CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A021400090002-3
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
9
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 23, 2003
Sequence Number:
2
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 16, 1972
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
![]() | 113.68 KB |
Body:
Approved Forlease 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T0097f,Qrb21400090002-3
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
16 March 1972
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A021400090002-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Approve
25X1
25X1
Central Intelligence Bulletin
25X1
CHILE: Allende maneuvers to blunt military opposi-
tion (Page 4)
25X1
25X6
25X1
25X6
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Ap
ILE: President Allende's assiduous attention
to t e military apparently continues to work to his
advantage.
The prospects that the Chilean military will
soon oust Allende are poor,j __f
sev-
eral recent shifts in key military assignments indi-
cate that Allende is ensuring that any coup attempt
would fail.
Allende will also renew his effort to include
at least one top military leader in the cabinet,
Such an appointment would
lend the prestige o ze military to Allende's poli-
cies and blunt potential military opposition but
would not strengthen the cabinet because Chilean
military officers are not well trained in political
and economic matters, as are their Peruvian counter-
parts.
Relations with the military have been a top
priority with Allende since the murder of the army
chief, on the eve of Allende's assumption of power,
rallied the armed forces to their role of defenders
of the constitution. He has flattered them, de-
fended them against critics, raised their pay, and
dealt deftly with their reluctance to be drawn
closely into many aspects of his administration.
Many in the military strongly resent Allende and
his Marxist policies and supporters. It seems cer-
tain, however, that the deep divisions and the inde-
cision now so apparent among all Chileans are re-
flected in the armed forces. Nevertheless, if the
power struggle n ht and left soon develops
into violence, the military
a
and police will har be a =e to avoi taking
and
Central Intelligence Bulletin 4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090
b02-3 25X1
25X6
25X1
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 8
25X1
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
25X1 Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3
25X1
Approved Fojelease 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79TO09 021400090002-3
Top Secret
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2003/08/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO21400090002-3