CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A018900060001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 30, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 040
30 April 1971
State Department review completed
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No. 0103/71
30 April 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Siri.k Matak has been designated to form
a new cabinet. (Page 1)
EGYPT: President Sadat will probably try to quiet
domestic critics of the nascent Federation of Arab
Republics in his speech tomorrow. (Page 3)
PAKISTAN: An assessment by the US Embassy in Is-
lamabad. (Page 4)
NATO: Most of the Allies favor a forthcoming posi-
tion toward talks with Warsaw Pact members on Euro-
pean security. (Page 5)
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AFGHANISTAN: The Etemadi government may face a. no-
con _ idence vote . (Page 7)
NEPAL-INDIA: Nepal's economy has been hurt by the
suspension of a trade and transit agreement with
India. (Page 8)
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JAPAN-USSR: Trade agreement (Page 9)
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CAMBODIA: The responsibility for forming a new
government has been passed to Sirik Matak.
Following Lon Nol's abrupt decision yesterday
to step aside, Chief of State Cheng Heng quickly des-
ignated Matak to organize a new cabinet. Lon Nol's
latest about-face may have come as a result of Matak's
unwillingness to serve in a. reduced capacity in a
proposed troika of deputy prime ministers. The two
leaders met for the first time in over a week on 29
April, but the substance of their discussions is not
known.
Matak probably is being given the first crack
at this task because he has been acting prime minis-
ter, and because he has had Lon Nol's support. Matak
probably would be willing to become prime minister,
provided that all political factions agree to close
ranks behind him. He is dealing from a fragile
power base, however. Matak is not overly popular,
and to the students and elements in the National As-
sembly he has become something of a symbol of the
old guard. Still, he is capable and energetic and
has established some rapport with a number of senior
military officers. Whether the latter will back him
in a political showdown is another matter.
If Matak is unwilling or unable to form a gov-
ernment, Son Ngoc Thanh's chances for becoming prime
minister would improve considerably. He is clearly
interested in the job, and his accession would be
appealing to those younger elements who have been
pushing for a thorough housecleaning in the top ranks
of the government. He has a powerful supporter in
Lon Non, who probably views Thanh as a more congenial
substitute for his brother than Matak.
The latest developments in Phnom Penh increase
the prospects for a further prolongation of the cur-
rent political impasse. Thus far, the maneuvering
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in the capital has been conducted in an atmosphere
notably free from tension or a sense of crisis.
Further indecision, however, will almost certainly
increase the potential for trouble as nerves begin
to wear thin and questions are asked about how long
the political drift can be allowed to continue in
a country at war.
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EGYPT: President Sadat's scheduled speech
tomorrow will probably include passages intended
to quiet domestic critics of the nascent Federation
of Arab Republics.
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The federation .is no
a genuinely popular concep-c n Egypt, and the ASU
politicians appear to have seized on the issue in
an attempt to increase their own influence on gov-
ernment policies.
Under President Nasir, the ASU was a political
sounding board without power, and Sadat has tried
to keep it that way. The President has moved to
bring his opportunistic critics to heel, preserving
the "democratic" process by modifying arrangements
for the federation and having the changes ratified
by all of Egypt's principal political and govern-
mental bodies. Sadat sent emissaries to Tripoli
and Damascus to get approval. for these modifications.
He is also reported to have the solid support of
Sharawi Goma, the powerful interior minister, in
defending his actions. The speech he has scheduled
for tomorrow presumably is designed at least par-
tially to express in popular terms the rationale
for Egypt's ratification of the federation's statutes
before any groundswell of opposition can develop.
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PAKISTAN: In the next two to three months,
the army will try to consolidate its hold on East
Pakistan while Bengali separatists attempt to or-
ganize active resistance, according to an assess-
ment by the US Embassy in Islamabad.
In the embassy's view, the larger, better-
equipped, and better-led West Pakistani forces ap-
pear to have the capability--even during the summer
monsoon--of continuing their mopping-up operations,
thus reducing Bengali forces into small uncoordinated
groups.
The government will also continue its campaign
to win political support in East Pakistan. So far,
however, its backing has come largely from groups
that did badly in elections last December. Only one
of the 447 elected members of the national or pro-
vincial assemblies from the outlawed Awami League
(AL) is supporting the government.
As the AL seeks to organize resistance, some
radicalization of its leadership is inevitable, in
the embassy's view. Over the short term, the cru-
cial question will be whether the AL leadership can
organize itself into a vehicle for insurgency.
The prospects for successful insurgency depend
both on the will and ability of the Bengalis to con-
tinue in the face of government punitive tactics
and on the degree of Indian support. The embassy
thinks it is still an open question whether Bengali
military and paramilitary personnel will be able to
form a nucleus for an armed resistance movement.
The embassy notes that India has so far provided
only limited aid.
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NATO: Discussions this week in Brussels con-
firm that a majority of the Allies favor a forth-
coming NATO position on talks with Warsaw Pact mem-
bers on European security.
Most of the Allies now believe that the June
NATO ministerial communique should state clearly
that a Berlin settlement is the only prior condition
for preparations for a conference on European secu-
rity (CES). In discussions at NATO on Wednesday,
Belgian proposals that any mention of NATO's current
additional requirement for progress in "other on-
going talks" be dropped met with fairly broad sup-
port. There was also wide agreement that an attempt
should be made to improve the chances for talks on
mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).
The Allies apparently believe that the outlook
for talks on force reductions in Central Europe has
already been improved by the recent favorable So-
viet comments on the subject. Although it is un-
clear whether the Soviet references are anything
more than an attempt to speed movement toward a CES,
Moscow's public position on NATO's MBFR proposals
has at least convinced the Allies that they should
make some positive response. Even the French, who
have abstained from previous MBFR initiatives, have
left open the possibility that they might go along
with some "mild mention" of MBFR in the communique.
Still contentious is the relationship between
MBFR and other European security questions. The
West Germans have said that they do not want MBFR
talks until Berlin is settled, lest East Germany be
given premature status in any multilateral forum.
Moreover, Bonn would prefer convening a CES only if
progress were being made toward force reductions.
A number of Allies, however, are opposed to any
statement in the communique that would require a
Berlin settlement before multilateral MBFR explora-
tions could begin. They are also reluctant--the
French most emphatically--to pose MBFR in such r a
way that it could become a roadblock to a CES.
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AFGHANISTAN: Growing tension between the gov-
ernment and parliament could result in the ouster
of Prime Minister Etemadi and his cabinet.
A no-confidence motion introduced in parliament
on 28 April is scheduled for debate early next week.
The motion was triggered by a wrangle over a proce-
dural matter, but it is actually an outgrowth of
dissatisfaction with the generally weak performance
of the Etemadi-led cabinets, which have held office
since late 1967. The government's alternate courses
of action include a concerted effort to defeat the
motion, resignation before it reaches a vote, or
dissolution of parliament by King Zahir. The King
has not yet indicated his intentions. Many Afghan
parliamentarians believe that the motion will suc-
ceed if it reaches a vote, unless the King makes a
vigorous effort to quash it.
King Zahir's "experiment in democracy," featur-
ing a constitutional monarchy and an elected legis-
lature, is only seven years old and has not yet es-
tablished firm roots in his tradition-bound, illit-
eracy-plagued nation. Parliament, dominated by
rural conservatives, is characterized by chronic
absenteeism, long and noisy debates, and little
tangible achievement. Political groups are weak,
and the fate of most proposals is determined by
nonaligned members who are easily swayed by lobby-
ing and oratory.
The King, although aloof from day-to-day pol-
itics, remains the dominant force in the country
and enjoys the loyalty of important power groups.
He will probably try to continue his effort at mod-
ernization through parliamentary democracy, but he
might designate someone else to head the government
in Etemadi's place.
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NEPAL-INDIA: Lack of a trade and transit
agreement with India since last November has seri-
ously affected the Nepalese economy, but the King
hopes appointment of a new prime minister will lead
to an early end to the suspension.
Normally, about 90 percent of Nepal's trade is
with India and most of the remainder transits India
and the port of Calcutta. Only a small share is
carried on with China through Tibet. Part of the
Indo-Nepalese disagreement is over the type of goods
that can be moved between the two countries and the
methods of control.
The disruption of arrangements with India has
caused prices of imported goods to increase 20 to
50 percent in the past six months while those of
exportable goods such as rice and jute have fallen
20 percent. Customs receipts and excise taxes,
which account for half of Nepal's domestic revenues,
are declining, reportedly by as much as one quarter
this fiscal year.
Hoarding of goods has become common and serious
shortages have developed. Nepal's haphazard efforts
to channel trade through public corporations and to
expand industry toward self-sufficiency have further
disrupted its economy. Although Communist China is
moving to increase trade with Nepal, much of it, un-
less heavily subsidized by China, would be very
costly to Nepal because of the high cost of truck
transport over thousands of miles of poor roads.
The King has become increasingly concerned and
realizes Nepal cannot remain adamant in the talks
with India. In an apparent effort to resolve the
trade-transit deadlock, he has appointed a new prime
minister whose nationalist reputation may enable the
government to reach a settlement with India without
being subjected to charges of capitulation
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NOTES
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JAPAN-USSR: A recently signed agreement calls
for a trade target of more than $5 billion over the
next five years. Fulfillment of this agreement prob-
ably will increase the slim lead Tokyo achieved last
year as Moscow's leading free world trading partner.
In 1970, trade reached $725 million, according to
Soviet figures. Although the Japanese still buy
more from the USSR than they sell in the Soviet mar-
ket, expanding Japanese exports account for most of
the rise in Japanese-Soviet trade in recent years.
Moreover, the two countries are still discussing a
variety of joint development projects in Siberia
and the Soviet Far East that could lead to even
closer economic ties in the future.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; ESTIMATES
The United States Intelligence Board on 29 April
1971 approved the following national intelligence
estimates:
SNIE 85-71 "Continuity and Change in
Castro's Cuba" 25X1
NIE 80/90-71 "The Soviet Role
America"
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