CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019800020001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 16, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Department review completed N2 42
16 August 1971
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No. 0195/71
16 August 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
JORDAN-SYRIA: Conditions appear less tense. (Page 1)
MALTA-UK: The North Atlantic council is to consider
a new British approach to Malta. (Page 3)
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MALAWI - SOUTH AFRICA: President Banda's visit to
South Africa is likely to involve more show than
substance. (Page 6)
GHANA: The government is seeking to alleviate
economic problems. (Page 7)
ARMS CONTROL: Nonaligned delegates to the Geneva
disarmament talks are troubled by the present draft
convention curbing biological weapons. (Page 8)
EL SALVADOR: President Sanchez apparently has picked
the government party's presidential candidate for
next year's elections. (Page 9)
NORWAY: Foreign policy initiatives (Page 10)
BAHRAIN/QATAR: Independence (Page 10)
VENEZUELA: Challenge to reversion law (Page 11)
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JORDAN-SYRIA: There have been no clashes along
the border since last Friday, and the situation ap-
pears less tense.
Although Syrian and Jordanian forces remain in
a high state of readiness, both countries appear
to have adopted more conciliatory positions. The
Jordanians have informed Syrian diplomats in Amman
that they need not leave. The Jordanian press has
avoided blaming Syria for the border incidents,
which it claims are the fault of the fedayeen, and
it has made no mention of Syrian air attacks against
Jordanian armor. In a speech on Saturday, Syrian
President Asad avoided any mention of the fighting.
Mediation efforts by Egypt may also have con-
tributed to the easing of tension. Egyptian War
Minister Sadiq flew to Damascus on Friday in an ap-
parent effort to ease the situation
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press reports from Damascus following a meet-
ing between 5agqaf and Khuli and Yasir Arafat indicate
that the fedayeen would agree only to the original
Saqqaf-Khuli proposals. The tough Jordanian stance
toward the fedayeen will make it difficult for the
Syrians to make any immediate move toward re-estab-
lishing relations and could force Asad to adopt an
even harder line toward Jordan in an effort to main-
tain a pro-fedayeen image.
16 Aug 71
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MALTA-UK: The North Atlantic Council will meet
again early this week to try to resolve differences
over a new British approach to Malta.
Under pressure from some NATO members who think
London is adopting too hard a line, the British
agreed to consider sending a more conciliatory mes-
sage. Final details of the message are to be worked
out in the council meeting. Despite pressure from
the US, London still seems unwilling to mention to
Prime Minister Mintoff any concrete figure on the
emergency financial aid that he claims is vital.
Mintoff has already rejected two separate British
proposals made late last week which specified the
amounts of aid and cash London and some of its NATO
allies were prepared to offer.
Even though Mintoff rejected the two earlier
UK proposals, there are indications he wants to keep
negotiations alive. He did not carry out his threat
to ask British troops to withdraw on 13 August if no
agreement were reached on Malta's financial requests,
and he apparently has now given London until 18 Au-
gust to reply. Moreover, Mintoff told the German
ambassador on the 13th that he would accept an in-
terest-free, "no-strings-attached" loan of $4.8 mil-
lion from either Bonn or Washington with the tacit
understanding that Malta would repay it if negotia-
tions with the British failed. The ambassador is
proposing to Bonn that the two countries, in consul-
tation with London and NATO, agree to make such an
offer.
Even though Mintoff continues to stress that he
has other options, he is concerned over the quid pro
quo Libya is demanding in return
ITripoli wants
to establish a "presence" on Malta that would appar-
ently allow Libya some far-reaching but as yet un-
specified rights. F__ I
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MALAWI - SOUTH AFRICA: President Banda's five-
day visit to South Africa, which begins today, is
likely to involve more show than substance.
In a conversation with the US ambassador last
week, Banda said that he expects no quick reform in
South Africa's racial policies and that he intends
to use his visit--the first by a black African head
of state--to develop communications designed to
foster change over the long term. Banda believes
that broad multiracial contact, rather than violent
confrontation, is the key to promoting black polit-
ical participation in states of southern Africa that
are ruled by white minorities. Although his thesis
has been accepted by some moderate black states,
militant black African leaders regard it as ineffec-
tual and immoral.
At the core of Banda's reasoning is his belief
that South Africa's leaders can be convinced that
they have nothing to fear from black governments or
from the racial and political integration of blacks
within South Africa, a notion not shared by South
Africa's leaders. Although South African leaders
pursue an "outward policy" of increased contact with
black African states, they have no intention of let-
ting that policy open the way for fundamental changes
in domestic racial matters.
Because the visit will be devoted to the public
relations aspect, both sides will seek to project
an image of reason and moderation. Such a display,
however, is likely to spark renewed criticism by
black African militants and could widen the gulf
between Banda and many of his colleagues. Within
South Africa, the preferential treatment accorded
Banda will contribute to the growing controversy
over the inequities of the racial rules. 25X1
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GHANA: Prime Minister Busia's civilian govern-
ment, now two years old, is making a greater effort
to come to grips with Ghana's pressing economic prob-
lems.
The government is pushing ahead with a program
that combines an intensification of the belt-tight-
ening originally instituted by the junta that ousted
Nkrumah in 1966 with increased expenditures aimed at
developing the agricultural sector and boosting ex-
ports. Active opposition to wage and salary hikes
is a basic feature. New measures announced in the
budget unveiled last month include "development
levies" involving increased taxes on individual and
corporate incomes and higher excise taxes. The gov-
ernment has also raised and extended surcharges on
imported goods while cutting military expenditures
and fringe benefits long enjoyed by civil servants.
The program is aimed most immediately at com-
bating continuing high unemployment, mounting infla-
tion, food shortages, and an adverse balance of pay-
ments. The government is also struggling to honor
inherited foreign debts,.which are still burdensome
despite three reschedulings. A decline over the
past year in prices for cocoa, Ghana's chief export,
has added to the government's difficulties. Beyond
its purely economic objectives, the program reflects
the present regime's interest in redistributing na-
tional income to provide a greater share to the
peasant majority, which supported Busia in the 1969
elections.
Although Busia's program should solidify his
popularity in rural areas, it risks alienating urban
dwellers, who comprise the most vocal and best or-
ganized sector of Ghana's body politic. Labor, in-
creasingly restive, will almost certainly call more
strikes. Other urban elements are also grumbling
about the reduced living standard imposed on them,
and the opposition party will do its best to fan
the discontent. The government is thus facing a
difficult period, although for the present there is
no overt threat to its continued rule.
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ARMS CONTROL: Nonaligned delegates to the Ge-
neva disarmament talks are troubled by the draft
convention curbing biological weapons (BW) on which
the superpowers have agreed, but they have not yet
decided how to respond.
The nonaligned countries have traditionally
taken the position that such a convention should
also include chemical weapons (CW). The present US
USSR text avoids the CW field because of its complex
verification problems but pledges further negotia-
tions in this area. The nonaligned countries are
considering a paper, written primarily by Yugoslavia,
that would seek to commit the superpowers more
strongly to the "principle" of reaching a comprehen-
sive CW ban at an early date.
The Yugoslav desire for a more affirmative ref-
erence in. the BW convention to. the 1969 UN General
Assembly resolution on the Geneva Protocol of 1925
is particularly unpalatable to the US. That resolu-
tion, adopted by an overwhelming margin, directly
challenged the US contention that the protocol does
not ban the use of tear gas and herbicides in war.
A Yugoslav delegate has frankly admitted that his
tactics are aimed at influencing the US Senate's
consideration of the protocol. Many of the other
nonaligned are reluctant, however, to sour the nego-
tiating atmosphere in that fashion.
If they do opt to open up a number of controver-
sial points, there would be a strong likelihood that
no text could be agreed upon this year by the 25
conferees. Conflict on the interpretation of the
1925 protocol could even jeopardize the delicate
superpower agreement to stand together in seeking a
BW convention. The USSR supports the majority view
taken by the Assembly in 1969 but has for some months
muted its propaganda line on that subject. Agreement
at the talks is a necessary precondition for Assembl
acceptance this fall of a BW draft convention. 25X1
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EL SALVADOR: President Fidel Sanchez apparently
has decided that his private secretary, Colonel
Arturo Armando Molina, will be the government party's
presidential candidate in elections next February.
Molina, a long-time friend and adviser to San-
chez, has been serving in his current post since
1969. Molina has been mentioned frequently as a
front-runner for the nomination; he is generally
considered an intelligent and competent military
officer.
According to a press account, the choice for
vice president is Enrique Mayorga Rivas, a civilian
and a high-level leader of the governing National
Conciliation Party. Like Molina, Mayorga has been a
close friend and adviser to Sanchez for many years
and has served as secretary general of the presidency
since Sanchez took office in July 1967.
Although both men are likely choices and have
been in positions from which they could obtain con-
siderable preparation for their prospective jobs,
Sanchez has until 20 August to make the final deci-
sion.
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NOTES
NORWAY: Prime Minister Bratteli's minority
Labor government plans some new 'foreign policy in-
itiatives to improve its record before local elec-
tions next month and national elections in 1973.
Several Norwegian officials have warned that these
moves, which include technical assistance to Cuba
through UNCTAD and financial aid for African "lib-
eration movements," may create some friction with
Norway's allies. The officials emphasized, however,
that the initiatives would not represent any weak-
ening of Norway's allegiance to NATO or change its
basic pro-US orientation. The officials did not in-
clude on the list of planned initiatives recognition
of North Vietnam, a move endorsed the Labor Party
at its annual convention in May. b 25X1
BAHRAIN/QATAR: On Saturday, Bahrain shrugged
off the protectorate treaty under which Britain had
handled its defense and foreign affairs since the
early 19th century, and assumed full independence.
At the same time the Sheikh announced that Bahrain
would seek membership in the Arab League and the UN.
Iran, the strongest Persian Gulf power, sent a mes-
sage of congratulations that amounted to recognition
of the new state; Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which
dominate Arabian Peninsula politics, also sent their
congratulations. The Sheikh's statement that the
.declaration would not affect Bahrain's "readiness
to accede" to some federation of the Persian Gulf
amirates under the proper circumstances apparently
satisfied the demands of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia
for eventual federation of all the amirates. The
neighboring state of Qatar is expected to follow
Bahrain's lead shortly; it, also, will probably be
recognized immediately. 25X1
(continued)
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VENEZUELA: Foreign oil companies (primarily
US) are challenging the constitutionality of the new
law governing reversion to the state of industry as-
sets when concessions expire. Thus far, four com-
panies have filed suit before Venezuela's Supreme
Court to have the law declared unconstitutional.
The law, signed by President Caldera last month,
considerably broadens the definition of assets that
will revert to the government when concessions be-
gin expiring in 1983-84. Should the court uphold
the law, as seems most likely, the companies fear
that its strict application will impose onerous fi-
nancial and administrative burdens on their opera-
tions.
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