CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A019200020003-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 30, 2003
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 2, 1971
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A019200020003-4.pdf | 344.11 KB |
Body:
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Secret
NO 040
2 June 1971
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No. 0131/71
2 June 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
CAMBODIA: Difficulty for the new government.
(Page 1)
SOUTH VIETNAM: New political' controversy. (Page 3)
PORTUGAL: Ultraconservatives are opposed to a con-
sti taut onal revision granting increased autonomy
for overseas territories. (Page 4)
UN-CYPRUS: The UN force remains plagued with
problems. (Page 5)
CHILE - COMMUNIST EUROPE: Foreign Minister Almeyda's
trip. Page 6)
ARGENTINA: Anti-US terrorism (Page 7)
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CAMBODIA: The new government is experiencing
some difficulty coming to grips with its major eco-
nomic and administrative problems.
Although the government has been in office only
one month, it is becoming increasingly clear that
it has not yet dispelled the sense of drift and in-
decision that characterized the political situation
in Phnom Penh under the previous administration.
Some high-ranking officials are already complaining
about the obstacles they are encountering in trying
to establish programs and policies to meet the coun-
try's most crucial problems.
Finance Minister Sok Chhong recently expressed
concern over the cabinet's lack of support for re-
forms to halt continuing economic deterioration.
Chhong admits that currency devaluation, price con-
trols, and more stringent efforts to stop payroll
padding in the army are likely to be unpopular in
some quarters, but he believes that the real dif-
ficulty is the cabinet ministers' unfamiliarity with
economic problems and their reluctance to address
them.
In Tam, the able and energetic first deputy
prime minister, is having trouble lining up support
for plans to get a pacification program off the
drawing boards and into the countryside. One key
aspect of his proposed program, calling for the
military police to be rejuvenated as the national
police under his control, has run into some formi-
dable political opposition. In Tam has gone so
far as to threaten to resign unless his recommenda-
tions are approved.
The government's search for appropriate measures
to cope with its difficult and complex problems is
further complicated by Prime Minister Iron Nol's con-
tinuing involvement in day-to-day affairs. General
Fan Moeung, the project officer in charge of the
impending reorganization of the Ministry of National
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Defense and the Cambodian Army (FANK) General Staff,
has told the US defense attache that Prime Minister
Delegate Sirik Matak is distressed over the fact that
Lon Nol is conferring with certain FANK field offi-
cers on a daily basis and is otherwise blurring the
lines of authority within the military establishment.
Lon Nol's involvement appears to represent a
breakdown in the understanding that was reached when
the new government was formed, wherein he was to
serve as a figurehead prime minister with Matak
holding the real reins of responsibility. Matak
and other key officials evidently are also concerned
over the fact that access to Lon Nol is being con-
trolled by a small entourage headed by his brother,
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SOUTH VIETNAM: The arrest and detention of a
prominent antigovernment member of the Lower House
has stirred up a new political controversy.
Deputy Ngo Cong Duc was taken into custody in
Vinh Binh Province on 31 May and accused of assault-
ing the chairman of the province council. Some
press accounts claim that he is being charged with
attempted murder,
In Saigon, opposition deputies are condemning
Duc's detention as a violation of his parliamentary
immunity. They have persuaded the Lower House to
express its concern to President Thieu and to send
a delegation to Vinh Binh to investigate.
It is unclear whether Duc's arrest came at
local initiative in Vinh Binh or on orders from
Saigon. In any event the deputy has been a thorn
in Thieu's side. He edits the most outspokenly
antigovernment paper in Saigon and has called for
an early end to the war. Although the President
would like to see Duc defeated in the elections
this summer, the deputy reportedly is still popular
in his home district. Duc's continued detention
probably would lead to further charges--both in
Saigon and overseas--of political repression by the
Thieu government.
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PORTUGAL: Ultraconservatives are attempting
to modify Prime Minister Caetano's constitutional
revision granting increased autonomy to overseas
territories.
A major political battle on this issue is ex-
pected in a special session of the Portuguese Na-
tional Assembly beginning 15 June. Current tactics
of far right elements include mailing harsh criti-
cism of the revision to National Assembly deputies
and other influential regime figures, circulating
two books attacking Caetano's proposals, and gal-
vanizing support in numerous right-wing meetings.
The ultras have already persuaded the government
to compromise on several points. Most importantly,
the government has agreed that the structure of
overseas territories' governments will be determined
in Lisbon rather than locally.
The prime minister has responded to the ultra-
rightists' campaign by obtaining advance approval
from conservative President Thomaz and the military.
Caetano assured military support by appointing a new
army chief of staff sympathetic to him and by ex-
tending the term of Venancio Deslandes, the chief
of the joint chiefs of staff, who might have lined
up with the rightists.
The prime minister has also appealed for pop-
ular support in visits and speeches throughout the
country, and he even has made a bid for the backing
of the liberals by displaying sympathy for the mod-
erate left through selected public appearances.
With this backing, Caetano's rather modest proposals
are not seriously threatened. While powerful, the
ultraconservatives are a small group, not fully or-
ganized, and have not been able to muster appreci-
able national support.
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UN-CYPRUS: The UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
remains plagued with problems despite its extension.
last week by the UN.
The six-month extension, the twentieth approved
by the Security Council, comes at a time of in-
creasing intercommunal tensions. The debate pre-
ceding the vote featured the usual exchange of
charges between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish dele-
gates,.as well as familiar Soviet allegations of
NATO involvement.
The specter of increased animosity between the
Cypriot communities inhibited Council discussion of
UNFICYP's chronic financial problems. The USSR and
its allies have never contributed funds for this
peacekeeping mission, and some other countries have
not honored pledges made several years ago. The
resulting burden of covering the budgetary gap--
well in excess of $10 million assuming all pledges
were paid--has fallen on the eight nations con-
tributing troops and on the US, which has agreed to
provide 40 percent of all money for UNFICYP on a
matching basis. Secretary General Thant has told
the US he plans a full-scale review of UNFICYP be-
fore its mandate next expires at the end of this
year.
The UK, the principal troop contributor, plans
to reduce its costs in December by withdrawing
eight helicopters, four of which reportedly will
be used in Northern Ireland. These helicopters,
used for both reconnaissance and transfer and re-
supply operations, have been vital to UNFICYP. The
British have said, however, they could consider
leaving four helicopters on Cyprus if the UN would
foot the annual $480,000 bill for maintenance.
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CHILE - COMMUNIST EUROPE: Chilean Foreign Min-
ister Almeyda is exploring special economic ties
during his current trip to the Communist countries
of Europe.
In addition to holding interviews with Premier
Kosygin and other officials in Moscow last week,
Almeyda signed several economic agreements. According
to TASS, these cover an unspecified increase in and
longer terms for the unused $15-million Soviet credit
to Chile, made in 1967 for machines and equipment;
assistance to a variety of industrial projects; and
the establishment of the first permanent Latin Amer-
ican trade mission in Moscow.
A high-ranking Chilean economic delegation making
a more leisurely tour of Almeyda's circuit probably
worked out the details of the agreement before the
foreign minister's arrival. On the basis of what has
been announced thus far, it is fair to say that Chile
is ready to utilize available Soviet credits and other
economic assistance in amounts larger than any Latin
American country except Cuba.
Ambassador Korry in Santiago believes that Al-
meyda's reported intention to establish some sort of
relationship with COMECON could be the Allende gov-
ernment's most significant foreign policy initiative
to date. The ambassador says that Almeyda's tour
indicates that the new government is going well be-
yond its professed nonaligned policy in seeking
special ties with Communist European countries. A
journalist in Moscow, however, reported that Almeyda
showed reluctance to move too rapidly in developing
COMECON ties.
Allende is facing increasingly complicated eco-
nomic problems at home
It
wou be consistent with his approach to domestic
political issues for him to try to arouse West Eu-
ropean, Japanese, and US economic interest by demon-
strating the ease with which Chile can approach the
USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe.
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NOTE
ARGENTINA: US military personnel stationed
in Buenos Aires appear to be a prime target for
urban terrorists. An unsuccessful attempt to
break into the home of a US military officer last
Friday marks the tenth attack on members of the
military group or the defense attache's office,
beginning with the firebombing of the defense
attache's home last October. During the same
period two attacks were directed against other
US government personnel, and US business estab-
lishments have been the targets of several bomb-
ing incidents,
2 Jun 7l Central Intelligence Bulletin
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