CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A021800060002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: May 4, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Top Secret
c 2,j 7
4 May 1972
State Department review completed
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May 19/2
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: Some government leaders are ready to adopt
more radical policies. (Page 8)
USSR-JAPAN: Moscow is studying disposition of
southern Kuriles. (Page 9)
MALAYSIA-USSR: Prime Minister Razak will visit Mos-
cow. (Page 10)
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BANGLADESH: Mujib resumes public activities (Page 13)
LIBYA: Negotiations with British Petroleum (Page 14)
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CHILE: Some important leaders of the govern-
ment coalition may be ready to adopt more radical
policies.
There has been rising concern among both Com-
munist and Socialist Party leaders over the steady
erosion of public support for the government. Their
dissatisfaction has focused increasingly on Presi-
dent Allende since the first of the year. Their
resentment over his high-handedness is beginning
to override their deep differences over how fast
Chile should be converted into a socialist state.
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There is growing evidence that Communist
leaders, noted for their shrewd political judgment,
are reevaluating the cautious approach they have
long promoted. Their chief concern is the deep
inroads being made by the extremist Movement of
the Revolutionary Left (MIR) into the Communist
Party's role as champion of the lower classes.
Party leaders are particularly determined to
.fight the MIR's growing control among labor. and
youth in the propaganda media, and they appear
prepared to take a more radical position in this
effort. F_ I
4 May 72
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USSR-JAPAN: Soviet leaders reportedly are
considering how to handle the "Northern Territories"
question in future peace treaty negotiations with
Japan.
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Foreign Minister Gromy os trip to Tokyo ast an-nce
uary, public lecturers in the USSR have been saying
that the status of the islands will be discussed in
peace treaty talks with the Japanese.
There are varying reports of what specific
concessions Moscow may be prepared to grant. Some
Russians have hinted that Moscow might return two
of the four disputed islands; others have talked
of the return of all four. Soviet officials have
also suggested that Japan might be satisfied with
some formula by which Tokyo obtained de facto con-
trol while Moscow retained final sovereignty.
Meanwhile, Moscow and Tokyo are exploring the
nature of peace treaty talks, which seem likely to
begin later this year. Moscow may hope its signs
of flexibility on the key issue of the northern
territories will encourage reciprocal concessions
from the Japanese. Japanese Foreign Minister
Fukuda, for example, recently suggested that Japan
would consider demilitarization of the islands if
they were returned. If Moscow decides to negotiate
settlement of the territorial question, it would
undoubtedly seek to drive a hard bargain that might
include a provision such as Fukuda suggested, or
other political and economic concessions such as a
firm Japanese financial commitment to Siberian
develo ment.
4 May 72
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MALAYSIA-USSR: Prime Minister Razak's accept-
ance of an invitation to visit Moscow next fall un-
derlines Kuala Lumpur's desire to maintain a bal-
anced foreign policy.
Razak evidently believes that a trip to the
Soviet Union will help balance increased Malaysian
commercial and cultural contacts with China and
will allay the fears of Malaysia's Southeast Asian
neighbors that it might rush into an exchange of
trade or diplomatic missions with Peking.
Both Razak and Soviet officials will want to
discuss the problem of security in Asia in the con-
text of the Soviet proposal for collective security
and Malaysia's proposal for the neutralization of
Southeast Asia. As yet, none of the great powers
has endorsed the neutrality concept, which was ac-
cepted as a desirable objective by members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations at a meeting
last November. Moscow can also be expected to raise
the issue of the Malacca Strait and to reiterate its
objections to the recent Indonesian-Malaysian an-
nouncement that proclaimed the strait as territorial
waters.
The Soviets probably will also use the occasion
to press their offers of foreign aid for Malaysian
development projects. Razak has displayed only luke-
warm interest toward previous Soviet offers but has
agreed to a Soviet feasibility study for a large
flood-control project in Malaysia's relatively under-
developed east coast area. Kuala Lumpur's desire to
retain its favorable trade relationship with Moscow,
a major purchaser of Malaysian rubber, will undoubt-
edly influence Razak's final decision on Soviet aid.
The Malaysian leaders recognize Indonesia's
sensitivity on the subject of Communist influence
in Southeast Asia, and Razak will undoubtedly seek
to reassure President Suharto, when they meet this
week in Djakarta, that he understands the "perils"
of working with Communist powers. Razak approaches
the matter of Soviet aid with great caution, and he
doubtless will ensure that any technical assistance
agreement narrowly restricts the range of Soviet
operations and the number of personnel allowed in
Malaysia,
4 May 72
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NOTES
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BANGLADESH: Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman ap-
parently is resuming a more active schedule after
health problems in mid-April reportedly caused a re-
duction in his public activities. Mujib has partici-
pated in several recent party and cabinet meetings,
and on 1 May he appeared on Bangladesh radio and
television to describe government relief efforts and
a new program of bonuses and benefits for low-income
farmers and government workers. A week earlier, the
prime mi
i
t
n
s
er was interviewed in Dacca b
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4 May 72
(continued)
Central Intelligence Bulletin 13
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LIBYA: The government may soon begin negotia-
tions with British Petroleum (BP) on compensation
for its nationalized interests in Libya. Libya, ap-
parently anxious to get out from under the legal
cloud BP has effectively imposed on producing and
marketing the "hot" oil, has asked the company to
send a high-level representative to Cairo. The ap-
proach to BP also suggests that Deputy Premier Jal-
lud's trip to the USSR and Eastern Europe in.March
was unsuccessful in solving the marketing problems.
Libya, however, will soon send a delegation to Mos-
cow to discuss implementation of the economic and
technical assistance aareeme t signed in early March
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(continued)
4 May 72
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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