CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018500050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Department review completed
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No. 0062/71
13 March 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR -- LAOS: Moscow and Peking
have reiterated their preference for Souvanna Phouma's
leadership. (Page 1)
TURKEY: Political leaders are seeking the formula
for a new government acceptable to the military.
(Page 3)
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: A proposal for minimum agri-
cultural price increases stands a good chance for
adoption. (Page 5)
LIBYA: The most recent deadline for oil companies
expires today. (Page 6)
SOMALIA: General Siad may have strengthened his
control of the government. (Page 7)
JAPAN: Komeito will send a delegation to Moscow,
and possibly Peking. (Page 8)
BRAZIL: The government has imposed press censorship
on "death squad" indictments. (Page 9)
PAKISTAN: Situation report (Page 10)
CHILE: Lubricating oil plant (Page 10)
HUNGARY-IRAQ: Oil development (Page 10)
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR - LAOS: Despite Sou-
vanna Phouma s acquiescence in the South Vietnamese
incursion into the Laos panhandle, both Moscow and
Peking have recently reiterated their preference for
his leadership.
Both countries have made it clear that they
still regard Souvanna's presence in Vientiane as
crucial to maintaining political stability and keep-
ing alive the possibility of a future political set-
tlement under the umbrella of the 1962 Geneva Accords.
Their position is a clear sign that while the Commu-
nists may doubt the efficacy of Souvanna's "neutral-
ity" as a restraining influence on allied operations
in Laos, they are reluctant to see the 1962 agree-
ment, which legitimizes the Communist movement in
Laos and affords it a position in a coalition gov-
ernment, completely abandoned.
Last fall, the Chinese charge in Vientiane pro-
vided the first indication of China's position on
this subject when he said China wanted to see Laos
return to "strict neutrality," with the Neo Lao Hak
Sat (NLHS) participating in the government. He also
stated he was doing everything he could to persuade
the NLHS to negotiate with the Royal Lao Government.
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Other Chinese officials in Vien-
tiane have also made it known that Peking is backing
Souvanna and that China will support Laos' neutrality
and all other provisions of the Geneva Accords that
concern it. In keeping with this attitude, the Chi-
nese
on
8 March officially endorsed for the first
time
the
"five-point" proposal for a political solu-
tion
in
Laos put forward by the Laotian Patriotic
Front
on
6 March 1970.
For its part, Moscow has also recently stressed
its continuing support for Souvanna Phouma's leader-
ship. During a conversation with a US Embassy offi-
cial in Moscow on 9 March, the deputy chief of the
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Foreign Ministry's Southeast Asian division flatly
stated that the Soviets still view Souvanna as prime
minister despite their official position that the
tripartite coalition government has collapsed. I
oscow s expressions of support or
ouvanna seem designed in part to prevent possible
challenges to him from Laotian rightists. Like the
Chinese, Moscow clearly thinks Souvanna's continued
presence at the head of the Royal Laotian Government
is far more desirable than the uncertainties that
would attend his overthrow by other non-Communist
elements.
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TURKEY: In the wake of yesterday's ultimatum
rom the ilitary commanders, political leaders are
seeking a formula that will satisfy the armed forces
and, at the same time, keep the government within
the bounds of the democratic system provided by the
constitution.
Prime Minister Demirel tendered his resignation
but has been requested by President Sunay to continue
heading a caretaker government until a new one can
be formed. The lower house of Parliament, met briefly
yesterday, but because no member of the cabinet was
present, adjourned to allow the deputies an oppor-
tunity to discuss the situation within their own
party groups. The Senate is scheduled to hold an
extraordinary session today.
All political leaders, while playing their cards
extremely close to their chests, have emphasized the
importance of maintaining the democratic system,
however illusory it may appear at the moment. Pres-
ident Sunay, who strongly opposes military involve-
ment in the government. structure, met with parliamen-
tary chiefs yesterday and will consult with the lead-
ers of the several political parties today in a
search for a political figure who can organize a na-
tional coalition government and assure passage of
the required legislation. Such legislation would
be aimed at ending extremism, which has disrupted
Turkey's social order, and at promoting political,
social, and economic reforms necessary to satisfy
the military establishment, which once having grasped
the reins of government might be reluctant to let
go. The next political move is up to the President,
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Meanwhile, the military is remaining in the
background following some initial show of force in
Ankara. A group of high-ranking officers delivered
copies of the military's ultimatum to the radio sta-
tion for broadcasting. A security force reportedly
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Chas been placed around the station, possibly to pre-
vent potentially subversive elements from trying to
put it off the air. In the Ankara area, all mili-
tary units have been placed on alert and full security
measures have
Otherwise, life in Ankara goes on much as usual,
although an Ankara radiobroadcast yesterday stated
that action has been taken against extremist groups
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: The EC Commission's pro-
posals for only "minimum" increases in agricultural
price levels seem to stand a good chance of being
adopted later this month.
At a Council meeting earlier this week, German
Agricultural Minister Ertl reiterated Bonn's demands
for price increases considerably beyond those pro-
posed by the Commission. Nevertheless, both before
and after the meeting, German officials assured the
US that Ertl's position is mostly for domestic po-
litical consumption. It is probable that his in-
sistence on specific price increases--especially for
feed grains--will be relaxed in the final debate.
The Commission seems also to have gained ground
at the Council meeting in its effort to link modest
price increases with a commitment from the member
states to get started on long-pending proposals for
the modernization of EC agriculture. Although Ertl's
insistence on advancing "counterproposals" provoked
a heated exchange between him and Commissioner
Mansholt, this appears also to have been at least
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_____________________Although the US has opposed
even the price increases the Commission contemplates,
these are modest compared with the requests of farm
groups, and the proposed reform program holds some
promise of making it easier for the Community to
hold the line on prices in the future.
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LIBYA: The most recent "deadline" for oil
compani- to respond to Libyan demands expires today.
Libyan tactics have alternated between ultima-
tums by Deputy Premier Jallud and indications from
Oil Minister Mabruk that certain demands are nego-
tiable. The two sides may be close on prices, but
sticking points are assurances against old claims
or any retroactive payments and the issue of a five-
year agreement.
The Libyans may employ the threat of a legis-
lated settlement to bring pressure on the companies
to improve their offer. Venezuela set the precedent
by passing legislation that gave the government uni-
lateral authority to set prices and taxes.
Oil officials from Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and
Algeria are in Tripoli to receive a report today
from Libya on the negotiations. Their presence as
well as the presence of Nigerian and Syrian offi-
cials may be used by Libya to indicate a "solid
front" of Mediterranean and African oil producers.
The other OPEC members of the Mediterranean group--
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria--have remained in
the background, and although they have agreed pub-
licly to support Libyan price demands, they prob-
ably will not support other Libyan demands.
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SOMALIA: General Siad, president of the ruling
military council, may have strengthened his insecure
grasp on the reins of government.
Siad's chief rival, General Gaveire, has been
dropped as defense minister and given a lesser port-
folio. A high-ranking police officer who was a
close ally of Gaveire has been dismissed from the
council and forced to retire. Since November 1970
when the former police officer was replaced as mayor
of Mogadiscio--his concurrent post--his future as-
signment has been the subject of considerable con-
tention between pro-Siad elements and Gaveire sup-
porters in the council.
With this setback for the Gaveire faction, it
is possible that Siad may make even further changes
in the government hierarchy. There is, however, the
danger that such action could provoke a reaction
from tribal and other elements sympathetic to Gaveire
and upset the delicate balance that has been main-
tained in the ruling council over the past year.
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JAPAN: Komeito, the political arm of the mili-
tant Buddhist Soka Gakkai sect, will be sending a
high-ranking delegation to Moscow and possibly Peking
this summer.
After a year of stalling, the party has accepted
an invitation from Moscow for an eight-day visit in
July. The delegation will also visit several East
European countries.
Komeito delayed accepting the Soviet invitation
in part hoping to receive one from Peking to balance
it off and also because of disarray within the party.
For some time Komeito has worked through pro-China
elements in the ruling conservative party in an ef-
fort to get a bid from the Chinese, most recently at-
tempting to use the good offices of a ranking conser-
vative party official who visited Peking last month.
The fact that the Soviet offer was accepted only sev-
eral days after the official returned indicates that
Komeito probably expects a Chinese offer soon.
In view of the considerable sentiment in Japan
for improved relations with Communist China, Komeito
undoubtedly is more anxious to develop contacts with
Peking than with Moscow. The party probably accepted
the Soviet offer because of the prestige involved and
in the interests of maintaining an independent image.
Both Moscow and Peking during the last year or two
have shown increasing interest in Komeito, which has
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achieved impressive electoral gains to become the
second largest opposition party in Japan.
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BRAZIL: The government has imposed press cen-
sorship on on reporting the indictment of police for
allegedly killing suspected criminals.
The Justice Ministry has ordered all media not
to deal with a charge handed down on 9 March by a
military prosecutor that accuses 15 Sao Paulo police-
men of murder committed as members of the notorious
"death squads." Since 1958 these vigilante organi-
zations have killed more than 1,000 persons suspected
of engaging in dope smuggling, prostitution, book-
making, and related activities. The "death squads"
are widely believed to be made up primarily of ac-
tive duty and retired security officers impatient
with what they consider the inefficiency and leniency
of the Brazilian judiciary system.
The prosecutor called for the death penalty or
life imprisonment for the men on the grounds that
their crimes violated national security laws by im-
pairing Brazil's international image. Because the
indictments were framed within the national security
context and thereby gave a military court mandatory
jurisdiction, the armed forces have been drawn into
the issue for the first time. Numerous other in-
dictments against alleged "death squad" members have
been filed in civilian courts, but only two convic-
tions have been handed down. The military's sensi-
tivity to anything that could damage its image, and
the fact that some indicted policemen have been key
figures in the government's campaign to counter ter-
rorism, may in part explain the new rigid censorship
order.
The government's extensive press censorship was
the reason cited by a Supreme Court justice for his
resignation on 10 March. He was the only member of
the court who said it should consider an appeal by
the country's only legal opposition party to end the
prior censorship of newspapers and magazines.
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PAKISTAN: IEast
Pakistani leader~o 3i ur . a man told an intermediary
sent by President Yahya Khan that the only way out
of the present impasse is to allow Mujib to govern
East Pakistan while Z. A. Bhutto forms a government
in West Pakistan. The two leaders would then nego-
tiate a new constitution---or separate constitutions
for the two parts of the country. Yahya is unlikely
to see much hope for a compromise if Mujib insists
on this stand. The President may still plan to fly
to Dacca in what could become a last-ditch effort to
find a
peaceful solution to the crisis.
CHILE: The head of the government oil enter-
prise has confirmed that Chile is negotiating to
use part of the. Soviet credit, acquired in 1967, to
build a lubricating oil plant. Romania may also be
a partner in the venture, which is expected to cost
$18 million. The Allende government is apparently
giving a high priority to the plant as a step toward
reducing dependence on imports of lubricating oils.
If the deal is concluded successfully, construction
is
lan
d
p
ne
Co begin before the end of 1971.
HUNGARY-IRAQ: Budapest is expanding its par-
ticipation in the Iraqi :national oil industry to in-
clude the drilling of at least three oil wells in
the Jambur oil field in northern Iraq. Work on this
contract, which will cost $3 million, is scheduled
to begin in December. The new project reflects
Baghdad's apparent satisfaction with Hungary's suc-
cessful drilling of two oil wells in the North Ru-
maila field, an area being developed primarily by
the USSR. In 1969, Budapest extended $11 million
in credit for developing the Iraqi national oil in-
dustry.
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