CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A020400100001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 11, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
State Dept. review completed
Secret
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No. 0270/71
11 November 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
SOUTH VIETNAM: Respected political leader assassi-
nated. (Page 1)
ECUADOR: Seizure of US tuna boats. (Page 3)
CHILE: Allende to renegotiate foreign debt. (Page 4)
PERU: New telecommunications law. (Page 5)
JAPAN-CHILE: Trade mission to visit Santiago.
Page 6)
PAKISTAN: Debt moratorium extended (Page 7)
CUBA: Castro's foreign visits (Page 7)
USSR: Tactical air-to-surface missile (Page 9)
SOMALIA-USSR: President Siad seeks economic aid
(Page 9)
URUGUAY: Leftist election campaign tactics (Page 10)
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SOUTH VIETNAM: The assassination of Nguyen
Van Bong, leader of the Progressive Nationalist
Movement (PNM), is a blow to one of the country's
strongest political parties.
Bong was one of South Vietnam's most effective
and respected politicians. His party is one of the
few with real organizational strength in areas out-
side of Saigon, and it did fairly well in the recent
National Assembly elections. The assassins are un-
known, but because Bong had no known political or
personal enemies, suspicion will fall on the Commu-
nists. Specific Communist motives for singling out
Bong are not evident; in the past they have some-
times staged such terrorist acts to expose Saigon's
vulnerability despite government security measures.
Bong was rumored to be in line for the post of
prime minister if President Thieu reorganizes the
government. here are indications, however, that
Bong believe e would not get the job, and that he
intended to have the PNM stick to the same moderate
opposition coursq- hat it has followed since its
inception in 1968.
'?~ Bong's death probably will not cause much of
a ch ige in the party's policy, although its number
two man, Nguyen Ngoc Huy, apparently is somewhat,-
more sympathetic toward the ac)7 rnmpn1-
11 Nov 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ECUADOR
Approximate area
of seizure
Rocafuerte~'.. S "
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ECUADOR: At least four US tuna boats were
seize yff esterday-operating some 65 miles off the
coast of Ecuador.
These are the first seizures of the season;
during the first three months of 1971 Ecuador
seized 26 boats and collected some $1 million in
fines. At that time 'the US suspended sales under
the Foreign Military Sales Act, and Ecuador then
expelled the US Military Group. The foreign min-
ister recently informed the US ambassador that
Ecuador intended to enforce strictly its fishing
regulations during the current season.
A contributing factor at this time may have
been the fact that the commander of the navy was
relieved on 8 November. His interim replacement
may have wanted to make a strong impression and
directed the seizures without referring to the
political authorities in Quito. In any event,
the government now will be d:r ressure to up-
hold the honor of the navy.
11 Nov 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: President Allende has announced that he
will renegotiate the nation's foreign debt.
Chile's foreign creditors have been expecting
such a move for several months. During 1971, Chile's
foreign reserves plunged from about $350 million to
little more than $100 million because foreign lines
of credit dried up, export earnings from the recently
nationalized copper industry declined, and food im-
port requirements increased. Under present circum-
stances Chile's creditors will have little alterna-
tive but to agree to renegotiate. Socialist ad-
visers might successfully pressure him to default if
renegotiation were refused.
Allende publicly blamed the balance-of-payments
crisis on the large foreign debt burden that he in-
herited and claimed that US "unilateral actions" to
protect its own economy had aggravated the situation.
The US import surcharge and the "suspension of for-
eign aid" specifically alluded to by Allende,"in fact
have had a negligible effect on Chile. Large-scale
foreign aid and credits during the 1960s, however,
sharply increased Chile's external debt, and the
heaviest repayments are scheduled during the next
few years. The American Embassy calculates net for-
eign debt outstanding at the end of 1970 at $2.3
billion and scheduled debt service at an average
$330 million annually during 1971-73, about 35 per-
cent of probable export earnings this year.
Chile could have covered its debt service ob-
ligations if copper output had increased as expected
under the US companies' expansion program and if for-
eign confidence in Chile's credit had remained high.
Santiago's failure to pay will affect mainly US and
West European creditors. Of total debt repayments
scheduled for 1971-73, almost 45 percent is owed to
US creditors, 15 percent to international financial
organizations, and most of the remainder to Western
Europe, mainl Italy, West Germany, France, Spain,
and the UK.
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PERU: The government has extended its control
over private enterprise in an apparent effort to
increase its ability to dictate policies.
On 8 November the minister of transport and
communications announced a new law under which the
government has expropriated 51 percent of the shares
of all television stations in Peru. In order to
restrict large media conglomerates, the law says
that radio stations may be. owned only by state com-
panies, by mixed companies in which the government
controls 25 percent interest, or by private com-
panies organized exclusively for radio broadcasting.
No single company can operate more than seven radio
stations in the country or more than one radio sta-
tion and one television station in the same depart-
ment.
The government also will be able to increase
its use of telecommunications for public "education"
and propaganda because of the requirement that 60
percent of the programming be produced nationally.
The military government has stressed throughout its
tenure the importance of using radio and television
for this end.
According. to a spokesman, the government will
deposit in the central bank the nominal value of
the capital stock shares to be expropriated. The
Ministry of Transport and Communications then will
make an appraisal on the basis of a "technical and
accounting audit" to determine the true value of
the shares. The law provides for workers' "commu-
nities" to receive some sort of profit sharing but,
unlike the systems in industry, fishing, and mining,
does not establish workers' ownership or control.
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JAPAN-CHILE: The Japanese Government will send
a high-ranking trade mission next month to Argentina,
Brazil, and Chile.
The decision to visit Chile, not originally
scheduled, followed strong requests by that govern-
ment. In Santiago the mission will seek safeguards
for loans extended by the Japanese to American firms
whose properties are now in the hands of the Chilean
Government, and it will seek guarantees for future
investment. ,Tokyo has assured the US Embassy that
Japan is not seeking to exploit current difficulties
in US-Chilean relations over uncompensated expropri-
ations.
The Japanese have long been involved in the
Chilean economy and the latest mission is not ex-
pected to bring any significant changes. The Jap-
anese are probably interested in obtaining some ad-
ditional long-term contracts for copper ore, espe-
cially in view of the current low world market price.
At the same time they would like to increase sales
of mining and other equipment to the Chileans. San-
tiago, for its part, would like to increase sales
to Japan and is anxiously seeking credits from any
source to bolster its rapidly deteriorating foreign
exchange position. The two countries should be able
to work out some business arrangement, because San-
tiago is almost certain to honor its repayment com-
mitments to Tokyo.
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PAKISTAN: Islamabad has extended its unilateral
debt moratorium through January 1972. This resulted
from the failure of the consortium of aid donors to
agree on debt rescheduling before the original six-
month deadline of 31 October. Pakistan is continuing
to repay the debt into blocked rupee accounts, but
this procedure creates legal. problems for some aid
donors and could ]Lead to a cutoff of some of the
$1.1 billion aid still in the pipeline. Rather than
lose ongoing aid, Islamabad probably will negotiate
bilaterally with these donors to overcome specific
problems. Meanwhile, Pakistan is continuing its
efforts to arrange multilateral debt rescheduling
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CUBA: Fidel. Castro has announced that he will
visit the USSR, Algeria, Bulgaria, and Hungary some-
time next year. Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika
left Havana just?this'week after two days of private
talks with Castro and other high officials. In addi-
tion, a Hungarian deputy premier is currently in
Cuba for an "official friendly visit." He is the
highest ranking Hungarian leader to visit Cuba since
diplomatic relations were established in 1960. The
acceptance by Castro of invitations to visit at
least five other countries after not being out of
Cuba for more than seven years suggests that he is
turning his attention to seeking greater interna-
tional support for his government after a long period
of concentrating primarily on domestic issues.
(continued)
11 Nov 71 Central Intelligence Bulletin 7
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MIG-21 With Tactical Air.-To-Surface Missile
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USSR: The Soviets may have deployed their first
tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM). The missile--
resembling the US Bullpup--was first sighted in Sep-
tember by Western observers during a bombing competi-
tion between Soviet tactical air units stationed in
East Germany. The new TASM is estimated to have a
maximum range of up to six nautical miles with a
warhead weighing 200 to 300 pounds. Such a missile
would improve the. ground attack potential of Soviet
frontal (tactical) aviation which had been equipped
only with bombs and unguided rockets.
SOMALIA-USSR: President Siad probably hopes to
acquire much-needed economic assistance during his
visit to Moscow later this month. Since the coup
of October 1969 the Soviets have gained considerable
political and military influence in Somalia, but in
fact they have provided only limited aid. About
one third of the existing credits of more than $60
million remains and. the Somalis may negotiate for
more favorable repayment terms.. The almost $110-
million aid agreement concluded earlier this year
between communist China and-.Somalia is sure to be
an element in. the bargaining, but any new Soviet
aid to Somalia will probably be modest. Moscow has
recently been parsimonious with the hard-pressed
Somalis, paying lower prices for Somali exports and
sharply increasing Soviet prices for petroleum prod-
ucts badly needed by Somalia
(continued)
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URUGUAY: The leftist coalition challenging the
two traditional parties in the general elections on
28 November has made its strongest attacks to date
against'US"interve:ntion." Spurred by weekend at-
tacks on its political caravans-by hostile.crowds,
Frente Amplio presidential candidate Liber Seregni
charged on nationwide TVthat ultraright groups,
"clearly assisted b;y US And Brazilian experts," were
behind the violence. Frente press organs further
contended that several US Embassy personnel are CIA
agents. Hoping to drum up a sympathy vote and to
trade on nationalist sentiment against foreign in-
tervention, the Frente will probably continue its
anti-US campaign through the elections. It hopes
to attract votes from the traditional parties with
sensationalistic char s i areas where its idenInay
has little appeal.
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