CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 10, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 26, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/09/02: CIA-RDP79T00975A01940001"y t
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Dept. review completed N2 040
26 June 1971
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02S]RtBfE"9T00975A019400030001-3
No. 0152/71
26 June 1971
Central Intellgence Bulletin
CONTENT S
VIETNAM: The North Vietnamese campaign near the
DMZ. (Page 1)
LAOS: The dialogue on opening peace talks. (Page 2)
JAPAN-US: Trade and investment policies. (Page 3)
USSR-JAPAN: Soviet concern about Tokyo's relations
with China. (Page 4)
NATO-MBFR: Differences among the allies. (Page 5)
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: There may soon be a deterioration
in relations. (Page 7)
25X1
TUNISIA: Bourguiba is following an active schedule.
(Page 10)
JAPAN: Clash between JCP and students (Page 11)
COMMUNIST CHINA - IRAQ: Economic credit (Page 11)
USSR-IRAQ: Economic protocol (Page 12)
25X1
PERU: Social mobilization front (Page 13)
NEW ZEALAND: UK-EC dairy products agreement
Page 13)
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 ?V[ ,j9T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/0~{~'~I 179T00975A019400030001-3
J. ~ .
FSB A
Sarge
Sh`u
Valle
New Communist road construction
6 7r : h' 0 F . 7' Cl ly' I` 1 Af
Approved For Release 2003/09/03:'FJ79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02-.- b 79T00975A019400030001-3
VIETNAM: The North Vietnamese are carrying out
yet another of their long series of military cam-
paigns in the area of the Demilitarized Zone and
northernmost South Vietnam.
Several weeks ago the intensity of enemy shell-
ings and ground probes increased. During the past
few days heavy North Vietnamese shellings forced the
South Vietnamese at least temporarily to evacuate
one strongpoint below the central DMZ--Fire Support
Base Fuller--and in central Quang Tri Province an-
other ARVN base has come under heavy enemy pressure.
The specific tactical plans of both the North
Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese, who are now
mainly responsible for defending the northern front
themselves, are by no means clear.
To facilitate movement in the area of the DMZ,
since early May the North Vietnamese have constructed
a 4.5-mile road through the western end of the DMZ
to about one mile inside northern Quang Tri Province--
the first such road ever observed. This road may be
headed for a junction with Route 608. Supplies and
personnel have moved through the DMZ for years over
an extensive network of trails, but the new road
will greatly enhance the Communists' logistical capa-
bilities in the area.
The South Vietnamese are facing the difficult
decision of whether to defend the forward strong-
points along the DMZ and in the western mountains,
which would keep the fighting away from the civilian
population, or to withdraw to positions closer to
the coast. In countering enemy drives in earlier
years, US forces withstood longer enemy sieges at
the forward bases.
In the coming weeks the strength of the North
Vietnamese push in Quang Tri Province and the South
Vietnamese response to this pressure may provide an
indication of Saigon's ability to pick up the secu-
rity burden as US forces withdraw.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/0225Jg- P79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02T9T00975A019400030001-3
LAOS: The Communists are continuing their polit-
ical dialogue with the Vientiane government on open-
ing Lao peace talks.
Pathet Lao leader Souphanouvong has sent Prime
Minister Souvanna Phouma another letter that hews
to the Communist line that any progress toward a
Lao settlement depends on a total US bombing halt.
The letter contains two new ingredients that appear
designed to convey an impression of reasonableness.
Souphanouvong now is proposing that a cease-fire in
Laos would coincide with a US bombing halt; previous
Communist terms were that a bombing halt would have
to precede a cease-fire.
In addition, the Communists have proposed that
Vientiane and the Plaine des Jarres serve alternately
as the sites for the negotiations that they say would
follow the cease-fire. This is the first time this
year that the Communists have gone so far as to dis-
cuss the modalities of the talks. The Communists
are aware that their. demand for a bombing halt is
the real stumbling block to talks; raising the ques-
tion of the site for talks is essentially designed
to give the impression that they are ready to move
ahead--if their terms are met.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/0EGTA-1 bT79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/OTC 79T00975A019400030001-3
JAPAN-US: Reflecting concern about growing US
criticism, Tokyo is attempting to assure the US that
it is committed to increased liberalization of its
trade and investment policies.
Takeshi Yasukawa, a top Japanese Foreign Office
official told Under Secretary Johnson on 23 June that
if economic relations between the US and Japan were
not handled properly, the results would be "very un-
fortunate." He expressed concern that economic prob-
lems could jeopardize chances for US Senate ratifica-
tion of the Okinawa reversion agreement. He was
warned by US officials that the atmosphere in the
Senate has been soured by economic frictions with
Japan, and submmLssion of the treaty to the Senate
might have to be delayed.
Yasukawa claimed that Japanese economic agencies
were taking a more positive attitude toward liberali-
zation, most notably the international trade ministry.
He also noted a growing emphasis in the Japanese
press that more must be done to alleviate US-Japan
economic tensions.
In a similar vein, Prime Minister Sato, campaign-
ing this week for his party's candidates in Sunday's
Upper House elections, stressed the need for increased
liberalization measures. As this type of plea is not
likely to win votes in Japan, Sato apparently is try-
ing to generate a public consensus for whatever meas-
ures Tokyo decides to adopt. In a further move to
build support for his position, Sato reportedly is
planning to bring in people more committed to lib-
eralization in the cabinet reshuffle planned for
early July.
Although much of the talk is probably for US
consumption, Tokyo recognizes that stepped-up trade
and capital liberalization are necessary to reduce
the present friction between the US and Japan. Ef-
fective liberalization measures are likely to take
some time, however, in view of continuing opposition
from certain elements in the government ministries
and business community.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/09/023.14 ~F 79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 Sr9TO0975AO19400030001-3
USSR-JAPAN': Moscow is increasingly concerned
about growing pressure in Japan for better relations
with China.
25X1
Nevertheless, Moscow's unwillingness to meet
Tokyo's political demands and its clumsy handling
of economic dealings with Japan continue to strain
relations. This week, for example, the annoyed
Japanese turned the tables on a visiting Soviet
emissary whose mission was to publicize the USSR's
recent "peace initiatives" and needled him about
the USSR's failure to return the "Northern Terri-
tories." Almost simultaneously, Moscow hurt its
drive for better relations when it postponed again,
this time indefinitely, the annual USSR-Japanese
economic cooperation meeting, claiming it was not
prepared to discuss various Siberian development
projects in detail. The cancellation may reflect
disagreement in Moscow over plans for Siberian de-
velopment and the role to be granted the Japanese
in it, as well as economic considerations such as
the terms of financing.
The Japanese have attached little urgency to
improving ties with Moscow. For one thing, there
is little political capital to be made on this is-
sue while advocacy of better ties with China creates
a highly favorable popular response. At least some 25X1
Soviet officials appear to recognize that the USSR
has only limited ability to stem this current.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/02S]ECARUW9T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/0F 79T00975A019400030001-3
NATO-MBFR: The quickening pace of the dia-
logue on mutual and balanced force reductions is
accentuating differences among the allies.
London remains fundamentally skeptical that
any force reductions can be negotiated that will
not reduce NATO's security. The British are partic-
ularly concerned that the drift toward negotiations
is outstripping allied preparations. London also
thinks that the Canadians and a few other allies,
by pushing for appointment of an emissary to dis-
cuss MBFR with the East prior to the meeting in the
fall of the NATO deputy foreign ministers, risk
blurring the existing NATO guidelines on how such
talks should be approached.
Paris generally shares London's skepticism
and is particularly concerned about news reports
that forward based nuclear systems might be in-
cluded in MBFR talks. Nevertheless, France report-
edly now considers that simple opposition to MBFR
is no longer tenable for it, and the government is
reviewing its entire approach. Paris plans on bi-
lateral talks with Moscow to probe Soviet motiva-
tions.
Bonn, following Brandt's recent talks in Wash-
ington, appears much more relaxed about the effect
of force reductions on Western defenses. Defense
Minister Schmidt was reported yesterday, however,
to have cautioned that the two superpowers could
not ignore the members of NATO in agreeing even to
symbolic troop reductions. The federal Security
Council will meet on Monday to consider various
approaches to MBFR, including that of initial sym-
bolic cuts.
Meanwhile, Moscow continues to urge that NATO
clarify its position on MBFR and quicken the pace
of discussions. Soviet Charge Vorontsov told US
officials in Washington late this week that because
26 Jun 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 '9T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02S.i&'+9T00975A019400030001-3
MBFR was a Western idea, NATO should be providing
answers and mak:Lng specific proposals rather than
asking questions. Although in no way defining the
Soviet position more precisely, Vorontsov repeat-
edly asserted that the current method and pace of
bilateral exchanges would not lead anywhere and
claimed that the USSR is "ready for substantive
discussions."
26 Jun 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/025tfAi 9T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/02S:k%- EP79T00975A019400030001-3
YUGOSLAVIA-USSR: The Yugoslav party appears
to be girding itself for a significant deteriora-
tion in its relations with Moscow.
At a meeting of the party presidium's commis-
sion on. international affairs on Wednesday, rela-
tions with the Soviets were reviewed and it was.
concluded that there has been no improvement since
the invasion of Czechoslovakia and that future
prospects are not good. The Soviets were accused
of trying to isolate Yugoslavia by criticizing non-
alignment and reviving the Brezhnev doctrine. The
commission also condemned Moscow's support of sub-
versive activities in Yugoslavia and abroad, and
claiming,without, presenting evidence, that the
CPSU is suggesting to the Soviet populace that the
situation in Yugoslavia is approaching that in pre-
invasion Czechoslovakia, and that "corresponding
actions should be taken."
In an unusual move, the party commission's re-
port will be disseminated to the lowest party units,
suggesting an expansion of the present polemical
campaign. The party appears to be using fears of
Soviet interference to drive the faction-prone fed-
eration together during this crucial reform period.
Tito might be prepared to go quite far with this
strategy.
The participants also demanded reciprocity in
bilateral information activities and pointed out
that the Soviets still refuse to allow a Yugoslav
information center to open in Moscow. This demand
is intended to lead to a cut in dissemination of
Soviet propaganda in Yugoslavia.
The Soviets have still not. replied to Belgrade's
official protest of 8 June against toleration of
anti-Yugoslav.emigre activities in Moscow. Publicly,
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 20033
NIS
:4-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
however, Izvestia has denied the charges anct. de-
clared that the USSR is willing to improve rela-
tions. Even the fact that these countermoves are
in low key has not eased Yugoslav suspicions of So-
viet intentions. Untraceable rumors in Yugoslavia
about Warsaw Pact and Soviet invasion schemers appear
to have multiplied.
26 Jun 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2004/f0-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003e@R._itf-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
TUNISIA: President Bourguiba has plunged into
a fairly active schedule since he returned to Tunis
a week ago, but there are still no indications of
what role he intends to play in the government and
the ruling Destourian Socialist Party.
There has been no reading as to the state of
his health since he returned. During brief' cere-
monies on his arrival, he spoke lucidly to the wel-
coming dignitaries and greeted governmental., party,
and diplomatic officials individually. He there-
after rode standing in a jeep in a televised hour-
long parade through the city. Since then he has
held long conversations with his prime minister and
the ministers of foreign affairs, justice, and in-
terior. These conversations appear to have added
fuel to the already circulating rumors of an impend-
ing governmental reshuffle.
The foreign press has reported the resignation
of Interior Minister Mestiri, but the fact that the
government has not yet commented officially on the
reports may indicate that Bourguiba is attempting
to persuade him to remain in the cabinet. Mestiri
and Habib Boulares, the former information minister
who resigned just before Bourguiba returned, rep-
resent the party's liberal wing, which favors de-
centralization of both party and government. Some
say that the "old guard," headed by Prime Minister
Nouira, has effectively neutralized the liberal wing,
but here again Bourguiba's intentions are still not
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2000,EEqA-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/023O4f"'9T00975A019400030001-3
NOTES
JAPAN: In an ironic twist, the Japanese Commu-
nist Party, on the occasion of the 11th anniversary
of the signing of the US-Japan, Mutual Security Treaty
on 24 June, was forced to call on-the Japanese police
for protection against an attack on JCP headquarters
by extreme left-wing students. The Communists have
charged that a court's refusal to grant an injunction
against the extremist demonstrators and inadequate
police protection represented a government "plot" to
let the Marxists destroy each other. The incident
comes as a clear embarrassment to the JCP on the eve
of Sunday's Upper House elections, as the Communists
have long been trying to cultivate a peaceful, par-
liamentary image.
COMMUNIST CHINA - IRAQ: Peking has extended
its first economic credit to Iraq. The credit is
valued at nearly $40 million and covers the cost of
unspecified plants, equipment, and technical assist-
ance. The liberal terms of the interest-free credit
call for repayment in Iraqi. goods to begin in 1984
and to take place over a ten-year period. The agree-
ment was reached during the recent visit of an Iraqi
delegation to Peking headed by the Iraqi oil and
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/0 LARRPj7'9T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 200 ,%MR.J 1 -RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
USSR-IRAQ: A high-level Soviet delegation has
departed Baghdad after more than a week of discus-
sions on various topics with Iraqi Government and
Baath Party officials. According to a joint commu-
nique, the two sides signed a protocol covering the
second stage in the development of the North Rumaila
oilfield and the construction of a canal that will
help regulate the. Euphrates River. Party relations
were discussed, probably in an attempt to ease the
friction between the'ruling Baath and the Iraqi Com-
munists. The Arab-Israeli conflict and fedayeen ac-
tivities also were discussed. The US Embassy in
Moscow believes that the visit may not have been
very warm; TASS coverage suggests that there were
some differences, particularly over Iraq's persistent
opposition to a "political" settlement of the Middle
East question.
25X1
25X1
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2002 R1$A-RDP79T00975A019400030001-3
 Approved For Release 2003/09/029 9T00975A019400030001-3
PERU: The Velasco government has established
a new cabinet-level office with the responsibility
of organizing the populace behind the "revolutionary
government." The new "social mobilization" front
will involve a network of national, regional, and
local organizations to provide training and orienta-
tion for the public, develop social institutions,
and to serve as a direct line of communications be-
tween the government and the people. The new system
initially will encompass organizations and coopera-
tives already controlled by the government. As a
long-term objective, the military government prob-
ably hopes to provide a vehicle it has lacked here-
tofore for organizing mass political support
25X1
25X1
NEW ZEALAND: The country's economy will not be
seriously hurt by the recent decision of the UK and
the European Communities (EC) regarding New Zealand's
dairy products? The agreement, which will come into
force with British accession to the EC, presumably
in 1973, calls for Wellington gradually to reduce
its butter and cheese shipments to the UK over a
five-year period to 71 percent of the current level.
These two products account for about 15 percent of
New Zealand's exports and the proposed reductions
would mean at most a five-percent drop in export
earnings spread over the five years. Dairy farmers
will be hurt by the partial loss of the British mar-
ket, and Wellington is already placing greater empha-
sis on diversifying the economy.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 :1k~9T00975A019400030001-3
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
 Sepfetved For Release 2003/09/02: CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19400030001-3