CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79T00975A022700080001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 26, 2003
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 9, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Central Intelligence Bulletin
Secret
N2 42
9 September 1972
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No. 0217/72
9 September 1972
Central Intelligence Bulletin
VIETNAM: Situation report. (Page 1)
LAOS: Government offensive makes little progress.
Page 3)
CAMBODIA: Military disorders shake Phnom Penh.
Page
CHILE: Allende bids for labor support. (Page 7)
SOUTH KOREA - USSR: Seoul's efforts to establish
contact with Moscow have drawn a tentative response.
(Page 8)
FRANCE-USSR: Mitterrand's criticism of Soviets
strains the Socialist-Communist alliance in France.
(Page 9)
EGYPT: Foreign Minister Ghalib removed from post
Page 11)
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C VIETNAM: South Vietnamese Rangers yesterday
reoccupied parts of Tien Phuoc district town in Quang
Tin Province that had been abandoned by territorials
on Thursday. Additional army units diverted from
the Que Son campaign have moved into the town. In
Quang Nam Province South Vietnamese regulars recap-
tured Fire Support Base Ross yesterday afternoon.
In Quang Tri Province, some 2,000 South Viet-
namese Rangers reportedly have moved into the south-
ern sector of the provincial capital, apparently to
add punch to the government's effort to recapture
.the city. Enemy shellings and ground attacks in
Quang Tri City have eased somewhat, but Communist
attacks against South Vietnamese paratroop positions
farther south have increased.
US pilots have reported several T-54 tanks
close to the 209th Regiment of the 312th. According
to a recently captured prisoner, the 209th was to
participate in an attack against South Vietnamese
paratroop positions in support of another Communist
force tasked with "liberating" Quang Tri City. Bad
weather may have delayed the attacks, which report-
edly were scheduled to start on 3 September and last
for at least seven days.
9 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin,
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LAOS: PLAINE DES JARRES AREA
f/0 Miles
10
-
?Government-held location
? Communist-held location
e Highpoint
Bouam Long
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LAOS: The government's offensive in northern
Laos continues to make little progress.
Only one of the four remaining task forces is
currently moving toward its objective. This force,
which six days ago had been pushed back by strong
Communist attacks, on 7 September advanced to posi-
tions about five miles northwest of Nong Pet, the
junction of vital Communist supply lines to the
Plaine des Jarres.
The remnants of the irregular task force that
was dispersed north of the Plaine on 30 August have
been withdrawn to Long Tieng, where they will be re-
grouped. Thus far, about one third of the irregu-
lars in this unit have returned to government lines.
The task forces west, southwest, and southeast of
the Plaine have clashed sporadically with the Commu-
nists in the past few days, maneuvering into better
defensive positions rather than making any effort to
move toward the Plaine. Low morale and sickness
continue to trouble government forces.
9 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 3
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CAMBODIA
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CAMBODIA: The stability of the government has
been shaken by a series of military disorders in
Phnom Penh.
Roving bands of undisciplined Cambodian Army
troops--including personnel from elite paratroop
units--engaged in widespread but essentially non-
violent looting in the capital yesterday. The
breakdown in public order was triggered by a wave
of raids on 7 September against shops, markets, and
warehouses by soldiers seeking cheap rice. Those
incidents were in part encouraged by an ill-timed
government order calling on the troops to "inspect"
shops in the city to ensure that merchants were
selling rice at the new subsidized prices estab-
lished by the regime.
In a bid to restore order and public confi-
dence, Lon-Nol has made a nationwide broadcast in
which he promised summary executions of those
caught in subsequent acts of thievery. He also
stated that a limited airlift was being organized
to transport rice to Phnom Penh from Battambang,
and announced that the government is soliciting
rice supplies from abroad.
The looting is a dramatic manifestation of the
unrest that has been building up throughout the
army over the past few months. Officers and troops
alike have become increasingly upset by the rising
cost of living and by the current rice crisis, as
well as by pervasive military corruption and by
the lack of direction and support for tactical op-
erations. If Lon Nol does not begin to give more
earnest and energetic attention to these grievances,
he risks losing his control over the military--
which now represents his main source of political
support.
Besides all these problems, the government
continues to fare badly on the battlefield. Commu-
nist forces have again struck hard at government
9 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 5
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positions along Route 1, and have now gained control
over a ten-mile section of that highway between Neak
Luong and Kompong Trabek, once again isolating the
defenders of Kompong Trabek. Given the present sit-
uation in Phnom Penh and the army's past performance
along Route 1, it is unlikely that the road can be
cleared without the aid of South Vietnamese forces.
9 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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CHILE: Allende's Popular Unity (UP) coalition
is making new attempts to firm up its labor support.
Although low income groups have clearly bene-
fitted from many of the UP's economic policies, the
independent-minded Chilean workers have proven
largely unwilling to. make the sacrifices demanded
by Allende's revolution. Strikes, deliberate in-
efficiency, and political infighting have compounded
already serious economic dislocations. The recent
steep rises in many prices, although designed to
hit the affluent hardest, have in fact been most
deeply felt by the poor.
Allende has now acted to reassure workers of
quick financial relief. His government has promul-
gated a law awarding a tax free bonus to public
employees, farm workers, and pensioners, and re-
quiring private employers to do the same. The law
also provides for a wage increase for October to
equal the cost of living increase for the first
nine months of 1972. By this action, Allende has
pre-empted the opposition congressional majority's
attempt to legislate two politically attractive
wage increases.
The importance of labor support was apparent
in the government's success in aborting a general
transportation strike on 6 September by private bus
and truck owners. Threats by drivers' unions to
take over vehicles and run them for the government
strengthened the UP's hand. Although concessions
were made that will probably raise transport rates,
more serious consequences were averted.
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Central Intelligence Bulletii.
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SOUTH KOREA - USSR: Seoul's efforts to estab-
lish some contact with Moscow have drawn a tentative
response from the Soviets.
Victor Louis, a Soviet journalist who has acted
as an unofficial contact man for Moscow in the past,
has reportedly arrived in Seoul to cover the plenary
session of the Red Cross talks opening on 13 Septem-
ber. As the first well known Soviet figure to visit
South Korea, Louis' presence is a decided plus for
Seoul's efforts to reach out to selected Communist
countries. For more than a year the South Koreans
have been approaching Moscow
ut
the Soviets have not been willing to follow up
Seoul's overtures. The Louis visit suggests that
Moscow has now decided to pursue these contacts on
a somewhat more public level, perhaps to encourage
Seoul's more independent foreign policy efforts.
The Soviet reluctance to encourage the South
Koreans probably stemmed from North Korean objec-
tions to earlier limited.So.iet contacts with Seoul.
Louis obtained a visa for South Korea late last year
but his trip never materialized. The improved at-
mosphere in North-South relations may have eased
Soviet problems in Pyongyang.
The Soviets are also probably using the Louis
visit to get a first hand assessment of the North-
South talks. Moscow may not have been aware of the
secret North-South contacts in advance of the 4
July communique, and its subsequent lukewarm cover-
age of developments has indicated some pique. The
Soviets may now feel that it is important to get
fully read in on the new Korean situation. Toward
that end, Konstantin Katushev, the CPSU Central Com-
mittee secretary responsible for dealing with ruling
Communist parties, is currently in North Korea, hold-
ing the first party-to-party discussion with the
North Koreans in over a year.
9 Sep 72
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FRANCE-USSR: The Socialist-Communist electoral
alliance in France has been strained by Socialist
Party First Secretary Mitterrand's strong criticisms
of Soviet policies.
Mitterrand canceled a visit to Moscow planned
for this November after he received a harsh letter
from Soviet Ambassador Abrasimov attacking his re-
cent criticisms of Soviet policies on Czechoslovakia
and Jewish emigration from the USSR. Abrasimov sug-
gested that Mitterrand's activities had put his trip
"in question." Following publication of the letter
in the French Communist daily Humanite on 4 Septem-
ber, Mitterrand announced that he would not go.
The controversy has put the French Communists
very much in a box. While the French Communist
Party (PCF) deplored both the Czechoslovak invasion
and the recent trials, its mild censures were con-
sidered inadequate by the non-Communist left. So-
viet immigration policy presents a similar problem.
PCF endorsement would alienate many in France but
criticism would raise Soviet hackles. In an appar-
ent attempt to cover both flanks, the PCF Politburo
issued a communique on 6 September which was crit-
ical of reactionary propaganda against socialist
states, but which reserved the party's right to
criticize any situation in these states.
An additional. problem for the PCF is that Mit-
terrand and the Socialists will probably gain the
most from the controversy. Abrasimov's reaction
effectively refutes the charges leveled when the
Socialist-Communist alliance was signed that Mitter-
rand had become a dupe of the Communists. Moreover,
it emphasizes Mitterrand's argument that the alli-
ance did not indicate total agreement. In this
first major test each party put its own interests
ahead of the common cause of the united left. The
alliance--very much a marriage of convenience--will
9 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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undoubtedly face many more strains before the elec-
tions next spring. Hard-line Communists, for in-
stance, reportedly are concerned that basic party
positions may appear to have been compromised and
have urged efforts to make sure that the real stand
of the PCF is made known.
9 Sep 72
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EGYPT: Egyptian Foreign Minister Ghalib was
replaced yesterday by the Minister of State for In-
formation, Muhammad Hasan Zayyat. No reason for
the change was given, but Ghalib's many years as the
Egyptian ambassador to the Soviet Union may have pub-
licly associated him too closely with Moscow's inter-
ests. Zayyat was formerly the head of the Egyptian
mission to the UN and has had a long career in the
Foreign Ministry. His tenure at the UN may have
recommended him as a valuable asset to President
Sadat's current diplomatic "offensive" designed to
brin some movement to the deadlock with Israel.
9 Sep 72 Central Intelligence Bulletin 11
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