CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
7
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 31, 2003
Sequence Number: 
3
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 4, 1971
Content Type: 
REPORT
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2.pdf92.96 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0192Tp09( 'et DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin "State Department review completed Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : C~ T ' 4 June 1.9 71 IA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 Central Intelligence Bulletin CONTENTS YUGOSLAVIA: Explorations of military cooperation 25X1 with Italy. 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Ap roved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 YUGOSLAVIA: BELGRADE'S EXPLORATIONS OF MILITARY COOPER TION WITH ITALY IN RECENT MONTHS REFLECT A DESIRE TO ATTRACT THE ATTENTION OF NATO POWERS TO YUGOSLAVIAOS ISOLATED MILITARY POSITION. I YUGOSLAV DEFENSE MINISTER LJUBICIC IN APRIL EMPHA- SIZED COMMON DEFENSE NEEDS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE. SINCE THEN, YUGOSLAV MILITARY ATTAC.HCS IN ROME AND VIENNA HAVE ATTEMPTED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE CONSIDERING A FORMAL DEFENSE ALLIANCE. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT BELGRADE IS SERIOUSLY CON- SIDERING SUCH AN AGREEMENT, OR THAT IT EXPECTS ITALY TO DO SO. RATHER, THE YUGOSLAVS MAY BE ANGLING FOR SOME KIND OF UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD ASSURE THEM THAT THEY ARE NOT WITHOUT FRIENDS. THEY PROBABLY ALSO BELIEVE THAT THESE TACTICS WILL IMPROVE THEIR CHANCES OF ACQUIRING WESTERN MILITARY EQUIPMENT. YUGOSLAVS GENUINELY FEAR SOVIET MILITARY INTER- VENTION DURING THE EVENTUAL TRANSITION PERIOD AFTER TITO DIES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO HARD INFORMATION TO CONFIRM SUCH A THREAT, YUGOSLAVIA'S BASIC FEELING OF INSECURITY HAS BEEN FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY THE GROWING OBSOLESCENCE OF ITS MILITARY HARDWARE AND ITS INABILITY TO FUND PURCHASES OF NEW WESTERN EQUIP- MENT. BELGRADEOS STRICT ADHERENCE TO ITS POLICY OF NONALIGNMENT HAS DEPRIVED IT OF MEANINGFUL MILI- TARY TIES IN EAST OR WEST AND IT NOW APPEARS TO BE ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP WAYS WHICH WILL MAKE IT LESS VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURES FROM THE EAST. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2 Top Secret Top Secret Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19200040003-2