CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018300010002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 13, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved Fo% elease 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T009Rf 018300010002-6
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
25X1
13 February 1971
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 CIA-R P79T00975A018300010002-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
 Approved F r Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A018300010002-6 25X1
13 February 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
COMMUNIST CHINA - LAOS: Peking does not seem to
have changed its policy of avoiding direct mili-
tary involvement in the Indochina war. (Page 7)
25X1
PAKISTAN: Meetings of East Pakistani leaders may
result in movement toward secession. (Page 11)
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A018300010002-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
 Approved Igor Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A018300010002-6I 25X1
COMMUNIST CHINA - LAOS: Peking's current at-
titude toward allied cross-border operations in
Indochina suggests no change in its effort to avoid
direct military involvement in the war.,
a Communist
icia ecen y indicated that
as long as alli en incur were restricted to
L
southern Laos and Cambodia and did not threaten
northern Laos, direct intervention by China was
unlikely. The official implied, however, that any
move into northern Laos might be considered a di-
rect threat to China, and this or a "further dete-
rioration of the situation" could raise the possi-
bility that Chinese troops might be brought into
the conflict.
25X1
Peking has throughout the
conflict shown a continuing concern for the protec-
tion of its own border, and the official's comments
are generally consistent with this attitude. The
official specifically used the 17th parallel in
Laos as a demarcation line, but this may be a means
of conveying Chinese sensitivity regarding areas
near its border, rather than representing a trip
wire that would automatically trigger Chinese in-
tervention if the line were crossed. Peking in
any case probably does not expect the allied in-
cursion to push above the parallel.;
?_Peking has had ample time to consider the im-
plications of allied moves in southern Laos; it
almost certainly has expected them for some time.
Peking has adopted a measured reaction to recent
developments and has avoided a high degree of bel-
ligerence. Although the Chinese have sustained a
high volume of propaganda, none of their pronounce-
ments suggests that they view the situation with
immediate alarm. Peking's propaganda seems designed
to dramatize its heightened concern as well as its
eagerness to throw its public support behind Hanoi._
13 Feb 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
(continued)
7
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0183000h0002-6
 Approv
,,The Chinese unquestionably hope to continue to
avoid-the risk of confrontation with the United
States. At the same time, however, they are cer-
tainly prepared as before to provide needed mate-
rial support for the Indochina war efforts
13 Feb 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved Fot Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
 Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975A018300010002-4 25X1
PAKISTAN: [Meetings next week of East Pakistani
political leaders may result in moves that could lead
to eventual secession.!
The Awami League (AL), which recently swept elec-
tions'in East Pakistan for a national constituent as-
sembly, next week will hold meetings tha 1 include
the AL members elected to the assembly. ~ wil
the tinal session o these meetings the party may
unilaterally declare adoption of a constitution based
on its own program for far-reaching provincial auton-
omy, unless by that time President Yah a Khan has set
a date for convening the assembly.
Yahya will soon announce that the assembly
will convene on 1 March.
[Senior AL officials continue to seek foreign
support for possible secession. The AL may only hope
that word of its talks with foreigners may leak to
Yahya and serve as pressure on him to select an early
date and then to accept Bengali demands despite prob-
able opposition from many West Pakistani politicians.
Nonetheless, sentiment among East Pakistanis for sep-
aration from the west wing may be higher now than at
any other time in Pakistan's history-
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approv d For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
at
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6
 Approved Foym$6Iease 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79TO097 018300010002-6
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2003/06/12 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18300010002-6