CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022300040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 11, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
~1tC'HIV~~L RECO.~D
~~~~~~ ARC,HIV~URN TO
SJ~
11 July 1972
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No. 0165/72
11 July 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
CHINA-INDOCHINA: Peking looks favorably on Vietnam
negotiations. (Page 3)
PAKISTAN: Rioting unlikely to threaten national
sta- bbl y. (Page 5)
USSR-SYRIA: Asad is warmly received. (Page 7)
PHILIPPINES: Marcos wins victory in campaign to
retain power beyond 1973. (Page 9)
ISRAEL:. Mrs. Meir compromises to avert coalition
showdown. (Page 10)
ARGENTINA: Lanusse suspends Peronist labor confed-
eration. (Page 11)
CHILE: Opposition and government maneuvering for
elections. (Page 12)
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VgE?I'NAM: F:..ghting has slackened around Quang
Tri Ci qty
th Vietnamese airborne elements are still
in the southwestern section of the city, but their
further advance has been delayed by artillery at-
tacks and the ~ae11-entrenched Communist defenders.
Other airborne forces south of the city have also
been subjected to shelling attacks, and mar~.ne
units t?~the east and northeast report .light ground
contacts
?, P.~t.on elsewhere has been light, except, in the
northern Mekong Delta where heavy fighting continues
in Dinh Tuong .Province. Enemy troops entered Long
Dinh, eight miles went of the provinc^al capital at
My Tho and attacked the district. headquarters there.
The region commander believes that this action to-
gether with the Communists' efforts to clear the
area around their nearby Base Area ~7Q are designed
to draw government forces away from border areas in
Cambodia and to open inf.-Lt.ration corridors to the
delta:
xuan Thug, North Vietnam's chief negotiator,
arrived i.n Paris yesterday amid further a,ndications
that the Communists will stick to their standard
negotiating demands .n the first of the new public
sessions on ThursdayT At an airport press confer-
ence, Thuy condemned US bombing and reaffirmed
Hanoi's commitment to the Viet Cong's seven points,
but he asserted that the Commun~.sts would "gladly
examine any new proposals from the US," 1n other
recent statements, Communist spokesmen have been
adhering to a hard line on negotiations, calling
ll Jul.. 72 G'entral Intelligence Bulletin 1
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for an end of the US bombing and mining and re-
jecting the possibility of a cease-fire without a
political solution, Thuy also indicated that Le
Duc Tho, chief adviser to North Vietnam's nego-
tiating team, would be returnina to Paris, but he
did not specify a time.
11 Ju 1 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHINA-INDOCHINA: Peking appears to be hinting
that the time or a negotiated settlement of the
war has come.
In a banquet speech to a visiting Yemen (Aden)
delegation on 9 July, Chou En-lai, citing recent
developments in Korea, Japan, and the Indian sub-
continent, claimed that the demand for reasonable
settlement of mutual disputes had become "an irre-
sistible trend" throughout the world. This empha-
sis on reasonableness and mutual accommodation was
also apparent in an NCNA article on 6 July comment-
ing on President Nixon's recent news conference.
The article stated that it was still necessary to
see "whether the US Government is prepared to end
the Vietnam war through negotiations" without spec-
ifying that Washington must follow Hanoi's negoti-
ating scenario to achieve this end.
Chinese propaganda remains strongly critical
of US actions in Indochina and continues to demand
that the US withdraw rapidly and completely from
the peninsula. On the political issues involved
in a possible settlement, however, Peking comment
is far more ambiguous--as it has been for some time.
The NCNA article on the President's news conference,
for example, set forth Hanoi's position on this
thorny question in reasonable and nonpolemical terms,
but carefully refrained from endorsing the North
Vietnamese view.
Chou En-lai's speech to the visiting Yemenis
was even more intriguing with respect to the polit-
ical issue. Although he called in standard general-
ized terms for a cessation of US support to Presi-
dent Thieu, Cambodian President Lon Nol, and the
"Laotian rightists" as well as for a US military
withdrawal from Indochina, Chou pointed out that the
recent agreement between the North and South Koreans
and the Indian-Pakistani accord on partial troop
withdrawal had been reached without the "superpowers'
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control and interference." A People's Daily edito-
rial of 8 July on the Korean nego is ions ma es a
similar point.
This hint that Peking sees advantages in polit-
ical talks between Hanoi and Saigon without direct
US participation strongly suggests that China may
be urging North Vietnam to look again at the US
proposal for an immediate cease-fire followed by an
eventual political settlement to be worked out di-
rectly by the two Vietnamese parties.
11 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PAKISTAN: Rioting in Karachi and other cities
in Sind Province is unlikely to threaten the sta-
bility of the national government, but the language
issue that sparked the unrest will be a continuing
problem for local authorities.
Urdu speakers took to the streets shortly after
the Sind provincial legislature on 7 July passed a
bill making Sindhi the official provincial, language.
Parts of Karachi--where about half the people are
Urdu speakers--were placed under curfew on 9 July,
but this proved ineffective. Yesterday the curfew
was extended to the entire city and police were
told to shoot to kill violators. Troops have been
called in, and ver 40 people have been killed in
the province. President Bhutto, who met with both
Sindhi and Urdu speaking leaders, has appointed a
four-member cabinet committee to seek a solution to
the language conflict.
Security. forces believe the situation is wors-
ening, but presently expect to be able to lift the
curfew in two or three days. The government's
security efforts presumably have the backing of
the Sindhi-speaking majority in the, province. This
language issue is confined to the Sind and the vio-
lence is unlikely to spread to other provinces.
Urdu--the mother tongue of only 7.6 percent
of the Pakistanis but the most widely read language--
is the official language of the country and of three
of the four provinces. In these provinces; where few
speak Urdu as a first language, it is generally
thought of in literary terms as a lingua franca.
Most Urdu speakers--primarily immigrants from
India in 1947--live in the cities of the Sind, and
Sindhi speakers have long believed these refugees
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held a disproportionate share of power in the prov-
ince. President Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party
draws most of its support in the Sind, Bhutto's
hame province, from Sindhi-speakers. Since coming
to power the party has sought to enhance the status
of Sindhis at the ex ense of the refugees.
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USSR-SYRIA: Syrian President al-Asad's four-
day visit to the USSR reflected the gradually warming
atmosphere between Moscow and Damascus.
The only agreements signed during the visit
concerned economic matters, including the estab-
lishment of a bilateral commission for economic
and technical cooperation. A Soviet Foreign Min-
istry official had remarked before the visit that
the talks would concentrate on economic affairs,
and the Syrian delegation was comprised primarily
of economic officials. The USSR, Syria's chief
source of capital for economic development, pro-
vides credits for railroad construction, petroleum
exploration, and several smaller projects. A
$133-million credit was extended in 1966 for con-
struction of the Euphrates Dam, which is proceeding
at peak levels with more than 1,000 Soviet tech-
nicians.
The Soviets reportedly have been pressing a
reluctant Damascus for a friendship treaty. The
Syrians were highly critical of the Soviet-Iraqi
friendship treaty, but its signing in April in-
creased the pressure on Damascus to accede to such
an agreement as well. Moscow's interest in a treaty
with Damascus may be shown in the communique that
records Soviet-Syrian readiness to expand coopera-
tion and to "continue consultations...at various
levels on all important international questions."
Unlike documents signed with Egypt and Iraq,
the Soviet-Syrian communique failed to condemn
"anti-communism and anti-Sovietism." Instead, the
Syrians agreed to language calling for the "con-
sistent struggle against any attempts aimed at
undermining friendship and cooperation between
11 Jul 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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socialist countries and Arab states." The com-
muniqu,e did not mention the Confederation of Arab
Republics, which has never received Moscow's en-
dorsement. There was, moreover, no reference to
UN Security Council resolution 242, which calls
for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist
and Israel's return of the terri s it occupied
in 1967.
11 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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PHILIPPINES: President Marcos has won an im-
portant victory in his campaign to retain political
power beyond~1973, but some significant hurdles
still remain.
On 7 July, the constitutional convention, which
was organized last year, voted to replace the presi-
dential system with a parliamentary form. Marcos
favors such a system because it will circumvent the
two-term limitation under the present constitution.
Marcos also believes he could more easily be elected
prime minister by the legislature than president in
a nationwide contest.
The margin of victory in the crucial vote in-
dicates that Marcos is still in control of the con-
stitutional convention despite the recent political
scandals over the bribing of delegates by agents of
Marcos. While pushing through adoption of the par-
liamentary form, Marcos forces defeated opposition
efforts to ban Marcos from running for public of-
fice in the future. The working draft of the arti-
cle on the new form of government must now be sub-
mitted to the convention for discussion and amend-
ment before a final version can be voted upon, but
Marcos should have little difficulty getting the
kind of document he wants.
Not all of Marcos' problems are solved, how-
ever. Anew constitution must still be ratified by
a national referendum, and the President's fading
popularity may result in the rejection of a consti-
tution too closely identified with him. Moreover,
there is no certainty that Marcos' Nacionalista
-Party .would win a majority in the new National As-
sembly'. TYe p~.rty lost six out of .eight contested
senate"seats to the opposi"t-ion Liberal Party l:as1~~~.
Nowernber; Marcos blames > thee' defeat on --party com~~~
placency, but it is more likely` that"~ the -~esults.~t.:
reflected the widespread o ular disillusionment
with him personally.
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ISRAEL: The threat of a major confrontation
among the political parties has been sharply re-
duced.
Prime Minister Meir has agreed to a request
from her key coalition partner, the National Reli-
gious Party (NRP), that it be permitted to abstain
on a Knesset vote on the imposition of stricter
religious requirements for immigrants. The measure,
which Mrs. Meir opposes., was introduced by a small
ultraorthodox religious party, and the NRP had been
tempted to support it. Mrs. Meir's permission for
the NRP to abstain allows it to stay in-the coali-
tion and eliminates a possible showdown that could
have resulted in her resignation, the formation of
a new government, or new elections,
The proposed immigration measures were intra-
duced in reaction to a pending bill to provide for
civil marriages. The dispute over the civil mar-
riage bill is still very much alive. The bill is
sponsored by the Independent Liberal Party--the
smaller partner in the coalition--which is still
determined to press forward with it. Should the
Liberals persis , it now appears that Mrs. Meir
will force them out of the coalition. The Liberals
have only four Knesset seats, and Mrs. Meir can gov-
ern effectively without them.
The prime minister is still faced with possible
defections from the MAPAM section of her own Labor
Alignment by those who want to vote for the civil
marriage bill. According to a Labor Party spokes-
man, the current status of negotiations is "not
good." Given Mrs. Meir's willingness to compromise,
however, and the fact that neither MAPAM nor the
Labor Party want to break up the Alignment or risk
new elections the chances of an accommodation seem
good.
11 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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ARGENTINA: President Lanusse has taken a large
political risk in suspending the Peronist labor con-
federation and challenging Juan Peron to return for
the presidential elections.
Reacting to a political statement from the
General Labor Confederation (CGT) meeting in Buenos
Aires, Lanusse has suspended the legal status of
the organization and frozen all of its bank accounts.
The CGT, which represents nearly all organized la-
bor, had warned the military government of a violent
revolution if the will of the people is frustrated
in the election next March. The government's heavy-
handed response to the CGT declaration could pro-
voke strong labor retaliation, but Lanusse appears
to have reasoned that the union leaders will not
risk losing their funds permanently by further an-
tagonizing the military.
The government's action against the CGT may
also be related to Lanusse's challenge to Peron to
return from exile in Madrid by 25 August if he
wants to be a candidate in the presidential elec-
tion. The sanctions would greatly reduce the Peron-
ists' ability to organize massive demonstrations in
the event that Peron did return and, if the freeze
on funds continues, deprive the Peronists of a
valuable source of campaign money.
President Lanusse's major gamble is that the
old dictator, reluctant to tackle Argentina's se-
rious problems and fearful of assassination, will
not come back. Lanusse was applauded when he
seemed to take himself out of the presidential run-
ning and then issued his challenge to Peron in a
speech to top military officers last Friday, but
the applause could turn to anger and serious lot-
ting if he has misjudged Peron.
11 Ju 1 7 2 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: Political maneuvering is focusing on
electio'- ns-as the government Popular Unity (UP) co-
alition strives to overcome its minority electoral
image.
Although the UP won last week's politically
important student elections at the University of
Chile, it still pulled only 43 percent of the votes.
Its prospects are somewhat better in a legislative
by-election on 16 July in one of its strongholds
against a candidate supported by all opposition
parties.
Splits in the coalition divided its majority
vote in the still undecided labor confederation
elections six weeks ago. The Christian Democrats
claim to have won a plurality in Santiago Province,
where nearly half the confederation membership is
concentrated.
Both government and opposition forces now have
formed electoral federations for the most important
elections, those next March for all national depu-
ties and half the senators. Overcoming Socialist
objections, the UP has formed a single electoral
group. The opposition, unable to solve its many
conflicts, registered two electoral federations by
the 7 July deadline. This division poses little
threat to a continued opposition majority in both
houses, but serves President Allende and the Commu-
nist Part 's desire to kee their adversaries at
odds.
11 Jul 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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