CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019500070002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 15, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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W
Ton Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Top Secret
C 191
15 July 1971
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uy
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi to receive requested military
ai from its Communist suppliers. (Page 3)
COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: Chou confirms rejection of
Moscow's renunciation-of-force proposal. (Page 10)
PAKISTAN: Famine effort inadequate. (Page 17)
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NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi apparently has recently
for increased military aid.
A North Vietnamese military delegation headed
by Vice Minister of Defense Tran Sam returned to
Hanoi early this month after a month-long trip to
Peking and to undisclosed European Communist capi-
tals. The fact that the delegation went to Europe
is known only from the Chinese press. None of the
European Communist governments, including Moscow,
has mentioned it. Hanoi has also been reticent
about the trip; the North Vietnamese have noted
only that a new supplementary military aid agree-
ment has been concluded with the Chinese.
15 Jul 7l Central Intelligence Bulletin
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COMMUNIST CHINA - USSR: Premier Chou En-lai
ha .on firmed Peking's refusal to accept a Soviet
proposal made in March regarding the border dispute.
for to e ovie: Party Congress last March,
Moscow formally proposed a pact renouncing the use
of force in the border dispute for a three-year pe-
riod during which time a final frontier settlement
would be negotiated.
Chou early in July said Peking considered the
offer a plot, and he claimed that Moscow's real in-
tention was to use the initial agreement to create
an impression of Communist unity in dealing with the
US. This, he said, was revealed by the Soviet spec-
ification that the accord should not take effect un-
til it was ratified by the "parliaments" of both
countries. Such ratification, however, is not un-
usual; the recent Soviet-Egyptian treaty was so
formalized.
Earlier this year, the Chinese ambassador in
Kabul elaborated on Peking's rationale by claiming
that the Chinese rejected the Soviet offer because
there was no mention of a ban on the use of nuclear
weapons and because of their concern over Soviet in-
tentions after the three-year period.
The Chinese have been demanding that Moscow
agree to include a nonaggression clause--including
use of nuclear weapons--in a preliminary protocol
regulating conduct along the border. The protocol
itself was a Chinese precondition for discussion of
border demarcation. The USSR, however, had previ-
ously said a nonaggression pact could only be con-
cluded simultaneously with a definite agreement on
the boundary itself.
Moscow apparently shifted to a flexible posi-
tion in an attempt to meet the Chinese demand for a
"preliminary protocol." Although Moscow does not
appear optimistic that such flexibility would le9d
to a border agreement, the USSR probably thinks it-
15 Jul 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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/useful to create a record in order to blunt Chinese
nba ges that Peking is being forced to negotiate un-
der military pressure. If such an agreement were
achieved, Moscow could use it to obscure continuing
Sino-Soviet difficulties,, Peking, however, appar-
ently feels that the border tension has lessened and
that state relations have sufficiently improved so
that there is no
future,
15 Jul 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PAK TAN: The US Consulate General in Dacca
repor s that an inadequate effort is being made to
deal with the threatened famine.
East Pakistan is expected to need 3.4 million
tons of imported food grains during the next 12
months, but with the current unsettled conditions it
is doubtful that as much as two million tons can be
imported and distributed. The consulate believes
that the army, the provincial government, and UN of-
ficials are all responsible for the failure to tackle
the problem effectively.
Bickering between UN Special Representative El
Tawil and the UN disaster expert has led to an over-
cautious approach that is increased by El Tawil's
fear for the safety of UN personnel who might be
sent outside Dacca. El Tawil complains that he is
getting little support from UN Headquarters, which
he thinks is more interested, in preserving the or-
ganization's reputation than, in mounting a relief
effort. The UN was, in fact., unprepared to deal
with the situation in East Pakistan and has been
hampered from the start by organization and money
problems as well as by a shortage of technical per-
sonnel.
The consulate believes that the caution of the
UN officials has contributed to the lack of effort
by the Pakistanis. The special government food co-
ordinator has no power and is concerned primarily
with his own political and bureaucratic survival.
The senior civil servant in the provincial govern-
ment is incompetent, in the consulate's view. At a
lower level, feuding continues and some Bengali of-
ficials are deliberately working slowly to sabotage
the government effort. Military Governor Tikka Khan
does not recognize the seriousness of the situation
and does not realize that "te11' nept bureauc-
rat what to do is not enough."
15 Jul 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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