CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A020000040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 13, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
State Dept. review completed
N? 41
13 September 1971
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``W~ SECRET W
No. 0219/71
13 September 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Indian preparations to recognize
Bang la Desh are increasing. (Page 1)
BURMA: Rangoon's isolationism is limiting its will-
ingness to cooperate in international efforts at
narcotics control. (Page 3)
COMMUNIST CHINA: The military is becoming deeply
involved in rebuilding party apparatus in local
administrations. (Page 4)
JAPAN-CHINA-UN: Chinese UN representation (Page 6)
FINLAND: Relations with East and West Germany
Page 6)
CUBA-USSR: Technological cooperation (Page 7)
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INDIA-PAKISTAN: Indian preparations to recog-
nize Bangla Desh are on the increase, but New Delhi
may have some hope that Islamabad can be pressured
to negotiate a settlement of its differences with
East Pakistan.
On 9 September a Calcutta daily featured an
interview with Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul, quoting
him as saying that India would recognize Bangla Desh
"very soon." Kaul reportedly made it clear that
India planned to make strong representations on the
Bangla Desh issue at the United Nations.
The Indians have also apparently played a
guiding role in the formation of a multiparty Bangla
Desh "National Liberation Front." The Front in-
cludes--among others--pro-Moscow Communists, who
knowledgeable sources believe were brought in at
Soviet insistence, and moderate Bengali Awami League
leaders. It broadens the base of the Bengali freedom
movement, and several members of the Awami League
expect the Front to become the forerunner of a "war
council."
"Despite these moves, the Indians are still
proceeding slowly and they may be attempting to
pressure Islamabad into negotiations with the Ben-
gali leaders. In a New Delhi press conference on
10 September, Bangla Desh Foreign Secretary Alam
reiterated his government's willingness to negotiate--
although he did not retreat from the independence
goal. A1am added that his government will send a
delegation to New York for the beginning of the UN
General Assembly.
The Soviets and the Indians appear to be co-
ordinating their activities, and Prime Minister
Gandhi has recently announced that she will travel
to Moscow later this month for a three-day visit--
possibly to
13 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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BURMA: Rangoon's long-standing isolationism
is sti llimiting its willingness to cooperate in
international efforts at narcotics control.
The thrust of comments by Burmese officials in
recent meetings in Rangoon with senior US officials
concerned with narcotics matters was that Burma is
determined to attack the problem of domestic opium
production with a minimum of outside assistance or
interference. Although the'Burmese expressed will-
ingness to exchange information with the US on
trafficking and refining, they rejected any involve-
ment in international action. Nor did the Burmese
want attention focused on their narcotics problem in
multinational organizations. They said that joint
efforts with Thailand and Laos to eliminate traf-
ficking in the triborder area would present political
problems, particularly with the Thai. Rangoon's
relations with Bangkok have been somewhat strained
over Thai countenance of smuggling and of various
resistance activities from Thailand, particularly
those of former prime minister U Nu.
The Burmese admitted that their access to the
area east of the Salween River, where much of South-
east Asia's opium is produced, is limited by long-
standing insurgency. They argued, however, that
the area's proximity to China ruled out any inter-
nationally sponsored aerial survey of poppy fields.
Rangoon is obviously concerned over any activity
.that might arouse Chinese suspicions and mar the
considerable improvement in Sino-Burmese relations
that appears to have resulted from General Ne Win's
visit to Peking last month.
Despite Burmese apprehensions about involvement
in international control measures, their discussion
with foreign officials has been considerably more
forthcoming than their usual response. Their agree-
ment to limited cooperation in the exchange of in-
telligence suggests that they may be amenable to
13 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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COMMUNIST CHINA: The military apparently is
becoming deeply involved in the sensitive process
of rebuilding the party apparatus in local adminis-
trative units.
In an unusually candid statement, an Anhwei
provincial broadcast on 4 September asserted that
since the spring of 1970 propaganda teams drawn
from regular units "at the regimental level and
above" had been sent to more than a third of the
province's 70 counties to carry out ideological
and organizational work. In one county, obviously
meant to be representative of the province as a
whole, all the party units at the township, commune,
and production brigade level are said to have been
"re-established before 1 July of this year." This
is a clear admission that these roving military
teams are directly involved in selecting and in-
stalling the leaders of individual party units at
all levels in the rural areas. Moreover, the as-
sertion that the teams had "ferreted out active
counterrevolutionaries" on the local revolutionary
committees set up during the Cultural Revolution
strongly implies that the military has been given
a free hand in purging militant factionalists and
other political troublemakers.
Military representatives clearly dominate China's
new provincial party committees, and recent broadcasts
have suggested that military men may hold a larger
proportion of key positions in the nascent county-
level party committees than had previously been as-
sumed. Even so, the extent to which regular troops
are apparently being relied on to oversee the complex
and time-consuming process of reconstructing the
party at administrative units below the county
level is remarkable. Given the regime's professed
desire to reassert "party control," this kind of
work might be expected to be entrusted to a greater
extent to "rehabilitated" party veterans who of late
are coming back to their old posts in increasing
numbers and who are undoubtedly more familiar with
local conditions. (continued)
13 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4
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The Anhwei broadcast characterized the practice
of sending down the army teams as "a new method" of
improving the military's performance of the many
onerous civil tasks it has inherited as a result of
the Cultural Revolution. If this method is being
adopted on a national scale, with extensive use of
regular troops, it will almost certainly hamper
Peking's recent efforts to bolster the army's combat
preparedness. Other recent provincial broadcasts
have also emphasized the long-term and complicated
nature of the problems facing the army in its do-
mestic political role, suggesting that the military
will remain a highly visible element in the emerging
post - Cultural Revolution party and overnment
structure for an indefinite eriod.
13 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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JAPAN-CHINA-UN: Japan's cosponsorship of US-
pro reso utions dealing with Chinese represen-
tation in the UN appears to be still under consider-
ation. Following a meeting with Prime Minister Sato
on 10 September, Justice Minister Maeo backed away
from his earlier threat to resign if the government
cosponsored dual representation for Peking and Tai-
wan. Maeo's public change of heart suggests that
Sato may have greater support for cosponsorship
within the government party than the adamant state-
ments of some powerful faction leaders had indicated.
FINLAND: President Kekkonen's proposal of 11
September to sign treaties with both German states
includes ?a veto power for Bonn and is therefore un-
likely to result in anything tangible. The Finns
have, however, given a psychological and propaganda
boost to the East German quest for international
equality with West Germany. There is little avail-
able evidence to explain Kekkonen's motives, but
the Finns may plan more actions of this sort as a
part of their campaign to win Soviet approval for
a future commercial agreement with the European Com-
munities.
(continued)
13 Sep 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 6
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CUBA-USSR: An agreement to collaborate in the
mechanization of the Cuban sugar industry apparently
was the only significant accomplishment of the first
session of the Soviet-Cuban intergovernmental Com-
mission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Coop-
eration. The commission, established in December
1970, is concerned with joint long-term planning,
coordination, and operation of the Cuban economy.
Press reporting on last week's meeting, however,
suggests that the two sides were largely occupied
with current problems, such as insufficient utiliza-
tion of Soviet-trained Cuban technicians, the fail-
ure to fulfill contracts, and inefficient handling
of Soviet ships in Cuban ports rather than with
more basic economic matters. The Soviet team re-
turned home last weekend.
13 Sep 71
Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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