CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019800090001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 24, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
24 August 1971
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No. 0202/71
24 August 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
WARSAW PACT: Exercise ISTOK apparently will not
take place this month. (Page 1)
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS- The dollar has
shown surprising strength. (Page 2)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Thieu is taking additional security
precautions. (Page 3)
LAOS: Government attack on Paksong on the Bolovens
Plateau. (Page 5)
SOUTH KOREA: Desertion of air force trainees.
(Page 6 .___
PHILIPPINES: Suspension of writ of habeas corpus.
Page 7
BOLIVIA: New government moves against opposition.
(Page 8 )
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ZAMBIA: Resignation of the vice president. (Page 10)
MAURITIUS: A strike has taken on political overtones.
(Page 12)
JAPAN: Communist Party visit to Moscow (Page 13)
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WARSAW PACT: The long-rumored, combined Warsaw
Pact exercise ISTOK apparently is not going to take
place this month in Bulgaria.
A Soviet assistant military attache in Bucharest
DIP25X1 told on 20 August that ISTOK
had been canceled. ns ea ,reorts 25)HIA
now indicate that preparations for a national
exercise involving only Bulgarian air and ground
forces are under way in the central part of the coun-
try.
The Soviet attache's statement about ISTOK's
cancellation corroborates earlier indications that
a combined exercise was planned but evidently turned
into a Bulgarian national exercise in the face of
strong Romanian resistance to participate. Signifi-
cantly, no official announcement was ever made, nor
have military preparations for a combined exercise
been observed. Numerous bloc-instigated reports
about the exercise, however, probably were intended
as devices to generate pressure on Romania.
The prospect for continued Soviet pressure
against Bucharest nonetheless remains. For one
thing, the Soviet assistant attache said that a
combined exercise is being planned for next year.
It reportedly will be "the largest that's been seen,"
and would call for participation by all Warsaw Pact
members. Neither its location nor time were cited
by the Soviet.
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: Major
European foreign change markets reopened yester-
day. Trading was slow and cautious with the dollar
showing surprising strength.
The dollar declined at the opening in most
European markets from rates of two weeks ago but
recovered slightly in light trading. At the close,
the declines averaged less than two percent. The
dollar's strength is probably attributable to de-
mand coming from those who had to cover dollar ob-
ligations that were outstanding when the new US
economic measures were announced. Public pronounce-
ments or meetings leading to renewed uncertainties
about eventual parities could result in future
fluctuations in exchange rates.
Tokyo's foreign exchange market was generally
calm yesterday with the Bank of Japan buying only
about $10 million to maintain the yen-dollar parity.
Japanese stock prices declined by about four per-
cent, again showing the effects of the monetary
crisis.
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. SOUTH VIETNAM: The uneasy political situation
has caused Presi ent Thieu to take additional secu-
rity precautions and to check on the loyalty of mem-
bers of the. government.
According to press reports, South Vietnamese
paratroopers are augmenting regular guards and police
at the presidential palace in Saigon. In addition,
police reportedly have been put on alert in the north-
ern cities of Hue, Da Nang, and Qui Nhon to head off
any demonstrations by militant opposition elements
following the withdrawals of Big Minh and Vice Presi-
dent Ky.
Public reaction to the withdrawals of Minh and
Ky is still developing, and there is little sign of
any imminent disruptive protests. Many opposition
groups are actively engaged in campaigning for next
Sunday's Lower House elections, and probably will
wait to assess the results of these contests before
deciding on any new course of action.
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Thieu 25X1
will go ahead with the October presidential e e -
tion on schedule, despite the withdrawals of Minh
and Ky. Although Thieu is the only active candidate,
Ky's name will remain on the
ballot. Thieu is currently meeting with government
leaders, seeking an informal vote of confidence on
his election policy. 25X1
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LAOS: Bolovens Plateau Area
an Lao
Ngam
Gov nment
,.Ih alions
Ban Houei
E ^aa song 'ong
Kout
Bolovens
25 50 miles
? Communist-held location
Government-held location
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LAOS: The government is mounting a new three-
prongecTassault against Paksong on the Bolovens Pla-
teau.
Three irregular battalions are to move toward
Paksong from the northwest, two other battalions
have been airlifted into positions southeast of the
town, and three Lao Army battalions are pushing east-
ward along Route 23. Two of the latter units have
reported continuing contact with the enemy and have
made little forward progress. Tactical air and ar-
tillery are being used to support the operation.
Earlier government efforts to recapture Paksong
were repulsed by determined North Vietnamese resist-
ance. The most recent enemy counterattack, on 18
August, dispersed four Lao Army battalions, which
reportedly suffered heavy casualties. Air observers
report that the enemy is continuing to build up de-
fenses in and around Paksong. Although the North
Vietnamese defenders--probably largely from the 9th
NVA Regiment--have been hit hard by air and artil-
lery attacks, they have shown no dispositions to
abandon their hard-won gains.
Elsewhere in Laos, military activity has re-
mained relatively light. Vang Pao's irregular forces
on the Plaine des Jarres continue to skirmish daily
with Communist units located in an arc to the east
of the Plaine, but little new territory has been
gained or lost.
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SOUTH KOREA: Senior South Korean military of-
ficials may resign as a result of the desertion yes-
terday of a group of air force trainees.
most were ki e
or apprehended after a running gun attle near Seoul.
Initial reports claimed that the incident in-
volved North Korean infiltrators, but the government
moved quickly to correct this erroneous assumption
and the Minister of Defense appeared on TV to apol-
ogize and accept full responsibility. He, the air
force chief of staff, and possibly the Minister of
Home Affairs may step down as a result.
Failure to set the record straight could have
had serious implications for the upcoming talks be-
tween North and South Korean Red Cross representa-
tives over the question of divided families. The
decision to den publicly that infiltrators were
involved
L15-eec s e importance leaders in eou a ac
for direct bilateral contacts with Pyongyang.
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PHILIPPINES: Popular suspicion that President
Marcos intends to turn an incident of political vio-
lence to his advantage may further erode his public
standing.
Marcos claims that radical leftists were re-
sponsible for the grenade attack on an election
rally of the opposition Liberal Party on 21 August
and has suspended the writ of habeas corpus, contend-
ing the action is necessary to permit their apprehen-
sion. The blasts resulted in ten deaths and the
hospitalization of all eight Liberal senatorial can-
didates.
The government's allegation that the radical
left perpetrated the incident could be valid, al-
though there is no confirming evidence as yet. The
apparent effort to wipe out the Liberal Party leader-
ship does not fit the traditional pattern of Philip-
pine political violence, which has been marked by
attacks on individual adversaries more than by whole-
sale slaughter.
The Liberal Party, nearly eclipsed by Marcos'
Nacionalistas in the 1969 elections, is anxious to
get the maximum political mileage from the tragedy
which it believes has improved its prospects at the
polls. Mindful of Marcos' aggressive campaign meas-
ures two years ago, it is fearful that he may use
the habeas corpus measure against selected Liberal
candidates. The party also sees Marcos' hint of
martial law as a possible step toward tampering with
the election timetable.
Liberal Party President Roxas, himself injured
in the explosion, has placed responsibility on Mar-
cos for the atmosphere of lawlessness that contrib-
uted to the incident. Public suspicion of a Nacion-
alista hand in the event, buttressed by the Nacion-
alistas' record of violence in 1969, will further
discredit the Marcos administration.
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C BOLIVIA: The new government appears determined
to crush any- remaining opposition.
The only major violence in La Paz since General
Torres' ouster took place yesterday after negotia-
tions between leftist students barricaded at the
university and the military broke down. The univer-
sity came under heavy fire from troops, and an air
force plane strafed the building. Reports on the
number of casualties varied, but they are not be-
lieved to have been heavy.
Other potential troublemakers, including left-
ist miners, workers, and peasants, remain at large.
President Banzer1s firm handling of the students,
however, may serve as an example to others that an
attack on his administration will be dealt with
swiftly.
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ZAMBIA: The resignation of former vice presi-
dent Simon Kapwepwe from the cabinet and the ruling
UNIP party, is unlikely to create any unmanageable
problems for the Kaunda government.
Accusing the government of corruption and Pres-
ident Kaunda of stifling democracy, Kapwepwe formally
announced at a press conference on Sunday that he had
formed a new political party, the United Progressive
Party (UPP). He also called for new elections and
told reporters that he plans to meet soon with lead-
ers of the parliamentary opposition party, the Af-
rican National Congress, to discuss a merger. Such
an alliance seems unlikely, except in the loosest
sense. Even if the two groups do find enough common
ground to work together, neither commands sufficient
support in parliament to pose a serious challenge to
the government and new elections are not mandatory
until 1973. Nevertheless, the UPP threatens Kaunda's
plans to establish a one-party state, and he many try
to stifle it quickly .r The government reportedly ar-
rested two members of the new party yesterday on un-
specified charges.
Although a close associate of Kaunda for many
years, Kapwepwe's star has been on the wane for some
time. Last year, he was removed from the vice pres-
idency because of increasing opposition to him within
the UNIP. Kaunda retained him in the cabinet., how-
ever, because of his popularity among Bemba tribes-
men, an important source of government support. To
recoup his sagging fortunes, Kapwepwe apparently be-
gan organizing the UPP several months ago, but the
party has not shown very impressive signs of strength
thus far. Potentially, the UPP could draw support
from the volatile copper-belt miners, who are Bemba-
speakers.
The most serious problem that Kapwepwe's resig-
nation could create for Kaunda is to arouse tribal
animosities within the UNIP. Only a few UNIP Bemba
leaders have openly aligned themselves with Kapwepwe
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so far. Last week Kaunda suspended four MPs from
the ruling party for their connection with the UPP,
which was then still under wraps. Nevertheless, the
Bembas are unpopular with other tribal groups in the
party and could become the subject of a witch hunt.
Kaunda, however, has acted firmly in the past to
suppress tribal rivalries and unless there are mass
Bemba resignations from the government and the UNIP,
which seems unlikely, he should be able to hold the
lid on.
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MAURITIUS: A strike that has crippled the is-
land for almost. two weeks has taken on political
and communal overtones.
The strike, which was triggered by bus drivers'
demands for higher wages and pensions, spread quickly
to dock, utility, and other workers. Government ef-
forts to force the strikers back to work with arrests
and threats of fines and dismissals have hardened the
strikers' resolve and touched off considerable anti-
government violence, much of it in the volatile Mus-
lim community. Employers, meanwhile, have refused
to negotiate until the strike is ended.
The strike is being led by the Mauritian Mili-
tant Movement (MMM), an increasingly important left-
wing opposition party formed in mid-1969 by radicals
who had studied in France. During the past year,
the MMM has scored a number of political victories,
many of them at the expense of the government. The
MMM has also been able to draw support from the more
important ethnic communities, enabling it to expand
its activities throughout the island. As a result,
the party has become the best organized political
movement in Mauritius and the principal threat to
Prime Minister Ramgoolam's shaky coalition.
Government efforts to settle the strike were
initially and largely in the hands of Foreign Min-
ister Gaetan Duval. Duval apparently viewed the
crisis as an opportunity to crush the MMM. He ar-
rested the party's top leaders and suspended pub-
lication of its newspaper, Le Militant.
Prime Minister Ramgoolam, recognizing that
these moves have heightened tensions and have vir-
tually eliminated chances of a quick end to the
strike, has appointed a conciliator "to bring the
parties together," but so far no compromise has been
reached. Despite the prime minister's action, the
government's handling of the strike has further
eroded public confidence in his already unpopular
administration.
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NOTES
JAPAN: The recently concluded visit of Japan
Communist Party (JCP) chief Miyamato to Moscow in-
dicates the JCP has given up its efforts to improve
relations with Peking. Miyamato, apparently con-
cerned over the international-isolation of the JCP
resulting from its independent. policies, suddenly
decided to add Moscow to planned stops in Romania,
Italy, and North Vietnam after a recent series of
Chinese blasts at the JCP. Miyamato's decision to
visit Moscow for the first time in five years high-
lights the JCP's position as the only opposition
party in Japan that has not been able to capitalize
on widespread popular sentiment for improved rela-
tions with China.
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 19
August 1971 approved the following national intel-
ligence estimate:
NIE 12-71 "The Changing Scene in Europe"
7_ I
24 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin .14
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Secret
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