CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 8, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

?
25X1
? Approved ForRelease 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00973#1015906eOpet
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
STATE review(s) completed.
Secret
51
8 April 1970
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved Forltease 2003/0?ECI6AIDP79T009754015900110001-3
No. 0084/70
8 April 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Israel The introduction of SA-3 missiles into Egypt
has raised uncertainty over Soviet intentions. (Page 1)
Laos: Communist forces have begun to move against
Bouam Long. (Page 3)
South Vietnam: Political discontent and agitation in
TagiSTare again on the rise. (Page 4)
USSR - Communist China: Soviet officials say the two
countries have agreed to exchange ambassadors. (Page 5)
Hungarz: The regime has received an endorsement from
the Soviet leadership. (Page 6)
Argentina: The government intends to seek OAS action
to help curb terrorism. (Page 7)
Guyana Burnham plans to give his new economic pro-
gram a strongly nationalistic bent. (Page 8)
Panama A The government is intensifying its efforts
to gain popular support. (Page 9)
Tunisia: The treason trial of a former official may
pose new problems for the government. (Page 10)
Trinidad-Tobago - Caribbean: Black power (Page 11)
Uruguay: Robbery (Page 11)
Burma: Economic problems (Page 11)
Approved For Release 2003/Kft9IRDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved Forvaialease 200Stii&KEI-RDP79T009754015900110001-3
Israel: ElThe introduction of SA-3 missiles into
Egypt has raised uncertainty in Israel over Soviet
intentions and as provoked a wide-ranging debate on
future actions.
Israeli leaders had assumed that the Soviet Union
woul move cautiously in the Middle East and would
avoid getting directly involved in the fighting. US
Ambassador Barbour believes Tel Aviv now is less
certain of this. Fears are being expressed that Moscow
may be drawn into the conflict despite itself, creating
a spiral of involvement that neither Israel nor the
USSR wants.)
Upie thesis that Israel could handle the situation
by itself is getting less publicity now. There is
more emphasis on the need for US support and a US
warning to the Soviets against greater involvementij
Lhere is a consensus among the Israeli leader-
ship and public, however, that air superiority must
be maintained over the Suez Canal area in order to
keep Nasir from any military adventures. There is
general agreement that the canal and the area im-
mediately west of it must be left free of SA-3s or
any other effective air defense system.)
LSuch top leaders as Prime Minister Meir and,
most recently, Defense Minister Dayan have indicated
that Israel would not make any air raids against
Alexandria, Cairo, or the Aswan Dam--all areas of
special interest to the Soviets.3
Uven though Tel Aviv has no guarantee that
Moscow will not extend the new defenses to the canal
area, the Israelis have refrained from attacks on
SA-3 sites at Alexandria, Cairo, and Aswan, perhaps
to encourage Soviet restraint. At the same time, the
Israelis have carried out heavy daily bombing raids
along the canal not only to destroy military instal-
lations but also to dissuade the Soviets from at-
_tenptinq to install an effective air defense system.?
Approved For Release 2003/RMalt-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved Foelease 2003 5900110001-3
LAOS: Current Situation
AREA OF
MAIN MAP
Vientiane.
Bouam
Ion
p
Xieng
houangville
Ban Nail
Tha Tam
013 Leung
yang Vieng
10 2O Mies
10 20 Kilometers
98145 4-70 CIA
? Government-held location
EV\communist-held location
Approved For Release 2003/4Ft:TaltDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved Forgo lease 2003/0SWO1ETDP79T00975405900110001-3
Laos: Communist forces have begun to move
against Bouam Long, the most important government
base north of the Plaine des Jarres.
After weeks of reconnaissance and battlefield
preparation, the Communists launched a series of
ground assaults yesterday against government posi-
tions at Phou Then, an outpost guarding the south-
western approaches to Bouam Long. Guerrilla defen-
ders at Phou Then reported that five enemy companies,
supported by heavy artillery, took part. The at-
tacks, all of which were successfully repulsed,
followed two days of intensive Communist shelling.
The situation southwest of the Plaine in the
critical Long Tieng - Sam Thong area remains rela-
tively stable. Government forces, meanwhile, have
begun an offensive in the Tha Tam Bleung area.
yang Pao's guerrillas reoccupied the nearby base
at Khang Kho, which was lost to the enemy last
month.
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
3
Approved For Release 2003/05?TcatTP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved For-itlease 2003/0549eRtrP79T009711%15900110001-3
South Vietnam: The level of political discon-
tent and agitation in Saigon is again on the rise.
Although the government has tried a combination
of firmness and conciliation in dealing with veter-
ans marching on the presidential palace and the
National Assembly building during the last two days,
it has been unable to head off violence. Despite
orders to exercise restraint, the police were forced
to use tear gas on a number of occasions.
President Thieu is anxious to prevent further
demonstrations by veterans groups, probably because
he fears troops serving in the armed forces sympa-
thize with their cause. In answer to the veterans'
demands for adequate housing, the government has
offered some temporary quarters in Saigon while more
permanent housing is constructed. This has failed
to mollify the veterans, however. L.I.n an effort to
defuse the situation, President Thieu has asked for
urgent National Assembly action on a bill proyiding
increased monetary benefits for the veterans.1,
Government attempts to calm the situation have
been complicated by a simultaneous student protest,
as well as by general discontent over the increasing
cost of living. Although some students participated
in one clash between veterans and police, there is
no evidence that the disaffected elements generally
plan to join forces. Should such a development
occur, the government would be faced with a much
more serious problem.
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
4
Approved For Release 2003/0n9(;_apP79T00975A015900110001-3
? Approved ForNaplease 2003/0g4UTEMRDP79T0097544315900110001-3
USSR - Communist China: Soviet officials say the
USSR and Communist China have agreed to exchange am-
bassadors.
One official explained that a public announce-
ment has been delayed pending Peking's agreement to
Moscow's nominee, Vladimir Stepakov. He said the
Chinese indicated they might wait until "a little
later" to name their own ambassador. There has been
no confirmation of the agreement from the Chinese
side. The Soviet and Chinese ambassadors were with-
drawn in 1966.
The Soviets may feel that in sending an ambassador
to Peking now, they would be able to bring Deputy
Foreign Minister Kuznetsov home, but continue the
Peking talks at a lower level, thus avoiding the ap-
pearance that the discussions have failed. Stepakov,
who most recently headed the Central Committee Propa-
ganda Department, does not have experience in either
diplomatic or Chinese affairs.
The Soviets have portrayed the appointment as
"good news" and evidence of progress at the Peking
talks. There is, however, no indication of any move-
ment on basic differences involved in the frontier
question. Moreover, Moscow's war of words against
China continues hot and heavy. By informing the US
of the ambassadorial agreement, the Russians may be
trying to foster the notion that they have their
problems with China under control on the eve of the
second round of SALT.
For its part, Peking clearly views the current
talks as a useful way to forestall Soviet military
and diplomatic pressure. As a result, they also
have an interest in creating the appearance of some
progress and probably will accept the new Soviet
ambassador.
8 Apr 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
5
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
SECRET
Approved For lease 2003/05MCWIDP79T0097515900110001-3
Hungary: The Kadar regime received an impor-
tant endorsement from the Soviet leadership during
the commemoration of Hungarian liberation day last
week, but some differences with its allies were
also aired.
Soviet party boss Brezhnev highlighted the oc-
casion by publicly endorsing Kadar's "creative" ap-
proach to socialist construction, something the So-
viets had not done since the Czechoslovak crisis in
1968. Brezhnev also praised Kadar personally and
lauded the Hungarian party's "principled policy."
These statements could help ease tensions generated
by the ambiguous positions taken by the Soviets in
the recent past.
Some differences in nuances did crop up. Brezh-
nev quoted an earlier statement by Kadar to the ef-
fect that national interests must not be allowed to
work to the detriment of internationalist goals.
Kadar's anniversary speech, however, contained a
strong argument for the role of legitimate national
interests in Hungarian development, These varia-
tions, however, were kept in low key and the Hun-
garian party leadership probably judges that Brezh-
nev's endorsement satisfied the demands of the oc-
casion.
East Germany's Walter Ulbricht injected a strong
discordant note into the proceedings by all but ig-
noring the Hungarian holiday and by using the forum
for a tirade against the West Germans. The Hungar-
ians begin trade talks in Bonn this week and they
probably view Ulbricht's interference as a deliber-
ate attempt to spoil the atmosphere
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
SECRET
? Approved Forylease 2003(0/ZERVE-RDP79T009754015900110001-3
Argentina: The government intends to seek OAS
action to help curb terrorism, but fears objections
from some countries?
A Foreign Ministry official said he expects to
begin sounding out other governments ?soon on denying
political asylum to persons involved in terrorism;
Argentina has had.such a law since 1963.
In the mid-1950s Argentina proposed a similar
plan to the OAS, but received no backing. This time
the government fears that many Latin American repub-
lics, especially those faced with elections soon,
will not wish to discuss political subjects at the
June OAS meeting in Santo Domingo.
Argentina is the only Latin American country
to defy kidnapers successfully by refusing to re-
lease prisoners in exchange for a hostage. Govern-
ment leaders believe that the only way to end the
kidnaping menace is to take a firm stand, even
though it may initially cost the lives of a few for-
eign representatives.
The government is extremely concerned, however,
that terrorists may plan some spectacular incident
involving the large resident foreign community in
Argentina, many of whom are Americans.
8 Apr 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
7
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
SECRET
Approved Forftease 2003/0qptiEWIRDP79T009710115900110001-3
Guyana: Prime Minister Burnham plans to give
his new economic program a strongly nationalistic
and socialistic bent.
Burnham outlined his plan in a demagogic speech
to the annual meeting of his People's National Con-
gress Party on 5 April. He attacked foreign aid,
including US assistance, and strongly criticized pri-
vate investment and foreign banks. He demanded 51
percent equity in future foreign investment projects
in forests and minerals.
Burnham also demanded elimination of the "met-
ropolitan presence," presumably the US and Britain,
from the Caribbean. In an obviously contrived ma-
neuver, a resolution was passed immediately after
his speech calling on the government to take control
of imports and "similar transactions," to establish
cooperatives in the insurance field and to ensure
that all official entities henceforth deal exclu-
sively through the National Cooperative Bank.
If the government takes action along these
lines or if similar resolutions are passed by the
party, Burnham will probably find it increasingly
difficult to get the foreign investment and inter-
national economic assistance Guyana needs.
Burnham's fiery address was an apparent effort
to gather support for the cooperatives, as well as
to draw support from followers of Marxist leader
Cheddi Jagan. He also may have set the scene for
playing a dominant role at the conference of heads
of Caribbean Commonwealth States next week.
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
SECRET
? Approved For4please 200/05E4C1ISTDP79T00975405900110001-3
Panama: crihe government is intensifying its
efforts to gal popular support, even at the expense
of further alienating the business communityj
[Workmen's compensation insurance, previously
handled by private companies, is being taken over
by the government's Social Security Fund. Insur-
ance companies have attacked the decree as tanta-
mount to expropriation and the business community
is concerned because there was no prior consulta-
tion with the insurance industry. The bankers, in
particular, fear that the government might next
move against them.t)
tyhe moves are being pressed by Panamanian
strongman General Torrijos, who has backtracked
from such efforts in the past when faced with busi-
ness opposition and calls for caution from his ci-
vilian ministers. In this case he ignored the cab-
inet's recommendation that the decree be postponed
and ordered its immediate implementation.:1
Corrijos has had little success in gaining in-
vestor confidence or in stimulating private domes-
tic investment. He has been forced by economic and
political developments to continue an expensive pub-
lic works program and may be planning to further in-
crease the government's role in the economy:/
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
9
Approved For Release 2003/0gft;ktiRDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved Forltlease 200341TARTAFDP79T0097ft15900110001-3
Tunisia: (The impending treason trial of for-
mer economic chief and leading socialist Ahmed ben
Salah may pose new problems for the government./
tpne difficulty for the government lies in the
possibility that Ben Salah will emerge from the
trial as a martyr. The proceedings will certainly
compound the already substantial antigovernment
feeling among Tunisian intellectuals and students,
and will generate an unsympathetic reaction in the
foreign press. Moreover, the government risks
widening the credibility gap it has faced since last
fall when it failed to acknowledge the involvement
of other top Tunisian leaders who had endorsed Ben
Salah's now discredited programs:
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin
10
Approved For Release 200Wk11-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved For lease 2003g/cAURDP79T009754815900110001-3
NOTES
Trinidad-Tobago - Caribbean: The black power
movement in Trinidad and Tobago continues to demon-
strate durability and a potential for spontaneous
violence. Weekend protests on Tobago resulted in
damage to banks, businessmen's residences, and a
country club. The continued demonstrations have
contributed to a 'growing recognition of the move-
ment's political potential in the Caribbean. This
sentiment was exemplified by Guyanese Prime Minister
Burnham's speech on Sunday including black power as
part of a new socioeconomic revolution. In Trinidad,
Prime Minister Williams' efforts to embrace the
movement have thus far been unsuccessful.
Uruguay: The largest robbery in the country's
history was skillfully executed on 4 April by the
Tupamaros, a pro-Castro urban terrorist group.
With the aid of a company official, they made off
with more than US $302,000 from a financial company.
This money will help in financing their operations.
The robbery indicates that the Tupamaros retain the
capability to carry out well-planned terrorist
acts, although more than 100 of its members are in
jail.
Burma: The government is planning to sell
one half of its $84 million gold reserve to meet
its sharply deteriorating balance of payments sit-
uation. Burma's rice exports, a major hard cur-
rency earner accounting for about half of its total
exports, are expected to decline by over 50 percent
this year. Rangoon is also faced with debt ser-
vicing problems, the most pressing of which is
$40 million due on short-term bankers' credits
accrued over the past two years.
8 Apr 70
Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
Approved For Release 2003/CMCMMRDP79T00975A015900110001-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3
secreipproved Fora Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T009/115A015900110001-3
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/05/29 : CIA-RDP79T00975A015900110001-3