Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 21, 2003
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 26, 1972
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1.pdf805.84 KB
Approved For-Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097 p213( IGt1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret N?- 41 26 February 1972 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21300030001-1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21300030001-1 Approved For BIease 2003/RDP79T009754W1300030001-1 No. 0049/72 26 February 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israelis stage one of biggest re- prisals since 1967 war. (Page 1) MALTA-UK: Mintoff resumes talks in London. (Page 2) CHILE: Military examines possible consequences of termination of US arms sales. (Page 3) SPAIN-USSR: Spanish officials anticipate trade agreement next month. (Page 4) ZAIRE: Mobutu reshuffles cabinet and party politi- calbbureau. (Page 5) BOLIVIA: Nationalist Revolutionary Movement holds irk' st full convention in eight years. (Page 6) PAKISTAN: Devaluation rumors (Page 7) DAHOMEY: Situation following coup attempt (Page 7) THE NETHERLANDS: Metalworkers strike ends (Page 8) SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1 Approved F elease 2003/SEUR RDP79T009 021300030001-1 Israeli Retaliation LEBANO vtlIages =ale SYRIA; AI Mafrag SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21300030001-1 25X1 Approved For,Wease 2003/0Aft ffA f DP79T0097SW21300030001-1 ISRAEL-LEBANON: The two-pronged attack into southern Lebanon yesterday, in retaliation for the death of two Israeli civilians and an Israeli army officer, was one of Israel's biggest punitive op- erations against any Arab country since the 1967 war. A mechanized battalion, augmented by close air support, seized and searched three towns in central southern Lebanon. A number of houses were destroyed and some prisoners taken before the force withdrew. At the same time, the Israelis hit fedayeen bases on the slopes of Mount Hermon with artillery and an es- timated 40-50 aircraft. Fedayeen losses are believed to be high, and the Lebanese Army lost at least one soldier even though it did not directly engage the Israelis. The Israelis suffered no casualties. Lebanese officials are dismayed by the magni- tude of the raids in the face of what they describe as their strenuous efforts to control fedayeen ac- tions. They say they are unable to prevent the fed- ayeen from infiltrating Israeli territory. The Is- raelis publicly claim, with substantial accuracy, that there is an agreement between Beirut and feda- yeen leaders that there will be no firing into Israel from Lebanese territory and that, in return, the Lebanese will grant the fedayeen bases in Lebanon from which the fedayeen can infiltrate into Israel. Acting Prime Minister Yigal Allon said over Jerusalem radio that Israel sees absolutely no difference be- tween the two conditions and that it will continue to take direct action if the Lebanese do not control the terrorists. Beirut has called for a UN Security Council meeting for this morning. With popular pressures building up over the approach of parliamentary elec- tions, this is the least the government can do. Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1 Approved Folease 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00921300030001-1 SECRET 25'X1 L/ZTA-UK: Prime Minister Mintoff will resume negotiations with British Defense Secretary Lord Carrington today prior to meeting with Prime Minis- ter Heath on Monday. At Mintoff's insistence, the British have given assurances of an open agenda and have agreed reluc- tantly to an Italian presence at the talks. Sunday is presently scheduled to be a "day off" to allow the negotiators time to consider today's develop- ments. The British will stand by the final UK-NATO offer of $36.4 million annually, plus bilateral aid, and the allied position on foreign military use of Malta. An agreement still appears possible, how- ever, if both sides show flexibility on bilateral issues, particularly those concerning the terms of local employment. If the talks succeed, Mintoff will have a set- tlement that most Maltese will view as an immense achievement. If the negotiations fail, he will be able to claim that he has made an extra effort and then try to shift the blame for failure to T,ond nn_ Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02130 Approved For Wease 2003/05C$ ,, TP79T0097521300030001-1 CH E: Military officers are studying the pos- sible consequences of a complete break with the US as a source of military equipment, possibly as jus- tification to refuse a Soviet arms offer. Materiel commands of all services reportedly were ordered on 18 February to prepare a detailed study of the ramifications, especially economic, of a total refusal on the part of the US to sell Chile military equipment. The study is to be predicated on the assumption that Chilean acceptance of a re- puted Soviet offer of arms credits would cause the US to react wi an immediate sus- pension of all military sales to Chile. The time limit for the study is not yet known, but the con- clusions are to affect the decision whether to ac- cept the Soviet offer. There is still no confirmation that the Soviet arms credits have been raised I from thel offer ma a as year. Whatever the final amount, the ultimate decision whether to accept the offer has not yet been made. While the military study will be an important fac- tor, the decision will be determined primarily by political considerations. Discussing Chile's surprise decision on 24 February to start overdue payments on its debt to the Kennecott Copper Corporation, a Chilean offi- cial reportedly claimed that the decision was at least partly due to fear of attachment of military funds on deposit in the US for the purchase of US spare parts. This consideration is unlikely to have been a major factor in the decision to pay Kennecott. The reference to it, however, is a sign that the government wishes to keep military links with the US open or to shift the blame for a possible future parts shortage to US rather Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21300030001-1 Approved For Release 2003/0$R"CRIE- DP79T009 021300030001-1 SPAIN-USSR: Spanish Foreign Ministry officials rep'Srtedly are optimistic that agreement will be reached next month on the establishment of trade re- lations with the Soviets. The third round of Spanish-Soviet trade talks, scheduled to begin in Paris on 13 March, may also explore consular relations Efforts to negotiate a commercial- consular agreement in March and July of last year foundered on Moscow's wish for a larger number of personnel for its proposed consulate in Madrid than the Spanish were willing to allow. In keeping with Spain's policy of normalizing relations with all countries, regardless of ideol- ogy, cultural and economic contacts have increased in the last year or two. This has occurred in spite of ideological differences and the residual ill will caused by the USSR's role in the Spanish Civil War. Limited rapprochement also accords with Mos- cow's European detente policy. While the value of trade with the USSR has more than doubled since 1960 to approximately $14 million in 1970, it still amounts to only one per- cent of the total, so that the USSR represents a largely untapped market for Spain's burgeoning ex- ports. One reason for this stagnation has been So- viet recourse to a clearing account arrangement to balance bilateral trade. Spain would prefer that payments be in convertible currencies on a multi- lateral basis, but it is unlikely that the Soviets, given present pressures on their foreign exchange reserves, would agree to more than token payments in hard currency. Spanish-Soviet relations are expected to fol- low the pattern Spain has used in improving rela- tions with Eastern Europe. Hence, the signing of a commercial pact would precede a consular agree- ment and the exchange of consular representatives. Madrid has yet to undertake formal diplomatic rela- tions with an East European country. SECRET Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1 '25X1 25X1 Approved For lease 2003/0~-1C I J DP79T009754Lg21300030001-1 ZAIRE: President Mobutu Sese Seko's current campaign to tighten up his government stems more from a need to increase administrative efficiency than from political reasons. Mobutu announced on 21 February that he had reshuffled his cabinet and the political bureau of the official political party. He replaced six cab- inet ministers, shifted three others, and moved several vice-ministers up to ministerial posts. The new cabinet is stronger than its predecessor in technical and administrative expertise and could be a plus for Mobutu at a time of general economic malaise in Zaire. The reduction in the party political bureau from 35 to 15 members, with seven holdovers, should produce a policy-making body more responsive to Mobutu's drive to forge national unity. Although a number of senior politicians were dropped from the bureau, it now appears to strike a better bal- ance between national and regional interests and to open broader contacts with special groups such as youth and intellectuals. Mobutu also ordered last week that senior cab- inet and party officials, provincial governors, and directors of state enterprises desist from hiring personnel on the basis of family, tribal, and re- gional connections. He informed the officials con- cerned that he would review all appointments. On this issue, however, Mobutu is challenging tradi- tion, and he is likely to meet with widespread foot- 26 6 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1 Approved Foi- Nlease 2003/05D P79T0097 021300030001-1 BO IVIA: The national convention of the Na- tionalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR) got under way in La Paz yesterday despite demands from dis- sidents that it be postponed. It is the full party's first public convention since the overthrow of Victor Paz Estenssoro's gov- ernment in 1964. After almost seven years of inter- nal feuding in opposition, most of the MNR joined with some old enemies, the armed forces and the Falange, to overthrow President Torres last August. The party has since returned to partial power through participation in President Banzer's coali- tion government. The MNR remains Bolivia's only true mass party and the most cohesive political force in the nation after the military. It is still rife with dissen- sion, however, and its precarious unity may be se- verely strained by the convention. Internal con- flicts are ideological, political, generational, and personal. The key figure remains Victor Paz, still the personification of the party and a past master of political intrigue. Whether he leads the party down his chosen path or merely adapts to the pre- vailing winds, it seems fairly certain that Paz Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21300030001-1 Approved For lease 2003/0 ' ftlftr j DP79T009754D21300030001-1 % PAKISTAN: Widespread rumors of an impending currency evaluation have contributed to a ten- percent rise in the price of gold in the last ten days. The rumors stem from the annual visit of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) team to Pakistan. According to press reports, the IMF team has been detailing measures necessary for Islamabad to qual- ify for a standby credit to strengthen its foreign exchange reserves. The IMF for several years has been urging Pakistan to devalue as a means of easing continuing balance of payments problems and correct- ing the misallocation of foreign exchange resources caused by the complicated multiple exchange rate system Pakistan uses in foreign trade. The World Bank and the Aid-to-Pakistan Consortium also have urged devaluation. President Bhutto probably re- alizes that he cannot avoid this step if he hopes to gain needed international aid. DAHOMEY: The ruling civilian triumvirate headed by President Maga remains in power following an attempted coup on 23 February by dissident army officers. The coup move began with an early morning attack on the-army chief of staff, and ended with the negotiated surrender late in the day of rebel- lious elements based in the army camp in Cotonou. Eight junior officers and noncoms were subsequently arrested, but senior officers who probably master- minded the affair so far have not been touched, ap- parently because the government fears provoking further military action. Despite the government's success in defeating this threat, competition for power will continue among Dahomey's military_,~,Lnd civilian factions. (continued) 26 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021300030001-1 Approved For (ease 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975 1021300030001-1 SECRET THE NETHERLANDS: The end of the 17-day-old wildcat strike by socialist metalworkers in Amster- dam and Rotterdam has saved the Biesheuvel govern- ment from breaking with its policy of noninterven- tion, a step that might have disrupted the stabil- ity of the coalition cabinet. In an effort to re- gain control of its restive rank and file, the so- cialist trade union leadership had threatened to ignore the accepted practice of industry-wide bar- gaining and to negotiate directly with individual firms if the workers' demands for increased vacation pay were not met. Because the differences in nego- tiating positions were narrow, the harried union leaders finally agreed to binding arbitration that resulted in a generally favorable settlement that includes an 11.7--percent negotiated wage increase. The settlement represents a blow to the government's battle against inflationary pressures and could set 26 Feb 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin SECRET 25X1 Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02130 030001-1 Approved FQ Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T0097JA021300030001-1 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2003/05/21 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21300030001-1