CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015500020001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 27, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 30, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
30 January 1970
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No. 0026/70
30 January 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
corrTE~rTs
Vietnam: Le Duc Tho is on his way back to Paris.
Page 1)
Czechoslovakia: Husak is still trying to satisfy
Soviet requirements without reversion to Stalinist
repression. (Page 3)
Belgium: Walloon and Flemish differences continue
to threaten the coalition. (Page 4)
Greece: Athens wants to offset its trade deficit
with Communist countries. (Page 5)
Rhodesia?Zambia: Ian Smith has publicly warned Zam-
bia against continuing its assistance to guerrillas.
(Page 6 )
Costa Rica: The elections on Sunday could produce
a surprise. (Page 7)
Italye Coalition (Page 8)
Poland-Iraq: Sulfur (Page 8)
India: Disputed city (Page 9)
Dominican Re~ubliC: Student dissent (Page 9)
NATO: Travel documents (Page 9)
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Vietnam: Hanoi's high.-level negotiator, polit-
buro member Le Duc Tho, is on his way back to Paris.
According to the Communist press, Tho is re-
turning to the French capital, after some seven
months in Hanoi., ~o attend the 19th Congress of the
French Communist Party next week, The Western
press, however, has already begun to speculate that
his trip shows a renewed interest by Hanoi in the
negotiat.ionso
This speculation is probably exactly what the
Communists have in mind. They may calculate that
Tho's presence in Paris will generate interest in,
and pressure for, naming a successor to Ambassador
Lodge. Communist intransigence in recent months
has facilitated US and South Vietnamese efforts to
show that progress in the negotiations is only pos-
sible if the Communists show some flexibility.
Hanoi i.s anxious to counter this impression and to
put the onus for the lack of progress back on the
US.
There is probably more than this to Le Duc
Tho's return, however. The Chinese Communists made
no comment when he transited Peking, suggesting
that, aid least in Chinese eyes, his return to Paris
is directly associated with. the talks. When Tho
returned to Paris last spring after several months
in Hanoi, i.t was only a matter of days before the
Vietnamese Communists introduced their ten-point
peace proposal. This time, however, the official
pretext for Tho's trip could be used to explain his
visit if it results in no new initiatives. Tho's
return to Paris may well signal the conclusion of
another round of Hanoi policy deliberations, and he
is probably bringing the latest Communist plans for
both the war and the negotiations to the Paris ne-
gotiating team.
(,continued)
30 Jan 'ZO Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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Tho probably would not participate directly in
the talks unless Washington appointed a new chief
for the US delegation. Xuan Thuy, the head of the
Hanoi delegation, has boycotted the talks since Am-
bassador Lodge left. Tho's presence in Paris may
mean, however, that the Communists intend to make
greater use of the Paris talks to further their ob-
jectives in South Vietnam than they have in the past
30 Jan 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Czechoslovakian The latest developments at the
party central committee plenum indicate that Husak
is still trying to satisfy Soviet requirements with-
out a full reversion to Stalinist repression.
A l2-member party commission has been set up to
oversee a program for revalidating the credentials of
each party member. The commission is dominated by
prominent pro-Soviet conservatives, which suggests
that substantial numbers of party members will be
dropped during the coming year.
Husak appears determined, however, that those
dropped shall not be subject to prosecution, An
article in yesterday's major party daily instructed
the membership that the changes are a concerted effort
to assemble a more efficient and unified regime rather
than an act of revenge. The new federal minister of
interior--a crucial position at present--reportedly
is Husak's personal choice.
The central committee has also streamlined the
federal government apparatus in an effort to cope with
its economic problems. Five ministers-and one deputy
premier with expertise in economic and technical
fields are included in a reorganized cabinet. In
addition, the federal post of "state secretary" has
been abolished, removing a bureaucx?atic level that
had been dreated to give minority Slovaks equal rep-
resentation in the Czechoslovak cabinet.
3 0 Jan 7 0 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Belgium: Walloon and Flemish :differences con-
tinue to threaten Prime Minister Eyskens' Social
Christian - Socialist coalition.
The latest challenge comes from the leaders of
the Walloon branch of Eyskens` own Social Christian
Party. They have threatened to resign from the cab-
inet if it cannot soon agree on solutions to two
vexatious issues and present them to parliament by
mid-February. They have failed to carry out such
threats in the past, however, and may back down
again.
The issues concern broadly the relationship be-
tween Belgium's Flemish and Walloon communities, and
specifically the status of minority Flemings in Brus-
sels and minority Walloons in its suburbs. No gov-
ernment in the past decade has been able to muster
the necessary votes in parliament behind any proposed
solution to the competing political interests. The
latest effort, in an extraparliamentary committee,
failed last fall.
Moreover, the government since early January
has been faced with wildcat strikes in the depressed
coal mines of Limburg Province, where the strikers
have been influenced by militant Flemish nationalists,
radical students, and anti-establishment clergy.
Many Belgians see a parallel with the strikes of
1960-61, which brought down Eyskens' last coalition.
Eyskens' chances of muddling through rest on
his ability to sidetrack contentious issues and on
the aversion of the major parties to a national
election at a time when militant nationalist parties
3 0 Jan 7 0 Central Intelli~eylce Bulletin
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Greece: Recent moves to expand trade with Com-
munist countries are designed primarily to offset a
widening trade deficit. They do not herald a funda-
mental change in Greek foreign policy, but provide
the junta with a means for venting .its irritation
over Western criticism.
Greece would like to increase exports of sur-
plus tobacco and citrus fruit to the USSR and East-
ern Europe to offset a trade deficit with these
countries that probably .rose from $20 million in
:1968 to $25 million in 1969. Moreover, the share
of exports to these countries fell from 24 percent
of total exports in 1966 to 17 per cent in the first
half of 1969. The USSR and Eastern Europe are often
prepared to accept agricultural products in payment
for capital goods, but prospects for greatly e.x-
panded trade appear limited,
The recently signed Greek-Soviet. trade agree-
ment for the first time lowered tariffs on certain
Soviet-manufactured goods.
5ov~et tra e with
Greece has declined since 1966. Last year's trade
probably remained in the neighborhood of the $50
million recorded in 1968.
Greece thus far has taken only limited steps
to increase i,ts trade with Eastern Europe. Athens
has concluded an agreemexat with Albania that envis-
ages annual trade of only about $l.5 million. It
has raised its credit ceiling to Bulgaria by $2.5
million to cover exports of citrus products a. Greece
also has announced its intention to estab lisp a
chamber of commerce mission in East Germany to pro-
mote the sale of its products
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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.Rhodesia-Zambia: Prime Minister Ian Smith has
publicly warned the Zambian Government against con-
tinuing its assistance to guerrillas,
Smith's warning, his strongest. to date, comes
two weeks after dramatic and well-publicized raids
by Rhodesian nationalists on a border police post
and the airport at Victoria Falls, Smith was under
pressure then to strike back militarily against
Zambia, where the guerrillas have their staging
bases, He seems to have decided not to take any
action this time. If another similar incident oc-
curs, however, he will probably feel. compelled to
retaliate.
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Rhodesia has a number of options available, It
could close down its rail service to Zambia, on which
the Zambians depend heavily to export their copper,
It could cut off power from the Karib a dam, on which
Zambia relies for most of its electricity, Rhodesian
military forces could even attack the guerrilla camps
just inside Zambia with impunity.
Smith would probably prefer to avoid the unfav-
orable publicity and international pressures that:
would result from a military strike. His veiled
threat of retaliation will probably be enough, haw-
ever, to prompt the Zambians to press the Rhodesian
nationalists to curtai ctivities at least
temporarily,
30 Jan 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Costa Rica: The unusually large number of can-
didates and parties in Sunday's general .elections
increases the possibility of a surprise outcome.
Jose "Pepe" Figueres has held his lead in the
presidential race because of the disunity of the for-
ces opposed to his opposition National Liberation
Party. In addition, Costa Rica has a recent tradi-
tion of replacing the party in power. Nevertheless,
the other major candidate, Mario Echandi of the Na-
tional Unification Party, has made gains by charging
that Figueres and his party are aligned with the Com-
munists. Because a number of minor parties, including
the Christian Democrats and a Communist front group,
are in the race, it is possible that no candidate will
win the 40-percent plurality that is required for the
presidency.
The traditionally vitriolic contest has been
particularly abusive this year because the campaign
has focused on the competition between Figueres and
Echandi, who are long-time political rivals and ex-
presidents. The slanderous accusations that have
been exchanged promise an extended period of national
disunity.
Civil guard units have been put on alert in
anticipation of possible armed action by hothead
elements on the losing side. Both major parties
are confident of winning, and either will find it
difficult to accept defeat gracefully
Adding to the potential far postelection vio-
lence, a Communist front group is likely to win at
least one seat in the legislature- -a development
which rightist paramilitary groups have threatened
to protest forcefully.
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iVOTES
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Italy: The four center-left parties--the
Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the right-wing
Unitary Socialists, and the Republicans--have made
progress toward an agreement on the general princi-
ples for a new coalition government. If the execu-
tive directorates of the four parties approve an
agreement, Prime Minister Rumor could resign as
early as 31 January. Some weeks of further negotia-
tion on government posts and details of the coali-
tion's program would probably be necessary before
Poland-Iraq: The first shipment of Polish
equipment for exploiting sulfur deposits at Mishraq
was sent to Iraq in mid-January. Poland agreed last
May to develop these mines under a contract valued
a-~. $30 million. The mines, scheduled to be completed
a.n three years, are expected to have an annual out-
put of nearly 1.3 million tons, With the development
of these mines Iraq will become a ma'or world ro-
ducer of sulfur.
(continued)
30 Jan 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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India: Mrs. Gandhi's announcement that the dis-
puted city of Chandigarh will be given to the Punjab
should avert disturbances in that northwestern state.
The city has served as the joint capital of the Pun-
jab and Haryana, which also claimed Chandigarh, since
1967. Despite such concessions to Haryana as finan-
cial help to build a new capital and the transfer of
some land from the Punjab, a violent reaction to the
announcement is possible in Haryana and in Chandigarh.
* * ~
Dominican Republic: Dissident groups have
seized upon the continued unexplained disappearances
of government opponents to initiate student protests
around the country this week. Secondary school
youths, responsive to Communist-led organizations,
have come out in considerable numbers, and police
have been confronted with widespread disturbances.
The theme of alleged government repression will con-
tinue to generate unrest during the period preceding
the May presidential elections, but the police have
proven tough, generally effective, and more than
willing to do battle with students. President Bala-
guer is probably ready to employ harsh measures if
necessary to maintain the relative stability that has
characterized his administration.
* * ~
NATO: The North Atlantic Council, meeting on
28 January, agreed in principle to the suspension of
the temporary travel document (TTD) system regulating
the entry of East German nationals into Allied coun-
tries. The agreement was based upon terms proposed
by the US, UK, France, and West Germany, suggesting
that the suspension be implemented some time before
the NATO ministerial meeting in May, but not until
the Soviet response to the tripartite sounding on
Berlin has been reviewed. As expected, Denmark stated
its intention to dissociate itself from the TTD sys-
tem on 3roblemhwillabelreaddressed'b pthesCouncil on
timing p
25 February.
3 0 J an 7 0 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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