CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 8, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2003/05/19: CIA-RDP79T00975A01990tbt
25X1
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 42
8 September 1971
Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/1 $L79T00975A019900100001-0
No. 0215/71
8 September 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
JAPAN: Sato's party splits over China policy. (Page 1)
HONDURAS: Student disorders. (Page 2)
NATO-MBFR: European allies cautious. (Page 3)
JORDAN: Tal gains from senate reshuffle. (Page 5)
ARMS CONTROL: Soviets to propose world conference
(Page 6 )
COMMUNIST CHINA: Decline in radical influence
Page 6)
Approved For Release 2003/05/19E J pf79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05t3E1 l P79T00975A019900100001-0
JAPAN: Some leaders of the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) are moving to dissociate
themselves from Prime Minister Sato on the China
representation issue.
These leaders--including former defense chief
Yasuhiro Nakasone, who otherwise supports Sato--
are opposing a decision to cosponsor US-proposed
resolutions on the issue, although the government
has promised to support them. Two major party lead-
ers--former foreign ministers Miki and Ohira--have
publicly objected even to supporting the resolu-
tions, advocating instead all possible encourage-
ment for Peking's admission. Ohira's stand has
been seconded by Justice Minister Maeo and Agricul-
ture Minister Akagi. At a weekend meeting of the
top ruling party leaders, no consensus on the ques-
tion of cosponsorship could be reached on the eve
of Foreign Minister Fukuda's departure to head
Japan's delegation to the joint economic conference
in Washington on 9-10 September.
The question is complicated by the fact that
Miki, Ohira, and trade minister Tanaka--who is also
attending the Washington meeting--are Fukuda's
rivals to succeed Sato as prime minister. Nakasone
fears that Sato's foes and party rivals would seize
upon the defeat of US-proposed resolutions to force
Sato to step down as prime minister before his own
plan for the succession can be completed. Nakasone
privately favors acquiescing in Taipei's exclusion,
but for the time being is interested in supporting
Sato and indirectly Fukuda, against Ohira and Miki.
Fukuda realizes that his chances to become
prime minister are also closely related to how Sato
manages the China representation issue, and that
the strong domestic pressure for rapprochement with
Peking must be taken into account in approaching
the question.
8 Sep 71
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/05/VdQ'NA 0 P79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/0b/ 1&IriTRDP79T00975A019900100001-0
HONDURAS: Despite some concessions on the
part of the government, student violence continues,
and the military has threatened to take action.
Disorders by leftist students and teachers,
ostensibly against the USAID-sponsored educational
assistance contract, have not abated even though
the government has renegotiated portions of the
contract and arranged the withdrawal of the US
personnel involved. The demonstrators, who claim
that the contract amounts to "cultural imperialism,"
continue to demand its complete termination. They
now have added other demands that the President
feels would give the Communist-dominated university
control of the educational system. Five more bombs
were exploded late last week bringing the total to
eight or ten over the past several weeks, during
which time demonstrators have also blocked traffic
and burned textbooks. So far, there have been no
injuries, but US personnel may be targets in the
future.
The force behind the campaign remains obscure,
but many observers believe that Minister of Govern-
ment and Justice Ricardo Zuniga may be encouraging
the disorders. Zuniga, who was the "power behind
the throne" during the previous regime, could ben-
efit from a military take-over by former president
Oswaldo Lopez. Lopez, now Chief of the Armed Forces,
has warned President Cruz that he must end the dis-
orders or the military will be obliged to do so.
8 Sep 71".1 Central Intelligence Bulletin
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/86 1 _ P79T00975A019900100001-0
NATO-MBFR: The European allies remain extremely
cautious as NATO prepares more actively for negotia-
tions on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR).
The somewhat skeptical approach of the allies,
evident in recent discussions at NATO, is motivated
primarily by their feeling that Washington's support
for MBFR is dictated essentially by domestic US
pressures. Despite reassurances from the US, the
convergence of recent events--particularly those
associated with the financial crisis--has fed sus-
picions that MBFR could turn out to be mainly a
cover for large reductions in US forces.
A special high-level session of the North
Atlantic Council on 5-6 October will probably des-
ignate retiring Secretary General Brosio to explore
prospects for MBFR negotiations in talks with Warsaw
Pact countries. In discussions preparatory to the
meeting, the West Germans have continued to urge a
slow, orderly approach to MBFR, recommending ini-
tially limited and verifiable reductions in order
to build confidence in the good intentions of both
sides. The UK remains doubtful that any reductions
would be compatible with Western security. Both
Bonn and London are prepared, nevertheless, to
begin a long and difficult negotiating process
whereas Paris remains adamantly opposed to any
Western force reduction.
Some of the smaller allies are now assessing
more thoroughly the potential impact of MBFR on
their interests. A coalition of southern allies--
Greece, Turkey, Italy, and Portugal--is emerging in
opposition to any expansion of the geographical
coverage of MBFR to include their countries. Their
concern is not so much that their forces would be
included but that limitations might be placed on
the US presence in the Mediterranean. Norway and
Denmark, on the other hand, apparently are not op-
posed to an eventual extension of MBFR coverage to
include their territory.
(continued)
8 Sep 71
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/05/9gP79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/8EMMP79T00975A019900100001-0
The allies will likely continue to look to the
US for leadership on NATO's MBFR position. In spite
of their hopes for detente and support for a Conference
on European Security, however, the allies are uncertain
about how Western Europe's defense would be manacled
with a reduced US presence.
8 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
Approved For Release 2003/0!gD(IAFJDP79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/05/W.q 4&~79T00975A019900100001-0
JORDAN: Last week's senate reshuffle seems to
be a victory for Prime Minister Tal.
All former prime ministers, who by parliamentary
tradition are given senate seats, have been dropped
from the new list. This effectively eliminates the
last formal foothold in politics of several key op-
ponents of the prime minister. The terms of half of
the senate's 30 members--who are appointed by the
King--expire on 1 November. Tal, rabidly anti-
Egyptian and an advocate of a harsh approach to the
fedayeen problem, has long been under fire from
other Arab governments as well as enemies within
Jordan.
Several highly vocal Palestinians also lost
their senate seats, but the rough balance between
East and West Bankers has been maintained. Six
current cabinet ministers have been appointed to the
senate as well, possibly so that they could be
dropped from the next cabinet without loss of face.
The new body may be expected to cooperate readily
with any political plans the prime minister has up
his sleeve.
8 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
 Approved For Release 2003/0 1qlprPDP79T00975A019900100001-0
I ARMS CONTROL: The Soviets have informed sev-
eral embassies in Moscow that the USSR will shortly
make a new proposal for a world disarmament conference
to deal with both nuclear and conventional weapons.
The text of the proposal reportedly will be trans-
mitted to U Thant and publicized soon. Support for
such a conference was contained in Brezhnev's "peace
program" last March but the Soviets have not pushed
the idea since then. China's recent torpedoing of
the Soviet-recommended Five-Power Nuclear Conference
probably contributed to Moscow's current initiative.
In refusing to consider the Five-Power Conference,
Peking reiterated its support for a world conference
to discuss abolition of nuclear weapons. The Soviets
may intend this new initiative to place Moscow on
record as acceding to China's proposition and at the
same time place the responsibility for the next move
on Peking.
COMMUNIST CHINA: Peking's first public refer-
ence to the be_H'1_ncT-_t_he-scenes investigation of the
ultraleftist May 16 Corps, which has been exacer-
bating tensions within the ruling politburo for
nearly two years, further attests to the growing
strength of moderate forces in the leadership. in
a widely disseminated article last week calling
for more moderation in educational reform, the
party theoretical journal Red Flag condemned ad-
herents of the May 16 Corps for attempting to block
the regime's efforts in 1968 to restore order in
factionally troubled Tsinghua University. The
thrust of the article apparently is intended to
signal that the political influence of the more
radical leaders on the politburo, which previously
had appeared paramount in the educational areas,
has taken yet another downward turn. The May 16
affair has been discussed in closed party sessions
for some months and the open reference to the May
16 Corps apparently follows a decision by Peking
to exploit publicly the affair to dramatize its
repudiation of political extremism, past and pres-
ent, across the full spectrum of domestic and for-
eign policy.
8 Sep 71
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/0S6l1K-kDP79T00975A019900100001-0
 Secri-oved For Release 2003/05/19: CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0
Secret
Approved For Release 2003/05/19 : CIA-RDP79T00975A019900100001-0