CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A017900060001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 4, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 31, 1970
Content Type:
REPORT
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D
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
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40
31 December 1970
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No. 0313/70
31 December 1970
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SIERRA LEONE: The prime minister apparently has
shelved his plan for an executive presidency.
(Page 3)
THAILAND: The foreign minister continues to pro-
mote ETe idea that Thailand must improve relations
with Communist countries. (Page 4)
BELGIUM: The government has taken a further step
toward tax harmonization in the EC. (Page 5)
CONGO (KINSHASA) - ANGOLA: Aid to insurgents re-
u'ced Page 6)
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SECRET
SIERRA LEONE: Prime Minister Siaka Stevens
apparently has shelved his controversial plan to
substitute an executive presidency for the parlia-
mentary system.
:Enstead of seeking elections to approve such
a constitutional change, Stevens reportedly will
propose to his party convention early next month
that his government. remain in office until the end
of its term in 1972. The government would devote
its primary attention to economic development and
would de-emphasize political activity.
Stevens' current effort to secure a reconcil-
iation with several. former cabinet members who were
jailed last fall for opposition to the plan also
suggests that he may have decided to set the pro-
posal aside. These men had charged publicly that
an executive presidency would lead to one-man rule,
so any reconciliation is likely to require at least
a temporary retreat by Stevens on this issue.
Stevens' reasons for apparently backing off
are unclear. Although his action against his op-
ponents last fall, which included the proclamation
of a state of emercrency, was endorsed by parliament,
Stevens is probably reluctant to call elections
while his party remains so seriously split. He may
also fear that elections at this time could trigger
disorders that would be difficult to control. The
Sierra Leone security forces are in their usual
state of disarray. An army warrant officer is now
on trial for plotting a coup, and the need to sup-
press disorders during an electoral campaign would
almost certainly impair the army's already shak
discipline.
31 Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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THAILAND: Foreign Minister Thanat is continuing
to promote the idea that Thailand must improve re-
lations with Communist countries.
in a number of year-end foreign policy reviews
with Bangkok's press corps, Thanat reaffirmed his
desire for better relations with Communist China
and North Vietnam. For the first time, he publicly
interpreted North Vietnam's dispatch of a refugee
repatriation delegation to Bangkok as a favorable
new development in Hanoi's foreign policy, and he
described Thailand's acceptance of the delegation
as a "sign of our goodwill."
Thanat's statements on improving relations with
the Communists have been accompanied by what have
become standard expressions of misgivings about the
steadfastness of the US commitment to Thailand and
the possibility that influential circles in the US
will thwart the proper implementation of the Nixon
Doctrine. He told the press, for example, that
there had been some deterioration in US-Thai rela-
tions over the past year, implying that the fault
lay with Washington.
Although Thanat undoubtedly views an adjustment
in Thai foreign policy as long overdue--in fact, he
has been publicly pushing for changes for well over
two years--some of his statements are probably cal-
culated to give Bangkok additional leverage with
the US. He recognizes that Thailand has no viable
alternative to dependence on the US for its security,
as long as it is incapable of defending its terri-
tory with its own resources and as long as there is
a credible Communist threat. There is also a con-
tinuing question of how much support Thanat can
command from the military leadership for imp ortant
changes in the country's oreign policy.
l Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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BELGIUM: The government's adoption of a tax
on vavie-aaaaed (TVA) effective 1 January is a further
step toward tax harmonization in the European Com-
munity, but it may lead to some aggravation of do-
mestic inflationary pressures.
This is Belgium's first basic tax reform in 50
years, and it is expected to increase consumer prices
by at least two percent on average. In order to
reduce its inflationary potential, the government
delayed the effective date by one year to 1 January
1971: and scaled down the rates. Measures also have
been taken to restrain sellers from increasing profit
margins 'under the guise of tax adjustment during the
changeover period.
Furthermore, to avoid a shortfall in tax reve-
nues for 1971, a year when expenditures are expected
to rise at a brisk 10-to-12 percent, the government
has advanced the TVA payment schedule. Businesses
will be required to prepay their estimated TVA
liabilities monthly beginning in early January.
To assure adequate government receipts, exports
will be only partially exempted from TVA in 1971,
and investment spending will be exempted gradually,
receiving full exemption after 1974.
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NOTE
CONGO (KINSHASA) - ANGOLA: President Mobutu
has decided to cut the Kinshasa government's monthly
subsidy to the Angolan Revolutionary Government in
Exile (GRAE) in half--from $20,000 to $10,000. Al-
though GRAE leader Holden Roberto hopes to persuade
Mobutu to reverse the decision, it conforms with Mo-
butu's strategy since early 1969 of restraining GRAE
guerrilla operations while quietly renewing and
strengthening his working relations with Portuguese
authorities in Angola.
Roberto depends heavily on Mobutu for financial
support, and a cut of this magnitude could sharply
reduce GRAE arms purchases and thus curtail projected
GRAE operations into Angola. Mobutu, on the other
hand, can use his continued public sponsorship of
GRAE--the more moderate of the two major Angolan guer-
rilla groups--to deflect criticism from African mili-
tants for his increasingly visible collaboration with
the Portuguese.
31 Dec 70 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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