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December 14, 2016
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May 5, 2003
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March 19, 1971
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Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18500100 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE fret Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret N9 40 19 March 1971 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18500100001-5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/1 E I 9T00975A018500100001-5 No. 0067/71 19 March 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: Peking has issued its strongest polemical blast in nearly a year. (Page 1) USSR: Copper production is to be raised by more intensive use of existing plants. (Page 3) SOUTH KOREA: The appointment of a vice president of the government party could cause renewed intra- party strife. (Page 4) INDIA: Incumbents have retained the key portfolios in the new cabinet. (Page 5) EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: Accession negotiations remain stalemated. Page 6) GREECE: Most political detainees are to be released. (Page 7) TURKEY: Kidnaping plot (Page 8) CHILE - NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi mission (Page 8) MALAYSIA: Rubber (Page 8) ARGENTINA: Situation in Cordoba (Page 9) SWEDEN: Discount rate (Page 9) Approved For Release 2003/05/1 95. AF79T00975A018500100001-5 J Approved For Release 2003/05/19 :$R7TT00975A018500100001-5 COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: In anticipation of the upcoming Soviet party congress Peking has issued its strongest polemical blast against Moscow in nearly a year. The new attack, contained in a joint editorial by the major Chinese propaganda organs, is essentially a restatement of the ideological differences that divide the two parties. It appears designed to drive home the point that despite recent improvements in state-to-state relations the fundamental gulf between Peking and Moscow remains as wide as ever. The Chi- nese clearly wish to set the record straight on this score before the 24th CPSU congress begins; in a sense the editorial is Peking's reply to the invita- tion to attend the congress the Soviets claim to have tendered to the Chinese. In contrasting Chinese adherence to "revolution- ary violence" to the Soviet brand of "revisionism," the editorial accuses Moscow of going "all out" in the arms race while oppressing people at home and abroad, and repeatedly denounces Soviet party leader Brezhnev by name. Nevertheless, specific grievances against Moscow such as the putative Soviet "threat" to Chinese territory are not raised, presumably be- cause the occasion calls for a more theoretical or ideological statement of the Chinese position. In- deed, the editorial appears to have been drafted with a view to avoiding, as much as possible language which would hamper Peking's diplomatic offensive in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Like the classic anti-Soviet blasts of the early and mid-1960s, Peking's current attack on the "revi- sionists" has domestic as well as international im- plications. The themes central to the editorial are also applicable domestically. In this respect Peking seems to be warning cadres at home against "revision- ist" sins--a further sign that internal problems have still not been fully resolved. 19 Mar 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : WRfJP 'TT00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/-CG1[WP79T00975A018500100001-5 ? Mining, concentrating and smelting Area of major expansion 1960--1970 ? ? ? Approved For Release 2003/05/?t~P79T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/1 gJJ F 19T00975A018500100001-5 USSR: The new five-year plan directives indi- cate that the 1975 target for copper production will be achieved by more intensive use of existing plants, leaving until the end of the decade development of the giant Udokan deposit in eastern Siberia. The plan projects a 35- to 40-percent increase in copper production, compared with a 60-percent gain achieved in 1966-70. The absolute production increase, however, is about the same. Copper out- put is estimated to have reached 1.2 million metric tons in 1970 and may approach two million tons by 1980. Increased mechanization of production, improve- ments in the technology of metallurgy, and gains in labor productivity will be stressed. This will be a departure from the extensive development of large- scale combines, primarily in Soviet central Asia and the Caucasus, which characterized the 1960s. Udokan, the location of the largest copper de- posit in the USSR, is expected to begin production toward the end of the 1976-80 period. The Soviets hope for an annual output of 350,000-400,000 metric tons, accounting for nearly the entire growth in total copper production for that period. Develop- ment is hindered by the remote location, rugged ter- rain, severe temperatures, and large capital require- ments. Negotiations for foreign technology and finan- cial assistance from Japanese, British, and French firms, under way since 1965; have been complicated by these technical difficulties. Recent press re- ports, however, indicate that some agreements may be concluded shortly. Development costs are esti- mated at $1.4-2.0 billion, about 50 percent of which would be assumed by the USSR. A large portion of the Udokan output probably will be sold in the West to pay for the foreign assistance. (Map) Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/10 l'P9T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/19j]Mjk4JRFJ9T00975A018500100001-5 SOUTH KOREA: President Pak Chong-hui's appoint- ment yesterday of Kim Chong-pil to fill the new post of vice president of the government party could pro- vide the basis for renewed intraparty strife. As chief architect of the near-bloodless coup that elevated Pak to power in 1961 and as founder of the government party, Kim was at the center of much of the factional infighting that marked the regime's early years. In 1968, Kim was forced onto the poli- tical sidelines when his own presidential ambitions for 1971 almost brought him into open conflict with Pak. His gradual re-emergence as a political power has been strongly fought by party colleagues who have benefited from his political eclipse. Pak apparently created the post of party vice president especially for Kim in order to take ad- vantage of his considerable political talents in the presidential election in late April and the National Assembly elections about a month later. Kim is one of the few--if not the only--government politicians whose public speaking ability matches that of Kim Tae-chung, the popular opposition can- didate for president. Also like him, Kim Chong-pil is attractive to young people and can be counted on to be a strong campaigner in his home province, where support for the regime reportedly has slipped. 19 Mar 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/18E1A79T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/19gA9T00975A018500100001-5 INDIA: Prime Minister Gandhi's new 13-member cabinet contains five newcomers, but key portfolios remain in the possession of incumbents. In an apparent attempt to provide her new gov- ernment with an image of both continuity and change, Mrs. Gandhi has shuffled portfolios and personnel, particularly among the junior members in the larger Council of Ministers, which includes the cabinet. She apparently remains content, however, with the performance of the four veterans who have held the important portfolios of finance, defense, foreign affairs, and food and agriculture since the last cabinet shuffle in June 1970. She kept the sensitive and prestigious home affairs portfolio, which deals with domestic security. One of the more prominent ministers dropped from the cabinet is Dinesh Singh, former minister of industrial development and before that foreign affairs. Singh incurred widespread antipathy-- both domestic and international--while he was Mrs. Gandhi's confidant in the early years of her prime ministership. Her party's landslide electoral victory earlier this month has largely freed Mrs. Gandhi from her past concern with political survival and parliamen- tary opposition. As a result, there could be an important shift of power from the party and parlia- ment to the cabinet. Mrs. Gandhi is in a better position than at any time during her five years as prime minister to tackle pressing economic and social problems and to drive through policies that have previously met stiff resistance from vested interests. 19 Mar 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/1S9E",C'I W79T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/190,CCPJMf ][79T00975A018500100001-5 EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - UK: Accession negotia- tions remain stalemated because of differences among the Six and British reluctance to show any give on how much the UK will initially?contribute to the EC's budget. At a ministerial-level meeting on 16 March be- tween the UK and the Six, there was no progress on the principal outstanding issues--financing, arrange- ments for New Zealand's dairy exports, and guaran- tees for sugar exports of the Commonwealth countries. On financing, France maintains it is now up to Lon- don to better its initial offer. The other members want bargaining on this question to resume on the basis of a Community counteroffer. All Six agree that certain assurances can be given to maintain EC imports of New Zealand dairy goods and Commonwealth sugar, but Paris is less forthcoming on these issues than the others, perhaps in the hope of eliciting a tougher position on fi- nancing from its EC partners. Should the French continue these tactics, it seems doubtful that the Six can work out a common negotiating position before the next ministerial meeting with the British on 11 May. The British did succeed in tentatively scheduling two extra meetings after the 11 May session, and this could provide more time to thrash out differences. Fail- ing this, both sides may see some advantage in set- ting the stage for a "crisis" which would be re- solved perhaps in marathon sessions or even at the summit level, where the political importance of British membership would be clearly in focus. I I Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/15.x! .1`19T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/1%IRGj 9T00975A018500100001-5 GREECE: Prime Minister Papadopoulos has ordered the release of political detainees, but there is no sign that he is contemplating an early end to mar- tial law. A government spokesman recently announced that the majority of the 300 political detainees would be released by the end of April. Some 60 or 70 in- dividuals still considered to be dangerous will, however, be sent to remote villages with their fam- ilies where they will remain under surveillance. In addition, only 25X1 ten of another 40 persons arrested tor terrorist acts in late 1970 and since held without charge will be brought to trial. 25X1 the trial will not take place until September in or- der to avoid bad publicity during the summer tourist season. The wording of the press release was obviously intended to indicate that the release of these de- tainees is a follow-up to Papadopoulos' promise on 19 December to do so rather than a result of inter- national pressure on the government. In any event, occasional large-scale roundups of persons the re- gime considers dangerous will continue. 19 Mar 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/19ECJ4 p79T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/19B:AJBP179T00975A018500100001-5 NOTES TURKEY: 25X1 the left- ist Revolutionar Youth Federation 25X1 may soon kidnap a diplomat or one of his family as a hostage in seeking the release of terrorist leader Deniz Gezmis. Gezmis, who engi- neered the previous American kidnapings in Turkey and who is the self-styled leader of the embryonic Turkish People's Liberation Army, was captured Wed- n sd l ith th e ay a ong w ano er others are still at large. CHILE - NORTH VIETNAM: Six North Vietnamese representatives arrived in Santiago on 16 March to set up a commercial mission and a news agency of- fice. Chilean Foreign Minister Almeyda announced that the mission will have the same status as the existing North Korean one. According to the Chilean Communist Party newspaper, the mission will become an embassy when Chile establishes relations with North Vietnam. Cuba is the only other country in Latin America with official North Vietnamese repre- sentation. MALAYSIA: In an effort to halt declining prices, the government is now intervening by making purchases in the world natural rubber market. Nat- ural rubber prices had been falling steadily since mid-1969. As the world's largest producer Malaysia is most concerned about the drop in prices and its intervention has temporarily halted the decline. By highlighting the poor market conditions, Malaysia may hope its action will influence the US not to re- sume sales of stockpiled rubber. (continued) Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/161'1579T00975A018500100001-5 Approved For Release 2003/05/19Sg1'99T00975A018500100001-5 ARGENTINA: The presence of army troops and tanks in the streets prevented a renewal of violence in Cordoba yesterday, but a 14-hour general strike reportedly paralyzed the industrial city. General Lopez Aufranc, the commander of the Cordoba military zone, declared the city to be in a state of emer- gency and warned that his troops were authorized to take whatever action necessary to prevent looting or vandalism. Meanwhile, a key Cordoba labor leader told a US official that the prime objective of the Cordoba confederation's "struggle plan" is to force the removal of President Levingston and bring about the establishment of a nationalist militar overn- ment in Argentina similar to that in Peru. SWEDEN: The Riksbank has lowered its official discount rate from a postwar high of seven percent to 6.5 percent to encourage further industrial in- vestment. This move, concurrent with a lessening of inflationary pressures after three years of eco- nomic overheating, follows the recent lifting of the price freeze on producers' goods. The rate change, as well as continued government restrictions on housing and public investment, should stimulate the transfer of limited investment to the manufacturing sector. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/1 Chi-RBP79T00975A018500100001-5 SaMW&d For Release 2003/05/19: CIA-RDP79T00975AO18500100001-5 Secret Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO18500100001-5