CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A016000060001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 11, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 15, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
5Q
15 April 1970
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No. 0090/70
15 April 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Laos: Communists move to blunt government gains. (Page 1)
Laos: Chinese finishing road segments. (Page 3)
South Vietnam: Enemy offensive continues. (Page 4)
USSR: Brezhnev's pre-eminence underscored. (Page 5)
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Malaysia: Anti-Communist sweep in Sarawak. age
Nigeria: Oil production rising rapidly. (Page 10)
Morocco: Suspected subversives rounded up. (Page 11)
Pakistan: President's veto rights opposed. (Page 12)
Cuba: Policy toward US and Latin America. (Page 13)
Trinidad-Tobago: Prime minister's opposition. (Page 14)
Arms Control: Revised draft of seabeds treaty. (Page 15)
European Communities: Antitrust action. (Page 16)
Hungary: Celebrations canceled (Page 17)
Finland: New government (Page 17)
I
Turke : Student violence (Page
Dahomey: Political crisis (Page 18)
Latin America: Curbing terrorism (Page 18)
Brazil: Mirage purchase (Page 19.)
Ecuador: Student troubles (Page 19)
Costa Rica - Panama: Flood losses (Page 19)
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LAOS: Current Situation
Na
Khan
Bouam
Long*
Muong'- PEAINE Norig.Pe,j
Sour
~?vz d
Sala
Phou
;noun
DfS
...
#Xiesg Khouang
Xieng ang JA5Rt '
?Muong Pot
Enemy-buildup N.VA baaion moving
continues ThaTam tow d base
10 leung?
Thom? -nnang
Kho
NVA forces
reoccupy area
n 20 Mites
Sa{n
Xieng
Khouangville
? !Government-held-,,l ocat ion
? ,Communist-held If cation
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Laos: The Communists are moving to neutralize
recent government gains southwest of the Plaine des
Jarres.
During the last few days, large enemy units
have pushed back into the region between Long Tieng
and Tha Tam Bleung. One important government hill-
top position has been overrun, and several enemy
battalions are closing in on other key positions in
the area. New enemy troop movements also have been
reported near the government's base at Sam Thong.
A North Vietnamese battalion has been spotted
moving toward Tha Tam Bleung, which was recaptured
by Vang Pao's guerrillas last week. Enemy control
of the Tha Tam Bleung area had greatly facilitated
operations southward against the Long Tieng - Sam
Thong sector.
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I Northern Laos: Chinese Road Construction Continuing
Muong Si}S
.. r NaKn fl i ' r Road bui:t
pt 68-Al 69
AAA bbddupj
No construction
activity noteo- i4
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0
Nam
Bac
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ETNA
Phong Sate
Muong
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on - April
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*Laos: The Chinese appear to be concentrating
on finishing road segments already under way rather
than expanding the network further during this dry
season.
Aerial photography I Ireveals that the 25X1
road under construction south of Muong Sai has not
progressed beyond the point that was reached some
two months ago--one mile north of Muong Houn. The
construction activity observed between the two vil-
lages indicates the Chinese are trying to complete
an all-weather road in the Nam Beng Valley before
the beginning of the rainy season in early June.
No construction activity was noted south of
Muong Houn. There has been, however, a significant
increase in antiaircraft artillery sites immediately
north of the village. The buildup is near a ford
crossing the Beng River, suggesting that the Chinese
may plan to construct a bridge at this location in
coming months. A similar strengthening of air de-
fenses occurred prior to bridge construction at other
key points.
The road under construction northeast of Muong
Sai toward Route 19 is now motorable 14 miles past
Muong La 25X1
The rugged terrain appears to be e major o
to more rapid construction in this area.
I rails
east. of Muong Sai are being widened, but no construc-
tion equipment was noted in the area. This suggests
that if the Chinese intend to build a road to the
Lao Communist headquarters at Nam Bac, they may wait
until the next dry season.
I I
*Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic
interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency without the participation of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, Department of Defense.
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South Vietnam: The Communists' spring offen-
sive is maintaining considerable momentum.
Enemy sapper and infantry forces continue to
have unusual success in penetrating and overrunning
allied field positions. Two more outposts in the
upper delta, one manned by South Vietnamese regulars
and another by territorial forces and armed civil-
ians, fell in recent days with losses of more than
100 dead and wounded. In the highlands, Communist
troops temporarily seized several small outposts
around the Dak Pek Special Forces camp, and other
allied positions located just below the Demilitarized
Zone have been heavily shelled.
The Communists appear to be having some success
following the military guidelines spelled out by
General Giap and other North Vietnamese leaders dur-
ing the winter. Stressing the use of sapper and
guerrilla forces in surprise attacks, the Communists
have been able to deal the allies a number of tac-
tical setbacks while limiting their own losses.
It is still too early to assess the full impact
of the enemy's spring offensive phase, but heavy
South Vietnamese casualties could badly damage the
morale of the army and the government. It also ap-
pears that the pacification program has been stalled
in a few provinces because of the increased fighting.
Nevertheless, the South Vietnamese can point
to a few brighter spots. They are successfully de-
fending the Special Forces camps in the highlands,
a number of elite government units have again per-
formed well in contacts with the enemy, and much of
the recent fighting has been confined to the more
remote regions well removed from the major popula-
tion centers.
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USSR: Party boss Brezhnev's pre-eminence has
once again been underscored in connection with cer-
emonies related to the Lenin centennial.
The speeches which he delivered in Kharkov on
13 and 14 April were given extensive publicity in
most, if not all.?the Soviet media. Moreover,
Pravda's account yesterday of his visit to a fac-
tory, where he reportedly talked with workers and
dispensed advice, seemed to stress his personal in-
terest in local problems. Coverage of the other
leaders' participation in similar ceremonies else-.
where in the USSR, however, is likely to approximate
Brezhnev's and thus maintain the image of collective
leadership.
Some of.Brezhnev's comments on economic ills
ostensibly were less hidebound than usual. Although
he endorsed the economic reforms adopted in 1965, he
ignored their key elements, such as profits. His
comments gave no clear indication of high-level op-
position, but hinted at some resistance to recent
actions by lower-level officials. His remark that
the 24th Party Congress will be held this year would
make it seem all but certain that the gathering will
be held before the end of 1970.
Brezhnev, in his statement on foreign policy,
made his first public reference since the beginning
of SALT to an arms agreement, saying that one is
possible provided that the US is as reasonable as
the USSR on this subject. It marked Moscow's most
authoritative endorsement of the talks. He said
that the USSR would welcome a "sensible" agreement
and would do its utmost to make the talks "useful."
He warned of Moscow's determination to prevent any-
one from achieving "military superiority over the
USSR," thereby serving notice that the Soviets in-
tend to talk from a strong position in Vienna. Hav-
ing made this point, however, the Soviets might be-
lieve themselves to be on more solid ground should
they choose to be flexible when talks resume.
(continued)
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,W.
Brezhnev's remarks on the economy were limited
to a familiar recital of the country's ills. He
identified the short-run difficulties as the severe
weather and "complications in the international sit-
uation"--probably the Sino-Soviet border dispute,
possibly also Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and the Mid-
dle East--which "imposed a certain additional load
on the Soviet economy,"
He also acknowledged the more serious, long-run
difficulties as "problems connected essentially to
our growth," such as the need for more efficient use
of production capacity. Brezhnev also noted the lag
in the introduction of advanced technology. In ac-
tuality, although it is effectively employed in the
space and defense industries, it usually fails to
percolate down to the civilian economy. He gave no
hint of change in the timid reforms that thus far
have failed to improve the administration of research
or to encourage manageri 1 efficiency and innovation.
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Malaysia: Government Conducts Large-Scale Anti-Communist Operation
Security sweep concentrated
against Communist base camp
$ibu
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Malaysia: A government anti-Communist security
sweep in process for six weeks in Sarawak is the
largest of its kind to date.
More than 2,000 men from the security forces
have taken part in the operation, which has been
concentrated against a Communist base camp within
20 miles of Kuching. The government claims to have
killed about 40 terrorists and has arrested more
than 300 suspects. The rebels are probably part of
a force that had been operating in Indonesia and
reinfiltrated into Malaysia in early 1969.
The government's operations have had a mixed
impact on the local population. Malay-Chinese re-
lations in Sarawak are not as potentially inflam-
matory as they are in West Malaysia, and the local
populace has been impressed by the government's show
of force.
many Sarawakians are re-
sentful over the somewhat indiscriminate attacks
and arrests by the predominantly Malay force, which
represents to them an authoritarian mainland govern-
ment.
The weak Communist movement in Sarawak probably
numbers only about 300 armed insurgents, but it may
be able to capitalize on general resentment of the
government's harsh measures to gain further support
from the local population.
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Nigeria: The rapid rise in oil production will
soon place Nigeria second only to Libya among Afri-
can oil producing countries.
Production in March exceeded 900,000 barrels
per day (bpd), the highest level ever attained.
Nigeria probably will reach the million bpd mark by
June, six months earlier than originally estimated.
At that rate of production, the government can ex-
pect to get close to $210 million in revenues this
year, over double the amount received last year.
Shell - British Petroleum, the major producer
of the four oil companies operating in Nigeria, re-
cently announced it would invest $157 million this
year for oil field development and pipeline construc-
tion. It will be the largest annual expenditure the
company has made in Nigeria. Gulf Oil is optimistic
about its new offshore oil discovery, which could
increase the potential for further substantial
growth in production.
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Morocco: Security forces are continuing to
round up possible subversives and confiscate cached
arms in connection with an alleged conspiracy against
the regime.
The plotting was discovered early in December
when eight self-imposed exiles of the radical wing
of the leftist National Union of Popular Forces
(UNFP) were apprehended in southern Morocco after
infiltrating into the country.
The police dragnet in
Morocco has now netted at least 40 and perhaps as
many as 60 low-level UNFP militants, many of whom
were involved in a 1963 plot against King Hassan.
The two ringleaders of the radical wing remain in
exile.
The search for arms caches apparently inten-
sified last month after the interception and cap-
ture off Morocco's Mediterranean coast of a Spanish
ship transporting arms reportedly supplied by Syria
in support of the UNFP plot. Some additional arms
were seized early this month in police raids in re-
mote southern towns, although it is not clear whether
these weapons were connected with recent plots or
were of earlier vintage.
The pervasive and prolonged police action has
inspired some rumors that the regime was endangered.
The security forces, buttressed by the army, are
considered loyal to the regime, however, and are
competent to deal with scattered and sporadic dis-
sidence.
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Pakistan: President Yahya Khan's decision to
retain the right to veto any constitution drafted
by the national constituent assembly--to be elected
in October--is stimulating increased political op-
position.
Popular East Pakistani politician-Mujibur Rah-
man, under pressure from militants in his Awami
League, has demanded that the President's veto pre-
rogative be abolished.
In West Pakistan, two parties have come out
strongly against Yahya's veto power. The chairman
of one of the parties has suggested that any impasse
between the assembly and the President be resolved
by popular referendum. The other party has called
upon "democratic forces" to unite and launch a move-
ment to guarantee that the constituent assembly will
not be overruled.
Although negative reaction to Yahya's rules for
the constituent assembly is substantial, it does not
now appear sufficiently intense to offset the parties'
fundamental interest in proceeding with their plans
to contest the fall elections. Furthermore, Presi-
dent Yahya may be willing to compromise. He recently
told newsmen that if the constituent assembly's con-
stitution does not accord with his outlined prin-
ciples, he may send it back for reconsideration in-
stead of dissolving the assembly.
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Cuba: Havana's policy toward Latin America and
the US has not changed, according to recent state-
ments by a high-ranking government official.
At a recent luncheon at the UN, Minister with-
out Portfolio Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said that Ha-
vana will continue to support revolutionary groups
in Latin America, declaring that "it is not only our
right but our duty." He added that Cuba will continue
to grant refuge to those revolutionaries who seek
such assistance.
. Rodriguez completely rejected the possibility
of his country rejoining the Organization of Ameri-
can States, labeling it "a colonial ministry of the
United States." He considers Cuba's reintegration
into the Latin American community another matter,
however. In an apparent response to demands that
Havana cease its policy of intervention, Rodriguez
stated that Cuba would have to be accepted on its
own terms and principles, which it "has not altered
and will not alter."
In regard to the US, the minister stated that
his government is not happy with the problem of hi-
jacked aircraft and is considering US proposals for
a bilateral agreement on this subject. Rodriguez
reaffirmed, however, that Havana is not interested
in establishing official relations with Washington.
Rodriguez' pronouncements are the first "public"
foreign policy statements by a high-level Cuban of-
ficial in a long time. They are probably meant not
only as a simple declaration of foreign policy, but
also as an acknowledgement of the recent statements
of some Latin American leaders urging the re-estab-
lishment of trade relations with Cuba.
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Trinidad-Tobago: Prime Minister Williams may
soon :face more effective opposition to his domestic
policies.
The resignation of Minister of External Affairs
Robinson, the prime minister's strongest party rival,
comes in the midst of political protests by black
radical leaders.
His resignation is an outgrowth of the long-
standing political enmity between him and Williams
and seems timed to take advantage of what he prob-
ably believes has been Williams' mishandling of the
Local situation., If Robinson moves into outright
opposition, he could become the rallying point for
a serious challenge to Williams' lengthy and nearly
undisputed leadership.
Will.iamsvi decision not to attend the opening of
the Caribbean heads of government meeting in Jamaica
this week indicates he is concerned with domestic
events. Reserve police and military forces have
been ordered to duty in response to continuing dem-
onstrations. Thus far, government response to the
protests has vacillated between Williams' cautious
public attempts to embrace the movement and a tough-
ened police policy, neither of which has proved ef-
fective.
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Arms Control: The Soviets have given the US a
revised draft of the seabeds treaty and have asked
that it be presented as a joint text to the other
participants in the Geneva disarmament talks.
After a lengthy review, Moscow has agreed to
include in the draft a number of suggestions that
have already been accepted by the US. These were
made last fall at the UN General Assembly and ear-
lier this year at Geneva. The revisions may secure
the support of Canada and Argentina, two of the more
influential critics of the draft presently before
the Geneva conferees.
Moscow has given its disarmament delegation in-
structions to press for an endorsement of the treaty
before the usual spring recess of the talks. Having
accepted so many suggestions from the other delega-
tions, the Soviets maintain that they have exhausted
the possibilities for further substantive changes in
the text.
The nonaligned nations represented at the Geneva
talks are not likely to accept the revised version
until they have had a chance to review it in their
capitals, which may well require at least a month-
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European Communities: The EC Commission has
for the _first time 'begun antitrust proceedings con-
cerning the European operations of a US-based firm.
The Commission believes that the Continental
Can Corporation may have violated Article 86 of the
Treaty of Rome, which prohibits a firm from taking
the EC?
If, after study, the Commission finds that
Article 86 has been violated in this case, it can
oblige Continental Can to end the infringement.
Should the firm not comply, the Commission could
impose fines or other penalties.
The Commission?s move comes as increasing at-
tention is being given to the growing strength of
US corporations in Europe. The EC is now consider-
ing a community industrial policy which, if adopted
by the Council, would encourage the creation of Eu=
ropean transnational companies to meet the American
industrial challenge.
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Hungary: The Hungarians have unaccountably can-
celed their Lenin centennial celebrations planned for
18, 21, and 22 April. A Foreign Ministry spokesman
called the US ambassador yesterday to inform him that
because of "an administrative problem" there would
be no celebrations. There is no evidence of a seri-
ous problem in Budapest, but it is likely that only
one of an unusual nature could precipitate such a
move. There is as yet nothing to indicate that other
East European capitals have taken similar steps.
F
Finland: Social Democratic Party leader Rafael
Paasio is taking soundings among the various parties
looking toward forming a new government. Paasio re-
ceived a mandate from President Kekkonen on Monday,
after an initial effort by the chairman of the con-
servative National Coalition Party last week quickly
foundered. Paasio also faces difficulty in putting
together a cabinet,' and negotiations may continue
for some time. Many observers, however, expect that
despite the losses suffered by the government par-
ties in last month's parliamentary elections, a new
center-left coalition similar to the outgoing one
will eventually be formed.
(continued)
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Turkeys: New clashes between student extremists
in Ankara have resulted in the accidental killing of
an army lieutenant who happened to be in the vicinity.
The student situation had seemed to be cooling off
following the recent National Security Council an-
nouncement that "anarchist" activities would no
longer be tolerated and the National Police campaign
to arrest leftist agitators. If it is confirmed
that the fatal shot was fired by a known rightist
leader, the crackdown would then be extended to all
student extremists.
Daho: The ruling military triumvirate re-
portedly has given the four ex-presidents until to-
morrow to agree on a solution to the crisis that has
plagued Dahomey since the army took power last De-
cember. if the civilians' personal animosities keep
them from agreeing, however, army leaders apparently
believe they will be able to overcome the worsening
splits within their own ranks and form a government
themselves. Meanwhile, talk of secession is continu-
ing in the northern provinces. Southerners residing
in the north are increasingly apprehensive about
their safety, and lar e numbers of them reportedly
are fleeing the area.
Latin America: Argentina has decided to raise
the issue of kidnaping and terrorism at today's meet-
ing of the Permanent Council of the Organization of
American States (OAS). A favorable response by sev-
eral other nations to the initial Argentine overtures
apparently prompted this decision. The Argentine
ambassador to the OAS reportedly realizes that the
initiative probably will be referred to the polit-
ical-juridical committee for extensive study, par-
ticularly by those countries opposed to the revision
of the basic concept of political asylum. The mur-
der of the west German ambassador to Guatemala, how-
ever, has received worldwide publicity, and the
Council may adopt a resolution designating murder,
torture, or serious injury of diplomatic personnel
an international crime.
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.Brazil: The acquisition of a squadron of Mirage
jet fLg'- fighters may have been temporarily delayed be-.
cause of discussions within the Finance Ministry
about the terms of the deal. Air force.officer.s re-.
portedly are pressing the government to complete the
negotiations, and the announcement of the signing
of a contract could come on 22 April, the anniversary
of the founding of Brazil's first fighter group,
F
Ecuador: Allegations of police brutality were
used by extremist student leaders to set off new
violence against the government yesterday, and more
trouble is expected. The unexplained beatings of
two leftist university militants and the death of
one provided student leaders with an issue to gain
support for another violent clash. Key. military
leaders view such continual crises as a growing threat
from the left and reportedly are again urgin Pre -
dent Velasco to assume extraordinary powers.
Costa Rica - Panama: Torrential rains and flood-
ing have severely damaged banana plantations in Costa
Rica and Panama. Preliminary estimates place the
loss of crops, homes., and transportation facilities.
at $4 million in Costa Rica. Particularly hard hit
was the area near the Panamanian border, where the
newest: and most productive Costa Rican banana plant-
ings are located. The extent of damage in Panama
is not yet fully known. Damage to banana crops, the
chief export of both countries., may cause export
earnings to decline this year.
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