CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019200040001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 24, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N9 040
4 June 1971
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No. 0133/71
4 June 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
SOUTH VIETNAM: The presidential election bill.
(Page
COMMUNIST CHINA: The reappearance of politburo mem-
ber Kang Sheng. (Page 2)
SOUTH KOREA: The new prime minister. (Page 4)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: The relief situation. (Page 5)
INDIA: The new budget. (Page 7)
MALTA: An apparent trend in favor of the Labor
Party. (Page 8)
FRANCE-USSR: The Soviets have made another gesture
toward economic cooperation. (Page 9)
CANADA: Criticism of Trudeau's foreign policy.
Page 10)
PANAMA: Popular attention is being focused on the
canal issue. (Page 11)
MOZAMBIQUE: Portugal is cracking down on the ac-
tivities of foreign missionaries. (Page 12)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Novotny's party status (Page 13)
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SOUTH VIETNAM: A clause in the presidential
election bill passed yesterday apparently is in-
tended by President Thieu to force Vice President
Ky out of the race.
Thieu successfully persuaded the Lower House
to reinstate the restrictive nomination clause,
which requires candidates to be endorsed by either
40 of the nearly 200 National Assembly members or
100 of the 500-odd members of provincial councils.
One of the original purposes of the provision was
to limit the number of candidates, thereby making
it more likely that the winner would receive a
majority mandate (the winning Thieu-Ky ticket re-
ceived only 35 percent of the vote in the 1967
election, in which there were 11 candidates). Thieu
did not back the provision strongly when it encoun-
tered opposition in the Senate two months ago.
Since then Ky has shown a greater interest in the
race, and Thieu evidently chose to pressure the more
pliable Lower House to override the Senate.
Of all the possible candidates, only Thieu and
Big Minh seem certain to be able to meet the terms
of the nomination requirement, and Minh has warned
that he might drop out of the race in protest against
the provision. Minh's resolve to run has wavered
periodically, apparently largely due to doubts about
his prospects. He probably believes that his own
chances for victory would be reduced if Ky is elim-
inated from the contest. Ky cannot be counted out,
but in view of his limited political support, he
is likely to have difficulty gaining the required
endorsements unless Minh withdraws.
Although Thieu's chances probably would improve
if Ky does not run, the President's tactic is cer-
tain to provoke accusations in Saigon and abroad
that he is stacking the political deck.
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COMMUNIST CHINA: The reappearance yesterday
of politburo member Kang Sheng after being on the
political sidelines more than six months is the
latest reflection of the fluid state of the current
leadership in Peking.
Kang, who ranks fifth in the party hierarchy
and was a leading figure in the Cultural Revolution,
was present at a major reception for visiting Ro-
manian party chief Ceausescu yesterday attended by
Mao
Tse-tung and Defense Minister Lin Piao.
Kang
was
listed in his customary place among the
regime's
top
leaders, indicating that he retains his
position
on
the elite politburo standing committee.
He had
not
appeared in public since 13 November.
During the past several months there have been
recurring rumors within the diplomatic community in
Peking that Kang and fourth-ranking politburo member
Chen Po-ta, who has been out of sight since last
August, were criticized at a major party gathering
last fall for promoting "extremist" activities during
the Cultural Revolution. Chen, Mao's personal sec-
retary and the regime's leading theoretician, re-
portedly was charged with a dozen major "crimes,"
and there is evidence that an article in the party
theoretical journal last month attacking "sham
Marxists" was intended as official notice that Chen's
voice in regime councils has been silenced.
There have been subtle differences in the way
the regime has handled Kang's absence in comparison
to that of Chen, suggesting that the question of
Kang's political fate has been the subject of de-
bate. The charges against Kang were never specified
even in the rumors, and several regime publications
carried photographs showing him along with other
leaders during his absence.
At this juncture, it is not clear whether Kang
has been fully "rehabilitated." He is reputed to
have had major responsibilities in the important
party rebuilding program, but these tasks seem more
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recently to have come under the purview of Premier
Chou En-lai, who appears to be the principal spokes-
man for proponents of moderation and reconstruction
within the leadership. Moreover, the regime's failure
to account for Kang's temporary eclipse and its curious
handling of the fate of two other politburo members
in recent months strongly suggest that China's current
leadership coalition remains beset by major political
differences over a wide range of policy and personnel
problems.
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SOUTH KOREA: President Pak Chong-hui's appoint-
ment yesterday of Kim Chong-pil to be prime minister
marks the full return to public life of one of South
Korea's most dynamic politicians.
As chief architect of the near-bloodless coup
that elevated Pak to power in 1961 and as founder
of the government party, Kim was at the center of
much of the factional infighting that characterized
the regime's early years. In 1968, Kim was forced
to the political sidelines when his own presidential
ambitions almost brought him into open conflict with
Pak. Kim's appointment appears to be a reward for
his vigorous campaigning on behalf of Pak and the
government slate in the recent national elections.
Kim undoubtedly will attempt to use the premier-
ship to strengthen his claim to be Pak's political
heir. His ability to do so could be improved by
additional changes Pak may make among his top lieu-
tenants. At present, control of the government party
machinery is in the hands of Kim's factional enemies
who are coming under increasing fire from the party
rank and file as a result of the strong showing of
the opposition in the race for the National Assembly.
Other cabinet changes announced along with Kim's
appointment are largely routine. The new foreign
minister, Kim Yong-sik, is an experienced diplomat
and briefly held the same position in 1963. None
of the key economic ministers was changed, including
the deputy prime minister, who has over-all respon-
sibility for all economic planning.
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INDIA-PAKISTAN: Relief efforts gained consider-
able momentum t is week, but the situation remains
potentially explosive.
New Delhi's problems with the refugees are
growing more complex. The state of West Bengal--
currently playing host to most of the four million
refugees--was ill-prepared to deal with the influx,
and state officials fear a total administrative
breakdown. According to a Calcutta newspaper, when
Prime Minister Gandhi visits that city tomorrow,
she will be threatened with the resignation of the
entire state cabinet unless she agrees to relieve
the Bengal government of all responsibility for the
refugees.
With the coming monsoon rains, conditions in
the refugee camps will become even more desperate
and, encouraged by the state's radical Communist
Party--one of Mrs. Gandhi's major opponents--thou-
sands of refugees may try to enter Calcutta. The
law-and-order situation in the city is already pre-
carious, and a surge of refugees would add to the
tension. West Bengal authorities are pressing Mrs.
Gandhi to move the refugees to nonborder states,
but this would be a monumental task and could not
be accomplished in time to avoid the expected dif-
ficulties. The local newspapers are already report-
ing that the radical Communists are considering
staging a statewide general strike to embarrass the
prime minister and bring down the state coalition
government dominated by her Ruling Congress party.
The office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees, Prince Sadruddin Khan, has just completed
a comprehensive survey of conditions in the West
Bengal refugee camps and is instituting a massive
relief effort under UN auspices. Cholera, endemic
in East Pakistan, appears to be on the rise in the
camps, and there is deep concern about it.
(continued)
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UN Assistant Secretary General Kittani, an ex-
pert in disaster relief, expects to visit Islamabad
and Dacca next week to work out guidelines for aid
operations of the international community in East
Pakistan. These guidelines will include provisions
for UN monitoring of the use of the supplies, most
of which will be provided by UNICEF and the UN's
World Food Program. The official Pakistani request
is for 250,000 tons of wheat and 100,000 tons of
edible oil.
Meanwhile, drought and low procurement prices
have resulted in a food problem in West Pakistan as
well. Officials estimate at least one million tons
of wheat will have to be imported in the next 12
months to build up government stocks. Insect damage
has also driven down rice production in West Pak-
istan.
The poor agricultural prospects in the West
will require East Pakistan to depend entirely on
foreign imports of foodgrains in the near future.
Under the circumstances, it may be that the West
will consume the wheat that was diverted because
of the civil war to Karachi from congested East
Pakistani ports, despite Pakistan's promise to the
US that the wheat, given under PL-480, would be re-
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INDIA: India's new budget contains no major
new approaches to the country's economic and social
problems.
Apparently the government is in no hurry to use
its solid majority in Parliament to enact Prime Min-
ister Gandhi's much-discussed "radical" socialist
policies. The budget is only mildly expansionary
and will not support a comprehensive development
program for appreciably more rapid economic growth.
The budget is essentially conservative with
total spending scheduled to increase by only 4.6
percent. The country's -tax base remains essentially
unchanged, but the imposition of new taxes will hold
deficit financing down to about the 1970 level. New
Delhi has not yet devised a means of taxing the large
agricultural sector, which remains under the author-
ity of the states.
Development programs are to be concentrated in
industry, transportation, and communications, with
the share of expenditures devoted to irrigation and
power projects scheduled to decline. The budget
also contains no major new proposals to attack the
massive unemployment problem.
Moreover, unless substantial international as-
sistance is forthcoming to help India care for the
estimated four million refugees from East Pakistan,
New Delhi may even be forced to cut what limited
economic development and employment programs are
planned. The allocation of $80 million for refugee
relief in the current budget will suffice only for
a limited period.
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MALTA: An apparent trend running in favor of
the Labor Party in a key electoral district could
spell serious trouble for Prime Minister Borg-
Olivier's ruling Nationalist Party in the 12-14
June parliamentary elections.
In the contest for the 55 legislative seats,
present soundings indicate that Dom Mintoff's oppo-
sition Malta Labor Party (MLP) may pick up two ad-
ditional seats in Gozo, a district which in 1966
awarded four of its five parliamentary seats to the
Nationalists. Such a gain would be significant in
an election which most observers expect to be a
photo finish.
The key question is whether a pro-MLP trend in
Gozo, the smaller of the two inhabited islands, would
also be reflected in the island of Malta itself.
There are several factors working in favor of the
MLP, the main one being the reconciliation between
Mintoff and the highly influential Catholic church.
In 1969 the church, which in past elections publicly
branded a vote for Labor a mortal sin, agreed with
Mintoff to refrain from any overt intervention in
the elections.
Also working for the MLP is the fact that ap-
proximately one out of every six voters will be go-
ing to the polls for the first time. These young
voters may look to Labor as having the more appeal-
ing economic and social policy. The virtual disap-
pearance of splinter parties--only one insignificant
party is challenging the two prime contenders--is
also expected to work to the MLP's advantage.
The foreign policy section of the MLP election
program, issued last weekend, pointedly avoids any
reference to NATO. Prior to the campaign, Mintoff
had indicated that the small NATO presence was at
odds with his theme of "positive neutrality." He
now seems to be hinting that, if he wins, NATO will
not have to give up its Maltese base if it is will-
ing to give "adequate" compensation.
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FRANCE-USSR: Soviet Foreign Trade Minister
Patolichev has made another gesture toward closer
economic cooperation with France.
Patolichev, in Paris for the air show, announced
that specifications for the Kama River truck plant
have been passed to Renault and that the two coun-
tries will collaborate in building an oil refinery
in France to process Soviet crude. He also noted
that further discussions were held on building a
joint metallurgical complex near Marseilles that
was agreed to during President Pompidou's visit to
the USSR last fall.
These agreements contain little that is new
or especially significant. Renault apparently will
undertake only the cab and sheet metal stamping unit
of the truck plant, and the refinery probably will
add only marginally to France's refining capacity.
As for the metallurgical complex, it remains in the
talking stage as do various other economic proposals
raised in recent years.
The recent announcement may be setting the
stage for the upcoming meeting of the "Grande Com-
mission," a body that meets periodically to explore
new areas of cooperation between the two countries.
Although the commission has not been publicized
during the past several years, Moscow may attempt
to revitalize it now to promote closer ties with
Paris.
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CANADA: Prime Minister Trudeau's efforts to
highlight his "independent" foreign policy during
his recent trip to the USSR have come under increas-
ing attack at home.
The opposition parties and the press have ex-
hibited growing concern over the possible implica-
tions of the visit for relations with the US and
NATO and the resulting protocol on consultations.
Despite government reassurances that its aim is
merely to diversify its foreign policy and not to
loosen traditional ties with the West, critics are
charging that Canada's position on East-West secu-
rity issues is becoming ambiguous.
Parliamentary and press critics also complain
that Trudeau has compromised relations with the US.
Defense of and praise for Washington have come from
such unlikely sources as former prime minister Dief-
enbaker and prominent members of the socialist New
Democratic Party.
There are no indications that press reports
alluding to undisclosed agreements have any basis
in fact. These reports apparently were sparked by
the delay in the public release of the protocol.
I I
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PANAMA: The government is focusing popular at-
tention on the canal issue.
Members of Panama's negotiating team are hold-
ing a series of public meetings outlining the govern-
ment's position and objectives. They have already
met with business executives and some community
leaders, and additional meetings with students and
other groups are planned. The government position
as enunciated in these discussions concedes continued
US control of canal operations, calls for a reduced
US military presence, and stresses Panama's interest
in attaining full jurisdiction over the Canal Zone.
The negotiators also stated that any new treaty
would be ratified by plebiscite.
This current round of popular consultations
seems designed to develop a climate of opinion that
could be further mobilized and used during negotia-
tions. It also serves to head off any later charge
that the regime was acting secretly to conclude an
unfavorable agreement with the US. The obvious dan-
ger, however, is that government rhetoric at this
stage can redu needed flexibility and complicate
negotiations.
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MOZAMBIQUE: Portugal is cracking down on the
activit oforeign Catholic missionaries.
Lisbon's decision last week to expel the 38 mem-
bers of the international Catholic Order of White
Fathers--active in the province since 1946--was
based on allegations that certain members had en-
gaged in "anti-Portuguese" and "offensive" acts.
One missionary was charged with urging his congrega-
tion to join the nationalist Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Early last month,
another Catholic missionary was ordered out of the
province on much the same charge.
Portugal is unable to supply enough mission-
aries for its African provinces and must rely heav-
ily upon foreign missionaries, whom it nevertheless
views with suspicion. Many of these Catholic mis-
sionaries--largely West Europeans--are averse to
Portugal's policies in Africa and inculcate nation-
alist sympathies upon their congregations. Several
years ago, an entire White Fathers' seminary class
defected to Malawi and many joined FRELIMO. Al-
though the Portuguese decided against expelling the
order at that time, they have kept it, and other
missionary orders, under close surveillance. The
Portuguese are especially sensitive at the moment
because of the dry season offensive into insurgent
territory that began last month, and even the slight-
est connection of a missionary group with FRELIMO
is likely to bring government tion against
it.
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NOTE
CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Unconfirmed press reports in-
dicate that the party membership of former party
boss Antonin Novotny was reinstated at the recent
party congress. If true, it would mark further
progress in the party leaders' efforts to settle
their factional differences. Novotny's party status
has been a troublesome issue since his membership
was suspended in 1968 for his complicity in the
Stalinist trials of the 1950s. His final expulsion
would have resurrected that sensitive issue which
conservatives and the Soviets would like to avoid.
Novotny's reinstatement would not mitigate his of-
ficial disgrace, and the moderates in the Husak
regime may have agreed to it in return for not
taking any further action a ainst the reformist
leaders of the Dubcek era.
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