CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79T00975A021400110001-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
10
Document Creation Date:
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date:
October 8, 2003
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 18, 1972
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP79T00975A021400110001-1.pdf | 322.56 KB |
Body:
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Secret
N2 41
18 March 1972
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SECRET
No. 0067/72
18 March 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CHILE: Military leaders may seek Soviet noncombat
equipment. (Page 1)
USSR-GREECE-CYPRUS: Assessment of Soviet policy.
(Page 2)
TUNISIA: Crisis brewing over presidential succes-
sion. (Page 3)
ZAIRE: Government continues efforts to control
Catholic Church. (Page 4)
ISRAEL-LEBANON: New incident could lead to reprisal
(Page 5)
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CHILE: The chiefs of the armed services may
try to use proffered Soviet military credits to ac-
quire useful but noncombat equipment.
President Allende recently summoned the three
service commanders to discuss the acquisition of
Soviet equipment, according to a source of the US
defense attache. All gave reasons for not utilizing
a reported $300-million offer of Soviet military
credit. The navy chief added, however, that a So-
viet hydrographic vessel would be acceptable; the
air force and army commanders said that they could
use telecommunications equipment and vehicles.
The choices were based, the source reports, on the
commanders' desire to avoid sending Chileans to the
USSR for training or accepting Soviet advisers.
They have similar objections, he added, to accepting
the Soviet Komar and Osa missile patrol boats that
the Cubans and Soviets are urging on the Chileans.
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Although Allende wants to weaken Chilean mili-
tary ties with the West, he is concerned, as are
the military chiefs, over the implications of Chil-
ean acceptance of Soviet military aid. If the com-
manders themselves can settle on noncombat equip-
ment to utilize some of the Soviet offer, both the
President and the military might find this an ac-
ceptable wa t 1 as for the
i i
18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 1
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USSR-GREECE-CYPRUS: The USSR has resorted to
a modest level poetical and propaganda pressure
against Athens in reaction to Greek demands on Arch-
bishop Makarios but wants to avoid direct involve-
ment.
Since the Greek ultimatum to Makarios on 11
February, Soviet Ambassador Levychkin has made three
calls on the Greek Foreign Ministry to stress Mos-
cow's concern. On each occasion, however, Levychkin
claimed that he was speaking on his own initiative
and not under instructions from Moscow. He avoided
even implied threats of Soviet intervention. In
his most recent demarche of 6 March, the Soviet am-
bassador first raised another matter and then turned
to a discussion of Cyprus. On his two earlier visits,
Levychkin appeared more concerned with the US-Greek
home-port arrangements than with Cyprus.
Soviet press statements, however, reflect Mos-
cow's concern over the viability of an independent
Cyprus. These statements have connected Athens'
pressure on Makarios.with the establishment of a
"base" in Greece for the US Sixth Fleet. The So-
viets waited more than two weeks to comment on the
homeporting arrangement and then timed their reac-
tion to coincide with the Greek demarche.
Makarios has not sought either Soviet or local
Communist assistance. Nevertheless, the Soviets
are uncomfortable about these developments and feel
obligated to take up the cudgels for the Archbishop.
Moscow continues to favor an independent and non-
aligned Cyprus. It wants the removal of British
bases on the island and fears the incorporation of
Cyprus into NATO by some form of enosis. The So-
viets will continue to apply cautious pressure on
Greece and, if the situation worsens, will probably
encourage Makarios to take the issue to the Secu-
rity Council where the Soviet UN representative is
serving as president for the month of March.
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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TUNISIA: A governmental crisis is brewing over
the issue of presidential succession.
President Bourguiba has changed his
and now is disinclined to create the post
mind
of
again
vice
president
which he first proposed nearly
two
years
ago.
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A joint meeting of the council of ministers
and the political bureau of the ruling Destourian
Socialist Party, chaired by Bourguiba on 14 March,
adjourned without agreeing on a solution to the
succession issue, which has dominated Tunisian pol-
itics for more than two years. The President's
equivocation has generated serious conflicts in the
ruling circles of both government and party. Bour-
guiba and Prime Minister Hedi Nouira are reported
to be in profound disagreement, and there are per-
sistent rumors that several ministers, including
Nouira himself, have threatened to resign.
Bourguiba probably will be able to secure ac-
ceptance of the succession formula he prefers, but
this may be achieved at the cost of greater divi-
sions and dissatisfaction with his leadership.
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ZAIRE: The government continues to press its
effor to gain political control over the Catholic
Church.
The political bureau of the official party re-
cently reconfirmed President Mobutu Sese Seko's
tough stance against the Church by issuing a strong
statement calling for chapters of the party youth
wing to be installed in all seminaries by 1 April.
Seminaries failing to comply will be closed and
their bishops will be subject to "legal action."
According to local press reports, chapters have now
been installed in various small seminaries around
the country. The political bureau also upheld the
closure of the Church's major seminary in Kinshasa
and the charges against Cardinal Malula, presently
"on consultation" at the Vatican following a clash
with Mobutu earlier this year.
The statement from the political bureau was a
swift response to petitions presented to Mobutu
last week by the Council of Bishops. The petitions
expressed support for Malula and reaffirmed the
Church's refusal to allow party youth chapters in
seminaries. The bishops argued that political or-
ganizations have no business in centers of theolog-
ical study.
The party's pronouncement amounts to a final
rejection of the bishops' position and makes clear
that the issue is not subject to negotiation. The
government long has suspected the Church, hereto-
fore an independent institution, of being a source
of social agitation and believes that it must be
brought under government direction. Although some
members of the clergy, particularly the foreign
priests, are likely to continue resisting govern-
ment pressures, united opposition seems im rob-
18 Mar 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: The landmine explosion in
northern Israel on 16 March that killed two Israeli
soldiers and wounded five was the second such inci-
dent since last month's four-day search-and-destroy
attack on fedayeen bases in southern Lebanon. The
Israelis are investigating to determine if the mine
was planted by infiltrators from Lebanon. If Tel
Aviv decides this is the case, retaliation could
occur. Fedayeen targets in Lebanon were last hit
on 9 March, following rocket attacks on Israeli bor-
der settlements,
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LEBANON; Hermon
S R AE L'
1 .
Bet
She'an
Landmine explosion
kills two Israelis salad.
Haifa
f N,.
I Dan'
Al t(Oaytirah
S'"\RIA
HEIGHTS ' /
D A N
EST:9ANK
Tel Aviv-Yafo
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