CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A020600050001-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
22
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 18, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
December 2, 1971
Content Type:
REPORT
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Body:
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DOS review(s) completed.
DIA review(s) completed.
Secret
N2 042
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No. 0288/71
2 December 1971
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CAMBODIA: Government forces abandon major areas
along Route 6. (Page 1)
INDIA-PAKISTAN: Situation report. (Page 3)
COMMUNIST CHINA: Authoritative editorial reaffirms
paramountcy of party leadership. (Page 5)
CUBA - SOUTH AMERICA: Castro's imminent departure
from Chile apparently will be followed by stopovers
in Peru and Ecuador. (Page 7)
ARMS CONTROL: Disarmament issues in UN General As-
sembly. (Page 8)
ITALY: Communist Party scores moderate success in
conference on EC. (Page 9)
COMMUNIST CHINA - PERU - CHILE: Recent agreements
strengthen commercial relations. (Page 11)
COSTA RICA: Accreditation of two Soviet diplomats
may create political tension. (Page 12)
AFRICA-RHODESIA: Reaction to UK-Rhodesian agree-
ment Page 13)
SOUTH VIETNAM: Reaction to economic reforms (Page 13)
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USSR-SOMALIA: Development aid (Page 15)
VENEZUELA: Policy toward foreign oil companies
Page 16)
MAURITIUS: Aftermath of assassination attempt
Page 16
MALI-FRANCE: Paris will underwrite development
plan (Page 17)
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CAMBODIA: Route 6 Area
? Kampung Thorn
Fsr&-u&Wri?ordered,
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CAMBODIA: The government is abandoning major
areas along Route 6 in the face of heavy Communist
attacks.
The Communists routed a nine-battalion govern-
ment force from Baray with heavy ground, recoilless
rifle, and rocket attacks early yesterday morning.
The retreating troops destroyed several tanks, ar-
mored vehicles, and artillery pieces prior to pull-
ing out. Brigadier General Hou Hang Sin, the army's
assistant chief of staff for operations, was in
Baray during the attacks and apparently managed to
organize a withdrawal of soldiers and their depend-
ents toward Tang Kouk, some ten miles to the south.
Farther north, a five-battalion government force in
Kompong Thmar was still under enemy attack at last
report, with all outlying outposts abandoned and
government troops digging in near the center of
town. There are as yet no reports on the magnitude
of government losses in these actions.
Prime Minister Lon Nol has ordered the evacua-
tion of Kompong Thmar, a move prompted by a desire
to avoid the loss of additional battalions. It is
not yet clear whether this also means the prime
minister has abandoned the idea of maintaining a
Chenla force north of Tang Kouk, where the Chenla
II operation began last August. He evidently does
intend, however, to hold positions south from Tang
Kouk to Skoun and has ordered battalions returned
to Tang Kouk from the Phnom Penh area.
The continued heavy fighting suggests that the
Communists will continue to pressure the remaining
Chenla II-North forces, at least for the next sev-
eral days. Communist propaganda is laying consider-
able stress on the Route 6 campaign, portraying it
as a major setback for the Lon Nol government and
as evidence that the Cambodians cannot successfully
prosecute the war even with allied support. The
propaganda calls for the "complete smashing of Op-
eration Chenla II," and has mentioned Tang Kouk as
a principal target. F77 I
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I INDIA-PAKISTAN: Fighting continues around
the periphery of East Pakistan. Operations evi-
dently are being pursued in the Jessore area, at
Hilli.--where the Indians acknowledge that Indian
troops entered East Pakistan--near Pachagarh, which
the Pakistanis now admit they have lost, and at
Kamalpur. There is no confirmation of Indian
claims that the Mukti Bahini are besieging Feni--
an important town on the railway and main road
from Chittagong to the`rest of East Pakistan.
In Sylhet District, the Mukti Bahini claim
to have liberated several towns. These are, how-
ever, on a remote part of the border.
There are signs, moreover, that the movement
of Pakistani troops to the border is giving the
Mukti Bahini a much freer hand in the interior.
Security forces have abandoned a small area about
15 miles west of Dacca, and to the east the town
of Ghorasal is now flying the Bangla Desh flag.
The Indian press credits the guerrillas with con-
trolling all of Faridpur and Barisal districts.
The claim appears, however, to be at least partly
exaggerated, and in any case guerrillas for some
time have controlled a large part of the rural
areas of southcentral East Pakistan.
(continued)
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With Indian military pressure growing in the
East, there has been a flurry of political activity
in West Pakistan. President Yahya has met with the
leaders of the two largest parties--Nurul Amin, an
East Pakistani who adheres to the government, and
Z. A. Bhutto, the left-leaning West Pakistani. Ac-
cording to a Pakistani press report, Bhutto has
agreed to accept the post of deputy prime minister
in a coalition civilian government headed by Amin.
Yahya may intend to establish such a civilian govern-
ment even before the promulgation of a constitution,
now scheduled for 20 December. Yahya may see turn-
ing over power as the only means to avoid having
personally to choose between negotatin with the
Bengalis and fighting a war with India.
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COMMUNIST CHINA: Peking's first major pro-
nouncement on domestic politics since the purge of
Lin Piao forcefully reaffirmed the paramountcy of
party leadership in all fields but did not forecast
a broader purge within the military hierarchy.
The joint People's Daily - Red Flag - Liberation
Army Journal editorial on 30 November cautiously
skirted future policy guidelines but provided the
first public rationale for the recent leadership up-
heaval in its veiled, yet unmistakable, implication
that Lin fell because he was involved'~in a "conspir-
acy."
The editorial's failure to praise the political
rectitude of the military or to cite its important
role in civil administration reinforces the impres-
sion that Peking intends to exploit Lin's fall to
pave the way for some diminution of the military's
authority in China. The warning to high-ranking
cadres to observe Mao's line, the emphasis on the
importance of unified leadership in all party commit-
tees, and the call for observing strict discipline
almost certainly are directed at military powerhold-
ers who might have reason to fear some future reduc-
tion of their political leverage.
The impression that Peking is determined to re-
assert party--as opposed to military--authority was
reinforced last week in Hong Kong by Jack Chen, a
publicist for Peking, who wrote that key policy di-
rectives on all national matters are to be trans-
mitted in the future through the party and govern-
ment, rather than the military, chain of command,
and that the key figure in all leadership organs
will be the party's representative--"whether or not
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he is a military member." Chen described these ad-
justments as a major structural reform currently
being implemented throughout the country.
The publication of the joint editorial strongly
suggests that Peking is confident that the situation
within the nation's leadership is now under control
and that Lin's fall is unlikely to have serious re-
percussions on domestic stability. The editorial
conveys the impression that the recent purge involved
only a handful of "anti-party" elements at the top
levels and even implies that others who may have been
peripherally involved will not suffer serious conse-
quences. Thus, the regime's determination to close
ranks within the leadership seems clear. The process
probably is being facilitated by behind-the-scenes
reassurances that Lin's fall is not the prelude to
sweeping purges in the regional and provincial power
structure, and that some rectification of the present
imbalance between civil and military authority in
party and government organs will not result in a
drastic reduction of military influence.
Nevertheless, the oblique signal in the joint
editorial that a major internal crisis has passed
does not mean that the situation is fully resolved.
Selected changes in personnel assignments in the
provinces are almost certainly in the offing and,
at the national level, Peking is still operating
with a rump politburo.
approximately
a dozen vacancies on ipolitburo remain to be
filled, and the appointments of a new defense minis-
ter and army chief of staff obviously are issues of
considerable sensitivity. At this stage, it is
clear that Premier Chou En-lai's influence remains
overriding.
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CUBA - SOUTH AMERICA: Fidel Castro's prolonged
excursion to Chile is about to be concluded. A
farewell rally is scheduled in Santiago this evening,
but the timing of his actual departure is not yet
clear.
Castro probably believes that he has accom-
plished all of his journey's goals and now realizes
that after three weeks his welcome is wearing thin.
e An unprecedented violent antigovernment demonstra-
tion by thousands of women in San sago last night
was also directed against Castro. His next stops
apparently will be in Peru and Ecuador.
Castro's prospective visit to Peru has been
greeted with mixed emotions in official Peruvian
circles, but President Velasco Alvarado reportedly
still intends to greet him at Lima's airport. No
formal invitation has been announced, however, and
Velasco's statement to the press that Castro can.
stop if he wishes may not satisfy the Cuban leader.
Moreover, Peruvian
reaction to as ro s request to visit Cuban disaster
workers in an area severely damaged by the 1970
earthquake was decidedly negative. Faced with these
rebuffs, Castro could decide to skip Peru.
Ecuador's President Velasco Ibarra has announced
that he will greet Castro when he stops in Guayaquil.
The two leaders reportedly will hold a meeting at
the airport. They are likely to discuss Ecuador's
probable cooperation with Peru in seeking revision
of OAS sanctions against Cuba and the possibility
of renewal of relations between Ecuador and Cuba.
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ARMS CONTROL: The UN General Assembly's annual
disarmament a ate is drawing to a close with several
important issues yet to be decided.
An especially thorny problem is the future of
the Geneva disarmament conference. Most UN members
clearly regard the Geneva talks as a highly desirable
forum, but want the door left open for Chinese par-
ticipation and hope that the French will occupy their
long-vacant seat. Although neither the Chinese nor
the French have made their intentions clear, the main
stumbling block to their participation is the fact
that the superpowers serve as cochairmen. The Swedes
have drafted a resolution that would have the Assembly
terminate the cochairmanship. There is also the pos-
sibility that some members will call for scrapping
the Geneva forum in favor of convening the unwieldy
all-member UN Disarmament Commission.
The Soviet proposal for a world disarmament
conference now seems unlikely to make any headway at
this session of the Assembly. During last week's
polemical exchange on the issue, the Chinese dele-
gate stated that the Soviet text should not come to
a vote. The Swedes and the Mexicans have drafted
what they regard as face-saving amendments for the
USSR; these amendments would in effect defer the
matter to next year's session of the Assembly.
With respect to other disarmament issues, the
US and the USSR are likely to secure Assembly en-
dorsement of their draft convention curbing bio-
logical weapons. However, the two superpowers are
singled out for criticism in a Mexican draft resolu-
tion on the need for a comprehensive nuclear test
ban (CTB). The Mexican text calls for setting a
date for ending all nuclear tests and asserts that
"there is no longer a valid reason for delaying"
agreement on a CTB. The US mission at the UN re-
ports that most members believe this resolution will
pass if put to a vote in the Assembly. The USSR has
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ITALY: The Italian Communist Party had moder-
ate success last week convoking a cross-section of
European leftists to discuss the European Communi-
ties (EC).
?The meeting in Rome from 23 to 25 November
drew representatives from nine West European coun-
tries and all Warsaw Pact states. Italian Christian
Democrats, Socialists, Republicans, heads of two
major government enterprises, and a French Social-
ist also attended.
The PCI, which over the past two years has made
tentative moves away from its long-standing hostil-
ity to EC, was evidently testing the climate that a
new position on the Communities would meet both in
Italy and among leftist parties elsewhere in Europe.
Acting secretary general Berlinguer reportedly has
told his central committee that the PCI's role in
Europe will be one of the major topics for its
thirteenth congress in March 1972. Under Berlinguer
the PCI-has stressed its support for Italian eco-
nomic growth, which in its view is linked to an
Italian role within the EC.
Giorgio Amendola, who leads the six-man Italian
Communist delegation to the European Parliament,
opened the meeting by calling for West European Com-
munist recognition of the "EC reality." He proposed
that EC should operate in cooperation with CEMA
within a larger European framework but emphasized
that the PCI did not oppose Italy's participation
in the Community. He said that the PCI would never
accept the reduction of Europe to merely its cap-
italist part but added "we are not so closed dogmat-
ically that we cannot see that the difficult work
of Socialist construction in the East needs more
advanced democratic development." Other PCI speak-
ers emphasized the development of a Europe of or-
ganized labor to face the Europe of the monopolies.
This emphasis reflects PCI interest in the success
of current negotiations for unification of the three
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major Italian labor confederations and its hope
that the unification may be repeated elsewhere in
Europe.
Aleksei Kozlov, consultant to the CPSU inter-
national section specializing in foreign Communist
parties, did not directly attack the EC but concen-
trated his remarks on the need for an early Confer-
ence on European Security. He said, "Europe, great
Europe, is indivisible, as European security is in-
divisible. It cannot be cut up like an apple."
The sole French Communist representative, a
newspaperman, supported the Amendola line but urged
great caution. Ron Bellamy of the British Commu-
nist Party directorate, clearly unable to be more
positive on the EC than the British Labor Party,
flatly opposed Amendola.
The Italian Communist success in convoking the
meeting, which emphasized a popular plank in the
PCI program and drew non-Communist Italians, will
help the steady PCI effort to win respectability
among non-Communist political elements in Italy and
elsewhere in Europe.
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COMMUNIST CHINA - PERU - CHILE: Peking's com-
mercial relations with Peru and Chile have been en-
hanced by several recent agreements.
China's long-term interest-free credit of over
$40 million to Peru is the first to be extended by
Peking to a Latin American country other than to
Cuba. It will be used to provide technical aid to
help develop Peru's mining and petroleum industries.
Peking also agreed to purchase $100 million worth
of Peruvian copper, lead, and zinc. Because deliv-
ery under this agreement is to be made during
1972-74, the copper involved may incorporate the
40,000 tons that Peru agreed in June to ship to
China before the end of 1972.
Chile recently signed a contract to deliver
60,000 tons of nitrates worth about $3.3 million to
China during the first half of 1972. An agreement
for a smaller amount was signed last year. In a
related development, a Chilean economic'mission ar-
rived in Peking on 29 November, probably to work
out the details of trade next year under the long-
term agreement concluded between the two countries
last April.
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COSTA RICA: The unexpected accreditation of
two Soviet diplomats as advance members of a Soviet
embassy may set off a new period of political ten-
sion.
The arrival of the two diplomats, a first and
a second secretary, raises the number of Soviet of-
ficials in Costa Rica to seven. A permanent five-
man trade mission quietly set up shop in late Octo-
ber. Presumably other officials, including an
ambassador, will be added in the future.
The move can be expected to create a political
stir, especially in view of the manner in which
President Figueres and his foreign minister have
handled the question of Soviet presence in Costa
Rica. The Foreign Ministry, when queried by the
press on 28 November about the two diplomats, in-
dicated that they were on only a temporary visit.
Figueres had given the impression last July, when
the prospect of a Soviet embassy provoked a ground-
swell of local opposition, that the plan had been
abandoned. When the trade mission arrived, the
government indicated that it would leave as soon
as it completed work on a commercial agreement.
The government has chosen a good moment to
make its move: one of the chief opponents of an
exchange of embassies with the Soviets is out of
the country now and the presence of several popular
touring Soviet cultural groups perhaps has helped
to create a climate of receptivity to the idea of
closer ties with the USSR.
Nonetheless, those who opposed the President's
plan in July are still strongly against the Soviet
embassy. If they learn that they have Russian
diplomats in their midst, they probably will again
cause an uproar and Figueres may be forced to back-
pedal once more.
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AFRICA-RHODESIA: Black African reaction to
the UK-Rhodesian settlement has been surprisingly
muted so far. The governments of Tanzania, Zambia,
Kenya, and Ethiopia have been strongly critical, but
most other African governments have yet to make pub-
lic statements. The issue will probably be debated
soon within the Organization of African Unity. It
is doubtful, however, that a majority of the OAU
members will do more than publicly condemn the set-
tlement and agree to act in concert in the UN against
any British bid to drop UN economic sanctions.
SOUTH VIETNAM: Saigon's business community re-
mains uncertain about the likely effects of the re-
cent economic reforms, but prices thus far have risen
much less than expected. Although there have been
sharp increases for such key commodities as rice,
condensed milk, and sugar, the over-all retail price
level in Saigon is up only 1.9 percent since the re-
forms were announced on 15 November. In areas out-
side Saigon prices have increased somewhat more, but
US officials expect the stability of Saigon markets
to have a settling influence elsewhere. The com-
plexity of the reforms, which included a large de-
valuation of the piaster, adoption of flexible ex-
change rates, and complete revision of import taxes,
apparently has caused a slowdown in import activity.
As the importers adjust to the new exchange rate
system, however, there probably will be further in-
creases in the prices of imported goods.
(continued)
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USSR-SOMALIA: A Soviet Foreign Ministry offi-
cial reportedly has said that Moscow will finance
most of the Juba River development project in So-
malia, although a high-level Somali planning offi-
cial has stated that Moscow would pay the entire
cost of the project--estimated at between $85 and
$115 million. This suggests that, in either case,
Moscow will provide a substantial amount of new
aid because only about $25 million of earlier cred-
its has not been used. The Soviets surveyed the
area several years ago but the study will have to
be updated, according to Somali sources. The proj-
ect includes construction of a dam, irrigation
canals, and a hydroelectric power station. E
(continued)
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VENEZUELA: The government apparently is con-
sidering minimum production levels for foreign-owned
oil companies to force them to boost output. Vene-
zuela's oil exports encountered difficulties this
year as growth in foreign demand slowed and produc-
tion dropped in September to a daily average of 3.3
million barrels, compared with 3.7 million barrels
per day in 1970. Although production recovered
somewhat in October-November when seasonal demand
for heating oil increased, it is now declining again,
and one industry official believes it may fall fur-
ther during the next few months. In addition, the
companies, largely US-owned, are apprehensive that
the production cutbacks could become a political is-
sue and prompt the Venezuelan congress to hit the
industry with new restrictive legislation.
MAURITIUS: Tension persists following the at-
tempt to assassinate opposition leader Paul Berenger
last Thursday. Police have arrested four thugs of
the Social Democratic Party, the second largest
party in the government coalition. The identity of
the assailants was generally known at the time of
the incident, but police action has been slow and
this has further discredited the already unpopular
government. Berenger has attempted to maintain
calm, but his followers in the Mauritian Militant
Movement are restless and dockworkers are threaten-
ing a wildcat strike. The maintenance of public
order over the next few weeks will depend in large
measure on how vigorously the government prosecutes
the accused.
(continued)
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MALI-FRANCE: France's aid chief reportedly
assured Mali s leaders during his recent visit that
Paris would underwrite about 80 percent of the coun-
try's current development plan. France will also
continue substantial budgetary and other support
vital to financially hard-pressed Bamako. The
French aid chief told US officials that Paris did
not attach any political strings to this assistance
package. This represents a new success for Mali's
policy of seeking unfettered aid from all sources.
Bamako can be expected to use this reassurance of
substantial French aid to solicit greater assistance
from Moscow and from Peking, which has just sent a
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