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December 14, 2016
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July 18, 2003
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February 11, 1972
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Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO2120 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE HIP t' Central Intelligence Bulletin State Department review completed Secret N?_ 042 11 February 1972 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021200010001-4 SECRET No. 0036/72 11 February 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin LAOS: Irregulars move deeper into Communist rear areas. (Page 1) USSR-EGYPT: Moscow seeks to revive four-power talks and Jarring mission. (Page 3) USSR: Leading Soviet journal underlines Brezhnev's role as principal advocate of detente. (Page 4) NATO: Allies divided over next move regarding Brosio mission. (Page 5) THAILAND: Government forces encounter stiff oppo- sition in major anti-insurgent drive. (Page 7) 25X1 BRAZIL-CHILE: Brazilian Government reportedly will Help finance commercial transaction with Chile. (Page 9) JORDAN: Cabinet changes (Page 10) Approved For Release 2003/08/26.: CIA-RDP79T00975A021200010001-4 SECRET Approved For Release 2003/0W A'RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 e Hiqhpoint 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/0 1 / IDP79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08MRP79T00975A021200010001-4 c LAOS: Vang Pao's irregulars are moving deeper into -the -enemy's rear areas south of the Plaine des Jarres. Forward elements of one task force are now about three miles from the southern tip of the Plaine, and other units are farther to the south and east. Little resistance has so far been en- countered, presumably because the irregulars have not yet moved into any vital areas. Vang Pao clearly believes that at this junc- ture the best defense is a good offense. Rather than digging in at Long Tieng for a costly head-on struggle with the attacking North Vietnamese, he has chosen to divide his 12,000-man force, leaving a 7,000-man contingent to defend Sam Thong and Long Tieng and sending the remainder to probe deeply to- ward the enemy's lines of communication. Vang Pao hopes to recapture the initiative and rekindle the fighting spirit of his troops, while forcing the North Vietnamese to divert their forces from the front lines to protect their supply corridors. The operation is, however, a calculated risk. It could so weaken Vang Pao's offensive force that its future usefulness would be impaired should the operation fail to reduce the pressure on Long Tieng. Moreover, the Communists could attempt to take ad- vantage of the reduced government strength around Long Tieng and Sam Thong to move quickly against them. Several indicators suggest that the North Vietnamese may have nearly completed their prepa- rations for new attacks. Enemy reconnaissance and patrol activity has increased both at Sam Thong and along Skyline Ridge. The new road from the southern edge of the Plaine to Ban Hintang report- edly is motorable, promising to reduce supply dif- ficulties and making it possible to move heavy ar- tillery closer to the base. (continued) 11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1 Approved For Release 2003/089~~DP79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/2gEe4t 79T00975A021200010001-4 C Much will now depend on whether the irregulars can move with speed and purpose to stir up enough trouble in the rear to divert the North Vietnamese before they can launch an all-out attack on Lon Tieng and Sam Thong. 25X1 11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/08/2&1'if144579T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08( Ff MP79T00975A021200010001-4 USSR-EGYPT: The Soviets would like to revive the four-power talks and the Jarring mission in or- der to reduce pressures on Egyptian President Sadat. The Deputy Chief of the Soviet Foreign Minis- try Near East Division, Ye. D. Pyrlin, told a US Embassy officer on 9 February that while the USSR and Egypt lacked specific proposals for a resumption of Jarring's activities, Soviet UN Ambassador Malik would be sounding out his four-power colleagues on the matter. The Soviets have long favored a resump- tion of the four-power talks, although Pyrlin sug- gested it was Sadat's idea. It appears that neither Moscow nor Cairo wants to close any possible door to an initiative for a political settlement. Pyrlin did not even foreclose the possibility that Sadat could eventually agree to entering "proximity" talks with Israel. The Soviets continue to play for time. In ad- dition to hoping that their diplomatic initiative can take the heat off Sadat, the Soviets are point- ing to the visit of President Nixon to Moscow in the spring as an opportunity for progress in nego- tiations. Pyrlin noted that the Soviet leaders had told Sadat that the Middle East would be discussed with the President. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08&R(P79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/W-cC;R EIP79T00975A021200010001-4 USSR: The Soviet party's leading journal, Kommunist, has strongly underlined Brezhnev's role as the principal advocate of detente within the leadership. The journal's editorial last month evidently was intended to provide high-level functionaries with a public definition and justification of So- viet detente policy in Europe and Brezhnev's for- eign policy role. The need for such high-level guidance was indicated last December when the lead- ership undertook a round of speeches in the prov- inces to answer questions engendered by Soviet ac- tivities abroad in the past year. The editorial credits Brezhnev with promoting detente through his talks with Pompidou and Brandt. The basis for this policy, according to Brezhnev, is the ascendency of "forces of realism" in capital- ist countries and Europe's resulting "shift" from a cold war era to one of peaceful coexistence. The editorial does not associate Brezhnev's name with any passages critical of the US or its allies, while Podgorny and Kosygin are identified with Soviet support of North Vietnam against the US and Egypt against Israel. Moreover, after noting President Nixon's planned visit to Moscow, the arti- cle recalls that Brezhnev, as general secretary, met "directly" with the French president and the FRG chancellor, underlining that his party position is to be considered entirely suitable for dealing with Western heads of government. 11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26F;C]P,-79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/~ eQbAIWP79T00975A021200010001-4 NATO: The allies are divided over how to deal with Moscow's continuing reluctance to receive the Brosio "explorer" mission on force reductions. On 9 February the Canadians reported to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) that their ambassador in Moscow found Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko notably cool toward the prospect: of receiving Brosio. A Soviet diplomat in Washington also reportedly told a Canadian diplomat that Brosio would not be received in Moscow. The remarks of other Soviet diplomats, however, reflect instructions not to place Moscow on record with a definite refusal. The Soviet position poses a dilemma for NATO. France, Norway, and Denmark, concerned that the force reduction question could delay a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) urge that the Soviets not be confronted on the issue. A num- ber of others, supported by Secretary General Luns, want to issue a public statement that would make it clear that the Soviets are holding up the force re- duction dialogue. They do not, however, want to give Moscow an opportunity to suggest an alternative, in view of the fact that the Soviets probably would propose either bilateral discussions with the US or postponement of force reduction talks until after a CSCE. Either course would diminish the chances of dealing with military security issues at a CSCE. The allies will meet: with Brosio next week to consider the status of his mission. Brosio 25X1 I _j pro a y would a amenable to scrapping the mission if, in the process, the onus could be placed on Moscow. 25X1 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2003/08 ( fpP79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/"!W DP79T00975A021200010001-4 NORTH THAII LAND: Counterinsurgency Operation Underway Target area of government operati4 Approved For Release 2003/0$J/ ;Ri fIDP79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 SECRET THAILAND: Government troops have run into stiff opposition as they conduct. the most ambitious military operation yet undertaken in the seven-year struggle against Communist insurgents. The operation, begun on 20 January, involves the use of 12,000 troops, including elements from the elite Bangkok-based First Division. It is sup- ported by five artillery batteries and an unprece- dented number of tactical aircraft. The target is a mountain massif along the borders of Phitsanulok and Phetchabun provinces in northern Thailand, where the Communists have over 600 armed men, mostly Meo tribesmen. This is the closest Communist base to the central plains and has been the scene of heavy fighting in the past. Blocking positions have been established to the north within Thailand and across the border in Laos by irregular forces, but the in- surgents are showing little inclination to withdraw from the target areas. Forewarned about the opera- tion, they have constructed fortified positions and cached supplies for a two-month siege. The insur- gents have been giving ground grudgingly, and the government troops, hampered by -the rugged terrain, have not been able to reach their objectives. Recognizing the importance of the operation, which is part of a wider campaign planned this year against insurgent strongholds, :Bangkok has extended it until at least 25 February. Even if the govern- ment does not achieve all of its objectives, it has regained some of the initiative from the insurgents, and the operation provides tangible evidence that the leaders in Bangkok are willing to do more than they have in the past to combat the insurgency. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/? P79T00975A021200010001-4 BRAZIL-CHILE: The Brazilian Government prob- ably will prove e a large credit to Chile to finance the export of 1,000 Mercedes Beni; buses manufactured in Sao Paulo. Brazilian Government officials say that a de- cision on whether to extend the credit is still pending, but a Mercedes Benz employee has said privately that the contract has been signed and that he expects the government to provide major as- sistance in financing the deal. Chilean newspapers report the credit will be for $18 million. Although Brasilia remains totally opposed to the Allende government's political course, these ideological differences are likely to be overcome by the desire to promote exports, particularly of manufactured products. In pursuit of this end, Brazil currently is working hard to expand markets; targets of this campaign include the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Communist China. Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/ .FCl 79T00975A021200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/;eift-pqP79T00975A021200010001-4 NOTE JORDAN: Further changes are likely in the government in the wake of Wednesday's cabinet shuf- fle. Although King Husayn brought eight technocrats into the government in his attempt to find officials who can deal effectively with the country's mounting .domestic problems, he still has to find a new prime minister. He reportedly has postponed this task until Jordan's future relations with other Arab states become clearer. Rumors circulating in Amman during late January indicate that, when the new prime minister is finally named, Husayn may also make some long-considered changes in the military and other non-cabinet posts. F7 11 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08hi'-.(bP79T00975A021200010001-4 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2003/08/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21200010001-4