CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015300010003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 30, 1969
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50.
30 December 1969
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No. 0312/69
30 December 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
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North Vietnam: Defense Minister Giap provides clues
to Hanoi's ong-term military strategy. (Page 2)
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Israel: Military exercises (Page 5)
Ethiopia: Student disturbances (Page 5)
USSR-Brazil: Aircraft landing rights (Page 6)
USSR-Yugoslavia: Trade protocol delay (Page 6)
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North Vietnam; A long new article on the war
by Defense Minister Giap, although not a blueprint
of Communist military tactics, does provide some of
the most authoritative clues to Hanoi's longer term
strategy in soipe time.
Writing on the occasion of the army's 25th anni-
versary in .date December, Giap strongly suggests that
in the next few months the Communists will try to
maintain a credible military threat and to prepare
for whatever opportunities may come their way in the
course of further protracted warfare. Giap repeat-
edly stresses the need for the Communists to preserve
and to build their forces, to safeguard rural base
areas, and to be ready to exploit allied military and
political vulnerabilities as they may appear.
Giap calls for continued strong military action
by the Communists. His emphasis on fundamentals,
however, and on ensuring that adequate political pre-
parations precede climactic phases of the struggle
suggests that Hanoi does not believe the time is ripe
for an across-the-board challenge to the allied po-
sition in South Vietnam through an all-out military
effort. Although Giap keeps this option open in case
a suitable opportunity arises, he seems to see this
as a contingency well down the road and implies that
the proper Communist course at the moment is essen-
tially to play for time.
As he has in the past, Giap stresses guerrilla
warfare during all phases of the struggle, but he
also gives prominent play to the need for big-unit
action and for such tactics as attacks on cities.
Giap makes clear,. however, that main force operations
and urban attacks must be carried out "rationally"--
that is, not in ways that will decimate Communist
forces and undercut their capabilities for dragging
out the war indefinitely.
(continued)
30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Giap's article is in line with other evidence
that the Communists are now concentrating on trying
to protect their assets in South Vietnam and to im-
prove their over-all position for the longer term
struggle. In this regard, Giap seems to echo the
gradual, step-by-step strategy for the war that was
set forth by Hanoi after the costly 1968 offensives
and that has been reflected in Communist. military
tactics in South Vietnam since last !E
30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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Israel: The armed forces began major military
exercis es in the Sinai on 29 December. The maneu-
vers will last for several days. Since taking
Sinai, the Israelis have often conducted exercises
in the peninsula and are building elaborate defen-
sive positions along the Suez Canal and at the en-
trance to the Gulf of Aqaba. There are no indica-
tions that the exercises are a prelude to a major
thrust into Egypt, bu the probably are intended
to impress the Arabs.
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Ethiopia: Several students were killed yester-
day in a clash with police at Haile Selassie Univer-
sity in Addis Ababa. The students had gathered on
the campus following the murder of the recently
elected president of the student union by unknown
assailants on 28 December. Although tension between
the students and the government has been building
gradually since the university opened last fall,
the hard-core radicals have been unable so far to
provoke any new crisis in their continuing anti-
government campaign. This latest incident, however,
is likely to provide them with the necessary.ammuni-
on to initiate a new round of student disturbances.
~continuea) 25X1
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USSR-Brazil: The two countries are discussing
landing rights in Rio de Janeiro of the Soviet air-
line Aeroflot
Un er the proposed agreement, the Soviets, who hope
to fly weekly between Rio and Moscow, would grant
reciprocal rights to Varig, the international air-
line of Brazil. The USSR. reportedly already has
concluded a deal with the Rolls Royce Company in
Sao Paulo to service the engines of Aeroflot air-
craft in Latin America and the engines of all Soviet
civil aircraft sold there. Cuba is now the only
country in Latin America where Aeroflot flies, but
recently the French gave the Soviet company onward
rights from Paris to both North and South America.
USSR-Yu
gos
lavia:
The negotiation of the an-
nual Yugosla
v-S
oviet
trade protocol for 1970 has
been delayed
L
ast ye
ar's trade talks we're started
so I-a-Te-tliat the protocol was not signed until
April. The delay was attributed in part to Moscow's
unhappiness over Tito's outspoken opposition to the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. This year's
postponement may have resulted from differences
between Yugoslav negotiators who wish to expand
direct enterprise-to-enterprise trade and Soviet
negotiators who prefer to stick closely to the more
restrictive commodity lists provided in the 1966-70
long-term trade ac/reement.
30 Dec 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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