this option open in case a suitable opportunity arises, he seems to see this as a contingency well down the road and implies that the proper Communist course at the moment is essen- tially to play for time. As he has in the past, Giap stresses guerrilla warfare during all phases of the struggle, but he also gives prominent play to the need for big-unit action and for such tactics as attacks on cities. Giap makes clear,. however, that main force operations and urban attacks must be carried out "rationally"-- that is, not in ways that will decimate Communist forces and undercut their capabilities for dragging out the war indefinitely. (continued) 30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET Approved For Release 2003/@RR9R(R DP79T00975A015300010003-8 Giap's article is in line with other evidence that the Communists are now concentrating on trying to protect their assets in South Vietnam and to im- prove their over-all position for the longer term struggle. In this regard, Giap seems to echo the gradual, step-by-step strategy for the war that was set forth by Hanoi after the costly 1968 offensives and that has been reflected in Communist. military tactics in South Vietnam since last !E 30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 25X1 25X6 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Approved For Release 2003/g j RDP79T00975A015300010003-8 Israel: The armed forces began major military exercis es in the Sinai on 29 December. The maneu- vers will last for several days. Since taking Sinai, the Israelis have often conducted exercises in the peninsula and are building elaborate defen- sive positions along the Suez Canal and at the en- trance to the Gulf of Aqaba. There are no indica- tions that the exercises are a prelude to a major thrust into Egypt, bu the probably are intended to impress the Arabs. 25X1 25X1 Ethiopia: Several students were killed yester- day in a clash with police at Haile Selassie Univer- sity in Addis Ababa. The students had gathered on the campus following the murder of the recently elected president of the student union by unknown assailants on 28 December. Although tension between the students and the government has been building gradually since the university opened last fall, the hard-core radicals have been unable so far to provoke any new crisis in their continuing anti- government campaign. This latest incident, however, is likely to provide them with the necessary.ammuni- on to initiate a new round of student disturbances. ~continuea) 25X1 30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 SECRET 25X1 I 25X1 25X1 25X1 USSR-Brazil: The two countries are discussing landing rights in Rio de Janeiro of the Soviet air- line Aeroflot Un er the proposed agreement, the Soviets, who hope to fly weekly between Rio and Moscow, would grant reciprocal rights to Varig, the international air- line of Brazil. The USSR. reportedly already has concluded a deal with the Rolls Royce Company in Sao Paulo to service the engines of Aeroflot air- craft in Latin America and the engines of all Soviet civil aircraft sold there. Cuba is now the only country in Latin America where Aeroflot flies, but recently the French gave the Soviet company onward rights from Paris to both North and South America. USSR-Yu gos lavia: The negotiation of the an- nual Yugosla v-S oviet trade protocol for 1970 has been delayed L ast ye ar's trade talks we're started so I-a-Te-tliat the protocol was not signed until April. The delay was attributed in part to Moscow's unhappiness over Tito's outspoken opposition to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This year's postponement may have resulted from differences between Yugoslav negotiators who wish to expand direct enterprise-to-enterprise trade and Soviet negotiators who prefer to stick closely to the more restrictive commodity lists provided in the 1966-70 long-term trade ac/reement. 30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 SecI .oved For Release 2003/01/29: CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8 Secret Approved For Release 2003/01/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO15300010003-8