CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018600020001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 22, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Department review completed
N?_ 4 0
22 March 1971
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No. 0069/71
22 March 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
LAOS: The government has suffered some sharp set-
backs in the Luang Prabang area. (Page 1)
COMMUNIST CHINA:. The appointment of a long-absent
politburo me er to the top party post in Peking
city may reflect a shift in the balance of forces
in the leadership coalition. (Page 2)
PAKISTAN: President Yahya and Mujibur Rahman appar-
ently made progress in their weekend meetings.
(Page 4)
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ICJ - SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: Hearings on the UN com-
plaint against Pretoria's hegemony over South-West
Africa have recessed. (Page 6)
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CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE): Arrest of regime opponents
(Page 8)
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LIBYA: Oil settlement imminent (Page 9)
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LAOS: The government has suffered some sharp
setbacks in the Luang Prabang area.
Government troops have abandoned a number of
defensive positions in the face of a series of co-
ordinated Communist attacks, and at last report
fighting was continuing in the mountains just east
of the city. Luang Prabang's already threadbare
outer defenses are now almost nonexistent. The
Communists for the first time this dry season placed
rocket fire on the Luang Prabang airfield. Although
damage to the field and aircraft was light compared
with previous years, the new attack underlines the
continuing vulnerability of the city.
The US Embassy estimates that a Communist attack
against Luang Prabang is unlikely, but US dependents
have been temporarily evacuated to Vientiane as a
precautionary measure. Steps have been taken to send
three additional irregular battalions to the area if
they are needed. King Savang is scheduled to partic-
ipate in Army Day ceremonies in Vientiane today, and
he presumably,'will press for additional military
measures, including increased US air support.
This is not the first time Luang Prabang has
been threatened, but the Communists are closer to
the city and in larger numbers than they have been
before. As in the past, the Communists could move
into the city almost at will, but such a step would
mark a major departure in North Vietnamese strategy
in Laos. Almost without exception, the Communists
have refrained from direct attack, harassment, or
terrorism against major population centers in the
country. It. seems more likely, therefore, that the
current campaign near Luang Prabang is to further
Communist objectives in the countryside and to dem-
onstrate once again to the Lao leadership the es-
sential precariousness of their country's situation.
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COMMUNIST CHINA: The unexpected appointment
of long-absent poli uro member Hsieh Fu-chih to the
top party post in Peking city may reflect a shift in
the balance of forces in China's unsettled leadership
coalition.
Hsieh was the first of a trio of important polit-
buro members to have dropped from sight in the past
year. Although the regime never openly acknowledged
that he was in disgrace, Hsieh's failure to appear
with other top leaders on occasions when his presence
was virtually obligatory, a brief press attack on
the public security system--which was under his di-
rection--shortly before his disappearance, and per-
sistent rumors that he had been censured at a secret
high-level meeting last April all pointed strongly
to his involvement in behind-the-scenes politburo
infighting.
Peking's sudden announcement on Friday that he
had been "elected" first secretary of the new munic-
ipal party committee in Peking therefore suggests
that he has undergone a political resurrection after
a concerted effort to oust him from the Chinese lead-
ership. However, the facts that Hsieh did not deliver
the major address at the municipal congress which
"elected" the new party committee and that he has not
yet been identified again as politburo member and
minister of public security may indicate that he is
not yet completely out of the political woods.
The precise reasons for Hsieh's lengthy dis-
appearance are still obscure, but he may have been
a temporary victim of "leftist" pressure within the
politburo. In his position as head of public security
he was almost certainly involved in an investigation
which began in January 1970 to ferret out officials
who had supported the ultraleftist "May 16 corps."
According to Red Guard accounts, the "corps" had
been backed by a number of leaders on the present
politburo, including standing committee members
Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng, both of whom may have
felt politically endangered by the investigation.
Chen and Kang have themselves subsequently dropped
from view, and rumors in Peking allege that Chen
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was censured at a party plenum last summer for or-
ganizing the "May 16 corps."
China's present politburo is composed of indi-
viduals who were often bitter rivals during the Cul-
tural Revolution and who must necessarily be con-
cerned with securing tenable political positions for
themselves and their followers in anticipation of
the death of 77-year-old Mao Tse-tung. Indirect
evidence suggests that these rivalries have been
extended and renewed by the process of rebuilding
the nation's party and government apparatus--a pro-
cess in which some of the militant ideologues who
have been closest to Mao appear to have been losing
ground. They seem to have been unable to form many
bases of power in the reconstructed party organs
which, like the new Peking committee, are led in
most localities by military men and veteran officials,
many of whom were once victims of political attacks
inspired by radical leaders such as Chen and Kang.
Indeed, the formation of party committees at the im-
portant provincial level did not begin until the
disappearance of Chen and Kang.
in any case, the confirmation of Hsieh in an
important party job while Kang and Chen remain side-
lined suggests that the balance within the politburo
has now swung in favor of a loose grouping of rel-
ative moderates which includes Chou En-lai and some
of the powerful central and regional military lead-
ers. It also raises serious questions as to the
present power of Mao himself. Since he has close
personal and philosophic ties with Chen and Kang,
a setback to them seems to tarnish his image and
suggests there are constraints on his authority.
.Neither of these important leftist leaders has
been denounced in public and it is possible that,
given the fluid state of Chinese politics, they
may be eventually "rehabilitated" much like Hsieh.
Nevertheless, even their return to the limelight
would not belie the impression that the "leftists"
on the politburo have lost a round in the ongoing
struggle and have even less chance than before to
carry much political clout in the post-Mao era.
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PAKISTAN: Developments over the weekend have
encouraged hopes that a political solution can be
found.
President Yahya and East Pakistani leader Mujibur
Rahman. apparently made progress in their meetings on
19, 20 and 21 March. Another meeting is scheduled
for today. Both sides are holding the results of the
discussions closely, but there is speculation in the
press that Yahya will give in to Mujib's demands.
If so, Pakistan would remain one country, but almost
all power would be in the hands of the provincial
governments.
Despite these encouraging signs, the crisis is
far from ended, and there is no assurance that West
Pakistanis will agree to any concessions Yahya might
make. A number of West Pakistani politicians, in-
cluding Z. A. Bhutto, have gone to Dacca to partici-
pate in the discussions. As late as Friday, Bhutto
had refused to join in what a close associate called
"the conspiracy to sell out West Pakistan."
Several East Pakistanis were killed in the clash
with West Pakistani troops on 19 March, and similar
incidents could easily occur.
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ICJ - SOUTH-WEST AFRICA: The initial hearings
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on
the UN complaint against Pretoria's continuing he-
gemony over South-West Africa have recessed, with
neither side retreating from its basic position.
The UN representative and associated speakers,
including those from the US and the Organization of
African Unity, maintain that South Africa failed to
promote the well-being of the inhabitants of South-
West Africa and that therefore the Security Council
was entitled under the UN Charter to terminate Pre-
toria's territorial mandate--originally given by
the League of Nations.
The South Africans' responses challenged at
first the political motivations of several judges
and subsequently the legality of all actions of the
UN on South-West Africa from 1946 through the deci-
sion of the Security Council to submit the issue to
the ICJ. The lengthy South African presentation,
completed last week as the oral phase of the court's
procedures drew to a close, was remarkable in its
firm rejection of any shade of international obliga-
tion.
Still before the court is the proposal South-
Africa made in January that a plebiscite be held
in South-West Africa and be "jointly supervised" by
the ICJ and Pretoria. Attempts have been made to
have this initiative clarified. Most UN members
are not inclined to accept it at face value. They
believe acceptance would concede too many important
legal points and permit a plebiscite that Pretoria
could manipulate.
The ICJ has declined to respond at this time
to the plebiscite offer. The court contends that a
response would anticipate its decision on the issues.
The court is likely to write an opinion supporting
the UN's termination of the mandate over South-West
Africa, but Pretoria certainly will not relinquish
control and probably will contend that the ICJ de-
nied it due process.
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CONGO (Brazzaville): Several southern oppo-
nents of President Ngouabi's northern-based regime
have been arrested following the circulation of in-
flammatory tracts in Brazzaville accusing the re-
gime of persecuting southern tribes. Ngouabi appar-
ently viewed the tracts as part of an attempt to
unite the southern tribes in order to oust his gov-
ernment. The arrests were ordered after the power-
ful southern leftists who dominate the ruling party's
politburo refused to authorize a sweeping investiga-
tion requested by Ngouabi. The arrests, including
that of the extreme leftist commander of the army's
armored squadron, could provoke a showdown with the
southern extremists. Ngouabi's defiance of the pol-
itburo indicates that the President believes he
still has the backing of key northern army officers.
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(continued)
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LIBYA: An agreement between the operating oil
companies and the Libyan Government was to be signed
yesterday. Although details are not available,
Libya reportedly received a substantial increase in
the posted price of its oil but yielded to the com-
panies' demand for a five-year agreement, renuncia-
tion of retroactive payments, and continuation of
the current tax rate. Saudi Arabia and Iraq will
be offered similar teems for their Mediterranean
oil .
22 Mar 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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