CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 31, 2003
Sequence Number:
3
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 4, 1971
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Approved For Release 2003/08/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0192Tp09( 'et
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
"State Department review completed
Top Secret
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4 June 1.9 71
IA-RDP79T00975A019200040003-2
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Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
YUGOSLAVIA: Explorations of military cooperation
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YUGOSLAVIA: BELGRADE'S EXPLORATIONS OF MILITARY
COOPER TION WITH ITALY IN RECENT MONTHS REFLECT A
DESIRE TO ATTRACT THE ATTENTION OF NATO POWERS TO
YUGOSLAVIAOS ISOLATED MILITARY POSITION.
I
YUGOSLAV DEFENSE MINISTER LJUBICIC IN APRIL EMPHA-
SIZED COMMON DEFENSE NEEDS IN GENERAL TERMS WITH THE
ITALIAN AMBASSADOR IN BELGRADE. SINCE THEN, YUGOSLAV
MILITARY ATTAC.HCS IN ROME AND VIENNA HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE
CONSIDERING A FORMAL DEFENSE ALLIANCE.
IT IS UNLIKELY THAT BELGRADE IS SERIOUSLY CON-
SIDERING SUCH AN AGREEMENT, OR THAT IT EXPECTS ITALY
TO DO SO. RATHER, THE YUGOSLAVS MAY BE ANGLING FOR
SOME KIND OF UNDERSTANDING THAT WOULD ASSURE THEM
THAT THEY ARE NOT WITHOUT FRIENDS. THEY PROBABLY
ALSO BELIEVE THAT THESE TACTICS WILL IMPROVE THEIR
CHANCES OF ACQUIRING WESTERN MILITARY EQUIPMENT.
YUGOSLAVS GENUINELY FEAR SOVIET MILITARY INTER-
VENTION DURING THE EVENTUAL TRANSITION PERIOD AFTER
TITO DIES. ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO HARD INFORMATION
TO CONFIRM SUCH A THREAT, YUGOSLAVIA'S BASIC FEELING
OF INSECURITY HAS BEEN FURTHER AGGRAVATED BY THE
GROWING OBSOLESCENCE OF ITS MILITARY HARDWARE AND
ITS INABILITY TO FUND PURCHASES OF NEW WESTERN EQUIP-
MENT. BELGRADEOS STRICT ADHERENCE TO ITS POLICY
OF NONALIGNMENT HAS DEPRIVED IT OF MEANINGFUL MILI-
TARY TIES IN EAST OR WEST AND IT NOW APPEARS TO BE
ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP WAYS WHICH WILL MAKE IT LESS
VULNERABLE TO MILITARY PRESSURES FROM THE EAST.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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