CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A017700100001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 9, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
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No. 0294/70
9 December 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
USSR: Reports show no increase in the published
defense budget, but continued growth in military
research and development. (Page 1)
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CUBA: Castro has postponed Christmas. (Page 5)
COSTA RICA: President Figueres is supporting a Com-
munist labor union effort. (Page 6)
JORDAN: Fighting has diminished, but army command-
erse tactics may stir more trouble, (Page 7)
PAKISTAN: The election results are almost certain
to cause the military concern. (Page 9)
INDIA: The major opposition party is seeking allies.
(Page 11)
GUINEA: A special OAU session convenes today in
Nigeria. (Page 12)
CHILE-CUBA: Air and shipping service (Page 13)
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VENEZUELA: Oil taxes (Page 13)
UN-CYPRUS: Peacekeeping force (Page 14)
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USSR: Reports presented at yesterday's meeting
of the Supreme Soviet show no increase in the pub-
lished 1971 defense budget, but do indicate con-
tinued growth in military research and development.
Industrial production is to grow at a moderate rate.
Finance Minister Garbuzov announced a defense
budget of 17.9 billion rubies for 1971, the first
year since 1965 that the Soviets have not announced
an increase in military appropriations. Presumably
Moscow's aim is to project an image of moderation,
particularly while the Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks are under way. This impression is strength-
ened by Garbuzov's claim that the 1971 budget is
one "of peaceful economic and cultural development."
The published defense budget, however, excludes
most spending for military research and development
and for the space program. These programs are
largely financed by the science budget. While total
science expenditures for 1971 were not explicitly
identified, the reports referred to a growth rate
of 8.3 percent for "overall state expenditures on
research."
The leveling off of the published defense budget
is also consistent with intelligence estimates., of
the Soviet defense effort. These estimates project
total Soviet defense expenditures in 1971, including
military R&D and space, at about 23 billion rubles--
or the equivalent of about $68 billion if measured
in US costs--an increase of between one and two per-
cent over 1970. The estimates attribute most of
the increase to expanded military research and de-
velopment. State planning chief Baibakov revealed
no information on the 1971-75 plan but promised
that it would be ready for presentation at the 24th
Party Congress in March of next year, The 1971
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goals for industry and agriculture reflect a more
sober assessment of the potential of the economy,
which has been a disappointment to the leadership
during the last several years.
Baibakov proposed a growth rate of 6.9 percent
for industrial production in 1971, considerably
lower than the annual average of 8.6 percent planned
for 1968-70. Agricultural production is expected
to grow by only 5.5 percent in 1971 compared with
this year's target of 8.5 percent. The production
of consumer goods is slated to grow at a higher rate
than producers goods in 1971, for the fourth con-
secutive year. This target, in conjunction with a
modest rate of growth planned for wages, indicates
that an attem t is being made to ease inflationary
ressures.
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CUBA: Fidel Castro has decreed that Christmas
be shifted to July to permit unbroken concentration
on the sugar harvest.
in a speech Monday night, Castro set a produc-
tion target of seven million metric tons of sugar
for 1971. He called the goal the minimum necessary
to meet obligations arising from Cuba's large trade
deficit with the Soviet Union and to maintain the
present level of economic development. He noted
that the harvest, which recently got under way, is
already behind schedule.
Although the goal is 1.5 million tons below
last year's output, it may be beyond reach. The
island experienced drier than normal weather during
the growing season and has not solved its perennial
labor and transportation problems. Even if the goal
is reached, Cuba will be unable to export enough to
reduce its trade deficit with the USSR, which is
expected to approximate $200 million this year.
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COSTA RICA: President Figueres has legitimized
Communist union gains by participating in a labor
rally.
Figueres and Labor Minister Jimenez pledged to
support a Communist union's fight to organize at a
United Fruit operation, and Jimenez agreed to pre-
sent the union's grievances to the company. The
President admitted that he and his National Libera-
tion Party had worked against unionism in the past,
but assured the assembly that his government is on
the side of the workingman. Figueres indicated
that he would support the Communists only so :Long
as their demands are reasonable.
Less than two months ago the Communists scored
a major labor breakthrough at Standard Fruit by
signing Costa Rica's first agricultural collective
bargaining agreement. If the Communists can work
a similar agreement with United, they will control
the labor force of almost the entire banana industry.
i
The arrangement urged y igueres wou13
not be costly to the company, however, and it will
3'_ikel be ado ted in time.
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C JORDAN: Fighting has diminished to a few small
skirmishes, but tough tactics of army commanders may
stir further trouble.
Jarash is reported to be completely under army
control with many troops evident in the city. Dam-
age to buildings was apparently light and casualties
few. Townspeople are said to be pasting pictures of
the King on their walls, perhaps as insurance against
army action. Nevertheless, travelers were prevented
from entering Jarash yesterday because--press reports
say---some shooting was still taking place. Other
small clashes occurred in the area west of Jarash,
but none developed into a serious incident.
Late yesterday afternoon the Higher Military
Committee met for the second time in two days. The
conferees agreed to draw up a timetable to complete
implementation of the provisions of the several
cease-fire agreements and to eliminate all violation
of these agreements.. The arrival of truce super-
visor .Bahl Ladgham, scheduled last night, should
serve to bolster the efforts of the truce committee
in restoring the cease-fire.
Fedayeen propaganda media, such as the Fatah
clandestine radio, continue to accuse Prime Minister
Wasfi Tal of instigating the army to wage a "war of
extermination" against the commandos. Tal has not
been linked with such a plan, but there is growing
evidence that army officers may be taking a hard
line in dealing with the fedayeen. The US defense
attache" in Amman reports that procrastination and
moderate policies by the Jordanian General Staff in
handling the problem of the armed commandos have
pushed a number of unit commanders to the point of
taking independent action against the fedayeen. At
the same time troops of the Popular Resistance, the
Jordanian militia that often serves villages as a
local guard unit, are becoming increasingly bellig-
erent in their behavior toward the fedayeen and
clashes are now a daily occurrence.
(continued)
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I As the Jordanian Army slowly tries to maintain
control of the countryside, the danger of large-
scale clashes. will increase, particularly as long
as the commandos view the pacification programmer
a campaign to destroy their organizations.
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PAKISTAN: Sweeping election victories in West
Pakistan by supporters of former foreign minister
Bhutto and in East Pakistan by advocates of provin-
cial autonomy are almost certain to cause the mili-
tary concern.
Mujibur Rahman's Awami League (AL) seems likely
to capture almost all of the 153 seats being con-
tested in East Pakistan, and consequently--with 22
other seats yet to be filled--will almost certainly
have an absolute majority in the 313-seat National
Assembly which is to write a new constitution. The
AL has demanded much greater autonomy for East Paki-
stan, but with a good prospect of controlling any
future government it may moderate its stand. If
it does not and instead chooses to force through
strong autonomy measures, the AL could find itself
in direct confrontation with the military.
The military will also not be happy with re-
sults from West Pakistan, where Bhutto's Pakistan
People's Party (PPP) will apparently hold over 80
of the 138 contested seats. Bhutto is very unpopu-
lar with many high-ranking officers, and his strong
showing may well make them more prone to consider
intervening again in the political process. The
military will be reluctant, however, to risk the
popular reaction--especially in East Pakistan--that
might follow any overt interference.
The two parties may be able to work together
in the National Assembly. Although the AL is con-
siderably more moderate regarding economic reforms,
there is no major ideological gulf between the two
on domestic issues. The PPP, moreover, has taken
no firm stand on provincial autonomy.
On the other hand, foreign policy could cause
problems. Bhutto has long been critical of US pol-
icies and has advocated closer relations with China
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against India. The AL's Mujib, however, favors bet-
ter relations with India, while vaguely calling for
greater independence in foreign relations. In any
case, the military will continue to control such
matters until an acceptable constitution is written,
and any future government will have difficulty find-
ing an alternative to the present policy of trying
to balance relations with the US, USSR, and China.
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INDIA: The Organization Congress Party, Prime
Minister Gandhi's strongest political rival, is at-
tempting to unify all "democratic parties" opposed
to the present government.
Fearful lest the prime minister call a snap gen-
eral election before the February 1972 deadline, the
Organization Congress is searching for allies. At
its annual convention on 5-6 December, the party re-
solved to "achieve maximum understanding" and work
for "electoral adjustments" with other political
groups. Not all convention delegates agreed, how-
ever, and some may bolt the party.
In Gujarat and Mysore, the two states where or-
ganization Congress governments are in power, local
leaders are reluctant to agree to alliances with
their traditional rivals for state control. More-
over, they are not anxious to identify themselves
with the Hindu nationalist and right-wing parties
that form the core of the organization Congress'
natural support. Since the Congress Party split in
November 1969, Mrs. Gandhi's Ruling Congress has
seized the initiative in projecting a more "progres-
sive" image than its principal rival,
Mrs. Gandhi's political opponents have been
making various attempts to coordinate their anti-
administration activities for some months. So far,
petty political feuds and ideological wrangles have
prevented them from achieving a unified position,
but as national elections approach there will be
mounting pressure to agree on some measure of coor-
dination. Conditions peculiar to individual states,
such as Gujarat and Mysore, will continue to hamper
the effectiveness of an agreement made at the na-
ever
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GUINEA: A special session of the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), prompted by the recent Por-
tuguese attacks on Guinea, convenes today in Nigeria.
In addition to joining in virtually unanimous
denunciations of Portugal, some members may attempt
to link Lisbon's NATO partners with the attacks, a
position being pushed by the OAU's militant secretary
general. Guinea may push for greater support for
African liberation movements, and particularly for
the African Party for the Independence of Guinea
and the Cape Verde Islands, the Guinea-based organ-
ization opposing Portuguese rule in Portuguese
Guinea,
It is unlikely that the OAU will serious::l.y con-
sider sending a military force to Guinea. Long-
standing proposals for extensive mutual security
arrangements, including the creation of an "African
High Command," may be revived, but the majority of
African governments remain opposed to such far-
-.reaching measures.
C Meanwhile, the UN Security Council yesterday
voted to condemn Portugal- for the attacks on Guinea
and threatened to invoke sanctions against Lisbon
in the event of another attack. The Western powers
abstained in the 1.1--0 tally, a position certain to
be criticized at the OAU session. The Western pow-
ers maintain that the resolution went much too far
toward committing the Council in the direction of
mandatory diplomatic and economic sanctions, i.n.-
cluding the possible use of force by the
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CHILE-CUBA: A Chilean delegation has arrived
in Havana to discuss establishing regular commercial
flights between Chile and Cuba. LAN-Chile, the
government airline, is considering a route with
Havana as a terminal point rather than as an inter-
mediate stop on a route to the US. The Chilean
state maritime enterprise reportedly is considering
setting up a regular shipping service to Cuba,
particularly for transporting agricultural products.
Trade in Chilean products began earlier this year.
VENEZUELA: The government, under attack from
opposition parties that strongly favor higher levies
on the oil industry over other measures to increase
taxes, has informed petroleum companies that it
wants to raise reference prices used in calculating
their income taxes. By this approach, Caracas be-
lieves it could obtain some $110 million more in
revenues in 1971. The oil companies protest that
the change would violate a five-year agreement run-
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UN-CYPRUS: [The Security Council is expected
to meet soon to extend the mandate of the UN force
in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for another six months. UNFICYP
has been in existence since 1964, and its role .in
resolving recent incidents between Greek and Turk-
ish Cypriots indicates that it continues to per-
form a useful function. The revamping of UNFICYP
earlier this year--designed to provide greater ef-
ficiency at lower cost--included a significant re-
duction in the force. Although the UN effort on
Cyprus continues to cost more than the reimburse-
ment to the seven nations contributing troops,
these countries do not appear inclined to withdraw
their contingents because of the financial rob?-
lem.
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