CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019800090002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 24, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State, JCS, DIA reviews completed. On file Commerce release instructions apply.
Top Secret
C 190
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24 August 19-71
Central Intelligence Bulletin
EUROPE: The Berlin agreement. (Page 1)
MOROCCO: Request for improved military relations
with the US. (Page 13)
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EUROPE: The Berlin agreement now in sight will
add powerful impetus to the movement toward detente
in Europe.
Although certain details remain to be negoti-
ated between East and West Germany, Pankow is not
likely to be able to hold out against Soviet insist-
ence upon an agreement. The entire Berlin package
must thereafter be approved by the Big Four. This
step will open the way for the Bonn coalition of So-
cial Democrats and Free Democrats to present for
ratification, well in advance of the 1973 elections,
the treaties signed last year with Moscow and Warsaw.
Agreement on Berlin will also satisfy the condi-
tion that NATO has made for moving toward a Confer-
ence on European Security. Soviet spokesmen are al-
ready putting new steam behind this project. The
members of NATO, some of whom want to give prefer-
ence to the issue of force reductions rather than a
conference devoted largely to atmospherics, will be
under pressure to speed their preparation of a nego-
tiating position.
In a larger context West Germany will regard
the agreement, achieved on even better terms than
Bonn had anticipated, as a signal victory for its
Ostpolitik. This policy aims at promoting, over
the long term, a broad European reconciliation which,
by overcoming Soviet and East European fears of Ger-
man intentions, Brandt hopes might ultimately make
possible German reunification. The success achieved
to date is also likely to make Bonn more confident
in dealing with its Western allies, in particular
the French, who have not shared all of Bonn's aims
in the Berlin talks and whose support is less neces-
sary now.
The Soviets also see themselves as gainers.
They will portray the Berlin agreement, together
with the treaties which Bonn will probably ratify
in due course, as a watershed in their postwar di-
plomacy. They have sought Western acceptance of
their primacy in Eastern Europe and of East Ger-
many's legitimacy as a sovereign state. With the
24 Aug 71
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way cleared for further detente initiatives, the
USSR will target its diplomacy primarily upon reduc-
ing the American presence and role in Europe. At
the same time it will not overlook opportunities to
play off one West European nation against another,
and to delay consolidation of the European Communi-
ties.
East Germany, in contrast, must take an unhappy
view of the Berlin agreement and the prospects that
it opens. The agreement itself voids Pankow's claim
to full control over its own territory, and a period
of detente threatens to weaken East Germany's de-
fenses against Bonn's efforts to normalize relations
between the "two states of the German nation." East
Germany will seek to block any broad inter-German
accord by setting difficult preconditions, such as
full diplomatic recognition and admission to the UN,
but its campaign to limit contacts with West Germany
will stand in some contrast to the policy of other
East European states and will tend to isolate it
from these allies.
Most other East European states will welcome
the Berlin agreement. These states will see it as
enhancing their national security within unquestioned
boundaries and as perhaps allowing greater access to
the Western technology and financing they hope to
use to ease domestic political and economic pres-
sures. Others, particularly Romania, will see it as
abetting the process which they hope to loosen
Soviet control.
24 Aug 71
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MOROCCO: Major General Mohamed Oufkir, recently
named minister of national defense and chief of staff,
has requested improved military relations with the US.
During a meeting with embassy and military aid
(MUSLO) officials on 18 August, Oufkir said he wanted
closer working relations with MUSLO--a departure from
half-hearted Moroccan collaboration in the past--and
declared that he would rely on MUSLO for recommenda-
tions on using the agreed $15 million FY-71 US mili-
tary credit assistance. He added that the main mis-
sion of Morocco's armed forces, which he is drasti-
cally reorganizing under what one officer says is
carte blanche from King Hassan, is defensive.
Oufkir said that the objective of the US mili-
tary aid program should be to provide suitable mate-
riel. He mentioned helicopters, which could be used
for military operations or civilian assistance; a
communications network to reach all units; an alter-
nate headquarters communications ca abilit
and patrol boats to perform reconnaissance and com-
munications missions.
At no time did Oufkir refer to the King or
claim to speak for him. Oufkir stressed Morocco's
value to the US because of his country's strategic
location. He said that nonalignment was not a real-
istic policy in a world dominated by two great pow-
ers and that Morocco was definitely on the side of
the US.
24 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 13
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