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December 14, 2016
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June 16, 2003
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August 28, 1971
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Approved For Release 2003/06/25: CIA-RDP79T00975A019900(sevret 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0199000 OOM-WIs t 1971 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/06 (aAMP79T00975A019900020001-9 No. 0206/71 28 August 1971 Central Intelligence Bulletin CUBA: Reduction in aid to guerrillas. (Page 1) BOLIVIA: Banzer is moving to consolidate his posi- tion. _(Page 3) INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS: Tokyo has an- nounced that the yen would e a owed to float. (Page 5) NEPAL: The prime minister has resigned. (Page 6) ECUADOR-CHILE: Allende's visit (Page 7) CENTRAL AMERICA: Trade agreement (Page 7) CHAD: Coup attempt fails (Page 8) Approved For Release 2003/06W, i TP79T00975A019900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19900020001-9 SECRET CUBA: 25X1 Havana has sharply reduced its aid to guerrilla-oriented revolu- tionary movements in Latin America. 25X1 the turning point in Cu Dan support to guerrilla warfare protagonists occurred in early 1968 after continuous reverses were suffered by Cuban- assisted rebel groups, the govern- 25X1 ment drastically reduced its aid to national libera- tion movements and concentrated its efforts on solving pressing domestic problems. Training in guerrilla warfare and other paramilitary subjects is now given only to small, select groups. Logistical support still continues to some rebel groups but it is re- stricted to very small amounts of arms, ammunition, and communications equipment. I IChile, Peru, Uruguay, Bo- ivia, and Guatemala, in that order, as the most im- portant Latin American countries in Havana's foreign policy scheme. Fidel Castro has issued instructions to maintain complete cooperation with Chile at all costs. In the case of Peru, where the situation is very promising, no operations are to be undertaken for fear of upsetting the favorable trend of events. Subversive groups in Nicaragua, Colombia, and Venezuela are considered too disorgan- ized, undisciplined, and untrustworthy to merit more than token Cuban support and, except for Mexico, all other Latin American countries are considered un- worthy of Cuban attention. Mexico is a special case because it has always been a center of Cuban opera- tions targeted against other countries; Castro has ordered that no operations are to be undertaken against the Mexican Government and that no assistance is to be given to any Mexican subversive group. 25X1 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/06/2 C IIAF DP79T00975A019900020001-9 Approved For Release 20031066125 CA- RDP79T00975A019900020001-9 Castro reassessed his policy of support- . Guevara fiasco in Bolivia the previous year, and opted for a more realistic approach to international relations. Analysis of Castro's speeches over the past two years shows clearly the emphasis he has placed on nurturing the development of friendly gov- ernments in Chile, Peru, and, until the recent coup, in Bolivia, and indicates that he has decided that a less violent approach is more likely to diminish Cuba's isolation t4an continuation of support to guerrilla groups. 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06~/ I~..- DP79T00975A019900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900020001-9 SECRET BOLIVIA: The country remains on an emergency footing while President Banzer moves to consolidate his position. Most of the resistance to the Banzer government has been quieted, although occasional bursts of gun- fire are still heard in La Paz at night and army troops continue to occupy the main campus of the university. Leftist students, many of them still armed, provide the primary source of continuing op- position to the government now that the miners have returned to their mines. In the hope of pacifying the miners, who make up the largest and most radical labor organization in Bolivia, the Banzer government has given assur- ances that no troops will be sent to the mines, that trade union rights will be guaranteed, and that the miners' present salary system will be respected. Banzer has also taken steps to obtain the support of the rural peasants, saying that domestic policies will be designed to "solve the problems of the major- ity of Bolivians, the campesinos." President Banzer is also seeking to strengthen his position in the military by giving many of the most important posts to officers involved from the beginning in the plotting against the Torres govern- ment. This has contributed to some ill feeling among senior officers who now find themselves work- ing for their former subordinates. The naming of Colonel Arana Serrudo as commander of the army, for example, has annoyed many and could eventually cause problems for the new president. On the international scene, the new Bolivian foreign minister has openly and repeatedly stated that his government will seek close relations with the US while maintaining relations with the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. The Soviet press has so far generally given factual coverage 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900020001-9 SECRET' Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19900020001-9 SECRET to the change in government in Bolivia, but Cuba has made considerable propaganda over the "fascist coup" and alleged US involvement. The Cuban press service has also given full coverage to a statement attrib- uted to former President Torres--now in exile in Peru--calling on the people of Bolivia to be prepared to fight for the "revolution" when the time is right. F 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/0 g fl -DP79T00975A019900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900020001-9 SECRET INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS : Tokyo an- nounce late Friday t at the yen would be allowed to float. When the Japanese exchange market opened this morning the yen appreciated by 5.2 percent in slow trading. The governor of the Bank of Japan told report- ers that the bank would support the dollar if the yen appreciated too much, but he gave no indication of the point at which intervention would occur. Private bankers predicted that the yen would be al- lowed to appreciate by about 6 percent. Tokyo's relaxation of restrictions on Japanese commercial. banks earlier this week, which resulted in the Bank of Japan purchasing about $1.8 billion on Thursday and Friday, should have taken some of the steam out of the drive to get out of dollars, and activity on the Tokyo exchange Saturday will probably be moder- ate. Japanese official reserves now stand at about $12.5 billion. Meanwhile in Europe, large gold sales by spec- ulators in bullion markets yesterday drove the free market price down to $41.12 per ounce at the final fixing in London. This represents a decline of $1.87 per ounce in the two full weeks since announce- ment of the new US economic policy. Speculators apparently are beginning to realize that there is little likelihood of an early increase in the offi- cial price of gold. Euro-dollar rate increases, which raise financing costs, also discourage spec- ulation. The floating of many major currencies fa- vors the chances for a permanent, general realign- ment of foreign currencies, reducing the possibil.- it of a rise in lar price of gold. 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/06t2~1 P79T00975A019900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900020001-9 SECRET NEPAL: Prime Minister Bista has resigned under pressure from King Mahendra. The ostensible cause of Bista'-s resignation was the King's decision to pardon a member of the national legislature, Ram Raja Prasad Singh, who had been ar- rested for his public criticism of the limitations of Nepal's system of "guided democracy." In the par- don message, Mahendra was critical of the Bista gov- ernment's handling of the case. Other factors, however, may have been as impor- tant. Bista was appointed last April, largely because the King believed his anti-Indian reputation would allow him to go further than other Nepalese in making concessions to India in the deadlocked trade-and- transit talks. With the recent signing of a trade and transit treaty and growing public dissatisfaction with concessions that were.made, the King may well have felt Bista had outlived his usefulness. Mahen- dra, moreover, may believe that the recent conclusion of the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty enhances India's power position on the subcontinent and thus furnishes an added reason for replacing the anti-Indian prime minister. Recent reports of corruption in the Bista cabinet may have also contributed to the King's de- cision. A variety of politicians are being rumored as possible successors to Bista. The King could decide to head the cabinet himself, however, as he did for the year preceding Bista's appointment. In any event, the change of government is not likely to have much effect on government policies, because the King him- self makes the final decisions on all important mat- 28 Aug 71 Central, intelligen.-e Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900020001-9 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/06/?Tff_ P79T00975A019900020001-9 NOTES ECUADOR-CHILE: The visit this week of Chilean President Salvador Allende to Ecuador is causing some problems for Ecuadorean President Jose Velasco Ibarra. Government Minister Nebot, a key man in the cabinet, may resign because Velasco has been so abusive about the inability of security forces to prevent the crowds that greeted Allende from adding uncomplimentary remarks about Velasco. Other Ecua- dorean officials are disturbed because Velasco has taken stands similar to Allende's on issues such as the reintegration of Cuba into the inter-American system. Most of Allende's public remarks have been uninflammatory. His only action that would seem likely to upset Velasco was his meeting with repre- sentatives of the antigovernment extreme leftist university student association. President Velasco, however, may be picking up the domestic pieces from the visit long after its end. F7 I CENTRAL AMERICA: Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Costa Rica have signed an agreement with Honduras renewing free trade, which may resurrect the Cen-, tral American Common Market (CACM). The agreement allows Honduran goods to enter the other three coun- tries duty-free while permitting Honduras to impose import duties at agreed upon rates. It signifies a major breakthrough toward re-establishing regional trade deadlocked since the soccer war between Hon- duras and El Salvador in 1969, when Honduras imposed tariffs on Central American products equal to those on imports from the rest of the world. The agree- ment apparently is a concession to long-standing Honduran complaints that CACM membership has caused growing deficits in its regional trade and slowed its industrial development. El Salvador, the re- maining member of CACM, was not a participant in the negotiations but will be under considerable pressure to accede to the agreemento 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin (continued) 7 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/06A (qI RpP79T00975A019900020001-9 Approved For Release 2003/(Iit,..~RRDP79T00975A019900020001-9 E CHAD: President Tombalbaye remains in control following an apparent coup attempt during the night of 26 August. Few details are available, but Tom- balbaye has announced the arrest of two unidentified government ministers and the alleged plot leader, a Muslim former parliamentary deputy, who later com- mitted suicide. Chad also broke diplomatic rela- tions with Libya following a radiobroadcast by the Chadian foreign minister in which he accused the Libyans of meddling in his country's internal af- fairs with the aid of "a large foreign power." Fort Lamy is reportedly under heavy guard and outside communications are sus ended pending_j:he roundup of additional suspects. 28 Aug 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0 p *IIi~ DP79T00975A019900020001-9 Secretoved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19900020001-9 Secret Approved For Release 2003/06/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO19900020001-9