CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79T00975A022600120001-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
T
Document Page Count: 
14
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 3, 2003
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 30, 1972
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79T00975A022600120001-7.pdf486.7 KB
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Approved For Refee 2004/01/05: CIA-RDP79T00975AU 600120 gret DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE D Central Intelligence Bulletin Secret State Department review completed N2 41 30 August 1972 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022600120001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600120001-7 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600120001-7 Approved For Rel a 2004/01 /05 ! &EP79T00975A0Xb600120001-7 No. 0208/72 30 August 1972 Central Intelligence Bulletin VIETNAM: Sharp fighting continues in the northern provinces. (Page 1) JAPAN-US: Tokyo intends to boost imports from the US. (Page 2) NATO-MBFR: Plans for talks on mutual and balanced force reductions are running into snags. (Page 3) INDIA-PAKISTAN: High-level negotiators in New Delhi are trying to work out differences between the two countries. (Page 4) 25X1 USSR-JAPAN: The Soviets have indicated willingness to begin peace treaty negotiations with the Japanese. (Page 6) BOLIVIA: President Banzer relieves dissident army officers. (Page 7) ARGENTINA-CHILE: The Argentine Government is smart- ing over Chile's decision not to extradite hijackers (Page 8) HAITI: The Haitian economy has registered record gains (Page 8) JORDAN: Elections may result in violent incidents (Page 9) Approved For Release 2004/01/0 IPVWPFi79T00975A022600120001-7 Approved For Rele*A~e 2004/01 /0,4)i *W79T00975A0 00120001-7 Gulf of Thailand SOUTH VIETNAM 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05:CIA -RD ~T79T00975A022600120001-7 Approved For Relse 2004/01/0?1,~79T00975A0600120001-7 VIETNAM: Sharp fighting is taking place in Quang Tri and Quang Nam provinces as South Vietnam- ese forces try to regain lost territory. In Quang Tri, South Vietnamese Marines have been encountering stiff enemy resistance to their probes north of Quang Tri City, and Airborne troops report a number of clashes to the south of the city. Enemy gunners continue to pump thousands of artillery and mortar rounds into government positions, and addi- tional enemy armor has been spotted moving south to- ward the city. In Quang Nam, a Ranger battalion is holding on in the district town of Que Son, and other. South Vietnamese units are conducting limited clearing operations south of Fire Support Base Ross. New en- emy attacks in the coastal plains of northern Quang Tin Province probably are aimed at spreading govern- ment forces thin. In the southern half of the country, enemy ac- tion continues to consist largely of sapper attacks, isolated small-scale ground attacks, and sporadic shellings. Early yesterday, Communist sappers blew up a bridge some 13 miles northwest of Saigon and blocked a major hiahwavnortheast of the capital. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2004/01 /0?j J R 7 79T00975A022600120001-7 Approved For Remorse 2004/01 /W.6* f P79T00975AOyi@600120001-7 NJ ANN-US: Tokyo will offer a plan to boost impor s from the US by $750 million in conjunction -anaka talks later this week. with the NixonT The package includes the proposed purchase of $320 million in safeguarded enriched uranium and another $320 million for aircraft and navigation equipment. The remainder consists of grain, coking coal, and gas turbines. Moreover, Tokyo is coupling an expected normal $400-million increase in agri- cultural imports to the total in order to increase the psychological impact of the proposal. The pur- chases will have little effect on Japanese imports from the US this year, because delivery of most of these items will be spread out over a number of years. The US, however, will benefit immediately from a capital flow from Tokyo because the Japanese will prepay for the merchandise. The Japanese have been considering these meas- ures for more than two months and part of the pack- age was presented at trade talks held late last month. Heated debate among the various ministries centered on quantities to be purchased and whether low-interest government, loans would be provided to finance the imports. Tanaka probably hopes this package will help meet his pledge to reduce Japan's trade surplus with the US to less than $3 billion by next April, and at the same time avoid any steps that might ad- versely affect his prospects in elections this ear or early next. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/Ogl M1L3r9T00975AO22600120001-7 Approved For ReJse 2004/01/WGR-ET79T00975A6 600120001-7 NATO-MBFR: Movement toward exploratory talks with the Warsaw Pact on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), is now blocked on two fronts: Consultations in NATO are currently hung up by disagreement over participation in the talks. The five "flank states"--Italy, Greece, Turkey, Norway, and Denmark--believe that since MBFR has been an. initiative of the entire alliance, all members who so desire should be represented. All the allies except France and the US now support a Turkish pro- posal to rotate representation among the five. The US has argued that participation should be limited to those countries with. forces or territory involved, in effect excluding the flank states from a direct role. e US wants MBFR exploration talks to parallel preparations for a Conference on Security and Coop- eration in Europe (CSCE), which Moscow has been seeking. Moscow is clearly aware of allied disarray on MBFR and probably believes that these difficul- ties give it a degree of flexibility regarding the recent US demarche urging agreement to start explor- at:ionsJ V. V. Kuznetsov, the acting Soviet foreign minister,. told Ambassador Beam last week that the US-Soviet summit communique did not imply a commit- ment to begin MBFR explorations in parallel with preparations for a security conference. While Kuznetsov showed little enthusiasm for MBFR, he did not repudiate Soviet willingness to discuss it. Neither did he reject the possibility that MBFR explorations could parallel CSCE prepara- tions. His main concern was to keep the former from becoming a new precondition for CSCE. Most of the NATO allies are willing to wait a short ti to see if the Soviets will be more forthcoming. Continued stonewalling, however, will build support in NATO for a further attempt to prod Moscow into opening MBFR explorations this fall. Even if Moscow stalls further, most of the allies would be unwilling to postpone CSCE preparations, which they expect to open in Helsinki_in late November. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/0 ]fV9T00975A022600120001-7 Approved For Relea a 2004/01 /0 loft79T00975A0 00120001-7 ,INDIA-PAKISTAN: High-level negotiations in New Delhi have bought more time for working out differences between the two countries, but the ne- gotiators apparently made no significant progress on the basic issues. According to the official joint statement, the deadline for mutual troop withdrawals has been ex- tended ten days to 15 September. The Indians, who would have given up much the greater area, had de- cided against withdrawing pending progress on other issues. The Pakistanis had no means of forcing the Indians to meet the original deadline. One ostensible reason for India's reluctance to withdraw was the lack of an, agreement on the line of control in Kashmir. Military negotiators are now to delineate this line--the location of troops at the time of the cease-fire last December-- by 4 September. The Pakistanis did not, however, agree to the Indian contention that the new cease- fire line eliminates the need for UN observers in Kashmir. The Pakistanis satisfied another Indian con- cern about withdrawal by guaranteeing the safety of those Pakistanis--mainly Hindus--who remained in the occupied territory or fled to India during the war. The Pakistanis, however, have maintained that there was never any question of the refugees' safety. The official statement mentions neither Paki- stan's refusal to recognize Bangladesh nor New Delhi's refusal to repatriate the Pakistani pris- oners of war without Dacca's approval. These two issues, nonetheless, are primarily responsible for the latest impasse, and could well continue to block progress toward any agreement. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/($EQRp79T00975A022600120001-7 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600120001-7 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600120001-7 Approved For Relea a 2004/01 /0 ff19T00975A02 00120001-7 *USSR-Japan: The Soviets have formally indi- cated their willingness to begin peace treaty nego- tiations with Japanese officials of "a sufficiently high level" in Moscow at any time. The timing of this move suggests that Moscow hoped to take some of the play away from Japan's forthcoming summit meetings with the US and China. The Japanese are unlikely, however, to show any real interest in starting talks until later this fall. Preparatory negotiations on the treaty talks had been scheduled to begin in September. According to the Japanese minister in Moscow, the Soviet ini- tiative has made these negotiations unnecessary. Tokyo, however, plans to do some further probing of Soviet attitudes when a Japanese parliamentary del- egation visits Moscow in early September. Japan's reluctance to begin formal talks stems in part from its basic suspicion of the Soviets and its current preoccupation with US-Japanese and Sino- Japanese relations. In addition, the Tanaka govern- ment, which is under no popular pressure to improve relations with the USSR, is hesitant to enter into talks without a clear prospect of success. The Jap- anese apparently are still uncertain about how Mos- cow will handle Japan's demand for the return of the Northern Territories--the four islands seized by the USSR after World War II--once peace treaty negotia- tions begin. Numerous Soviets have professed a will- ingness to compromise on this problem since Foreign Minister Gromyko first conceded that the question could be discussed last January. All of the sug- gested compromises have fallen well short of Japan's demand for the return of all four islands, however, and none of them has been conveyed at an authorita- tive level. *Because of the shortage of time for preparation of this item, the analytic interpretation presented here has been produced by the Central Intelli- gence Agency without the participation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05.` A RDtP79T00975AO22600120001-7 Approved For Rel a 2004/01/05: CIA-RDP79T00975AOM600120001-7 SECRET BOLIVIA: President Banzer has acted to avert po n threat from the right. Second Army Division commander Colonel Juan Ayoroa has been relieved of his command, along with his chief of staff and the commander of an important subordinate Ranger unit. Ayoroa's loyalty to the coalition government has been in question since his intervention early this month in the public feud between his cousin, army engineer commander Colonel Jose Patino, and the Nationalist Revolutionary Move- ment (MNR). Patino, w no was relieved o is command and later reinstated, may now again be removed, as may another cousin, Miguel, who commands the Santa Cruz Rangers and whom Ayoroa visited. The Ayoroa clan apparently has failed to gain significant military support for its militantly anti-MNR stand. Its members are personally dis- liked by the middle-ranking officers who command key units in and around La Paz. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022600120001-7 SECRET 6 25X1 Approved For Relate 2004/0SECRET P79T00975A0W600120001-7 NOTE2 ARGENTINA-CHILE: Buenos Aires has expressed "deep ispleasure at Chilean President Allende's decision to send the terrorists who hijacked an airliner to Santiago two weeks ago to Cuba rather than back to Argentina. The recall of the Argentine ambassador to Chile was only the first step in re- taliation, according to an Argentine Foreign Ministry source. The source said that Argentina intends to "tighten the screws" on Chile and may resort to eco- nomic sanctions. Argentina is an important supplier of meat and grain, to Chile, where shortages have led to some belt-tightening in recent months. It seems unlikely that Argentina will go so far as to turn its back on an important trading partner or halt several bilateral projects beneficial to both coun- tries, but President Lanusse's policy of dropping "ideolo ical barriers" will suffer a major setback. HAITI: The economy registered a six-percent gain in 171, the largest in almost a decade. Light industry and tourism led the way, reflecting, in part, Port-au-Prince's slowly improving image with tourists and foreign investors. The economic situ- ation can be expected to show further moderate gains, given continuing political stability. Overpopula- tion and the lack of resources and effective insti- tutions, however, will keep the Haitian economy among the world's poorest. (continued) 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A022600120001-7 SECRET Approved For Re1ej a 2004/01 /0 Ee1ft79T00975A0 600120001-7 JORDAN: Elections for officers of the govern- ment-controlled Arab National Union (ANU), Jordan's only legal political party, may serve more to ac- centuate local animosities than to cement national unity. The scramble for positions on the ballot has already led to intra-tribal feuding in the north and could result in some localized violence during the elections, which start today and continue over an extended period. The Jordanian Government, at the insistence of the late Prime Minister Wasfi Tal, founded the ANU in 1971 to undercut radical movements, especially among Palestinians, by'bririg- ing East Jordanians and Palestinians together in a mass political party. Most Jordanians, however, do not take the ANU seriously and. would be happy to see King Husayn scrap the organization altogether. He will nonetheless probably allow the elections to proceed, only taking steps to ease the tensions they have generated. 30 Aug 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 25X1 Approved For Release 2004/01/0SEOU79T00975A022600120001-7 Approved For ReI a 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AOQ000120001-7 Secret Secret Approved For Release 2004/01/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975AO22600120001-7