CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022100040001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 13, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
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No. 0141/72
13 June 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page I)
USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: Podgorny to visit Hanoi.
(Page 5)
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: Tough French position dims
prospects for EC summit. (Page 6)
URUGUAY: Bordaberry announces coalition government.
(Page 8)
ZAIRE-CONGO-ANGOLA: Reconciliation between major
insurgent groups likely to have little practical
effect. (Page 9)
BURMA: Sharp cut in rice export earnings. (Page 11)
JAPAN: Seamen's strike (Page 12)
JAPAN: Portion of new economic program to be d
layed (Page 12)
CAMBODIA--A review of post-election prospects
(Page 13)
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(VIETNAM: North Vietnam appears to be embarked
on a major effort to ensure overland resupply from
China.
Preliminary analysis of photography taken on
6 and 7 June shows trenching for a seven-mile pipe-
line between Ping-h'siang in China and Dong Dang
in North Vietnam. Forty storage tanks are being
added to the 50 now at Ping-h'siang, increasing
storage capacity there to 3,600 tons. Pipe seg-
ments observed between Dong Dang and Kep indicate
that the new construction is related to the pre-
viously observed construction to extend the Hanoi-
Haiphong pipeline from Hai Duong to Kep.
A North Vietnamese Foreign Ministry statement
on 10 June reiterated the appeals for stronger in-
ternational support that Hanoi has been making since
the step-up of US bombing in mid-April. It asserted
that the regime, while deeply grateful for previous
assistance, "appeals to its brothers and friends in
the world to struggle even move vigorously and in
an even more timely manner to stay the bloody hands
of the US imperialists."
On 12 June, Peking issued a strong Foreign
Ministry statement on Vietnam, apparently in re-
sponse to Hanoi's latest appeal. The statement
links bombing of areas "close.to the'Sino-Vietnam-
ese borders" as a threat to Chinese security--a
reference the Chinese have avoided since the allied
incursion into Laos in March 1971. The statement
also labels US military actions in North Vietnam
"grave provocations against the Chinese people"
and reiterates the "resolute support" of the Chi-
nese people and government for Hanoi's cause, noting
that "China and Vietnam are neighbors closely re-
lated like the lips and teeth"--formulations that
Peking has employed--but rarely--within the past
six months. The statement concludes by noting that 3
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C"US imperialism should know that the heroic peoples
of Vietnam and other Indochinese countries are by
no means alone in their struggle." This phraseology
has never previously appeared in Chinese expressions
of support for North Vietnam.
This is Peking's strongest statement in support
of Hanoi since the intensification of fighting in
Vietnam, but it commits the Chinese to no particular
course of action. They have clearly delimited the
area of their primary concern to the Sino-Vietnamese
border, while at the same time moving some way to
assuage North Vietnamese feelings, publicly ex-
pressed in Hanoi's statement of 10 June. This For
eign Ministry statement, coupled with Peking's dec-
laration at the UN environmental conference at
Stockholm over the weekend, represents a general
hardening of the public Chinese position on the
fighting in Indochina. Peking's propaganda posture,
nonetheless, still remains at a somewhat lower level
than during the Laos incursion, considerably lower
than in 1965 when operation Rolling Thunder first
got under way, and generally neither overly provoca-
tive nor bellicose.
Communist forces in South Vietnam are maintain-
ing heavy pressure on government positions in the
northern Mekong Delta area, particularly in Dinh
Tuong and Kien Tuong provinces.
At An Loc, South Vietnamese Army troops have
retaken the northwestern section of the city, leav-
ing only one pocket of resistance within the town.
At least two regiments of the Communist 9th Divi-
sion--the 95C and the 272nd--have been confirmed
as still operating in the An Loc area. Prisoners
indicate that both have taken heavy casualties,
and one captured on 9 June says his regiment--the
95C--has now received orders to "leave the area."
(continued)
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unis torces in the Area around Saigon are
planning to attack various targets in and around
the city, including Tan Son Nhut air base during
June in the hope of isolating the capital. Although
the disposition of these forces suggests that they
currently pose little direct threat to Saigon,
small-scale actions such as road interdictions, ter-
rorism, and shellings are well within their capa-
bilities. Moreover, the enemy's attacks elsewhere
in Military Region 3 have served to disrupt pacifi-
cation and divert troops from the defense of Saigon,
increasing the temptation for the Communists to try
to harass the capital itself.
The government is aware of this situation and
is taking steps to improve the capital's defenses.
The National Police are augmenting police forces
throughout the city and instituting more intensive
screening procedures to prevent the infiltration
of weapons and supplies. On the city's outskirts,
Regional Force units are patrolling along known in-
filtration routes and in areas frequently used by
the Communists for rocket attacks, and the regional
units may soon take on a pacification role in order
to strengthen government control in rural areas
around Saigon.
13 Jun 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 4
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USSR - NORTH VIETNAM: Soviet President Podgorny
will arrive in Hanoi on 14 June for a three-day visit,
Moscow undoubtedly sees a need to reassure
the
North Vietnamese following the summit meeting.
The
Soviet decision to receive President
Nixon after
the
mining of North Vietnam's ports did
not go down well
in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese will
want to discuss
ways of getting supplies through as
well as the USSR's
lukewarm endorsement of their current offensive.
Soviet media coverage of this offensive has been
even more sparse than that of previous offensives,
and the Soviet readers have been given a fairly ac-
curate picture of the problems Hanoi faces in pur-
suit of its goals. The North Vietnamese probably
resent this veiled skepticism about their prospects
and the USSR's repeated public statements that nego-
tiations are the best way to resolve conflicts.
Under the circumstances, the visit is likely
to be difficult. The Soviets will probably attempt
to reassure the Vietnamese but will have trouble do-
ing so effectively. The Soviets are likely to cite
their efforts to secure Chinese cooperation regard-
ing sea shipments to Hanoi as evidence that the
USSR has not abandoned the Vietnamese, and they will
probably be amenable to any North Vietnamese sug-
gestions on new approaches to the Chinese to secure
their cooperation in getting Soviet supplies to
North Vietnam. At the same time, however, the So-
viets are likely to reiterate their view that nego-
tiations offer the Vietnamese as many advantages as
fighting, and they probably will urge the Vietnam-
ese to explore the latest US peace proposals.
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EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: France's hard-nosed
position on the preparations for the summit of the
Ten next October has raised new doubts about how
much a meeting is likely to achieve.
When Belgian Prime Minister Eyskens visited
Paris earlier this month, President Pompidou pub-
licly warned that France might be unwilling to host
the summit unless Pompidou could be sure it would
result in solid achievements. The warning was cou-
pled with unusually brusque treatment of the Bel-
gians. This apparently was intended to convince
them and France's other present and prospective EC
partners that Paris wants to avoid what the French
feel are sterile debates over reform of community
institutions and that Paris believes the summit
should concentrate on progress in such areas as
economic and monetary union. Pompidou also insisted
that Paris be the site for any new secretariat for
the community's political consultations.
France's attitude probably is motivated in part
by internal political factors, including the dis-
appointing results of the referendum in April and
Pompidou's falling in popularity polls. Neverthe-
less, the posture also reflects traditional French
negotiating tactics and chagrin that the British,
in particular, have taken a more "community-minded"
stance than the French had counted on.
The French argue that firm institutional struc-
tures should be avoided until experience has been
gained in dealing with specific problems. They are
loath to see any real strengthening of community in-
stitutions at this time. Location of the political
secretariat in Paris, moreover, is intended to en-
sure that European cooperation will remain on two
separate tracks--with economic integration in the
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Communities kept rigidly separate from foreign pol-
icy coordination in the mechanism for political con-
sultation. In short, while France calls for a
strong, independent Europe, it is unwilling to give
it the requisite powers.
The other EC members and candidates have so far
reacted calmly and with at least an initial show of
firmness to what one British official has called
Pompidou's "blustery tactics." Although most of
France's partners may be willing to settle for only
modest institutional improvements at the summit meet-
ing itself, they believe that further movement to-
ward economic integration has political and insti-
tutional consequences which must be faced.
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URUGUAY: President Bordaberry has reshuffled
his cabinet to form a coalition government of Col-
orados and opposition Blancos.
On 9 June Bordaberry named Blancos as ministers
of commerce, labor, and transportation. This an-
nouncement constitutes a significant victory for
the president, who has been seeking a national ac-
cord with the Blancos since taking office on 1 March.
Although the coalition does not include the largest
Blanco faction, headed by Wilson Ferreira, the ac-
cord gives Bordaberry a slim legislative majority
in return for his promise to move toward major re-
forms in agriculture, industry, banking, and educa-
tion.
Meanwhile, the government continues to score
unprecedented successes in its aggressive drive
against the Tupamaros. During the past two months,
combined police and military units have captured
over 300 terrorists and seized important Tupamaro
arms caches and strongholds.._ The effectiveness
of Bordaberry's new coalition will be measured,
however, by the fate of his draft security legisla-
tion, which is intended to replace the state of
internal war that expires on 30 June. The presi-
dent's security proposal has been the focus of major
controversy between the Blancos and Colorados, and
a compromise solution is currently being sought in
the Congress.
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ZAIRE-CONGO-ANGOLA: A reconciliation in prin-
ciple between the two major Angolan liberation move-
ments, reached during a meeting last week in Brazza-
ville, is not likely to take on much substance.
The meeting, initiated by Congolese President
Ngouabi, included Zaire President Mobutu Sese Seko
and the presidents of the Brazzaville-supported Pop-
ular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
and the Zaire-based Revolutionary Government of
Angola in Exile (GRAE). The MPLA reluctantly agreed
in principle to Mobutu's proposal that it move its
political and military headquarters into Zaire and
that it operate from there along with GRAS. The
MPLA has operated out of Brazzaville and Zambia.
Mobutu, long distrustful of the Communist-ori-
ented MPLA, rejected its request for free passage
of men and equipment through his country. He em-
phasized that his government would restrict MPLA
movements and would require detailed information
regarding its plans and operations.
the participants
agreed to ask the current session of the Organiza-
tion of African Unity to appoint a commission to
make specific recommendations for implementing the
agreement.
A solid working agreement seems highly unlikely,
however. Mutual distrust between the leadership of
the two organizations runs strong. Moreover, Holden
Roberto, the president of GRAE, still has not com-
pletely reasserted himself following a mutiny ear-
lier this year by his military staff that was put
down by Zairian troops. Roberto will not accept
terms that might give the MPLA an opportunity to
exploit his tenuous control over his organization.
The MPLA is not likely to accept the strict condi-
tions imposed by Mobutu.
(continued)
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Only Mobutu and Ngouabi are likely to derive
any benefit from this reconciliation attempt. Both
leaders will use the meeting to enhance their im-
ages as African nationalists at the OAU, which it-
self is becoming increasingly frustrated with the
disunity of African nationalist movements.
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BURMA: A sharp decline in government procure-
ment may cut rice export earnings by about 50 per-
cent this year.
Burma had a relatively good harvest this year,
but the government is having its usual trouble buy-
ing rice. Farmers can earn up to 50 percent more
selling rice on the black market. Sales to cooper-
atives, newly authorized by the government in a move
to liberalize the rice trade, will probably not re-
duce black marketing since cooperatives are required
to buy at the government price.
Rice exports may total only about 400,000 tons
this year, compared with 880,000 tons last year when
stocks were drawn down to meet export commitments.
Rice stocks now are depleted, and Burma has had to
refuse some customers for the first time in a num-
ber of years. Despite a slight improvement in world
rice prices, the value of rice exports, Burma's ma-
jor source of foreign exchange earnings, probably
will fall to about half of the level of recent years.
Even with severe restrictions on imports, Ran-
goon's trade deficit probably will worsen this year,
and foreign reserves will decline. Burma held only
about $52 million in foreign reserves in early May
compared with about $150 million two years ago.
Rangoon is seeking loans from a number of countries
and international organizations to finance necessary
imports and to obtain development funds.
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JAPAN: The two-month old seamen's strike is
beginning to affect the nation's foreign trade.
The greatest effects were felt last week when the
All Japanese Seamen's Union called for a seven-
day total work stoppage on ocean-going ships. Un-
til then the strike was primarily aimed at coastal
shipping activity, although union members were boy-
cotting night loading and unloading operations on
ocean-going vessels. Workers also have been re-
fusing to handle container ships and tankers. Al-
though no trade data are yet available for May,
the strike is causing a slowdown in Japanese ship-
ments to the US and other markets and is interfering
with the flow of imports. If a sustained work
stoppage on ocean-going traffic occurs, the Japa-
nese Government probably will place strong pressure
on the union and shipping lines to reach some a ree-
ment. F
JAPAN: Enactment of legislation for the new
economic program probably will be delayed until at
least September because of the backlog of bills in
the Diet, which ends its session Friday. Existing
legislation, however, will allow the government to
proceed with some parts of the program, such as the
encouragement of orderly export marketing and the
easing of import restrictions. Efforts to reduce
foreign exchange holdings of $16 billion will not
be seriously hurt, in part because of earlier gov-
ernment measures liberalizing the outflow of capi-
tal. The delay will temporarily prevent the gov-
ernment from making direct loans to Japanese firms
for developing overseas raw materials and from in-
creasing the funds for Japan's Export-Import Bank.
It also will affect plans for depositing an addi-
tional $1.5 billion of foreign exchange in commer-
cial banks.
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CAMBODIA--A Review of Post-election Prospects
Although the results of the presidential elec-
tion on 4 June fell short of Lon Nol's expectations,
the outcome appears to augur well for Cambodia's
short-term political stability. The government
engaged in just enough skulduggery to ensure Lon
Nol's election, but it stopped short of manipulating
the lopsided victory Lon Nol wanted but could not
win honestly. The result is that opposition ele-
ments cannot make a strong case for foul play, the
students are quiescent, and the election has received
favorable treatment in the international press. More-
over, Lon Nol's claim to legitimacy is enhanced. He
can now counter Sihanouk's assertion that the royal
government was illegally deposed by citing victory
in an open and honest election as the legal basis
for his rule.
On the other hand, the narrowness of his vic-
tory exposes the fragility of Lon Nol's hold on the
Cambodian people. In Cambodia 25X6
Lon o s
55 percent o the vote comes close to being a re-
pudiation. In the populous and politically sophis-
ticated Phnom Penh area, Lon Nol ran well behind
his chief challenger, In Tam. Lon Nol almost cer-
tainly did poorly among the country's students and
intellectuals, who have been particularly upset
over his authoritarian style and over his failure
to crack down on widespread corruption in the gov-
ernment and armed forces. He lost the votes of many
civil servants and even some foot soldiers who have
been hit hard by rising prices. Primarily, however,
Lon Nol has been vulnerable to the complaints of
Cambodians in all walks of life that he is respon-
sible for the war and for the government's failure
to defeat the Communists and end the fighting.
(continued)
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Many Cambodians obviously are drawing invidious
comparisons between conditions under Lon Nol and
those under Sihanouk. This is demonstrated by the
remarkable 21 percent of the vote won by Keo An, a
political nonentity who had no money and did little
campaigning. Keo An's main attraction was his prom-
ise to allow Sihanouk to return to Cambodia. The
significance of his showing will not be lost on
Khmer Communists, who continue to exploit the Prince's
name for their own ends. At the same time, this also
serves to harden the determination of Lon Nol and
others not to accept any settlement with the Com-
munists calling for Sihanouk's return.
The election also has further enhanced the po-
litical power of the military. Until recently, the
country's senior military leaders have eschewed na-
tional-level politics. In this election, however,
they openly campaigned for Lon Nol, and if it had
not been for the large military vote they delivered,
Lon Nol might have been forced into an embarrassing
runoff election, or even been defeated. As a re-
sult, Lon Nol is now more dependent on the support
of his military colleagues. In addition, the gen-
erals' statements critical of In Tam during the
campaign indicate that they intend to exercise a
veto over who rules Cambodia after Lon Nol is gone.
With the military solidly behind Lon Not, the
prospects for political stability in the short run
appear good. Significant battlefield defeats could
cause the military once again to question Lon Nol's
leadership, but major reverses are not expected in
the next four months or so. The rainy season will
impair the Communists' mobility, and North Viet-
namese main force units will most likely either
remain preoccupied in South Vietnam, or will be in
no condition to undertake a major offensive in
Cambodia.
(continued)
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ILon Nol's choice of a vice-
president assumes considerable importance. In the
event Lon Nol has a second, possibly fatal, stroke,
whoever holds that office will have an edge over
any rival claimant for power. Lon Not has not in-
dicated whom he intends to appoint as his deputy.
Prior to the election he offered the post to Sirik
Matak, who turned it down, in part because he mis-
trusts the reliability of Lon Nol's support for
him. However, in view of Matak's evident desire
to remain in politics, he may reconsider if Lon Nol
renews the offer. Matak seems to have more support
among the military than any other successor now on
the horizon and, if he were vice- resident 25X1
he would stand a
good chance of taking over. First Minister Son Ngoc
Thanh is another possibility, but he is closely as-
sociated with the South Vietnamese, and it is doubt-
ful that he has the adroitness and forcefulness to
whip his opponents into line. In Tam, who would
command support among civilian elements in Phnom
Penh, is apparently unacceptable to the military,
and the military itself may put forth someone like
Defense Minister Sak Sutsakhan as a candidate. At 25X1
this juncture, however, events have not reached a
point where the principal actors themselves have
thought through the possibilities.
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