CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A016700070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 10, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 18, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
50
1,8 July 1970
State Department review completed
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No. 0171/70
18 July 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Cambodia: The military situation is generally calm.
(Page 1)
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South Vietnam: The government is adopting an increas-
ingly hard line against dissent. (Page 4)
Laos: A serious Pathet Lao effort to negotiate with
the government may be imminent. (Page 6)
Communist China - USSR: The deadlocked border talks
are continuing. Page 7)
Czechoslovakia: The Husak regime is trying hard to
close the book on the Dubcek issue. (Page 8)
Jordan: Extremist fedayeen groups may have already
Begun to disregard the recent agreement. (Page 9)
Israel: The interior minister's death will accelerate
a struggle for his party's control. (Page 10)
USSR-Egypt: Communique issued (Page 11)
Dominican Republic: Communist killed (Page 11)
Venezuela: Oil increase (Page 12)
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ThbeujJ
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Cambodia: Current Situation
Fighting cOn.tinues.:
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Cambodia: The military situation is generally
calm, following the goverment's move into Kirirom.
The week-long battle for the resort town tapered
off yesterday, and the commander of the government
forces at Kirirom claims that the situation has sta-
bilized. Four government battalions reportedly are
in the center of the town, with four others deployed
nearby. Many enemy troops apparently slipped away
during a lull in the fighting, when government forces
ran out of ammunition, but an estimated 250 Communist
troops apparently remain in the area.
In the only other major Communist action re-
ported in the country, enemy elements kept up their
renewed attacks on the Lovek ordnance depot, north-
west of Phnom Penh, The government garrison at
Lovek probably can count again on heavy air strikes
to help it maintain its position.
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
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South Vietnam: The government is adopting an
increasingly hard line against dissent that tends
to undercut the war effort.
President Thieu warned in a speech to a mili-
tary audience earlier this week that "we will beat
to death the people who are demanding immediate
peace in surrender to the Communists." Some of his
speech was obviously calculated to reassure the
army that the regime will not countenance eventual
coalition with the Communists. In this vein, for
example, Thieu said, "I am ready to smash all move-
ments calling for peace at any price because I am
still much of a soldier."
Following Thieu's lead, National Police Chief
Hai has warned the public that the police will use
more forceful measures to break up peace demonstra-
tions. This tougher attitude was reflected on 17
July when police invaded a school building and bat-
tled students after speakers advocated ending uni-
versity military training.
Meanwhile, senior government officials are re-
portedly being systematically indoctrinated against
encouraging any form of coalition or neutralist gov-
These measures are clearly aimed at curbing
additional public manifestations of antiwar senti-
ment. Last weekend militant students, abetted by
visiting US antiwar agitators, staged a brief dem-
onstration in Saigon calling for an end to the war.
Some student leaders hope to turn such protests
into a nationwide movement based on peace and anti-
US themes. Militant Buddhist elements also renewed
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their peace campaign recently, publicly calling for
a cease-fire and the establishment of a provisional
government for both North and South Vietnam.
The government probably views the problem of
antiwar dissent with greater urgency now because of
a new feeling in South Vietnam that some sort of
movement in the Paris negotiations is likely in the
near future. According to the US Embassy, the gov-
ernment is clearly nervous about any new formula-
tions on political settlement. This was manifested
recently when the Saigon press was asked to delete
some remarks by Secretary Rogers on 15 July con-
cerning the possibility that the Communists might
be willing to negotiate.
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Laos: A serious Pathet Lao effort to initi-
ate high-level negotiations with the Laotian Gov-
ernment may be imminent.
According to Pathet Lao spokesman Soth Peth-
rasy, a high-ranking messenger from Communist leader
Souphanouvong is expected to arrive shortly in
Vientiane empowered to discuss "points of view that
might lead to a peaceful settlement." Soth asserted
that if an agreement to talk were reached between
Souvanna and the Pathet Lao envoy, the ensuing ne-?
gotiations would be the most important between the
Lao factions since 1961 and would be regarded by
the Communists as a "summit meeting."
In discussing the substance of the possible
negotiations, Soth omitted any mention of the usual
Communist demand that a total halt in US bombing
be a precondition for a discussion of the issues.
Instead, the Pathet Lao representative stated that
a termination of the bombing could be one of the
two main questions to be dealt with during the ne-
gotiations.
The second major question, according to Soth,
would be the composition of the coalition govern-
ment. He thought that the Communists would be in-
terested in only four ministerial seats and would
expect equal representation for the neutralists.
Soth stressed that the Pathet Lao anticipated ne-
gotiations without foreign intervention and wanted
no part of a larger Indochina settlement involving
the US and the North Vietnamese.
The Communists' fear of possible allied plans
for coordinated military moves against infiltration
routes in the Laotian panhandle may be one reason
for their current efforts to give the appearance
of serious movement on negotiations. Whatever the
case, if the Communists do intend to make a bid for
negotiations along these lines, Souvanna Phouma can
be expected to work for a forthcoming response on
the part of the Laotian Government. The accuracy
of Soth's information will be in doubt, however,
'
s messenger.
until the arrival of Sou hanouvong
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Communist China - USSR: The deadlocked border
talks are continuing despite the absence of the
chief Soviet negotiator, Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov.
A Soviet Foreign Ministry official told US Em-
bassy officers on 15 July that since Kuznetsov re-
turned to Moscow on 30 June the discussions have
been supervised by his deputy, General Gankovsky.
Kuznetsov reportedly is recovering from the illness
that forced his departure from Peking, but the So-
viet official hinted that he would not be returning
to the talks.
Neither Soviet nor Chinese officials have com-
mented on recent Western press reports from Moscow
claiming that Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev has
been designated as Kuznetsov's replacement in the
Peking talks. Ilichev, who was Khrushchev's chief
propagandist and who was closely associated with
the anti-Chinese polemics of the early 1960s, has
been in partial disfavor since Khrushchev's ouster.
Although the Chinese would probably view Ili-
chev's appointment with some disfavor, his designa-
tion would satisfy their desire to have the talks
continue at the deputy foreign minister level. At
the same time, it would permit Moscow to assign ace
troubleshooter Kuznetsov to more productive work.
Soviet officials, meanwhile, have informed the
US that the widely rumored exchange of ambassadors
between Moscow and Peking will take place "soon."
Other diplomats in Moscow report that the Chinese,
after a three-month delay, have finally approved
Moscow's choice, reported to be a former high-rank-
ing propaganda official, Vladimir Stepakov. West-
ern diplomats in Peking also add that China has in
fact reciprocated by nominating its own candidate
to Moscow. Thus far, however, there has been no
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Czechoslovakia: The Husak regime is trying
hard to close the book on the Dubcek issue.
In its definitive interpretation of his role
in the 1968 reform movement, published on Thursday,
the party intended to destroy what it considers the
false Dubcek legend. The article discredited the
former leader's personal character, and said his
weaknesses led to the most severe crisis in the
party's history.
The article, however, does not depict Dubcek
as the principal villain behind the liberal move-
ment but rather as a dupe of "anti-Socialist forces"
who were able to divert the party's attention fol-
lowing the legitimate ouster of ex - party leader
Novotny. Dubcek's tenure, then, was an aberration,
brought on by an overemphasis of party "unity" when
the party should have sought a more qualified man.
By emphasizing the shortcomings of the Dubcek
as well as the Novotny eras, the Husak regime seems
to be making a more determined effort to blunt
charges by party hardliners, many of whom are ex -
Novotny men, that it is too lax in solving the
country's problems.
The Dubcek issue itself clearly remains a vex-
atious political problem for the regime. He is
still a popular figure not only with the public
but also among the party rank and file. His repu-
tation, buttressed by his refusal to recant in the
face of extreme pressure, has been an important
obstacle in the party's campaign to win popular
support. By taking such pains to justify Dubcek's
recent expulsion from the party--the ultimate po-
litical denigration--the leadership evidently hopes
to deflate his image.
The article falls short of accusing Dubcek of
criminal actions, however, suggesting that a polit-
ical trial--which for Husak would be a political
setback--is not in the cards.
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Jordan: Extremist fedayeen groups may have al-
ready begun to disregard the recent agreement between
the government and the fedayeen.
In an interview published in the Fatah news-
paper, Habbash stressed that his attitude toward the
agreement. was dependent on whether the army with-
draws from around Amman and whether the government
dissolves the "special organs" supposedly created
to undermine the fedayeen movement. Previous feda-
yeen demands for these two moves were resisted by
the government and were not included in the 10 July
accord.
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Israel: The death of Interior Minister Haim
Moshe Shapiro, long-time chief of Israel's largest
religious party, the National Religious Party (NRP),
seems certain to accelerate a struggle for control
between the party's moderate and extreme factions.
Shapiro, although a conservative, was one of
the cabinet's most influential doves. He prevented
the NRP from taking a rigid stand on the future of
the occupied Arab territories in the face of strong
pressures, and he moderated many of the religious
extremist demands that frequently threatened the
stability of the cabinet. The US Embassy believes
that the outcome of the struggle for control in the
NRP could affect the balance of forces across the
Israeli political spectrum and in the cabinet.
The NRP holds 12 seats in the 120-member Knes-
set and three posts in the 24-member cabinet.
I I
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USSR-Egypt: The communique issued at the con-
clusion of President Nasir's visit to Moscow yester-
day was primarily a recapitulation of previously
stated positions and gave little hint of what spe-
cific decisions were reached. It did say, however,
that the two sides discussed "means and methods for
achieving a peaceful settlement" in the Middle East
and that they agreed "to continue their coordina-
tion in this direction." The declaration phrased
in standard terms both countries' commitment to a
political settlement based on the November 1967 Se-
curity Council resolution and Israeli withdrawal
from all the occupied territories. The Soviets also
reiterated their readiness to provide the Arabs with
"necessary aid" for the struggle against Israel.
Dominican Republic: Security forces shot and
killed Communist leader Otto Morales on 16 July in
Santo Domingo. Morales, who headed the Dominican
Popular Movement (MPD), reportedly was behind the
kidnaping of the US air attache last March. Ter-
rorist reprisals are a possibility, but the recent
arrest of Rafael Taveres and Morales' death have
robbed the MPD of two of its more effective leaders.
In addition, the special security measures author-
ized by President Balaguer two weeks ago have proved
effective in reducing leftist violence.
(continued)
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Venezuela: Petroleum companies apparently are
going to take full advantage of the recent increase
in US quotas for Venezuelan oil. Some Venezuelan
companies initially were doubtful that they could
increase exports because of limited spare production
and refining capacity. Venezuelan oil production
already is at peak levels, benefiting from restric-
tions on oil production by Libya and the rupture of
a major oil pipeline in the Middle East. A survey
conducted this month by the government, however,
indicates that the companies will be able to expand
production enough to meet the increased import quota
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